In this paper, "the Middle East" includes all of the geographical area bounded by the Indus Valley on the east; the borders of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the north; the Greek-Turkey border, the Mediterranean and Red Sea on the east; and the Sea of Arabia and the Indian Ocean on the south. It includes the UAR but no other areas of Africa.
"Who rules East Europe
commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland
commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island
commands the World"

Sir Halford Mackinder
"Democratic Ideals and
Reality" written in 1918;
published in 1919 by
Henry Holt and Company
of New York

"In modern conditions the following categories of
wars should be distinguished: World wars, local
wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. This
is necessary to work out the correct tactics with
regard to these wars....Liberation wars will con-
tinue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as
long as colonialism exists. These are revolution-
ary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but
inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant
independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples
can attain their freedom and independence only
by struggle, including armed struggle....it is a libera-
tion war of a people for its independence, it is a
sacred war. We recognize such wars, we help and
will help the peoples striving for their independ-
ence....The Communists fully support such just wars
and march in the front rank with the peoples in
waging liberation struggles."

Nikita Khrushchev, January
6, 1961, speaking at a
meeting of party organiza-
tions of the Higher Party
School, the Academy of
Social Sciences, and the
Institute of Marxism-
Leninism attached to the
Central Committee of the
CPSU.
"...it is quite clear that there cannot be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors. The Soviet Union paralyzes the main forces of the imperialist powers and thereby eases the conditions of struggle by all peoples for their freedom, independent development, and social progress."

TASS, January 27, 1966
quoting Sharaf Rashidov
(member of Central Committee and candidate-member of Politburo of CPSU), leader of the Soviet delegation to the Havana Tri-Continent Conference.

"...the UAR is an important supporting base for national liberation and progressive development in the whole wide region of the Near East and Africa.... (It is important for us) that the predominant influence in the region is held by a friendly state, ready with us to struggle for the assertion of the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the peoples and the principles of peaceful coexistence -- and the UAR is one such state --".

Kosygin
7 June 1966

"The sides examined the situation obtaining in the south of the Arab Peninsula. They denounced the policy of oppression carried through by the colonial power in Aden and in the Arab south of the Arab Peninsula. Both sides express full support of the courageous struggle of the Arab people for the realization of their aspirations for freedom and self determination....In this context they urge the British government to carry out the decisions of the United Nations. Both sides reaffirm their support of the Omani people in the struggle against colonialism."

Joint Communiqué following Kosygin visit to the UAR
May 1966
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I. GENERAL - INTRODUCTORY

While the net impact of Soviet and Chicom influences affecting free world interests is, in many parts of the world, cumulative, the existence of a Sino-Soviet rift and geopolitical realities provide the substance for a central assumption that the Soviet threat is greater and predominant west of the Indus Valley; the threat from China is dominant to the east of the Indus in India and the rest of Asia. Both the Soviet and Chinese threats to free world interests, while constantly undergoing change, remain real; U.S. policy must take both into consideration. Although the war in Vietnam and the possibility of escalation raise the spectre of a direct military confrontation with China, the real thrust of the Soviet presence southward through the Middle East exceeds the real short-range potential of China to extend her influence far beyond her own borders. U.S. interests in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa and Europe are directly threatened by the Soviet expansion into the Middle East. USSR geopolitical interests in the Middle East and Africa were apparent in the USSR wartime strategy and particularly in Soviet positions in Stalin's meetings with Churchill and President Roosevelt; the current Soviet policy giving highest priority to its efforts to extend
Soviet influence into the Middle East and Africa appears to have its origin in the decisions made in 1958. Since that time, U.S. policy on the Middle East has been overtaken by a rapid growth of the Soviet presence, an accelerated withdrawal of the British, a virtual break in French-U.S. collaboration, an identification and polarization of political forces into those committed to the free world and those associated with Moscow.

