MEMORANDUM

We give below the details of two meetings that took place in Washington on Monday March 5th, 1962.

We commenced our discussions with No. 1 by saying to him that with the Punta del Este behind us we have now achieved in large measure many of the things that the Administration had been talking about for the last six to nine months, namely: embargo, joint denunciation of Castro and his regime by the OAS countries, etc. but nevertheless the principal problem still remains unsolved - how to get rid of Castro and the communist regime of Cuba.

I stated to No. 1 that earlier that day I had listened to Secretary Rusk and to Woodward and others pointing out in their discussions that private investments were most necessary adjuncts to the Alliance for Progress. They also alluded to the flight of capital that was going on in the various Latin American countries and how this had to be arrested and new moneys had to come in from private investments, or the Alliance for Progress would not be a success. In other words, that there were not enough public funds to even begin to do the job.

Relative to the foregoing, and the need for private investment I mentioned to No. 1 that if the Cuban situation was cleaned up quickly it should be the strongest tonic to bring about doses of private investment in Latin America; that as long as Castro and communism stay in Cuba, you would have a fear of investing anywhere south of the border.

No. 1 said that the problem in Cuba he now considers to be much more difficult than he had thought several months ago, when he was under the impression that there was widespread apparatus available throughout Cuba in the hands of various counter-revolutionary groups. That much checking had been done and that evidently there are some pockets of resistance, but that they are not nearly as extensive as had been hoped. In addition that the security measures of the Castro government were most intensive and made counter-revolutionary activities very difficult. Hence, it made evident that there were only three courses to follow, all of which involved military power:

a) Naked intervention. No. 1 said that a good deal of thought had been given to this by the Administration but that they shuddered at the use of this since they thought the effects of it would be very far reaching. For example; in Latin America they thought you could have an overturn in Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and perhaps Brazil, and, of course, that you had to keep in view the entire world wide picture. Hence, it seems to him that direct intervention by us was not foreseeable because of the eventualities that might follow.

b) Establishment of a beachhead in Cuba by a fairly large group of Cuban Freedom Fighters. No. 1 expressed the opinion that we would not see again training camps, etc. as we did about a year ago, since the situation now calls for a very professional approach. It
would be quite difficult to establish a beachhead, and then these people probably could only hold out for a very brief span of time, calling for assistance in the interim period. No. 1 stated that the Administration considered, after discussions with Latin American officials, that this would be too flimsy an approach, and that it would be better if they were thinking of this to go in directly.

c) Create or bring about an incident. - It seems, from the words of No. 1, that this was the approach that the Administration likes best, since it would give them the necessary window dressing to do what had to be done and still have it reasonably palatable to the Latin American nations and to the world as a whole. No. 1 went on to say that the situation was a dynamic one in Cuba and that with the downgrading of Castro, etc. you never could tell what might happen next. He would give no opinion on when he thought moves such as any of the above might be taken. He repeated that the Administration was very cognizant of the danger and knew very well that the situation had to be corrected.

I asked him about Miro and whether he would continue to deal with him. He replied that he knew Miro best and that the Government was going to continue to have him be the spokesman with Miro. I asked No. 1 what his thoughts and suggestions might be relative to Alberto. He said that two or three months ago he had advocated to Alberto that he and his group should become part of the Consejo. Now he considers that this was not so important, that it was preferable to address yourself to bellic activities since the person or group that does something about getting rid of Castro and communism would have much to say in the new Cuba.

No. 1 acknowledged that and his group did have backing within the Island and he considers to be a very practical fellow who attracts many types of people to him. In the opinion of No. 1, the new Cuba will very likely witness a situation where the people will be more to the right than to the left. He considers that the Cuban people are fed up and that if any one gets up and mouths what Castro formerly said, they would pull him apart, since they have had enough of promises and panaceas.

March 12, 1962.