FROM ODCSOPS.

1. (S) A. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE PREPARATION OF TWO STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMY NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN EUROPE. THE FOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS AS
RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE FROM THE JCS.

1) "COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

I. PURPOSE OF STUDY

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO ANALYZE THE COMMAND
AND CONTROL SYSTEM AND PROCEDURES RELATING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT WITHIN US ARMY UNITS IN EUROPE TO DETERMINE THE VULNER-
ABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE ASSURANCE THAT
CONTROL MEASURES GIVE IN PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED INITIATION OF THE
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN CONTROLLING THEIR EMPLOYMENT AFTER USE
IS INITIATED.

II. BASIS FOR COMPARISON

AN ANALYSIS SHOULD BE MADE OF THE PRESENT COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEM FOR ARMY UNITS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO DETERMINE ITS
VITAL WEAKNESSES AND MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS (IF ANY) IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FOLLOWING THIS THERE SHOULD BE AN EXAMINATION OF STEPS THAT COULD BE
UNDERTAKEN AND THE COSTS INVOLVED IN IMPROVING THE SYSTEM BY 1967 SO
THAT (1) THE SYSTEM WOULD BE SURVIVABLE IN THE FACE OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR
DISARMING STRIKE AND SUBSEQUENT NUCLEAR WARFARE DURING THE LAND
BATTLE, (2) ITS RESPONSIVENESS WOULD PERMIT RAPID, POSITIVE CONTROL
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE AT THE DIVISIONS, CORPS, ARMY AND THEATER
LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE AND (3) ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES FOR PREVENTING
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PEACE AND WAR WOULD BE
INCORPORATED.

III. REQUIREMENTS

A. THE STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION (SPECIFIC
DATA AND COSTS WHEREVER AVAILABLE) RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING QUEST-
IONS IN THE 23 MAY 1962 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM:

(1) "HOW IS COMMAND AND CONTROL PRESERVED IN A
TACTICAL NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT?"

(2) "UNDER CONDITIONS OF INTERCONTINENTAL
NUCLEAR WAR ARE ORGANIZED MILITARY OPERATIONS FEASIBLE IN THE SENSE
THAT THEY CAN BE CONDUCTED DESPITE NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND
CONTROL CENTERS, AIRFIELDS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS?"

B. IN ADDITION THE STUDY SHOULD SHOW HOW PERMISSIVE
LINKS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE IMPACT OF PERMISSIVE LINKS ON THE DEGREE OF
CONTROL AND RESPONSIVENESS.

(2) "NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE AND PHYSICAL SECURITY"
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO ESTIMATE THE EFFECT ON NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE PROCEDURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND VARIATIONS OF THESE PROCEDURES TO DETERMINE THEIR EFFICACY (1) IN NON-NUCLEAR WAR, (2) DURING AN EMERGENCY INDUCED TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR WAR, AND (3), IN NUCLEAR WAR.

II. BASIS FOR COMPARISON

At present, SACEUR has specific restraints with respect to release of nuclear weapons and has prescribed policies regarding storage and physical security of these weapons. The system, designed to provide acceptable responsiveness consistent with security, has certain weaknesses of which vulnerability and delay in converting from non-nuclear to nuclear combat are important. By 1967, installation of permissive units as a control device may permit changes in storage and security procedures. Further steps may reduce vulnerability of the storage, communication and distribution systems. A comparison should be made of the present storage and security system with an improved system that could be operating by 1967.

III. REQUIREMENTS

A. THE STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION SPECIFIC DATA WHEREVER AVAILABLE) RELATING TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

1. Does the proximity of field army tactical nuclear weapons to areas in which conventional combat is being fought create a problem of: (a) physical security for the nuclear weapons or, (b) assurance that nuclear weapons will not be employed without proper authority in time of stress?
1. In the event of conventional combat, would it be desirable to centralize nuclear weapons (in certain delivery systems) in protected storage sites to ensure their availability in the event of nuclear war? What would be the penalties involved and the cost for so protecting Army nuclear delivery systems in Europe (for 8-inch and 155mm howitzer, consider nuclear shell storage only)? Alternatively, would it be better to provide for protection through a concept of dispersal plus mobility?

2. In case of the second study, although not specifically indicated, is a requirement to include consideration of weapons provided in support of non-U.S. NATO forces?

3. (a) It is requested that you provide your views by 8 August on:
   A. Any weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the present command and control system and present storage and security system.
   B. Improvements in these areas which could be effected by 1967.
   C. Any other aspects requiring special consideration.

4. (d) Relayed to US CINC in EUR by CINC USAREUR at 751923Z.

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