During the early period of the Kennedy Administration, U.S. Afro-Asian policy reached a high point in what appeared to be preferential treatment for the new "nonaligned" emerging regimes without regard to the degree of existing Soviet influence. The view that substantial economic aid, technical assistance and a sympathetic political attitude on the part of the United States would cause these regimes to seek their futures in a truly non-aligned and neutral bloc was the enlightened though, in light of subsequent developments, debatable assumption underlying this policy. There was concurrently a belief popular among the Administration's Middle East specialists that the wave of revolutionary forces in the area would undermine rapidly the remaining conservative regimes; the durability of the CENTO alliance was, along with that of
the conservative regimes, underestimated. This view of the area was evident in our actions vis-a-vis India, the UAR and Algiers, in our reaction to the entry of the UAR into the Yemen, in our unconcealed disenchantedment with the Shah of Iran and in the downgrading of the importance of Pakistan. By 1963, however, the U.S. was attempting to restore a posture of "even-handedness" in its relations with all Middle East countries as the best guarantee of short-term stability and peace.

1964 and early 1965 were periods of disengagement from the area as a whole. New initiatives in late 1965 and throughout 1966 which began to shape the vague outlines of a changing policy included the President's statements on food and population, action linking PL 480 and other aid with economic performance (the UAR, Pakistan and India felt this pressure), the agreement on supersonics and other military aid for Jordan, the joint U.S.-UK defense package for Saudi Arabia, acknowledgement to the Shah that a threat to Iran from the south did exist, increased U.S. military sales to Iran in 1966, U.S. tacit acceptance of a limited Chinese role as an arms supplier to Pakistan, a satisfactory settlement with Ayub of the "facilities dispute", and U.S. tacit acceptance of RCD and limited independent military collaboration among the
CENTO countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. At the same time, we have not accepted the inevitability of polariza-
tion of the area into pro-Moscow and free world blocs. We have preserved cool but correct relations with Nasser and the other revolutionary leaders; PL 480 has been linked, without positive results, to UAR withdrawal from the Yemen and termination of UAR-sponsored terrorism against the British. In short, the door to better UAR relations with the free world has been left half open. Periodically, we have conveyed to the USSR, without positive results, our willingness to join with the Soviets in an effort to end the arms race in the Middle East. Israel periodically raises the question of a "Tashkent role" for the USSR in the Middle East and Mediterranean -- an idea ostensibly regarded with equanimity by the United States Government and thus far with caution by the Soviets.

But basically we have not consciously set forth a forward-looking statement of either our interests or our policies in the area. Our current "policy" is a mosaic of our reactions to ad hoc critical situations of the past decade and an accumulation of backlash reactions in the Middle East to our enunciated and demonstrated policies in Europe, in Vietnam, in Manila, in Cuba, and in Moscow. In Asia, the President's Mekong Delta plan, his trip to the Far East and our massive commitment in Southeast Asia
indelibly marked our commitment to the people of Asia and our own U.S. interests in Asia. In the Middle East, where one can argue that our interests are at least as great (oil, Europe's economic health, strategic communications linking the Atlantic Community and Asia), there has been no comparable effort to articulate our policy. Nothing reveals this neglect more dramatically than the inclination of members of Congress to reach for the obsolete Tripartite Declaration to deal with the current crisis.

There is a marked tendency among intelligence analysts and policy planners who think globally to apply to the Middle East judgements that have evolved from their experiences in the broader arena of U.S.-Soviet relations. In recent years the Middle East has been the unfortunate beneficiary of the American energies and resources that are left over from Vietnam and NATO commitments. The Soviets appear to have identified, assessed and exploited these weaknesses in the U.S. posture on the Middle East; a realistic appreciation of the tolerances, commitments and limitation of the U.S. position on the Middle East is apparent in the conduct of Soviet affairs in the Middle East.
The credibility of the NATO deterrent as seen from Moscow in the framework of the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation is obviously greater than whatever deterrent one can read into the U.S. commitment in the Middle East. Whether it is Soviet strategy to extend the Communist Empire country by country and region by region, or alternatively, to approach the goal of world communization by ultimately loosing nuclear weapons on Washington, Detroit and Houston, the shorter-range task of gaining control of the Middle East is logically an intermediate high priority Soviet objective in either strategy.

