EUROPEAN COMMAND

OFFICIAL INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: OSD
FROM: OSD
INFO: CHAFISH WASH DC
REF NO: DEP 953620, TOOREPAM 253 17 JAN 59

FROM OASD (PA) SIGNED SYNDER

SUBJECT: DOD Public Affairs Guidance 2-6

REFERENCES:

247. 08 SEP 58.

A.  Paragraph 07, JT STATE-DEFENSE-USIA CIR.

B.  DEF 950324, 29 October 58 292250Z.

The following is intended to clarify existing public information guidance on the subject of nuclear capability of US Forces. Interdepartmental coordination on this message has just been completed, and following replies to letter from Director, Information Services, OSAF, dated 13 Nov 58 NITAL, and to CINC PAC Message 18001Z Nov 58 NITAL to which CNO issued interim reply 112007Z DEC 58.

1. No authority exists to divulge or confirm the point at which nuclear weapons are located, no matter where such points may be. However, as an exception, in any incident or accident involving a nuclear weapon, official confirmation of the presence of such weapon may be made when it will have significant value in conjunction with public safety programs and as a means of reducing wide-spread public alarm. Such official confirmation might be required if an incident is followed by radiation team or other essential activity observable by the general public or evacuation of personnel, resulting in the generation of alarm, thus necessitating

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a factual, official statement of reassurance. Recognition of the need for confirming the presence of a nuclear weapon under such circumstances presumes the concomitant obligation to take all feasible measures for preventing these circumstances arising. Nor does the above in any way vitiate the basic policy of seeking to avoid disclosure of the location of nuclear weapons. In case such mishap occurs in foreign country and the public interest, as defined above, requires announcement of the presence of a nuclear weapon, such announcement should be made, if time permits, with the concurrence of the US Ambassador. Plans for such occurrences should, where feasible, be worked out in advance with the US Ambassador. In this connection, the DOD expects to furnish separately more detailed guidance on the subject of incidents or accidents involving nuclear weapons.

2. Certain US weapons systems have been publicly identified as having a nuclear capability. This prior indentification does not, in itself, provide authority to deviate from the provisions of first sentence, paragraph 06, above; nor to release information concerning the details of storage, handling or transportation of nuclear weapons or components as provided in paragraph 06 below, any contemplated releases involving or referring such specific information about UNITED STATES nuclear capability will be referred to the OASD (PA), through established Military channels, for decision by appropriate authorities.

3. No question, hypothetical or otherwise, will be answered regarding employment of nuclear weapons in a particular situation.

4. Reply to questions on authority to employ nuclear weapons will be restricted to the statement that nuclear weapons will be used only as authorized by the PRESIDENT.

5. All other information concerning authorization to use nuclear weapons is classified and not releasable.

6. Guidance for dealing with specific situations not covered by these instructions is in Reference (A) will be sought from Office Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

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7. If response to queries concerning solely nuclear-capable weapons systems cannot be avoided, such responses will not infer, speculate or otherwise disclose the presence or absence of nuclear warheads or other nuclear components. When reference to nuclear warheads is necessary, release will be confined to indicating that US-manufactured warheads remain under US control. Type of stand-by responses are as follows:

A. On presence of nuclear weapons--"The Department of Defense reiterates that the fundamental role assigned to the Strategic Air Command (other commands) is a positive deterrent one; and it has been demonstrated over the years that SAC (other commands) is an essential part of the US means of preventing war."

"In accordance with established policy, the US does not disclose the location of nuclear weapons. It has been repeatedly stated the US Strategic Bombers (US vessels) (other US forces) have a dual capability (e.g., high explosive and atomic), as do other modern weapons systems with which this country's military forces are equipped."

B. On accidents involving nuclear weapons where no immediate danger exists:

"A UNITED STATES (type) aircraft (other vehicle) carrying (classified cargo, an unarmed nuclear weapon, etc.) accidentally (crashed or other circumstances) approximately (location and time).

"Against any remote danger (from the crash of an atomic or high explosive detonation) however, in the interest of national security and to facilitate removal operations, visitors are asked to stay out of the area under surveillance by guards until the cargo has been removed. There is no need for evacuation." Use the terms "nuclear" or "atomic" only when other less specific terms will not serve. On nuclear accidents involving other circumstances, refer to stand-by statements contained in approved Service Information Plans.

C. If US delivery systems having a nuclear delivery capability are off-loaded in a foreign country, initial announcement of such deployment must be cleared with Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Such announcement would likely take the following form:

"These (type delivery systems) are normal equipment for US forces (and are designed with a dual capability). With reference to the availability of nuclear ammunition, the US does not discuss the availability or location of nuclear ammunition or warheads."

"If factually correct and provided the fact that such a system has a nuclear capability and its initial deployment overseas has been approved by the CSS for public announcement.

8. Use of the terms "atomic" and "nuclear" etc., should be avoided if possible in reply to queries, and replies should be phrased in such a way that they cannot be misconstrued as gratuitous official pronouncements. In any case, terminology should not be extended to include "thermonuclear", "hydrogen", etc.

9. Any necessary statements concerning US nuclear-capable deterrent forces should be restrained, explaining that AMERICANS are not a warlike people and reiterating the essential part they play in preventing war and in the defense of the free world, if such becomes necessary. No opportunities should be given the Communists to represent AMERICANS as provocateurs. Necessarily, certain of these forces must be held in combat readiness. However, in accordance with established policy, the US does not discuss the arms carried by specific aircraft, vessels or other elements of its military forces. On the contrary, it is the national policy to avoid drawing attention to the need for conducting continuous military operations with nuclear weapons. Special care must be exercised in these instances particularly, to avoid exceeding "policy pronouncements by President," Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

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