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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

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☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951—948170
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Attached is the report of the NSC/1290d Working Group.

The members of the Working Group are:

Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Dept. of State - Chairman
Major General W. W. Weaseinger, USMC, Dept. of Defense
Central Intelligence Agency
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., Foreign Operations
Administration
Mr. Livingston Satterthwaite, Operations Coordinating
Board

This report consists of:

1) A discussion and recommendations on a concept for
U. S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to
provide internal security in countries vulnerable to
Communist subversion. All members have agreed to this
section of the report, with the two exceptions noted in the
text.

2) A summary of the status of internal security forces
in the various countries mentioned in the first section of
the report, prepared by the Department of Defense. (Annex A.)

3) A survey of the vulnerability of the various countries
mentioned in section 1 to Communist subversion, prepared by the
Central Intelligence Agency. (Annex B.)

February 16, 1955

Douglas MacArthur, II
Chairman

5021812
February 16, 1955

REPORT OF NSC 1290d WORKING GROUP

PROBLEM

To formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.

The Nature of Communist Subversion

1. Communist subversion takes forms which range from political penetration to armed insurrection. Communist penetration is directed against every facet of national life; government, labor unions, newspapers, educational institutions and intellectual movements. Local strikes and disturbances are fomented when they will further communist objectives. The principal objective of communist penetration is to build the capability of seizing control of a country without insurrection and at least to reduce the capacity of the local governments to oppose insurrection if the communists resort to it.

2. Armed insurrection ranges from small-scale guerrilla activity to large-scale national rebellion. The communist tactics vary from country to country. They may attempt to weaken the political and economic system in order to discredit the local government and force it to accept communist participation; or they may attempt to seize control by armed force.

The Requirements of Internal Security

3. The general political and economic well-being of the country concerned is an important factor contributing to success in controlling communist subversion.
subversion. In particular, the success of preventive measures depends upon development of that type of public opinion which will lead the local citizenry to identify itself with the local government and the security forces in dealing with subversion, and which will assist in inducing defections from the communist side.

4. In the internal security field the prevention and control of communist subversion requires for the most part preventive, police-type activity including the application of limited force. Such activity includes:

a. The detection of communist agents, fellow-travellers, front organizations and other components of the communist apparatus.
b. The detention of communist personalities or groups.
c. The execution of judicial measures against these persons or groups.

5. In countries where communist subversion has reached a stage of actual or potential insurrection its control and reduction normally involves the use of greater force than is at the disposition of the normal preventive police-type services. Military-type action is therefore required in certain instances to supplement police-type action.

Internal Security Forces

6. The functions of detection, arrest and judicial action are normally vested in the civil arm of government—police, investigative services, and the courts. It is the function of these forces to discover and destroy the communist subversive apparatus before it is able to achieve important penetration. In countries where the control of subversion requires limited application
application of force, police-type forces are usually organized to include armed police, gendarmerie or constabulary. Such forces are generally under the direction of a civilian branch of the government and are distinct from the regular national armed forces.

7. Where police-type operations, including limited applications of force, are not adequate to cope with communist subversion the regular military forces must take action. The suppression of organized insurrection requires in addition to police-type action military-type action which can be effectively conducted only by regular military forces.

Vulnerable Countries

8. An illustrative list of countries which are threatened by communist subversion but where such subversion may still be responsive to preventive, police-type measures, including the application of limited force, might include the following: Iran, Iceland, Greece, Philippines, South Korea, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and certain of the Latin American Republics. *

9. An illustrative list of countries where communist subversion has reached a stage in which military-type action is immediately or potentially required might include the following: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia.