There is a marked need to interest other countries which have long-range interests in the area in the immediate threat to the area. Western Europe and Japan will, through the 1970's, remain highly dependent on access to Middle East oil; the economic interdependence of these advanced industrial areas and the oil producing Middle East in the 1970's will remain a principal factor in world power.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran are the principal oil producers; three of these have conservative governments that have not been swept by revolution; the fourth, Iraq, after a decade of revolutionary regimes and general deterioration, is slowly moving toward a more moderate position.
The Arab revolutionary movement, with leadership centered in Cairo, is currently giving priority to its efforts to establish revolutionary regimes in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula; success in these areas would leave Kuwait and the Gulf vulnerable for rapid consolidation.

A series of successes in Aden, Saudi Arabia, Baghdad, Kuwait and the Gulf would still leave the revolutionary Arabs with leadership in Cairo faced with heavy resistance from within and without; dependence on Moscow for arms and other support would not be reduced. The wishful thought that Cairo and Moscow interests will diverge once Nasser gains his immediate objectives requires a more critical examination.

Extension of the Cairo revolution to all of the oil producing Arab Near East would precipitate a crisis in Iran, in Kurdistan, in the Sudan, in Ethiopia and in Jordan; Turkey and Pakistan would view this development with alarm. Europe and Japan would be faced with the prospect of the Soviets exercising political and economic influence through control of Middle East oil; principal air and sea communications lines between the Atlantic Community and Asia under dominant Soviet influence.

The last year has produced an illusion of a quickening crisis in the Middle East; the reality is that we are
witnessing the playing out more or less on schedule of forces set in motion over a number of years. The decision by the British to leave Aden promptly in early 1968 is perhaps the only new ingredient in the Middle East situation which has discernibly affected the tempo. If, as some argue, the struggle for Aden will shape significantly events in the area, the urgency in the current situation stems from the rapidly approaching climax in the Arabian Peninsula. It is this isolated crisis, more than anything else, that dictates an urgent reappraisal of our entire Middle East policy; but the reappraisal must deal with the entire area -- not merely the Aden problem.

II. REQUIREMENT FOR A U.S. POLICY 1967-75

The debate within the United States Government on Soviet intentions and capabilities -- particularly in the area between Europe and Asia -- remains largely unresolved. The significance of the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East and Africa has been argued for almost a decade within the U.S. Intelligence Community, at every Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference, publicly in the news media and both privately and publicly in Congress. The extent of this disagreement has, more than any other factor, paralyzed any effort to formulate a U.S. foreign
policy to deal with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East.

It is true that the Soviet position in the Middle East does not now give the USSR a dominant position. Indeed, there is one widely held view in the United States Government that the Soviets have gotten little return from their massive investment in the area and can be presumed to be questioning the value of further large outlays of aid and credit to the UAR, to Algiers, to Syria and to Iraq. Soviet intentions and capabilities vis-a-vis South Arabia, the Red Sea Basin and the Gulf are viewed by many as unclear. If there is any consensus in the United States Government, it is on the narrow premise that USSR capabilities to rapidly expand its influence are dependent on (a) Soviet penetration/control/influence in the UAR regime, (b) Nasser's ability to extend Cairo's influence and (c) Soviet penetration/position/influence in other instruments or political forces within the area.

