MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS, OCB SPECIAL WORKING GROUP, NSC ACTION 1290d

SUBJECT: Report to the National Security Council, Synopses of Individual Country Analyses (Annex B)

1. The draft "Report to the National Security Council Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d" was forwarded without copies of Annex B, "Synopses of Individual Country Analyses". Attached are eleven (11) synopses and a revised cover sheet for the draft report. Please replace the original cover sheet and insert the attached synopses in your copy of the report.

2. The remaining seven (7) synopses will be forwarded at a later date.

Nos. 14 thru 48 not used to avoid confusion with numbers used by Defense Department copies.
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*Not attached to this draft.
The high vulnerability of Burma to insurrection and Chinese Communist pressure has largely induced the current neutrality policy. However, the Government has evidenced increasing awareness of the Communist threat and has endeavored to carry out fairly extensive internal security programs short of provoking Peiping. Although adequate numerical strength has been employed by the Burmese, the implementation of their programs has been far short of their objectives owing to deficiencies inherent in the public services, poor communications, lack of know-how and general shortage of special equipment. Burma is further handicapped by the diversion of effort required to reduce non-Communist insurrectionary elements. Although the Communists are believed to possess a serious capability for insurrectionary action, the indications are that they will continue the present policy of co-existence.

Mindful of Burma's sensitive position and the Chinese Communist threat, the U. S. has avoided actions which would be interpreted as provocative by the Chinese. U. S. economic and technical assistance programs were terminated in 1953 at Burma's request. There are no military aid programs for Burma although in March 1955 an effort was made in this direction. An active USIS program is being conducted in Burma. Noting the present and potential threat to Burma's security, its deficiencies in attempting to cope with same and its sensitive circumstances it was recommended that the U. S. provide the following assistance:

1. [ ] assist in improving training, techniques and special equipment of the police and investigative forces, giving particular attention to surveillance of Chinese minority population and Sino-Burmese border.

2. Officially expedite licensing of Burmese requests for arms and communications equipment; under reimbursable aid agreement, supply arms and materiel which Burmese may desire to purchase; stimulate Burmese requests for training of their police and public service personnel in the U. S.; expand courtesy training of Army personnel to include counter-intelligence and anti-guerrilla warfare techniques; expand educational exchange program to provide for increased travel and training of Burmese in the U. S.
This newly independent hyper-nationalistic country, distrustful of the West for historical reasons, is presently neutral and naively unaware of the dangers of Communism. Cambodia's fate is linked to that of Free Vietnam. Armed dissident elements exist outside governmental control and there is evidence of Communist subversive activities in political and cultural circles. Handicapped by long dependence on the French, Cambodian internal security forces are presently incapable of maintaining public order or of countering Communist subversion. The deficiencies of these forces, including the military, are general.

U.S. interest in preservation of Cambodia's independence is related to the defense of the entire SE Asia area. The inflated sensitivities of the Cambodian Government obstruct and restrict the extent of U.S. assistance. Current U.S. programs include the provision of military end-items, commodities, agricultural aid, highway construction, and advisory assistance to health, education and governmental administration. USAID's program, while restrained, is proceeding to indoctrinate the Cambodians on the nature of the Communist threat and requirements to meet it. In recognition of Cambodia's state of unawareness and unpreparedness to meet this threat at its doorstep, it was recommended that the U.S. undertake the following courses of action:

1. Implement, to the degree feasible, the recommendations of the FOA survey on Cambodia's police-type forces. This is the minimum assistance required to raise the effectiveness of these forces to the required level;
2. Urge reduction of overlapping forces by reorganizing Surface Defense Forces and Provincial Guard, simplifying control, effecting economies and improving coverage of rural areas;
3. Encourage training of Cambodian police in countries such as Thailand and the Philippines;
4. Urge reduction of Army to 30,000, appropriate to internal security mission, and proper deployment of troops to meet current requirements of this mission;
5. Aid Army by providing military end-items, direct forces support and training in Thai and Philippine military schools;
6. Provide, as feasible, Army training in counter-intelligence, riot control, pacification and anti-guerrilla techniques; improve capabilities in air and sea operations;
7. Continue efforts to stimulate governmental and public awareness of Communist threat; encourage political and police actions to reduce the current threat; particularly, to effect withdrawal of Viet Minh elements from Cambodian territory.
A quiescent state of insurrection exists, with two provinces of Laos under Communist control. Although the precise extent of their covert capability is not known, Communist penetration of free areas is extensive and is believed to be in an advanced stage of development. Indications at present are that the Communists intend to seek control by peaceful means so long as this course appears to offer a good chance of success. While the army is capable of preventing an expansion of indigenous Communist territory, providing large scale external Communist support is not forthcoming it could not regain control over the two provinces now dominated by them. The police-type forces are incapable of countering Communist subversion and infiltration.