U.S. Assistance in the Development of Forces for Internal Security

10. General Considerations. The U.S. has a vital interest in assisting free world countries to defend themselves against communist subversion. Since for most of these countries the U.S. is an important potential source of external

*The Defense representative believes that Thailand, Burma and Indonesia should be included in paragraph 8 and excluded from paragraph 9.
external assistance, it is in the U.S. interest that the internal security forces of these countries be able to deal with all forms of subversive penetration and insurrection both effectively and economically. In general it will be neither efficient nor economical for the U.S., initially at least, to press for sweeping changes in the general structure of the internal security forces of these countries. U.S. efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily toward improving the over-all effectiveness of existing forces.

11. Police-type forces. In countries where the primary requirement is to improve the capabilities of police-type forces and thus to prevent communist subversion from making important headway, the U.S. programs of assistance for internal security should center, to the degree politically feasible, on helping to meet the following requirements:

a. Honest and competent administration, more adequate pay, better training—both basic and technical, and the elimination of unqualified personnel from the police-type forces.

b. Provision of minimum appropriate arms and equipment, including transport and communications facilities.

c. Revision of legislation to permit effective police action.

d. Revision or reorganisation of judicial systems which block corrective measures.

e. Exchange of information on communist subversion and methods of identifying and combating it.

f. Assistance in the development of information programs which make clear to the local population the nature of the communist threat and the advantages of cooperating with the local government in its efforts to eliminate subversion.

12. Military—
12. **Military-type forces.** In those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection U.S. assistance should include, in addition to the measures outlined in paragraph 11, primary emphasis upon coping with the threat of armed insurrection. In most of these countries the U.S. does not expect that in cases of external armed aggression the regular military forces alone can deal with large scale attacks. The regular military forces could perform little more than a covering or delaying role. In some of these countries, moreover, the U.S. would not expect to use its own armed forces locally in case of external aggression but would plan to counter such aggression with military operations directed against the aggressor elsewhere. The U.S. should therefore be prepared where necessary to see some sacrifice of the capability of the local regular military forces to meet external armed aggression in order to achieve the required capability to deal with internal insurrection. For political and morale reasons these forces must have a dual missions: (a) protecting the frontiers of the country against external attack, and (b) suppressing internal insurrection. The latter mission, however, should in practice be conceived by the U.S. as primary and in these countries the U.S. should direct its military assistance towards providing that type of training, equipment and deployment of the regular military forces which will best fit them for dealing with insurrection. The U.S. could then better deal with pressure for the provision of that type of modern heavy military equipment which is useful only for meeting overt aggression by encouraging local governments to conceive of their regular forces as primarily an instrument for dealing with subversion. To the degree that
the local leaders can be brought to recognize and accept the importance of this mission, U.S. assistance can be more effectively utilized, and pressure on the U.S. for assistance in unrealistic types of equipment and organization would be relaxed.

RECOMMENDATION

13. The U.S. should adopt the following general concept for U.S. assistance in development of foreign forces for internal security:

   a. It is in the U.S. national interest to assist free world countries to defend themselves against communist subversion.

In general the U.S. should seek more effective use of forces and agencies in being rather than the creation of new types of security forces. Where communist subversion is in a relatively early stage of development and consists primarily of efforts at penetration, U.S. assistance for internal security should be directed primarily toward the development of effective preventative forces — police, investigative services, and judicial systems — and the development of public support for these forces. In countries where communist subversion has matured to the stage of actual or potential insurrection the U.S. should, in addition, direct its military assistance primarily toward developing the capability of the military forces of the country to take military action against insurrection. In doing so the U.S. should encourage the acceptance of action against internal insurrection as one of the primary missions of the regular military forces of the local country.

The U.S.
The U.S. should recognize that the assignment of this mission will reduce their capability to conduct large scale military operations.

b. The precise nature of U.S. assistance and the relative emphasis to be placed on various kinds of internal security forces should be individually designed to meet the specific requirements of each country. This determination should follow a comprehensive country-by-country analysis of internal security requirements which should be immediately undertaken and completed prior to May 1, 1955.

