1. Problem

To assess the significance of recent signs of unrest in the European satellite of the USSR, particularly in the so-called German People's Republic, to estimate U.S. psychological capabilities for influencing the situation, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated U.S. psychological operations to exploit readily existing opportunities for furthering U.S. national objectives in the Satellite states of Europe, while laying the foundations for more ambitious programs in the future if events should warrant them.

2. The Situation

A dramatic new element has been introduced into the European situation by the current wave of unrest sweeping satellite Europe. Popular discontent over Communist oppression has flared into open defiance of Communist authority in Czechoslovakia, where workers' demonstrations of a violence and tenacity hitherto unknown in the Satellite states broke out early this month. Though these riots appear to have been triggered by resentment over monetary reforms, in Pilsen, at least, they had broader implications. There, by the coincidence of the governmental press, an angry mob trampled on the Soviet flag and hoisted the American one. Minor acts of resistance have been reported elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. For some time, Albania has appeared to be on the verge of revolt, and a sober U.S. press observer, after a recent visit to Budapest, compares Hungary to a volcano which could erupt at any time.

Note: This document contains 18 pages, including 1a, 1b, 1c. Page 15 is the last page.
It is in the so-called German Democratic Republic, however, that the most significant and spectacular developments have occurred. The anti-regime demonstrations which began in East Berlin on June 16, and developed the next day into bloody mass rioting, subsequently spread throughout a large part of the Soviet Zone and were frankly characterized by the governmental press and radio as a rebellion. Despite the proclamation of martial law and the deployment of Soviet armed forces in East Berlin and in several parts of the Soviet Zone, calm had not been fully restored six days after the outbreak of the uprising. Several hundred thousand Germans appear to have participated in the movement. There were widespread strikes. The rioters were mainly workers, many of them from heavy industry and public utilities. Several strategically important large plants were either destroyed or badly damaged. The communist press has reported various "sabotage assaults" on party officials and police or other state employees, and mob attacks on government offices, jails, party headquarters and other installations have been noted.

In East Berlin and elsewhere large riots occurred, the puppet police and military forces appeared to be ineffectual. A number of defections from the Communist police occurred. The amiable behavior of Deputy Minister Otto Fiume and other puppet officials did not enhance the prestige of the regime. The reinforcement or replacement of East German by Soviet military forces, including tank units, naturally tended to suppress large-scale mob demonstrations but did not immediately cow the rebellious workers. A number of concealing attempts to spike the guns or sabotage the tracks of Soviet tanks were reported. Clearly there was no magic over in the most impressive manifestations of Soviet military strength. The tearing-down of the huge Soviet flag that has waved over the Brandenberger Gate in Berlin since the Red Army first entered the
city was a symbolic act of tremendous portent.

The drastic and sweeping Soviet repression, involving thousands of arrests and a number of summary executions, had not broken the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany a week after the beginning of the uprisings. Official communist statements reported in the Western press on June 22, declared that many of the 'fascist provocateurs' alleged to be responsible for the disorders were still at large and admitted that even in factories where work had resumed a number of the workers still exhibited an embittered spirit. Food shortages appear to be aggravating the unrest in Berlin.

Efforts of the East German puppet officials to win over the rebellious population by announcements that workers who were merely misled will not be dealt with harshly, by subject self-criticism which almost certainly forebodes a sweeping party purge, and by promises of drastic reform of economic relief, seemingly have been even less successful than the Soviet repression of the rebellion. Though resentment over excessive production quotas, food shortages and hard conditions of life generally triggered off the revolts in Germany as in Czechoslovakia, these grievances were overshadowed by the clearly expressed political objectives of the rebels. More than anything else the German uprisings appear to have been a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in which the East German masses voted with their fists for free elections, the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.

The repeated rob shouts of "Russki Go Home" and similar slogans gave the uprisings a clear anti-Soviet character from the start, but it would be a mistake to view them as pro-Western. Their essential motivation was nationalist. Unless the Soviets are prepared to come to terms with German nationalism—which seems unlikely—or to adopt savage measures...
of mass repression, there seems little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany will abate. On the contrary, the partial victory over the puppet government indicated by the promises of reform which have already been wrung from it, is likely to enhance the morale and step up the expectations of the resistance forces.

