Mr. Allen Dulles called about sending Bonsal back to Cuba. The Secretary said he was very sorry about Mr. Dulles' being upset but he thought everyone knew about it. Mr. Dulles said they didn't know about it until they saw it in the papers. The Secretary said we had released it because of the trouble started in the Senate and mentioned Smathers' role. Mr. Dulles said he realized it was not purely a policy decision and whatever the Secretary decided he would back him but he was worried about the effect of this action on what they were doing. It was a decision, the Secretary said, which the President had made the day before and it was thought that this was as good a cover as we could have. The controlling factor, as he saw it, was the worry re the lives of American citizens. If Bonsal has to come out again, that will be it. The Secretary said he did not want to throw in any monkey wrenches. Mr. Dulles thought it should be made clear that if Castro continues with his present techniques through the radios which he controls and is going to stir up his people against the Americans, we would have to consider asking Bonsal to leave. He thought there should be some stated purpose. The Secretary said if Bonsal is snubbed and insulted, we would have to ask him to come out for good. This is the last effort at reasonableness. We were in the same frame of mind as CIA was. The Secretary mentioned the Brazilian Foreign Minister's calling in his Chargé on Kubitschek's line of their acting as intermediaries. He had gone to the top and the Secretary said he had gotten a memo on the conversation with the top. The Secretary said that Rubottom was at the Brazilian Embassy this morning. There were two conditions involved - (1) the Sugar Act and (2) the question of giving asylum. Mr. Dulles added the Secretary might want to wait a little and see how it works. They would study it. The Secretary said it did not represent any policy change. If anything, it might be easier from a clandestine point of view.