In such a survey priority attention should be given to:

(1) Studies of the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with Communist subversion in the following countries: Iran, Iceland, Greece, Philippines, South Korea, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and certain of the Latin American Republics; *

(2) Studies of the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with Communist subversion and insurrections, in addition to measures to increase the effectiveness of local police-type forces, in the following countries: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and Indonesia.

*The Defense representative believes that Thailand, Burma and Indonesia should be included in sub-paragraph (1) and excluded from sub-paragraph (2).
### Annex A

**Summary of the Status of Internal Security Forces**
(prepared by the Department of Defense)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Internal Security Forces</th>
<th>Military Forces</th>
<th>Quasi-Military Forces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Afghanistan 20,000</td>
<td>45,244</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Burma 14,000</td>
<td>58,539</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Cambodia Insig.</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Greece 28,500</td>
<td>117,720</td>
<td>85,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Iceland 320</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Indonesia 95,880</td>
<td>202,497</td>
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<td>Iran 36,600</td>
<td>127,010</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Iraq 13,500</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Korea 52,000</td>
<td>697,297</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Laos Insig.</td>
<td>27,000</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Libya 3,600</td>
<td>300</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Pakistan 48,600</td>
<td>246,930</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Philippines 6,900</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Syria 4,600</td>
<td>37,842</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Thailand 42,700</td>
<td>92,449</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Vietnam, Southern Insig.</td>
<td>186,527</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AFGHANISTAN

Internal Security Forces:

Gendarmerie 20,000

Military Forces:

Royal Afghan Army 45,000
Royal Afghan Air Force (incl 73 men training in India) 45,244

Quasi-Military Forces:

Chadassars (Not available)
Urgun Militia (approx 1,000 on duty at any given time) 9,000

Chadassars and Urgun Militia are not full time forces, but tribal troops which maintain order in their own areas.

BURMA

Internal Security Forces:

Union Military Police (UMP) 14,000

Military Forces:

Burma Army (incl 5,000 Sitwammu or Burma Territorial Force) 55,000
Union of Burma Navy 2,180
Union of Burma Air Force 1,359 58,539

The Union Military Police is under the Minister of Home Affairs. The Sitwammu or Territorial Force is an irregular force under the direct control of the Army.
GAMBOJA

Internal Security Forces: Insignificant.

Military Forces:

Army (incl 4,000 National Guard troops) 21,000
Navy (present personnel strength is unknown, but the tentative plan calls for about 300 personnel)
Air Force (There is no air force in a military sense, however 11 light transport and training planes are maintained for prestige purposes. Personnel strength not listed.)

Quasi-Military Forces:

Miscellaneous forces (guards, etc.) 16,000

(about 61,000 Cambodians are being recruited for the Armed Civil Defense Forces in 1954. These forces will be semi-military in nature and will relieve regular units of security missions and defense of local areas.)

The quasi-military forces function as auxiliaries to the Cambodian Army auto-defense units, plantation guards and guards for communications lines.

GREECE:

Internal Security Forces:

Gendarmerie 21,000
Civil Police of Athens, Piraeus, Patras and Corfu (armed, organised & trained similarly to Gendarmerie) 7,300
28,300
GREECE: (Cont'd)

Military Forces:

Greek Army 105,000
Naval Forces (incl 6,421 reserves on active duty) 11,030
Air Force (incl 410 pilots) 117,720

Quasi-Military Forces:

Miscellaneous civilian units 85,000
(They have been issued about 90,000 rifles and guard strategic areas.)

The Gendarmerie and Civil Police are under the command of the Ministry of Interior (Public Order). Other loosely organized groups of civilians are called TEA Bns or Bns of National Guard Defense. In time of war they are under Army command, taking orders directly from local military commanders.

ICELAND:

Internal Security Forces:

Police (Legal authorization of 1 per 500 inhabitants, or about 290) 160
Fisheries Patrol Service 160

Military Forces: None.