At the same time the sweeping concessions which the Kremlin has forced the puppet authorities in Germany to make, or promise, are almost certain to stimulate demands for similar concessions in the other Satellite states. This communist dilemma, plus the indications that popular resentment in all the European Satellites is near the boiling point, plus the discrediting of the German puppet regime and the revelation that Soviet power in Eastern Germany has no basis but naked force, plus the demonstration furnished by the German rebels that defiance of Soviet authority is not always equivalent to suicide, adds up to the greatest opportunity for effective U.S. psychological operations to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light.
9. U.S. Psychological Capabilities

a. United States capabilities in the Satellite Status of Europe—including European or non-official American organizations normally responsive to U.S. official influence—are comparatively great, especially in East Germany. In no other part of the Soviet orbit is our position so favorable for influencing the thoughts and actions of large numbers of men. In one area at least—Eastern Germany—the population is probably more responsive to U.S. leadership than it is in many free countries. Our capabilities are probably least in Romania and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia however has significant psychological capabilities with respect to Bulgaria which could be used to support certain U.S. objectives.

(1) The greatest single U.S. capability in Eastern, as in Western Europe is the personality and prestige of President Eisenhower, both as an individual leader and as the symbol of America's enormous power in the service of the cause of human freedom which most inhabitants of Eastern Europe still regard as their own.

(2) The importance of the President as a U.S. psychological capability is enhanced by the relative effectiveness of U.S. controlled mass media in most of the Satellite areas of Europe. This makes it possible to project U.S. leadership rapidly throughout a large and populous region. The most important vehicles of U.S. influence in Eastern Europe are the following radio stations or programs: RIAS, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America. Throughout most of the Soviet Zone of Germany, RIAS has a popularity and an influence probably unequalled in the history of psychological warfare. Radio Free Europe is operated by a private American organization, but its staff will conform their programs to the national interest. Despite intensive jamming and danger to the individual in listening, RFE exercises locally a real and important influence in parts of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. VOA, though heavily jammed, is heard...
throughout most of the region.

(1) U.S. capabilities for covert actions are substantial in Eastern Europe. In most other Satellite areas direct covert capabilities are unfortunately very slight, where they exist at all, and cannot be quickly expanded.

b. Apart from the direct U.S. or U.S.-controlled capabilities listed above, there are significant foreign capabilities for supporting common objectives in the Satellite areas. By appropriate methods it should be possible in most cases to stimulate more effective exploitation of these foreign capabilities and to coordinate them more closely with U.S. capabilities. Both the BBC and the French national radio system have substantial listening audiences behind the Iron Curtain and both could effectively support covert U.S. programs if the two governments could be persuaded to adopt more dynamic psychological policies.

The psychological capabilities of the Yugoslav government are believed to be substantial in Southeastern Europe. U.S. support of, and selective cooperation with, the Yugoslav program is of major importance. Existing West German capabilities, official and non-official, are probably being exploited to the maximum, or close to it, at present, but they could be expanded...
Radio Madrid puts a strong signal into much of the region and its programs include a good deal of hard-hitting psychological warfare against the Soviet and puppet authorities in Satellite Europe. It is said to have a large listening audience.

The Italian Government radio facilities and Radio Vatican have been developing regular programs for the captive nations of the Soviets and should be useful in an integrated program.

The Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches, particularly the latter, have politically significant capabilities behind the Iron Curtain.

The real capabilities of the various emigre organizations are hard to evaluate and the rigid political objectives with which some of them are identified often impede effective coordination. On the other hand, the unexpected scale and intensity of the current wave of unrest in Satellite Europe as indicated in Paragraph 2 suggests the possibility that the emigre groups may have been underestimated. In any case, an objective, unprejudiced reexamination of the role of nationalist emigre organizations and leadership with respect to Eastern Europe generally would be required before the capabilities of these organizations, either in the Satellites or in the USSR itself, could be accurately assessed and a full scale program developed.
4. Conclusions

a. While the current wave of unrest in the satellite states of Europe may not foreshadow the beginning of a vast anti-communist and nationalist revolt throughout the Soviet empire, it does unquestionably offer the most promising opportunity yet seen for effective U.S. psychological and political attack upon Soviet power in the area.

