We had a long discussion with No. 2 over dinner. He said that his group had just so much authority to do things but that they needed more authority and a more direct mandate. He and his group are continuously asked for plans of what to do by the Top people, but that the higher ups insist that they must have complete answers of what will happen relative to each step to these plans, and from the viewpoint of No. 2, you cannot guarantee what the results of any given set or circumstances would be. All that he and his people can say is that if they apply pressures here, there and at other points, that the probable results would be an overturn. Evidently the powers that be insist that it cannot be problematical, that they have to be sure of the results.

No. 2 is fearful that indecision still permeates some of the higher ups who know what they would like to do but just cannot seem to make up their minds to do it.

No. 2 points out that 85% of the shipping going into Cuba is neutral and only 15% is communist. If they were given the authority a harrassment could be made of these neutral shipments which would upset them very quickly with considerable effect on the Island. Some calculated risks, of course, would have to be taken.

No. 2 thought that it would be a good idea if I could get some of my friends to talk with Bobby Kennedy, whom they consider to be very direct and a man who understands the need for action. He also thought it would be very good to talk to Mr. McCone.

No. 2 said that the security within Cuba was most intensive, and that with the system of block captains, etc. it was very difficult to do much moving around in the city. He admitted that there was re-sistance going on, that cane fields were put afire, etc. but that it was a very tight situation. He appears to have a good impression of and is thinking of him from the viewpoint not only now but here-after.

March 12, 1962