The US interest in Laos is related to the preservation of the entire SEA and its loss to Communist control would seriously affect the security of this region. All current US programs for Laos bear on the problem of internal security. There is no US program for assisting police-type forces and all military assistance prior to 1 January 1955 was channelled through the French.

In addition to current programs it was recommended that the following actions be approved on a priority basis to bolster the internal security of Laos:

1. Approve and implement the recommendations of the FOA police survey;
2. Reduce the army to US-recommended level, concurrently with the buildup of police services, and provide military end-items to the police as required;
3. Establish a civilian mission to supervise US military assistance programs;
4. Implement information programs on a priority basis with additional personnel and funds as required to exert maximum psychological impact prior to the forthcoming elections in Laos;
5. Exert continuing moral and political pressure on the Communists through the ICC, the Indian Government, signatories to the Geneva Agreements and eventually the UN; also encourage and support continued discreet reinforcement of Royal Forces in the Communist-controlled provinces with the view of holding and possibly extending government-held areas;
6. Implement an economic program to provide relief to the needy, transportation and communications to assist in political control, village programs, agricultural aid and establishment of an effective Laos procurement agency;
7. Influence government to establish friendlier relations with non-Communist tribal groups in northern Laos while influencing these elements to accept the authority of the Laos Government;
8. Inform the Chief of Mission, Vientiane, of above recommendations, once approved, directing him to take appropriate steps to carry out these programs on a priority basis in order to reinforce the government's position before the coming elections.
While the Ruk insurgents have been effectively reduced to a hard core of about 1,000, and the Communist Party may be considered under control, the Philippine Government has a continuing security problem in completely eliminating the armed Ruk elements and coping with the more subtle forms of Communist subversive activities, especially among the Chinese minority. The internal security forces, although numerically capable of maintaining internal order, have not to date adjusted to the shift from combating insurrection to countering clandestine subversive activities. Their deficiencies are in legislation, organization, coordination, direction, training and control.

The U. S. has a vital interest in the control of Communist activities and the avoidance of a neutral attitude in the Philippines. Current U. S. programs are designed to promote internal stability through improvement of the Government and diversification of the economy. Training grants have been made for police personnel and the Constabulary has received certain equipment under the MDA Program. The MDAF commitment for FY 56 is for one infantry division. While originally U. S. policy was designed to aid the Philippine Armed Forces to eliminate internal dissidents the mission of the Filipino forces has been expanded to include a contribution to the regional defense of the area. This change will affect the present deployment of certain units assigned to internal security missions. In consideration of this planned shift and of the foregoing situation it was recommended that the following courses of action be taken to improve the internal security situation in the Philippines:

1. That the Government be encouraged to adopt more effective anti-Communist legislation.

2. [That the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) be strengthened by appointment as Director of the most competent intelligence person available.]

3. [That the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), under NICA, be expanded by improving coordination and training of Constabulary and municipal police and assuming adequate direction of all subversive investigations, less military.]

4. [That NICA adjust and coordinate activities of Military Intelligence Service, placing emphasis upon counter-intelligence within the military and intelligence for operations against armed Communists, including separate direct assistance in detection techniques.]

5. That the Government be assisted in expanding the Constabulary to planned strength of 10,000 and that this build-up precede reorganization of the Armed Forces in order to avoid adversely affecting internal stability.