b. U.S. capabilities, particularly covert capabilities, are not yet adequate to forestall or support a widespread revolt against Soviet power in the European satellites, but, despite certain weaknesses, chiefly on the covert side, they should be able to contribute effectively to maintaining and extending the existing unrest. In view of the limitations of present U.S. capabilities, particularly the lack of substantial military power in Western Europe, we should be careful not to fan the sparks of revolt in Eastern Europe to the point where they risk flaring up into near open rebellion.

c. Owing to the lack of adequate intelligence on Eastern Europe, we cannot accurately predict the development of the situation there, even in the immediate future. Consequently, our psychological program to exploit the present situation should be sufficiently flexible to:

(1) Keep off without loss of confidence or prestige in the areas of the local population if the present unrest should die away in a few weeks;

(2) Permit rapid expansion and intensification if the national resistance movements in the satellite appears to be gathering momentum;

(3) Not rule out the possibility that despite our efforts to avoid encouraging premature rebellion, such open rebellions may actually flare up at any time in the satellites and even spread to
the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, the Baltic states, or to the other non-Russian nations of the USSR, thus creating a situation in which the entire course of history might be favorably altered by bold and prompt U.S. action in the form of military assistance to the rebels.

d. In order to increase free world capabilities for vigorous and coordinated action in Eastern Europe, we should exploit to appropriate operational liaison with the French, British, West German, Yugoslav, and Italian and Spanish governments, with the authorities of the Presidium, Orthodox and Catholic Churches (Radio Vatican), and with trade union and democratic political organizations. In view of the contingency mentioned in paragraph (3) above, we should also undertake, without delay, an objective and complete reevaluation of the possible role of anti-communist exiles and other nationality organizations and leadership, particularly in relation to the potentialities of nationalities as an anti-Soviet force, both in the satellites and in the USSR itself.

3. Long-Range Objects

a. For the purpose of this interim plan, our first objective is simply to stimulate, spread and maintain throughout the European satellites the spirit of active resistance to communist oppression evidenced in Eastern Germany, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Pursuit of this objective, however, must be qualified by the following considerations:

(1) We must avoid stirring up resistance to the point of open rebellion unless or until the United States is willing and able to give effective military support.

(2) U.S. measures to encourage the spirit of resistance must not be so obvious as to throw doubt on the spontaneous nature of the resistance, which we should exploit as a valuable psychological asset.

b. While we should encourage resistance for its own sake as indicated in the foregoing paragraph, we should also seek whenever feasible to direct it towards certain targets. The most immediately important target is the
puppet regimes in all the satellite states. We should seek no discredit

tion, to undermine their prestige and authority.

c. We should exploit every evidence of significant unrest in the
Satellite states of Europe, as vigorously as developing events justify,
to convince the peoples of the USSR, of Communist China and North Korea,
and of the neutralist nations in Asia, that the Soviet empire is begin-
ning to crumble. A sub-target of particular interest for this line of
attacks is the mind of nationally oriented groups in the
republics of the USSR contiguous to the European Satellites.

d. Finally, we should seek to convince our friends and allies in
the Free World, particularly those in Western Europe, that the love of
liberty and the hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron
Curtain than they have dared to believe, and that the problem of popular
resistance to ruthless totalitarian authority is less hopeless than they
have imagined.

(Continued on next page)
6. **H. R. Conner of Action: Phase I.**

(Actions which can be launched within sixty days on the basis of existing U.S. capabilities and within the framework of the entire of the situation as indicated in Paragraph 2)

(a) Basic Tasks,

(1) Intensify overt and covert U.S. information programs to the European satellities, including Western Germany, aimed at stimulating the spirit of resistance everywhere. In programs to Western Germany seek to convince the population that their resistance has already won promises of important concessions from the Soviet authorities and that continued or increased resistance will produce additional concessions, culminating in the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces and free elections for the unification of Germany. In other satellite areas—unless or until new major acts of resistance occur outside of Germany—the emphasis in our overt programs should be upon rapid, strictly-actual reporting of all resistance-news, from Germany or elsewhere, with particular attention to successful techniques of resistance, and to the unshakable will of freedom from which resistance springs. In covert information programs outside Germany—and to some extent in the overt ones—great emphasis should be put on the gains won by the German Resistance—particularly the de-collectivization measures and all relief to peasant land-owners and small businessmen—as indicating the immediate goals of local resistance activities. (For an extended list of appropriate themes, see Appendix A).