INDONESIA:

Internal Security Forces:

National Police Force 95,880
INDONESIA: (Cont'd)

(Municipal Police 70,000)
(Marine Police (similar to
U. S. Coast Guard) 10,000)
(Police Mobile Brigade 15,880)

Military Forces:

Indonesian Army 176,800
Indonesian Navy (incl 1,994 Marines) 9,648
Indonesian Air Force 17,049

National Police are under Ministry of Internal Security.

IRAN:

Internal Security Forces:

National Police 16,600
Gendarmeries 20,000
36,600

Military Forces:

Army 120,000
Navy (incl 1,000 Marines) 2,310
Air Force 4,700
127,010

The Gendarmerie, under the Minister of the Interior, is capable of maintaining law and order in rural non-tribal Iran under normal peacetime conditions, but could not control any major uprising without the assistance of the Army.

IRAQ:

Internal Security Forces:

Iraqi Police (approx 4,000 combat
effectives) 13,500
IRAQ: (Cont'd)

Military Forces:

Army (incl 225 man River Force) 41,200
Air Force (incl 75 pilots) 1,400

The Iraqi Police consists of traffic, garrison, and mobile forces.

KOREA:

Internal Security Forces:

National Police 51,300
Coast Guard (The ROK Coast Guard is ineffective and not capable of carrying out its mission.) 700

Military Forces:

Army 641,500
Navy 14,520
Marines 25,100
Air Force 16,177

LAOS:

Internal Security Forces: Insufficient.

Military Forces:

Army 27,000

-5-

TOP-SECRET
LIBYA:

Internal Security Forces:

Provincial Police Forces
(Tripolitania Police Force 2400)
(Cyrenaica Defense Force 900)
(Pezzam Police Force 300)

Military Forces:

Army 300

PAKISTAN:

Internal Security Forces:

Frontier Corps 25,600
Punjab Border Police 7,600
East Pakistan Rifles 3,100
Sind Police Rangers 2,500
Ministry of Defense Constabulary 5,800
State Forces (not incl the Azad-Kashmir forces in the Army, but such forces as those of Wali or Suz) 6,000

Military Forces:

Army 180,000
National Guard 47,000
Navy 6,430
Air Force (incl 250 pilots) 12,900

Pakistan's organized and full time internal security forces are controlled by civil authorities. They have relieved regular Army units of all internal security duties and have frontier control. The armed forces of Pakistan are a major factor in the stability of the present government. The National Guard is only partially armed and of poor quality.
PHILIPPINES:

Internal Security Forces:

Philippine Constabulary (Army) 6,900

Military Forces:

Army (less Constabulary) 38,800
Navy (incl 241 marines) 3,297
Air Force (incl 300 pilots) 1,200 45,297

The Constabulary is a national police force under the Department of Defense. Supplementing the Constabulary are the Army as a whole and various police forces, such as Municipal Police and private or plantation police. In an emergency the Secretary of Defense can direct the Municipal Police through the Provincial Constabulary commander. The Navy performs certain coast guard functions and in this sense contributes to internal security.

SYRIA:

Internal Security Forces:

Gendarmerie 2,800
Police 1,800 4,600

Military Forces:

Army (incl 400 man Desert Patrol) 35,600
Navy (part of the Army) 690
Air Force (part of the Army) 1,552 37,842

The Ministry of the Interior supervises the Gendarmerie and Police. These organizations are incapable of quelling serious demonstrations or insurrections without Army support. 50,000 armed Arab tribesmen constitute an important quasi-military potential, but their loyalty is questionable.
THAILAND:

Internal Security Forces:

Thai Police (incl about 1,000 Water Polices) 42,000
Volunteer Territorial Defense Corps (to expand to 50,000 during the next three years) 700
42,700

Military Forces:

Army
65,000
Naval Forces
(Incl: 2,441 Marines 13,849
283 Coast Defense Corps
618 Anti-Aircraft Corps)
Air Forces (incl 500 pilots) 11,600
92,449

The Thai police force is a national police organisation under the Minister of the Interior. No other police system exists in Thailand. Besides normal police duties the Thai police are primarily responsible for internal security. Its organisation also includes the Water Police, which functions as a Coast Guard. The Territorial Defense Volunteer Corps is presently being organized and trained to function as a home guard assisting police during national disasters and national emergencies.