While the situation in the Middle East continues to develop and the debate on the character of the Soviet threat goes monotonously forward, we must formulate a strategy and a new policy that will provide the United States Government the flexibility to preserve its interests regardless of the character or fortunes of Soviet strategy in the years immediately ahead. Such a policy
must be based on two planning assumptions:

Assumption A (The more optimistic American viewpoint)

The Soviet presence in the Middle East is now at a level tolerable to the U.S. and the free world. It will remain so for some time. Our interests are not threatened seriously. The detente we are seeking in the broader context, even though it is not entirely applicable in the Middle East, will not give the USSR an intolerable advantage in the Middle East. The drive of the Soviets into this area stems from the emerging character, after World War II, of the USSR as a Great Power playing a normal role in foreign affairs, including aid and trade matters. We have entered a period of "peaceful coexistence" in the Middle East in which the nationalism and neutralism will erode our "favored nation" status and do some damage to our special interests; this damage will be tolerable. At the same time, the USSR will be unable to establish a degree of influence which will give the Soviets a dominant influence in the area. The evidence available does not support the contention that the activities of the USSR in the area are the manifestations of a Communist conspiracy controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union calculated to rapidly extend Soviet influence into the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea Basin, North Africa, the Persian Gulf, the western Indian Ocean and East Africa. The combined restraints of nationalism, political neutralism and the general climate of improving U.S.-Soviet relations on a world-wide basis will keep the Soviet presence in the Middle East in the next decade or two at a level that is tolerable to the U.S.

Assumption B (The more pessimistic American viewpoint)

The Soviet presence in the Middle East has reached a level which provides the USSR the opportunity and probably the capability to
establish, in the next decade or two, a domi-
nant position in the Middle East which will
damage U.S. and free world principal interests
in the Middle East; Soviet influence in Africa,
the Indian Ocean and Europe will, with control
of the Middle East in Soviet hands, be signi-
ficantly strengthened. In the short term and
as a direct result of Soviet pressure to con-
solidate its position in the Middle East, poli-
tical polarization of the area into basically
revolutionary and moderate blocs will increase,
tensions will grow, the level of violence in
the area will rise; the U.S. and the free world
will be faced with the choice of either increas-
ing support to the moderate anti-Communist bloc
or accepting a dominant USSR role in the Middle
East. The Soviet strategy and strength is based
on the continuing primary role of the Communist
Party within the Soviet power structure and on
a combination of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and
the geopolitical realities which give the Soviet
Union, in this region of the world, a marked
advantage over all other Great Powers.

The history of the late 'sixties and the 'seventies
may be written in the broad middle range of the spectrum
provided by these two slightly extreme assumptions. How-
ever, there is not now sufficient agreement regarding
future developments in the Middle East to undertake plan-
ning of U.S. policy on a narrower assumption. Thus, for
the present, U.S. Middle East policy planning must allow
for a spectrum of assumptions broad enough to include
both Assumption A and Assumption B.

III. POLICY PLANNING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In planning a policy for the Middle East we must
identify our interests in the area, identify the resources
and forces in the area which are favorable to the protection of our interests and then identify and assess the threats, both internal and external to the area, which jeopardize our "vital interests". To provide perspective we must examine the geopolitical considerations. Finally, we must examine all of these together, employing not only the machinery of government but also the wisdom and experience of public figures who have independently from the policy-making machinery of government, involved themselves in the process of planning a policy. The appearances of George F. Kennan, eminent scholar of Soviet affairs, and Edwin O. Reischauer, the distinguished leader in oriental studies at Harvard, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early February 1967 clearly fall into this latter category; and what they had to say has considerable relevance to our reappraisal of U.S. Middle East policy. Mostly their views had to do with the character of the threat from the Soviet Union and Communist China; neither went in any depth into our "vital interests" that may be threatened by either of the Communist Great Powers; Dr. Reischauer did become quite explicit in recommending a U.S. policy for Asia. It would appear at least worthwhile to transpose his proposals for dealing with Asian countries threatened by Chinese Communists to the Middle East area where the
threat is not primarily Chinese but Russian.