(2) In Eastern Germany—and in all other satellite areas where it proves feasible—covertly stimulate strikes, demonstrations, sustained economic and particularly industrial sabotage and other revolutionary acts, short of mass rebellion, aimed at

(a) Creating pressure on the communist authorities for specific reforms;

SECURITY INFORMATION
(b) Reawakening or undermining the authority of puppet regimes in order, where feasible, to promote open Soviet intervention.

(3) Thereafter possible seek to establish secure resistance nuclei in the satellite areas capable of further large-scale expansion.

(4) Intensify overt and covert defection programs with particular emphasis upon inducing the defection of satellite police leaders and satellite military personnel—especially pilots—not without taking every opportunity such as now exists in East Berlin—to induce defection of Soviet military personnel as recommended in NSC 343/1a signed by Jan. 15, 1953 and in NSC 343, dated June 13, 1953.

(5) Strengthen operational liaison with representatives of the French, British, Yugoslav, Italian and Spanish governments, with the authorities of the Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic Churches with trade unions and other significant non-governmental groups in order to stimulate all free world activities behind the Iron Curtain and to coordinate them more effectively with U.S. activities.

(6) In information programs to the Free World, to the USSR, to Communist China and North Korea and to the neutralist nations of Asia, emphasize the themes in Appendix A which relate particularly to the objectives indicated in 5 (c).

b. Special Underpinnings.

(1) Through appropriate official statements or diplomatic notes, emphasize at the earliest possible moment the strong support of the United States for the unification of Germany based on free elections to be followed by a peace treaty.
(2) Activate the implementation of NSC 140 immediately, and complete necessary consultations with British Government and the Federal Republic of Germany as quickly as possible in order to permit early release of planned official announcement and subsequent psychological exploitation.

(3) Through appropriate procedures, bring the question of Soviet repression of East German revolt before the U.N.

(4) Launch immediately a world-wide movement to honor the martyrs of the East German revolt, linking it with the achievements and sufferings of the Czechoslovak resistance forces, but focusing attention upon Berlin. The proposed campaign should include one or more of the following subsidiary campaigns or actions:

(i) Cash collection, offer of scholarships, presentation of various gifts, etc., for the widow and children of Willi Geitling,

(ii) Erection of a memorial in Berlin to all heroes of anti-Soviet resistance,

(iii) Annual parades in Germany on each anniversary of June 17 revolt.

(5) Urge the U.S. Red Cross to ask International Red Cross to investigate conditions in East Germany in wake of Soviet reprisals, to determine the need for medical supplies, food, clothing and other relief for victims of the suppression and their families.

(6) Stimulate the international organization of Free trade unions in Brussels to denounce Soviet repression of East German revolt and demand investigation of economic and labor conditions which set it off.

(7) Stimulate religious, humanitarian and cultural organizations in the United States—and if possible in other free countries—to
collect funds and gifts for the families of the victims of Soviet repression in Germany.

(9) Undertake immediately a study aimed at identifying possible gaps in the coordination of U.S. psychological programs in Europe, with particular emphasis upon improving cooperation where necessary with allied governments and with the governments of Spain and Yugoslavia, and take all appropriate steps to effect rapidly any administrative improvements which may be desirable for the purposes of this plan.

(10) Undertake a special study of espionage and sabotage organizations suggested in paragraph 1.b. under psychological capabilities.

(11) The announcement by the President of allocation of specified funds to USA for the alleviation of the suffering of escapees to Germany should be vigorously exploited.
(12) The chief of state of one country with vast under-populated areas such as Brazil, should be induced to make a public offer to resettle large numbers of escapees who have fought against tyranny and have been forced to flee their homelands.

(13) Black radio transmitters should cut into wave lengths of receivers in Soviet and satellite military vehicles and aircraft and civilian lengths where feasible, to encourage defection from Soviet and satellite armed forces, with particular stress on air force personnel.