The Thai armed forces consist of the Royal Thai Army, Navy and Air Force. The King is the constitutional head of these forces, but he is in reality a figurehead, actual control being exercised by the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Finance and Minister of Defense. Almost one-half of the total Army strength is located in Bangkok, largely for political and internal security reasons.

VIETNAM, SOUTHERN:

Internal Security Forces: Insignificant.

Military Forces:

Army (incl 15,000 National Guard) 185,000
Navy 1,527
Air Force (no combat capability) Strength not available 180,527

Quasi-Military Forces:

Miscellaneous types: 90,000

-8-

TOP SECRET
VIETNAM, SOUTHERN: (Cont'd)

Armed units of various religious and political minorities, special police, railroad and plantation guards, village self-defense groups and sundry auxiliary troops of the French and Vietnamese Armies constitute quasi-military forces which provide some local security.
ANNEX B

SURVEY OF THE VULNERABILITY OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
(prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency)

I
Countries of Consideration Wherein Primary Emphasis would be on Police Type Action

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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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II
Countries of Consideration Wherein Primary Emphasis would be Military in Addition to Police Type Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>South Vietnam</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>Burma</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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Iran is clearly the most vulnerable target for Communist subversion in the Middle East. Although the Tudeh Party (The Communist Party in Iran) is illegal and has recently lost prestige and strength as a result of the present government's firm anti-Communist stand, it remains the only effectively organised political group. In addition the general economic and sociological conditions in Iran offer a fertile field for Communist exploitation.

Prime Minister Zahedi has as yet been unable to create any active popular support and opposition elements have become increasingly active. Some of these have been penetrated by the Tudeh. Opportunities for their manipulation by the Communists will increase as long as there is no progress toward eliminating the social and economic inequalities which at present form the basis of the Communist appeal in Iran.

Government efforts to weed out Communist subversion have been slowed by Tudeh penetration of many of the government's offices. In late 1954 an extensive Tudeh net was discovered in the Armed Forces. Although the Party is small (less than 40,000 members and sympathisers), its potential for subversion would be materially increased should the present government be weakened by the loss of the Shah's full support and be replaced by one less firmly anti-Communist.

Iceland

The Communists are not believed likely to assume power in Iceland by legal means, despite the political implications of their recent taking over control of the Icelandic labor federation, but the possibility of
Forcible action must not be entirely ruled out because of the almost total absence of internal security forces. The presence of U.S. troops in Iceland should be a deterrent to forcible Communist action, however. In the long run, however, in view of Iceland's growing dependence on Soviet Bloc markets for her fisheries products, the influence of the USSR in Icelandic economic affairs may increase, with political repercussions favorable to the Communists.

Greece

Despite U.S. economic and military assistance since 1948, the long prevailing economic distress of Greece and the country's characteristic political extremism and changes in leadership have made certain segments of the population, notably among the lower income groups, susceptible to subversion. The ability of the CP to exploit these conditions was indicated in the parliamentary elections of 1952, in which political parties serving as CP fronts won 10.4% of the total vote. The party, although illegal, has a membership of 80,000-100,000, but only an estimated 25,000 activists. It is highly improbable that the subversive groups in Greece could pose a significant threat to the Greek State without substantial aid from the USSR and the Satellite countries. Nevertheless, Communist influence in the labor unions, through ESKE (United Syndicalist Movement of Greece) represents a constant danger were the country to suffer severe economic relapse. The Cyprus issue presently provides the Communists with inflammatory propaganda material.

The security forces in Greece are considered capable, with the army, of maintaining internal security.