Dr. Reischauer in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee declared: "I believe we have tended to overestimate Communist (China) strength and its immediate menace to our interests and to its neighbors....the threat of unitary world Communism sweeping Asia has largely faded, and the menace of Chinese domination -- if ever it was a real menace in the military sense -- is growing weaker." Dr. Reischauer proposed that:

a. "The United States should try to minimize our military involvements and military commitments" because American military power "is not very effective" in combatting guerrilla wars and subversion and because "our vital interests are not likely to be threatened" in most places.

b. The United States should "not try to induce" Asian nations to join formal alliances with Washington because these are "not likely to be as effective in giving them security as their own unfettered nationalism".

c. The United States should "not sponsor political, social or economic change" in Asian countries because this draws us into assuming "responsibility for the existence or nature of
a regime". Washington should be receptive to requests for economic aid that would promote progress, leaving the initiative to the Asians.

d. The United States should avoid the role of "leader in Asia", rallying allies to our policies, seeking rather to withdraw "to the role of a friendly outside supporter of individual and collective Asian initiatives".

Although Dr. Reischauer was speaking of our interests in Asia and the Chinese threat, it seems useful to examine the general thrust of his proposals in a Middle East context and vis-a-vis the Soviet -- as opposed to the Chinese -- threat. Transposed, Reischauer's proposal would read something like this:

a. The U.S. should try to minimize our military involvement and military commitments. CENTO should be permitted to expire at an early date; perhaps, a loose military cooperation among the westward-leaning countries could develop counter-insurgency and countersubversive capabilities to meet their common security needs. The threat of a Soviet-armed attack has diminished; none of our vital interests appear to be threatened. We should encourage the Middle East countries, including those in the RCD, to diversify sources
and reduce the level of arms acquisitions.

d. As CENTO disappears we should "not try to induce" Middle East nations to join any new formal alliance with the U.S. because these are "not likely to be as effective in giving them security as their own unfettered nationalism".

c. The United States should "not sponsor political, social or economic change in Middle East countries", etc.

d. The United States should avoid the role of "leader in the Middle East", rallying allies to our policies, seeking rather to withdraw "to the role of a friendly outside supporter of individual and collective Middle East initiatives".

If our Assumption A appears to be valid as we move into the next few years, there is much to be said for developing U.S. policy for the Middle East along the lines of Dr. Reischauer's proposals. We could, while avoiding the question of an alliance, quietly support the RCD, including a degree of cooperation in dealing with mutual security problems. The general disengagement from the area in 1964 and 1965 has already produced a degree of U.S. withdrawal from leadership, from sponsoring political, social and economic change and from assuming responsibility for "the existence and nature of a regime".
Asia is not the Middle East; the Chinese are not the Soviets; geopolitical factors -- as seen from Washington -- are dissimilar. Particularly significant, the Chinese have in Asia nothing resembling the array of Soviet "proxy military bases" that have been established throughout the Middle East -- bases involving large quantities of first-line Soviet conventional weapons systems in the hands of revolutionary regimes avowedly hostile to Middle East countries that are not pro-Moscow in their orientation. These "proxy bases" would be less significant if these revolutionary regimes were to act with less hostility, if the Soviet influence on these revolutionary regimes were to show signs of recession and if the flow of arms from Moscow were to be drastically reduced. Were these changes to occur, a degree of American withdrawal from the Middle East comparable to that Dr. Reischauer proposes for Asia would merit serious consideration.

George F. Kennan's public testimony before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee included the statement that belated U.S. recognition of Soviet strategy in extending Communism to all of Eastern Europe and part of Central Europe at the end of World War II left the U.S. with little choice but to accept it since it had occurred; the alternative
was another war. Much of his speech dealt with the polycentric character of modern Communism; he observed that "unity of the Communist Bloc is a matter of the past". He found it "impossible to generalize, today, about Communism as a problem in the spectrum of American foreign policy".

Ambassador Kennan warned that Soviet Communism continues to reflect "elements of Communist ideology that are adverse to our concepts as well as our interests".

Probably most relevant to our efforts to appraise the Soviet threat to the Middle East was his observation that USSR foreign policy was likely to reflect two components -- the one "Communist ideological commitment", the other, "Russia as simply another great power with its own interests and concerns, often necessarily in conflict with our own but not tragically so -- a power different in many respects, but perhaps no longer an essential one from what Russia would have been had there been no Communist revolution in that country 50 years ago".