(15) A one-shot handbill operation should be staged where covert capabilities exist, giving the impression to the Soviet and satellite officials and personnel of non armed forces that the hour is late and all opportunities for escape should be seized at once.
7. U.S. Courses of Action: Page II.
(Actions requiring lengthy preparation, or contingent upon developments)

a. Basic Tasks.

(continued on next page)
(2) Intensify defection programs aimed at the Soviet Armed Forces, and launch a general attack through overt and covert information programs on every vulnerable point in Soviet morale, seeking to convince both the Soviet occupation forces and the local population that they are "secondarily" engaged in a hopeless struggle in trying to maintain Soviet control over the Satellites against the growing resistance of the local population; appeal to workers and peasants in the Soviet army not to fire on workers and peasants in the Satellite countries; seek to convince non-Russian elements in the Soviet Union that successful national liberation movements in the Satellites will hasten the liberation of the non-Russian republics from the ironclad yoke, or at least obliged the Kremlin to modify its present policies.

b. Special Undertakings.

1. Consider the feasibility and desirability of initiating through appropriate official statements or diplomatic acts at the suitable time the concept of the U.S. Government for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany, Austria and the Satellites, holding of free elections in the Satellites as well as Germany, and the association of the Satellite states with the West European community, with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation.

2. Encourage the expansion of existing radio programs to the Satellites, whether official or private, to increase coverage of the entire area and to emphasize the free cooperation among the various national resistance movements as exemplified by the West European Commonwealth of independent but associated states.

3. Consider the feasibility and desirability of developing new covert organizations, with suitable radio or other outlets, based on the following concepts:

[Additional text not visible in the image]
(c) A high-level "KISS"-type appeal to Soviet intellectuals attracted by Western culture which could be used to spread subtle defector propaganda and to discredit individuals.

(4) Consider the feasibility and testability of launching Phase II of the Volunteer Peace Corps program to include nationals of the USSR.

(5) When conditions are considered appropriate, launch large-scale regular balloon-deliveries of suitable propaganda material—particularly in the form of special resistance newspapers or magazines—to the satellites.
1. Psychological Objectives

(a) To sustain resistance to communist oppression throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion, and without compromising its spontaneous nature.

(b) To undermine satellite puppet authority.

(c) To exploit satellite unrest as demonstrable proof that the Soviet Empire is beginning to crumble.

(d) To convince the free world, particularly Western Europe, that love of liberty and hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron Curtain than it has been cared to believe and that resistance to totalitarianism is less hopeless than has been imagined.

2. Course of Action - Phase I (Requiring less than 60 days to initiate)

(a) In East Germany and other satellite areas, where feasible, covertly stimulate strikes, demonstrations, economic and industrial sabotage and other revolutionary acts short of mass rebellion aimed at putting pressure on communist authority for specific reforms, discrediting such authority and provoking open Soviet intervention.

(b) Establish, where feasible, secure resistance nuclei capable of further large-scale expansion.
(c) Intensify defection programs, aimed at satellite police leaders and military personnel (especially pilots) and Soviet military personnel.

(d) Stimulate free world governmental, religious, and trade union activities capable of psychological effect behind the Iron Curtain, such as:

1. International campaigns to honor martyrs of the East German revolt.

2. Free trade union denunciation of Soviet repression and demand for investigation of basic economic and labor conditions.

(e) Emphasize U.S. support for German unity based on free elections followed by a Basic Treaty.

(f) Implement FSC 113 completing discussions as soon as possible with Allied governments.

(g) Consider bringing Soviet repression of East German revolt before the UN.

(h) Launch clock radio intruder operations to encourage defection.

3. Course of Action - Phase II (Requiring lengthy preparation, contingent upon developments).

(a) Organize, train and equip underground organizations capable of launching large-scale raids or sustained guerrilla warfare when directed.