-2-
PHILIPPINES

The internal security system in the Philippines has up to now been sufficient to thwart Communist efforts to seize control and to keep the Communists in check. The Communist threat does remain, though it is probable that the security system will continue to be strong enough to keep it under control.

SOUTH KOREA

The ROK security forces are capable of meeting the threat of Communist subversion. North Korean Communist attempts at subversion in South Korea have all been failures up to the present.

A military coup in South Korea is not anticipated so long as the existence of the army in South Korea depends upon continued U.S. support.

IRAQ

In Iraq there is a basic antipathy to Communism and the USSR. Its population however is divided in its attitude toward the West. The government—run by old-line politicians loyal to the Hashimite family—is definitely pro-West. Hyper nationalist and anti-colonialist elements, however, have in the past succeeded in stirring anti-West sentiment which was exploited by the small outlawed Communist party.

The Communist Party of Iraq has been outlawed since its inception in 1927. Although its membership is said to range between 12,000 and 15,000 (approximately 0.3% of the population), it exerted considerable influence during the elections of 9 June 1954. The party is said to be capable of creating or directing civil disorders through exploitation of existing political and social unrest.
SYRIA

Syria is basically antipathetic towards the USSR. However, it harbors resentment against the West as a result of the West's failure to solve favorably the Palestinian question. Its economic backwardness and its inability to cope with the various problems confronting a new-born state have rendered it vulnerable to Communist subversion.

Recent parliamentary elections (September-October 1954) indicate a growth in leftist sentiment.

The Communist party is reportedly weak organizationally and, except for its leader Khalid Bakdash, who was elected to parliament in the last general elections, weak in the quality of its leadership. Its membership is estimated at 12,000, about 2,500 of whom form the hard core. Nevertheless, the Communists are able to exploit to their advantage the extreme radical and anti-West sentiment, which is on the upsurge, as a result of the current government's weakness.

LIBYA

Although Libya, an Arab State, is affiliated with the Arab League, it is definitely within the Western Sphere of influence and is relatively free of Communist subversion to date.

AFGHANISTAN

There is at present little evidence of any strong organized Soviet influence in Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan's common border with the Soviet Union and the access it offers to India make it a primary target for Soviet expansion in Central Asia. Some dissatisfaction with the government has reportedly been created among the Mullahs and other groups,
by Afghanistan's recent acceptance of Soviet technical assistance. The presence of Soviet advisors will increase Soviet opportunities for espionage and for promoting any future opposition to the government.

PAKISTAN

The Government of Pakistan is not threatened at this time by Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, but the Communist potential for subversion in this country continues to be fed by various basic problems which offer little chance of solution in the near future. The State is physically separated by the Indian Union. There is an appreciable non-Muslim minority in East Pakistan, which is susceptible to Indian influence and potentially to Communist penetration. Economic problems continue to be troublesome and may, if not corrected, seriously impair the government's stability. Communist efforts are being made to subvert student and youth groups, especially in East Pakistan with limited results.

✓ The CP of Pakistan (CPP) and all "front" organizations of the Party were banned throughout Pakistan in 1954. Prior to this date the CPP membership did not exceed 5,000, although it controlled organizations whose total membership was approximately 50,000. Capabilities of the CPP for subversion lie principally in certain underground political and cultural "fronts". In 1953, the Communists participated covertly in disorders raised by large orthodox Moslem groups in the northern area of West Pakistan. The CPP underground activity undoubtedly receives support from the CP of India. In the 1954 elections in East Bengal the Communist Party through its front the Ganitantri Dal, campaigned for the United front against the Muslim League and managed to have six of its candidates elected. However, official observers have discounted the Communists' claims that they were instrumental in the United Front's victory.
Present political leadership has passive support of some of the more important nationalist organizations but it is operating in a political vacuum in an atmosphere of confusion, frustration and disillusionment, clouded by internal factionalism and uncertainties about the future, notably the elections scheduled for 1956.