Ambassador Kennan did not address himself to Soviet policies and aims in specific areas. Nor did he offer policy proposals for dealing with the Soviet threat to the Middle East that compare in any way with those Professor Reischauer made in his testimony. The assumption
that Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Middle East today reflects a combination of the historical expansionist drive of Czarist Russia and an element of "Communist ideological commitment" can be inferred from Ambassador Kennan's views.

IV. UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States has certain identified and declared interests in all areas of the world; we want a world at peace; we still -- 25 years later -- want people to enjoy freedom from want, fear and disease; we are interested in a balance between population and food production; we favor social and economic progress -- particularly for the struggling new nations; and we favor a measure of freedom in political matters. We associate the U.S. with these not only because we want a good image; more pragmatically we know that a world with too few of these benefits in too many places will sooner or later militate directly against our own national well-being and security.

Aside from these we have, in most areas, a number of more tangible interests which are demonstrably vital to our national goals and security.

The vital interests of the United States in the Middle East are not fixed; regional interests derive largely from well-defined broad national interests and these change over the decades as world political alignments
shift, strategic military concepts and weapons systems are modified and technological and economic factors give new dimensions to the weight and use of national power. A great deal has been written about Sea Power versus Land Power and presumably geopolitical science is in the process of modernization to take into account modern air power and ICBM's as well as the population explosion and the burgeoning crisis in food production. Also, even principal or "vital" interests in an area must be more precisely defined. Oil in the Middle East is a vital interest. We are interested in Middle East oil as a potential source of industrial power for our own industry, as a source of power for the industry of our allies in Europe and those elsewhere in the free world whose economic health is essential to our own national security. We are interested in the oil that produces income to support those regimes which we judge to be friendly to the U.S. and thus considerate of our interests. We are interested in the American oil companies involved in all phases of oil exploration, production, shipping, processing and marketing because their successes or failures are reflected in our balance of payments and thus the basic strength of the U.S. dollar. In 1964, the U.S. petroleum industry accounted for about a third of net U.S. overseas investment, yet produced over 50% of total U.S. direct
investment income. For the same reason, we are interested in the oil companies of friendly countries because the stability of their currencies is likewise dependent on a sound position in world trade. Our friends also have balance of payments problems.

The main air and sea routes between Europe and Asia go through the Middle East. This is partly due to geography and partly due to the fact that the Communist countries have not been as cooperative as the free world countries in granting transit rights to foreign ships and planes. At least in theory, rigidly neutral or pro-Communist regimes in Algiers, the Sudan, the UAR, Syria, Iraq and Iran would give the USSR a controlling position over all of the air routes between Europe and the Indian Ocean. This would impinge on U.S. interests only to the degree that our political commitments -- to India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan among others -- and our strategic military plans require the movement of U.S. military aircraft between these two major regions of the world. It is clear that the UK, during the next few years, will have an interest in an overflight agreement with Turkey and Iran along the Van corridor because of the fact that they will have RAF elements in the Persian Gulf, cannot count on the Libya-Sudan-Aden route and must be able to move aircraft and troops between Europe and the Gulf in times of crisis. It would appear, given our continued
military commitments in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, that both the U.S. and UK should identify military air routes, overflight and transit landing arrangements between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean as a vital interest. Although there has been some deterioration of relations among the CENTO countries, it would appear that this alliance, at a minimum, provides an arrangement that protects this interest.