(b) Consider U.S. advocacy of all foreign troop withdrawal from Germany, Austria, satellites, free election in the satellites and association with Western European community, with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation.
(c) Consider new forms of covert organizations based on concepts of:

1. Manipulating Soviet officer conspiracy to establish honorable peace with the West.
2. Cooperation between satellite resistance elements and nationalists in non-Russian Soviet Republics.
4. Consider inclusion of USSR nationals in Phase II of WPO project.
5. Consider large-scale systematic balloon propaganda operations to the satellites.
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR OVER AND CONTEST INTEGRATION PROGRAMS

NOTE: The following list of themes is not to be considered exhaustive or mandatory in all circumstances but is intended to indicate some of the major ideas which, with various adaptations, should be recurrently stressed from time to time to give coherence and direction to our information program aimed at exploiting current in the European Satellites.

1. Not Only Speed, But Precision
   Emphasize the real nature of the "German Revolt," following on the heels of the Czechoslovak uprisings, as a dynamic demonstration of the pent-up resentments of a people longing for freedom from communist tyranny. The spark which set off the original spontaneous risings in East Berlin—workers' demands for lower prices—should be played secondary to the major theme of general demands for withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, unity, etc.

2. Return To Europe
   Promote the "Return to Europe" concept as a unifying theme within the countries now behind the Iron Curtain and cut off from Europe, pointing to integration moves in the West, appropriate statements at Strasbourg, and the activities of the "European Union" as manifestations of this force; describe the "Return to Europe" idea as a thread which can bind together all peoples of Eastern Europe in their efforts to throw off the Soviet yoke.

   Prevalence of irresistible resistance in satellite Europe should be treated as further evidence that "Soviet power is on the hill and running down," and that popular uprisings such as
there in East Germany are further proof of the inevitability of victory for the Democratic forces.

4. The Too-Thin Red Line

In contrast to the Soviet Union especially, the Kremlin's ability to deal forever with those recurrent break-outs in its tenacious empire should be severely questioned, and in covert programs Soviet criticism of the Kremlin's self-defeating strategy should be emphasized.

5. Fear the Russian Ramsay Gates

Ridicule the Soviet propaganda line about the "warm and enduring friendship" between the non-Russian satellites and the USSR, capitalizing on every strike, every riot, every overt evidence of unrest as a sign that history, tradition, and fundamental differences such as race, religion, and mores are really at the core of the trouble—that these uprisings are simply expressions of much more deep-seated resentment of Soviet oppression.

6. MAC's Mosaic

Explore the correlations in different areas of the revolutionary movements of 1848, to determine whether the symbol "48" can be used effectively to crystallize resistance today. Wherever the results of the study are negative, choose other historic parallels which are locally appropriate.

7. Pilsen—The New Cradle of Liberty

Special programs directed to Czechoslovakia should give credit to the Czechs, especially in Pilsen, for having taken the lead in showing real resistance to the Soviets. Plans to Germany which might be overheard in Czechoslovakia should exploit the "common bond" of freedom from tyranny which no man-made barriers can block.
but we should avoid giving the Germans credit for operating these outbreaks. An effort should be made to assuage the "smilk complex" reported running through the people of Pilsen now, for not having followed through. This double-play of credit must be discreetly and carefully handled because of the German-Czech antipathies and the likelihood that one audience may well caveat up on what is being said to the other. The real point is to give credit where credit is due, avoiding any implications that either party failed to act as perhaps it might have, and emphasizing the deep-seated community of interest which joins people of all oppressed nations.

8. Food and Fuel

We should stress the better standards of living in West Berlin, than in East Berlin especially with respect to food. In this connection, we could contrast the West Berlin food stockpile with the scarcity in the East (as long as they last) made worse by the "Armored Army" drain on what little there is there. We could imply that the food stocks in the West are not packaged in party politics—that this food could be available to the East Berliners if the Soviets would grant the people's demand to unify the city, instead of sealing it off with tanks and armored columns. We could also imply, if not actually recommend, that West Berlin could provide food relief stations in East Berlin if the barriers were down and proper safeguards were guaranteed.

9. $5 Million Demurcatur

Every opportunity should be taken to refute the Soviet charges of U.S. instigation of the uprisings in Germany, without over-protestation and with diverse counter-suggestions wherever possible.
The news itself should be used to disprove these allegations: We should ridicule the charges being made by the Soviets concerning the U.S. by pointing to the uselessness of our providing subterfuges and robots—there are obviously millions (of self-made insurgents) charging through Germany today with a lot more at stake than a U.S. agent could possibly have.