6. That military end-items and training under MDAF be continued to meet present U. S. commitments.

7. That the Philippines be encouraged to continue their leading role in the Counter-subversive Committee, SEATO.
Although the present Government of Iraq is very anti-Communist and pro-Western, and has taken strong measures to repress and eliminate Communist subversive activities, the threat is continuous owing to the poverty of the people, their depressed and apathetic political attitude and the existence of a Kurdish minority problem. Under the current internal security program it is unlikely the Communist threat will increase significantly; conversely, the effectiveness of this effort is not sufficient to constitute a roll-back but only to maintain a balance. There are political indications that the repressive anti-Communist program might be relaxed, particularly in event of the demise of Nuri Said. To meet this contingency and to improve the effectiveness of non-military internal security forces requires giving better training and technical equipment to the latter. Military forces are more than capable of maintaining internal security if actual uprisings should occur.

U. S. interest in the security of Iraq is related to the defense of the Middle East. Current U. S. programs are designed to assist in long range economic development and to help increase collective defense capabilities of Iraqi forces. USIS programs are directed at continuous indoctrination on the Communist threat, U. S. friendship and orientation of Kurds. In these circumstances the following recommendations were made pertaining to internal security:

1. Ensure Iraq's continuing appreciation of Communist threat, with particular attention to informational programs in university circles.

2. Arrange and conduct a U. S. survey of police-type forces to determine measures required to increase their effectiveness and be prepared to consider survey team recommendations, coordinate this action with the British.

3. Aid Iraq to remedy present subversive problems in penal system by providing training of officials in U. S.

4. Re-align U. S. and Iraqi economic programs to provide greater short-range impact on populace.

5. Whereas no change should be made in the present military aid program pending a decision in principle as to the role of Iraqi forces, in the defense of the Middle East, priority in the interim should be given to military units appropriate to their internal security function.
Whereas the Communist threat in West Pakistan is presently well contained, East Pakistan is confronted with a significant potential for subversion and any success therein would have an impact on the Central Government. Although conditions for rapid growth exist, the Communist threat in Pakistan in general is in the early stages. Poverty, lack of national identity, weaknesses in the governmental system, struggles between ethnic groups and international problems with India and Afghanistan all contribute to the background for subversion. Despite Pakistan's handicaps, its internal security system has proven relatively successful in combating Communism. Its weaknesses are largely administrative. Military forces are more than adequate for internal security requirements.

US interests indicate the desirability of maintaining a friendly, pro-Western government in the South Asian complex. Current US aid programs are designed to aid the Pakistani economy to sustain the military burden and improve the standard of living. They are supplemented by an indoctrination program against Communism. The US-supported military expansion is substantial and provides for 4 infantry divisions, 1½ armored divisions, 6 air squadrons, 3 destroyers and 5 mine-sweepers. In this context, the following recommendations were made pertaining to Pakistan's internal security situation:

1. The US should monitor its aid programs to avoid any possible deterioration of the economic or political stability of the government;

2. Pakistan is capable of sustaining such military forces as may be required solely for internal security; forces in excess thereof requiring continuing US support and straining of Pakistani resources should be reappraised by OCB, giving due regard to all vital factors involved, especially the binding nature of U. S. commitments.

3. Information and indoctrination programs should be continued, developing indigenous capacity to oppose Communism;

4. Reorganizational and procedural guidance for strengthening and improving Pakistani intelligence and security system should be provided, including technical assistance in establishing a national police academy and advisory assistance in improving counter-intelligence system within the armed forces;

5. Pakistani participation in counter-subversive activities of SEATO should be encouraged.
SYRIA

There exists a clear and present danger that the Syrian Government will become dominated by the Communists if the current trends remain unabated. The Syrian situation has been characterized over the past eight years by an inherently unstable Government, thinly veiled intervention by a number of foreign powers working at cross purposes, apathy toward Communism, and anti-West, allegedly neutral, international position. Although relatively successful and advanced in the subversive stages, the Communists by themselves do not appear sufficiently strong to seize the Government, nor does it appear that this is their intention. Rather, they seek to destroy national unity and to strengthen support for Soviet policies and opposition to Western policies, plus exacerbating tensions in the Arab world. In this latter aim, the Communists have made significant progress. A noteworthy degree of domination of the Government now exists through the Communist exercise of disproportionate political influence, made possible by their penetration of the Arab Socialist Revolutionists Party (ASRP) and the internal security forces.

Although under the Shishakli regime the internal security forces demonstrated their ability to control the Communist Party, at present these forces suffer from general deficiencies in administration, training and equipment. The military, while capable of controlling revolutionary or insurrectionary movements, is so penetrated by the Communists that there exists a danger they might aid a Communist inspired extreme left-wing, political maneuver for control of the Government.