The U.S. cannot make the assumption that it will not, under any circumstances, become involved in a military action in the Middle East. At a minimum, it must be able to deal with limited war contingencies, including those in which it would wish to provide substantial support to those countries who might elect to fight for their own independence if threatened by a Soviet "proxy war". It is not inconceivable, for example, that the UAR could -- after establishing a revolutionary nationalist regime in Aden -- subvert and attempt to take over Saudi Arabia. This development could provoke a reaction from other threatened countries, including present members of CENTO, who would join forces militarily and turn to the U.S. for assistance. Assuming that the U.S. and the USSR would refrain from active involvement of their forces in combat roles, the confrontation would be by proxy -- at a level somewhat higher than the Yemen conflict and with political
polarization in the area substantially advanced from its present state. In this or any other variation of a Middle East limited war -- including active fighting between India and China -- an established basis for limited military cooperation (overflights, transit base arrangements, communications facilities, supply depots and dumps) with a combination of Middle East countries would remain an absolute requirement. Some type of military cooperation -- even one as maligned and superficial as CENTO -- offers the only identified solution to this problem. The alternative is to base U.S. Middle East policy on the premise that the U.S. can, short of a general nuclear war, offer no country in the Middle East or "East of Suez" any assurance, explicit or implicit, of military assistance of any kind. Over a period of time this U.S. posture would effectively destroy the credibility of any positive U.S. policy in the area. Such a posture could, of course, reduce our identifiable vital interests in that part of the world. We would have no need for military agreements.
V. THE U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1967-75

Facing Moscow from a central vantage point in
the Middle East we can observe the main line of resist-
ance established in the 'fifties with Pakistan holding
an open flank and the left anchored solidly in the more
stable NATO of that time. In the decade that has passed,
the Soviets have all but turned the Pakistan flank, have
taken major areas to the rear of our main line and have
split NATO down the center -- leaving a weakened position
in Greece, Turkey and the Middle East. Small Soviet
forces dropped deep in our rear areas in Africa have been
unable to hold positions taken after light skirmishing;
but at the same time our forces on the front along the
Soviet border are openly fraternizing with the enemy.
But reassuringly our Sixth Fleet still dominates the Medi-
terranean and American military power in Europe ensures
the credibility of the NATO defense and our Middle East
commitments. But is all of this really as it appears to
be? To answer this question we can logically first examine
the security of our flanks, then our main line and finally
the security of our rear areas in the Arabian Peninsula,
the Red Sea Basin, East Africa and the Mediterranean.

Pakistan - the Eastern Flank of the Middle
East

On the assumption that China is the principal threat
east of the Indus and the USSR is the principal threat west of the Indus, the U.S. must pursue policies that relate to each threat. Thus, from Pakistan westward we must emphasize that the Soviet Union remains the main threat and China is a more remote and secondary threat; from India eastward, we must emphasize China as the main threat with the USSR relegated to the role of the secondary threat.

Pragmatically, we will tolerate a degree of Soviet presence east of the Indus that would be intolerable in Pakistan and the Middle East. Thus, the Soviet presence in India, in Indonesia and even in Hanoi -- while still undesirable in the long run -- is tolerable. Conversely, the present level of Chicom presence and influence in Pakistan is tolerable. This policy must be explained to the South Asian countries as being essential to the protection of our vital interests; we should not permit the Pakistan-Indian conflict over Kashmir to distort this policy.

It is essential to our Middle East policy that Pakistan's role as an integrated member of the region be preserved. This is Pakistan's natural role in terms of her culture, religion and her geography. Her only meaningful alliance is in CENTO. Her other interests in regional developments is in the RCD. When the role of
Pakistan within this Middle East region becomes uncertain, the solidarity and cohesiveness of the entire region suffers. Our Pakistan policy 1961-65 contributed directly to the deterioration of U.S. influence in much of the Middle East. Our insistence that Pakistan be judged within an Asian rather than a Middle East context has been the principal cause of the deterioration of our relations with Pakistan.

The U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge that the complex of Soviet-armed revolutionary regimes in the Near East, in the Horn of Africa and in the Mediterranean constituted a Soviet threat to CENTO, to NATO and to friendly governments in the area that had not been swept by revolution has been a major irritant in U.S. relations with some Middle East countries (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) and a significant contributing factor in the weakening of our position throughout the area.