10. **War of nerves**

The more information we can play back to the East with facts and figures the better we should be able to convince the Russians, or at least stimulate their suspicions, that all their efforts to control the people have failed. REAS should be used more and more to carry on a kind of "serve war" against the Russians emphasizing its importance to the people of Eastern Europe as a contrast with the West and reaffirming its credibility and reliability as a source of the truth. We should maintain the impression, backed up by facts, that the barriers which the Russians have found necessary to impose on the East Germans are not effective; we are getting the news and the people who carry the news—and REAS broadcasts prove it.

11. **Loyal Labor in Slave-Labor**

Soviet calls to "loyal workers" to take over industries crippled by strikes should be played back to all Eastern targets in the framework of the UN/ILO "forced labor" study, making it clear that we understand what the Soviets mean by "loyalty"—labor performed at pistol-point. This should be described as the low-water mark in immorality and symbolic of the society to which the Soviets have reduced the people under their control. This should be especially pertinent if reports of uprisings at the uranium mines are confirmed since the mines are known to be a forced-labor camp, and
"loyalty" there is meaningless.

12. *Iron-Gate*

We should never let the Soviets forget their use of armed might to stifle free speech. Continued demands by Western authorities, both German and others, for an explanation of this show of force would bring a sorry response, if only from the Soviets, and still to the "Firm, Go Home" line. This could be occasioned by whatever use the Soviets make of the Wehrmacht officers, if they ever get them: committing "unpatriotism" against a祖国 of Germans or trumped-up sabotage grounds, or turning them into "loyal" servants of the Kremlin, again at pistol-point.

13. *The New Oligarchs*

Oskar Grisewitz should be made symbolic of the puppets trying to act like statesmen all over Eastern Europe. His traitorous career over the past years, killed, by his selling to Soviet tanks and machine guns to kill his best, should be made to stick in the craw not only of the Germans, but of other Eastern Europeans. The whole concept of "oligarchs" in the satellite states should be made a recurrent propaganda line, and efforts should be made also to discredit all the "junior puppets," of the Rumpo variety, who appear anxious to take over if and when the dust settles on the iron curtain. Any encouragement to the people in Eastern Europe to rid themselves of these puppets will have a strong psychological, if not actual, impact. Further, the contrast between uprisings of this nature especially, and the stability and moral strength of the Western world, will prove the fundamental validity of our position.
14. "Run For Your Life"

We should also suggest that if and when the Soviets recover control in East Germany (and elsewhere, if the uprisings spread abroad), Khrushchev-ordered purges will be initiated to "clean up" the Armed Forces, the puppet Governments, and other control-mechanisms. In other words, everyone will face the possibility of death or slave-labor, no matter how small his role. Events and rumors both should be used extensively to bolster this line, adding fuel to the flames of suspicion wherever possible.

15. Special Military Defection Themes

By covert means, in programs aimed at the Soviet Union, we should foster distrust in the Army high command, and suspicions of the uses to which the Army is being put, especially suggesting that the KGB may be manipulating the Army for its own ends. To the enlisted men and junior officers, it should be stressed that the KGB is afraid to permit them even the off-duty pleasures normal in Western armies. Another line of attack would be to ask the soldier-soldier audience whether putting down workers' demands for decent conditions is the kind of duty to be expected of an intensively-trained "workers' army". In covert programs to "entice" personnel, we should make it plain that "patriots" who can act for liberty and remain hidden should do so; those who cannot may should be assured of asylum in the West. Lesser communist officials who turn on the regime may be assured their efforts will be their passport to the West.

16. Free Elections

In the political framework, our propaganda should continue to insist on free elections leading to unification, but without giving
willingness to the Soviet maneuvers to make concessions in Eastern Germany which would permit anti-European integration forces to look upon these moves as real accommodations. If we insist the Soviets to withdraw their forces, they cannot afford to do it, especially in the light of what has gone on this week. If by some chance they do call us, we should emphasize that the withdrawal has been forced by the rebellion, and that in turn makes it apparent that East Germany is free to vote as it will. We should be prepared to take immediate steps to promote free all-German elections, meanwhile continuing to regard the uprisings in the East and the forced withdrawal of the Soviets as proof of Western strength, in spiritual rather than in military terms.