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September 13, 1960 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLE 2011-26 #2
By MAK NLDDE Date 10/28/11

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN McCONE

THROUGH THE GENERAL MANAGER SIGNED, A. R. LUEDECKE

SUBJECT: REPORT OF TEST CESSATION WORKING GROUP FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH UK STAFF.

Attached is a copy of the above Report to Principals, as prepared by State staff.

The major issue remaining unresolved, both internally in the US Government, and with the UK is the question of a "ceiling" on the quota of on-site inspections under the escalated concept. In the first paragraph on page 2, last sentence, it is stated that an "ad referendum" US proposal of a ceiling of 20 was made. State thus recognizes that this matter is yet to be resolved in the US Government, and it can only be resolved by the Principals. We have, as you know, strongly taken the position that if such a proposal is made as a second option to our current proposal that there be no ceiling because with a ceiling of 20 this would

- (a) represent an unnecessary and undesirable concession to the USSR in that it could, and present estimates indicate that it would during many yearly periods, lead to fewer than 20 inspections per year, and
- (b) it would seriously undermine our often stated position that the number of inspections must bear a technical relationship to the number of events and the capabilities of the system.

We believe you agree with this position. Hence, this question remains for later resolution by the Principals.

Still unresolved, also, is the question, in numbered paragraph 1 on page 1, of the date for the beginning of the US seismic research program. We recommend that a date as early as possible be agreed between the Principals and the announcement made in Geneva. You

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DATE 07/14/79

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have considered the possibility of such a date being in October, using as an occasion the opening of the US Geneva station in Oklahoma. We recommend that you continue to press for agreement on a basis such as this.

We have also informally raised several points with them, primarily for clarification, as follows:

(1) In numbered paragraph 1, we questioned whether the UK had actually explicitly agreed on the "2 years plus 3 months" length of moratorium, since they had tended to favor "2 years plus 6 months." State staff believes that since the UK initially seemed to favor "plus 6 months" but did not later (after they had had the opportunity to report by telegram to London) re-raise the question, they are in agreement. It seems clear, however, that the UK has not unequivocally stated agreement. We, of course, strongly favor the position as stated.

(2) In numbered paragraph 1, next to last line, the word "joint," in referring to the research program, should be "coordinated." State has agreed to make this change.

(3) In the last paragraph on page 1, the last sentence describes the "sub phasing" arrangement in Phase I. Since the wording could be misinterpreted to mean that the second 2 year sub phase would not begin until the first was completed we have confirmed with State (Mr. Farley) that the agreed interpretation is that the installation of all control posts called for in Phase I (21 in USSR) is carried out as rapidly as possible from the beginning of Phase I, with the condition that at least 8 control posts in the USSR will be completed within the first sub phase of 2 years. We also confirmed with State that it is intended that on-site inspections begin as soon as a minimum location capability is provided for and in no case later than the end of the first sub phase of 2 years. Mr. Farley has also agreed to reword this paragraph to make these points clearer.

(4) In the last line of the first paragraph on page 2, aside from the unresolved question of ceiling versus no ceiling discussed previously, the word "eligible" is not descriptively explicit. State has agreed to reword the last words of this paragraph, beginning "20%," to read about as follows: "...20% of all events over 4.75 magnitude located by the criteria tabled by the US in Annex I, or 30% of the events over 4.75 magnitude remaining unidentified after application of the US criteria of TWG II be subject to inspection." This would make explicit what we mean, since either of these two



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formulas lead to about 20 inspections per year (for an average year of 100 events) in the USSR, and would remove the slight ambiguity which now exists in our position as presented in Geneva in that we have indicated our formulas would yield an estimated 20 inspections in the USSR per year whereas the on-site inspection article calls for (on review of the system) 30% of the events over 4.75 remaining unidentified using Annex I criteria (which are essentially location criteria).

S. G. English
Special Assistant to
the General Manager



Attachment:
Report, as stated (Conf.).

CC: Gen. Luedecke
Gen. Starbird

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