September 13, 1960

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President

JORDAN

Apparently mobilization of Jordanian forces along the Syrian border has an eye to supporting an internal coup within Syria on the part of disaffected military elements. Prospects for success are not good. The failure of the coup after overt Jordanian military intervention could lead to Hussein's overthrow.

As the result of your letter and the meeting between our Charge and the King, any move against Syria has been delayed. State had pointed out (1) the UAR's overwhelming air superiority, (2) the likelihood of the UAR and Israeli intervention, and (3) the fact that Jordan would be considered guilty of aggression in the U.S. opinion.

Our Charge considers the great danger lies in border incidents resulting from the mobilized forces. The King is not considered a completely free agent, being subjected to heavy pressures from the Bedouins, on whose support he relies. Our reports today indicate that Jordanian mobilization continues.

GUINEA

Sekou Toure is on a month-long trip which takes in Moscow, Peiping, Hanoi, and Ulan Batour. A joint communique issued in Moscow in late August announces USSR participation in the construction of the Konkoure hydroelectric project, Guinea's highest priority project.

IRAN

The Shah seems to be convinced that further participation in CENTO is useless. He may decide to withdraw from CENTO and fall back entirely on the Iran/U.S. bilateral pact. While the Shah's unhappiness is chronic, it has become intensified by continuing Soviet pressure and opposition to him over the rigged elections. (Date of report unknown -- see below.)

Soviet Ambassador Pegov is now en route back to Tehran. This probably results from Premier Sharif Emami's intention to improve relations with the USSR. Radio Moscow halted its propaganda attacks on the Shah on August 31st.
LAOS

On September 10th Phoumi indicated his intention to start a revolution. The success would of course depend on the degree of support he still enjoys in the Army. Phoumi was not satisfied by new concessions offered by Souvanna through a delegation of army officers sent to Savannakhet on September 9th. Laotian Army reports indicate increased Pathet Lao guerrilla activities in four different areas of North Laos.

Prince Boun Oum joined Phoumi in this action on September 10th and Souvanna declared a state of emergency. Souvanna conferred with the king on September 11th and the king invited rebels to come to Luang Prabang for further consultations.

Meanwhile, State instructed Ambassador Brown to seek an audience with the king and point out our fears that Laos is faced with a real threat of dismemberment due to the disintegration of the unity of patriotic elements. Brown is to emphasize that we see no peaceful solution outside of a royal reconciliation under the authority of the king. We are particularly concerned that Kong Le will join with the Pathet Lao. The French refused to join us in this demarche to the king.

The U.S. is in a little bit of a spot here since while we feel the best solution would be a return to the Souvanna government on the part of Phoumi, we hesitate to choose sides with neutralist Souvanna in the light of Phoumi's pro-U.S. orientation. Finally, the issue is now so full of emotion we are trying to avoid becoming identified with one solution.

Brown has also been instructed to point out to both General Ouam (Souvanna's armed forces commander) and Phoumi that we cannot stand by in the face of renewed Pathet Lao activities in the north while military commanders are engaged in political activities. If necessary, we will also support troops directly ourselves.

Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum have sent emissaries to the king to explain the reasons for their rebellion against Souvanna. Their solution would be the formation of a new government under Boun Oum with Phoumi as armed forces commander. They would "prefer" to retain Souvanna in the cabinet.
CONGO

The UN command is making an effort to establish the authority of Congo's President Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt to remove Lumumba from power. The UN apparently arranged the surrender of arms on September 10th by the bulk of the 3000 Congolese troops stationed in Leopoldville. In addition, the UN provided the troops their first pay in two months, and announced an order attributed to the Congolese army for a cease-fire throughout the Congo. The cease-fire order has been cautiously welcomed by Tshombe but has been denounced by Lumumba. The UN team has been dispatched to the Katanga border.

Hammarskjold received a cable from Kasavubu on Saturday announcing the appointment of a new government headed by Iléo. On learning of this cable, the USSR changed its tactics and demanded continuing substantive discussion rather than suspension. Wadsorth told Hammarskjold that we continue to stand behind them in supporting Kasavubu's efforts to oust Lumumba. Hammarskjold commented he still believes we can break Lumumba. Hammarskjold has called for $100 million in economic aid for the Congo and the State Department feels that an announcement of our willingness to contribute up to $40 million would have a substantial impact at the UN, in the Congo, and throughout Africa. The Russians intend to demand (1) release of airfields and radio to Lumumba, (2) freedom of action to Lumumba, and (3) dismissal of the UN command.

Finally, yesterday, on our motion, the Security Council voted 9 to 2 to adjourn and reconvene when the Council President considers it advisable. This was done because the Council felt it to be heading in no clear direction and all proposals seemed disadvantageous to Kasavubu. Our objectives are to aid Kasavubu, vis-à-vis Lumumba, to strengthen Hammarskjold's mandate and to focus on Soviet activities outside the Council framework. Wadsorth has been instructed to take the line publicly that Kasavubu is unquestionably Head of State and that the outside world looks to the head for authoritative information as to the identity of his government.

Meanwhile, the army arrested Lumumba for three hours yesterday, and on his release, he proceeded to the radio station in a loud speaker car, attempting without success to rally the population on the way. At the station a Ghana major in charge refused to allow him to use it. Following this, there is a report that Lumumba planned to seize the airport to execute an escape to Stanleyville. Also, he is reportedly trying to rally soldiers to his side without indication of success up to this moment.

Cairo has indicated support for Lumumba by announcing withdrawal of its force of 515 men on the basis that the UN had violated Congo sovereignty.
Harriman has been visiting the Congo and Kasavubu has assured Harriman and Timberlake of determination to stick to his guns in removing Lumumba. Kasavubu agreed that his forces were afraid during Thursday's vote. He also agreed that the Force Publique and the police should be disarmed and courts set up. Harriman's talks with Congolese leaders convince him that we can expect little if anything to be done in parliamentary form against Lumumba.

Meanwhile, Embassy Brazzaville reports that President Youlou is supporting Kasavubu by every means possible.

BERLIN - USSR

The British strongly oppose the publication of the tripartite note to the USSR. They still believe there is a possibility that the Soviets could be persuaded to intervene with the GDR, but not if the Western powers are using the note primarily for propaganda. Dowling agrees with Erhard and Brandt that the current East German actions are merely the beginning of a new series of moves, each designed to avoid a major reaction. He feels action should be taken now. While admitting that trade suspension might result in reprisals and thus hasten the crisis over Berlin, he believes that our position is stronger now than it can be at any subsequent stage in a series of East German moves.

UN

Thompson has sent a message regarding the forthcoming UN General Assembly session. He believes that Khrushchev will try to picture the U.S. as "war mongers" with the Soviets being "peace-loving." Khrushchev will make much of our so-called "policy" of overflights and will try to connect the RB-47 case with the U-2. Thompson recommends against justifying our overflights by Soviet secrecy unless we can produce startling evidence of Soviet preparation for aggression as revealed by earlier U-2 flights. Thompson believes our major emphasis should rest on Soviet overexploitation of the U-2 incident. If Khrushchev takes a hard line, Thompson suggests we present a survey of events since the war, including recent developments in proper perspective.

John D. Eisenhower