July 5, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

The President called me today regarding a special reconnaissance project which I had discussed with him on Tuesday. He asked that I advise Mr. Allen Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be suspended until he (the President) has an opportunity to consult on the matter with Secretary Dulles and Allen Dulles.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, US Army

7/6/56

I advised Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. Bissell of the foregoing on July 5th. At their request I met with them later in the day on the matter. They brought out that, under current procedures, there is normally a delay of not less than thirty-six hours before any reports would be received of discovery, tracking and attempted interception. It might be several days or weeks before reports were obtained of such reaction. We discussed this point, particularly in relation to the President's desire to have operations conducted at maximum rate. I indicated that my understanding of the President's desire would be that operation should go forward at maximum rate until the first evidence of tracking was received, at which time the action indicated above would be taken. Specifically, this would mean continuing with operations, and not standing down for the next few days to see if there were any reaction to the initial flights.

I said I would discuss this point with the President when I next talked to him.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

I reported to the President my discussions with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell subsequent to the President's phone call to me, and the conclusion I had reached that his desire would be to go ahead with operations until the first report of tracking was actually received -- not to wait after each operation to see whether any report came in. He confirmed that this would represent his desire in the matter.

I also reported on two recent events, including the anomalies in the tracks indicated in reporting in the area.

On the basis of the discussion which ensued, I advised Mr. Dulles on my return to Washington of the President's reserve on the operation -- that he seemed to adhere to a preference for other areas, that the ten-day span of current activities is very much in his mind, and that he seems very close to a decision not to continue. I mentioned his comment on our reaction "if they were to do this to us," and his indication that the basis for concern on our part of surprise action is much less than when he approved the activity. All of this, I indicated, would tend to lend emphasis to the development of alternative areas on which to base operations.

I subsequently reviewed the foregoing with Mr. Bissell, and also advised him that the interpretation on the President's instructions had been confirmed.

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CE, U S Army