South Vietnam is an open arena for Communist and anti-Communist propaganda and maneuvers of every kind, with many fence-sitters waiting to see how events will develop. There exists a pronounced susceptibility to Communist subversion as a result of careful Communist exploitation of popular anti-France sentiment and nationalism in the area. The Communists have thus extended their influence to many who are not Party members through a substantial network of front organizations covering all sectors of the population.

Internal security at the present time is very poor. At present there appears to be little or no capability of opposition to Viet Minh efforts to further internal chaos and eventually complete take-over, probably through the democratic means of free elections. The government's survival will be determined in large measure by the degree of protection foreign sources will provide in guaranteeing its future.

Cambodia's internal security is still threatened by the Viet Minh-supported Communist Khmer Issarak forces, though these forces were supposed to be disarmed under the truce agreement. Cambodia's "Pollyanna" approach to the subject of subversion negates the limited value of its present security system. Otherwise as stated in South Vietnam.
LAOS

There is no well-organized internal security force in Laos. The Army, which has the security responsibility, is too weak to combat the well organized Communist army (Pathet Lao), which under the terms of the Geneva truce agreements is still located in two northern provinces. This Communist army has had sporadic clashes with Royal Laoian troops, and only the truce agreement prevents it from completely overrunning the country, with the aid of the Viet Minh forces. Otherwise as stated in South Vietnam.

THAILAND

Although inclined to be apathetic to their specific leadership, the Thai people in general support their current leaders. Nevertheless there are unassimilated or disaffected political and ethnic groups of which the Chinese minority, numbering over 3 million, is the most susceptible to Communist subversion through either pressure or sympathy. Another such group is the Vietnamese minority which is concentrated principally in the economically-poor northeast area bordering Laos, who are, for the most part, strongly sympathetic to the Viet Minh. The Thai people, however, for the most part, have little interest in Communist doctrine.

Thailand has a well-organized internal security force which is able to delay subversive operations, though it may not be able to eliminate completely the potential threat of Thai and Chinese Communists.
BURMA

The stability of Burma has improved somewhat in the past two years. However, there remain many problems, weaknesses and unresolved internal conflicts. Although continued insurgencies of both political and racial groups have long threatened internal security and stability, government forces were successful in dispersing most major insurgent concentrations and in reducing insurgent effectiveness. Total strength of insurgent elements has been reduced to an estimated 13,000. Burma's CP, numbering about 6,000 has been successful in forming loose alliances with other leftist insurgent elements but has not been able to weld them into an effective fighting force capable of more than continued widespread guerrilla activity largely because of personality clashes between leaders. Along the undefined Burma-China border, however, Communist subversive agents are still able to operate at will, making border crossings without difficulty. However, not all insurgents are Communists.

The internal political opposition, particularly the pro-Communist Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (NWFP), while continuing its efforts to undermine the stability of the government, has been gaining some strength in the trade union field, a small but growing sector of the Burmese economy.

INDONESIA

Indonesia is a "free world" country under the control of a leftist regime which is supported by Communists, and the only "free" country in Southeast Asia where there is a legal Communist Party. Under these circumstances, what would be a Communist subversive threat from the point
of view of the U. S. is not a threat to the present regime. Threats to internal security arise from one religious group, the fanatical Moslem Dar-ul-Islam, and from two independence groups widely separated geographically: The Republic of the South Moluccas, in eastern Indonesia; and the Achinese, in northern Sumatra.

In the event of an anti-Communist victory in the forthcoming elections, the Communists might comprise an important threat to internal security. It is impossible to estimate the capability of the present security forces to control such a future Communist threat, since in the event of an anti-Communist election victory, the security forces would probably be reorganized. At present, the security forces' capability of resisting subversion appears to be strong in some areas, weak in others.

The Chinese minority population of about 2½ million, most of whom are fence-sitters who jump on the bandwagon easily, could constitute a potential threat to internal security.