Under the above circumstances, despite U.S. objectives to maintain a stable pro-Western balance in the Near East, no U.S. military, economic, or technical assistance programs for Syria exist. Five million dollars has been promised Syria as an inducement to resolve the Jordan River dispute. USAID has a modest program in Syria which is severely hampered under existing conditions and by Syrian sensitivities toward their minority problems. Accordingly, no direct or overt U.S. assistance for the improvement of Syrian internal security forces was recommended. Owing to the grave dangers presented to U.S. objectives in the area, it was recommended that the OCS Working Group (NSC 5428) give priority consideration to developing courses of action in the Near East designed to affect the situation in Syria and to recommending specific steps to combat Communist subversion. Contingency aid programs are to be held in readiness for implementation as required in developing the foregoing actions.
BOLIVIA

The incumbent administration, predominantly left-of-center, seized power by revolution in 1952 and still governs by decree. Although one of the most broadly-based and popular governments in Bolivian history it is sustained in power largely through the U.S. support of its economy. An environment of poverty, political immaturity and economic instability and a history of labor exploitation, has provided fertile ground for the growth of Communism, both Stalinist and Trotskyite. Numerically small (about 4,000), the Communists are concentrated in organized labor and educational circles and represent a significant portion of the politically-conscious population. Most (Stalinist) Communist leaders have travelled to the Soviet orbit. The Government, having used the Communists to gain power, generally regards them merely as political rivals for power and sporadically reacts against them in this context. The public is indifferent to the threat of Communism.

A civil militia, formed to support the revolution of 1952, although loosely organized, poorly trained and ill-conceived, remains the primary armed support of the Government. The Army, being purged and reduced, has been given the role of aiding the economic development program. These forces with the Carabineros are numerically capable of maintaining internal security. However, the schism between the moderate and extreme left-wings of the Government party, and between the latter and the rightist, revolutionary-inclined opposition, is reflected within the internal security forces. A conflict between these political groups could well lead to internecine warfare among the security forces. Any Communist attempt to seize the Government would almost certainly be postulated upon prior control of the highly vulnerable civil militia. The most serious threat lies in the possibility of Communists obtaining control of the militia through infiltration or through a series of political maneuvers with allied extreme left-wing elements.

The stability and security of Bolivia is related to US objectives in the Western Hemisphere and economic and technical assistance programs have been designed to serve these ends. However, the achievement of US objectives requires a multi-dimensional and unique approach as follows:

1. Economic - continuance of economic aid is essential to internal security.
2. Ideological - USIA programs should be intensified to combat Marxist philosophy.
3. Political - based upon reliable information the U.S. should urge the gradual elimination or insulation of known or pro-Communists from the Government.
4. Police-type forces - U.S. should conduct a survey to determine requirements and encourage establishment of a Chilean Police Mission to Bolivia.
5. Military - U.S. should take actions designed to restore prestige of Army and resumption of proper role; also to indoctrinate it in the dangers of Communism and appropriate techniques and procedures in counter-subversion.
6. Militia - recognize potential danger in present status of the civil militia and institute positive courses of action to eliminate extreme left-wing influence, reduce vulnerability to Communist subversion and bring them under tighter Governmental control. (A program for consideration was prepared and attached to the report on Bolivia.)
The Communist party of Chile is a mature organization with a popular base operating among some 40 front organizations. Its strongest influence is with organized labor, students and the intelligentsia. An outlawed political party of about 30-35,000 members, it is forced to work through front organizations and in this manner has exerted influence disproportionate to its actual strength. This influence in a political background of numerous splinter parties results in all sides currying Communist support in forming political alliances and coalitions. The current lack of popular support for the incumbent administration and the spiralling inflationary trends in Chile provide additional opportunities for the Communists. While presently incapable of subverting or seizing the Government, the Communists constitute a continuing security problem and require serious attention.

Although the public appears apathetic towards Communism, Chileans generally are traditionally proud of their democratic liberties. The internal security forces are adequate to cope with present and foreseeable security situations and are relatively free from Communist penetration. The Corps of Carabineros is one of the most effective police forces in Latin America. Chile has a counterpart organization to the FBI which is considered competent although lacking in adequate funds. The Armed Forces are more than adequate to fulfill their internal security role.

US interests in Chile are related to the collective stability and defense of the Western Hemisphere and US programs are designed to serve this end. These programs provide technical assistance in economic development, provision of surplus agricultural commodities and military assistance necessary for hemisphere defense. USAID maintains an active anti-Communist, pro-US program. While improvement of internal security forces in Chile is not urgent, the following recommendations were made:

1. Acquaint Carabineros and investigative officials with US security methods through unofficial, separate visits to the US; also, train small contingents of their operational personnel in modern counter-subversive techniques.
2. Encourage and support, if necessary, Chilean police missions in other Latin American countries and the training of police officials of other countries in Chile.
3. Encourage Chile to lead in exchanging information with other internal security forces in the area on Communist activities;
4. Review USAIDAP in Chile to determine whether savings might be effected for higher priority programs in Chile or elsewhere in the hemisphere;
5. Review the previous counter-sabotage program for adequacy, taking additional measures as necessary to ensure protection of US strategic, industrial interests in Chile.

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ANNEX B

GUATEMALA

Although the recent overthrow of the Communist controlled government was successful and resulted in the expulsion of known Communists, the danger of their resurgence remains. Economic stagnation, political instability and the absence of an effective internal security program are contributing factors to this danger. Police and military forces are adequate but poorly trained and equipped to cope with present and foreseeable subversive contingencies. U. S. prestige is involved in the survival of democracy in Guatemala and the prevention of Communist subversion is in the security interests of the U. S.

Accordingly, it was recommended that the U. S. aid Guatemala in the following manner in addition to existing economic and political programs; provide a survey of internal security forces, less military, to determine precise requirements and be prepared to support those recommendations of the survey team which are considered practical and in U. S. interests; meanwhile, train 14 police officers in the U. S. during 1955; provide counter-intelligence information as available and practicable; train military personnel in counter-intelligence procedures and internal security functions; facilitate purchase of military equipment as required and provide end-item grant military assistance to increase effectiveness in internal security role; also, indoctrinate military personnel wherever practicable in dangers of Communism.
The Greek Government, with the aid of the US and UK, successfully defeated two serious attempts by the Communists since 1944 to seize control of the Government by force. The last attempt resulted in forcing all Communists who remained in Greece to go underground, while those who fled behind the Iron Curtain resumed clandestine and propaganda activities from these safe areas. The Communists within Greece have reconstructed their clandestine apparatus, despite the vigilance of the internal security forces, and have recently emerged under a freer political environment with a steady show of 10% electoral strength or about 200,000 sympathizers. If the present trend continues and/or the opposition to the Rally Government is successful, security restrictions may become weakened and the Party restored to legality, thus increasing its capabilities for subversive action and for the reorganization of a paramilitary force. The repatriation of Greek refugees from Bulgaria increases the security hazards in the Northeast Territory. Present indications are that the Communists will continue long range development plans for subversive and/or insurrectionary action. Greek internal security forces, while adequate numerically need improved administration, training, techniques and specialized equipment to cope with current counter-subversive problems. About 2 to 3 full-strength Greek divisions might be required to cope with an all-out Communist insurrection, thereby affecting allied military strategy in SE Europe.

The stability and continued pro-West position of Greece is important to US objectives in NATO and Southeast Europe. Present US programs are designed to aid the economic development of the country and to help it meet its NATO commitments. USIA has diverted its mass support program to intellectuals and leaders. Greek concern over economic development would render any divergence of aid from military to internal security politically unacceptable and a reduction in over-all military and economic aid would simultaneously reduce Greece's ability to meet its NATO commitments.

Recognizing the resurgent problems in Greece and the continued need for US assistance, it was recommended that:

a. A US police mission conduct a survey of Greek police-type forces to determine precise requirements for further US aid or technical assistance;

b. The US continue to assist the Greek Government in its handling of the repatriatee problem;

c. The US provide advisory and technical assistance as well as training to improve Greek public relations and educational services;

d. Appropriate US planning elements in SHAPE be apprised of the wartime need for two Greek divisions for internal security and that no increase of Greek forces to meet both internal security and NATO requirements is contemplated.