The U.S. must, at least privately, clearly indicate to the leaders of countries in the area that the level of Soviet influence, the magnitude of Soviet arms deliveries and the apparent intention of the USSR in providing these arms is regarded by the U.S. as a distinct threat to the area. It should be an immediate aim of the U.S. to engage
to arrive at an agreed estimate of the scope and character of the threat. In recent years, the United States Government has consistently deprecated the Soviet threat and Middle East leaders who have felt threatened by Soviet expansion have inevitably exaggerated the threat. On the other hand, Middle East leaders who have become heavily dependent on Soviet aid and have contributed to the expansion of Soviet and Communist influence in the area have consistently assured the United States Government that Soviet and Communist influence in the area is minimal. The U.S. can only benefit by providing all Middle East countries with an unslanted appreciation of Soviet intentions and capabilities in the area.

The CENTO Alliance, however eroded and quiescent, remains indispensable. It is essential that we do not permit any further erosion of CENTO. The RGD countries, with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and possibly Iraq and Kuwait, have taken the first steps in developing a regional structure which is potentially a viable regional collective security arrangement. In the short term it is not an alternative to CENTO. The common interest of moderate Middle East governments in a loose regional cooperation in both economic and military affairs is based on the following factors:
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a. A common concern regarding the Soviet presence in the Middle East and shared frustration and distrust at continuing U.S. refusal to acknowledge any threat to the area beyond that of a Soviet military invasion -- increasingly remote by all estimates.

b. Recognition that the end of British military influence not "East of Suez" but "East of Gibraltar" is in sight.

c. Recognition that, with the exception of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, there is no U.S. military presence in the area; U.S. military commitments to NATO are on the wane and U.S. strategic reserves in the continental U.S. are depleted by Vietnam.

d. A desire to reduce the degree of U.S. control over the end use of arms acquired by Middle East countries. This manifests itself in (1) the expansion of local munitions industries, (2) the diversification of sources of arms purchases and (3) the acquisition of arms from both Communist and free world sources.

e. Growing nationalism and neutralism in each country.
In summary, we should encourage Pakistan to limit her relations with China; discourage any military relationship with the USSR; support her involvement in the RCD; influence her to maintain her CENTO role and bilateral cooperation with the United States and avoid confrontation with India. We should emphasize that our interests in Pakistan are best served if we encourage her to look westward for her ties. The U.S. should, in turn, assess Pakistan's behavior and value to us primarily within a Middle East-Africa-European context. Short of either armed conflict with India or resumption of an expanding political and military relationship with China, Pakistan's policies to the east should not be a matter of great concern to the U.S.

India - An area of U.S. Political Commitment in Asia and a Complicating Factor vis-a-vis our Middle East Policy

India should be told that U.S. interests are served by Pakistan remaining a stable and loyal member of the Middle East community -- whether it be CENTO or the RCD. This is a favorable time to advise India that this is to be U.S. policy and attempt to persuade India that it is one that is tolerable to India. Her border defenses against China have been significantly strengthened since 1962; China's position in Tibet is weakened by China's troubles at home; the Pakistan-Chinese cooperation developed
under Bhutto's initiative has militarily levelled off at a point that does not threaten India. India, on the other hand, demonstrated its military superiority over Pakistan in 1965 and has, since the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir clashes of 1965, purchased Soviet and Czech armored equipment, artillery, SA-2's and pressed ahead with its MIG 21 program adding substantially to the superiority over Pakistan which it had in 1965.

More important, India should not ignore the threat to her security and independence in a further expansion of Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and in India itself. Soviet domination of the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa would interdict the principal sea and air routes between India and the Atlantic -- reducing the foreign policy options open to India.

Finally, India should understand that the U.S. regards India as an integral element of Asia and the westernmost anchor of what the U.S. hopes will be a community of Asian nations who cooperate in their own development and in the containment of Communist China. Pakistan, on the other hand, is the key eastern flank of a logical Middle East community which faces a serious Soviet threat which appears to combine all the historic expansionist aims of
Czarist Russia with what remains a highly effective apparatus developed in the past 50 years within the ideological context of Communism. Technological changes in transportation, communications, weapons systems -- plus the beginning of the industrial revolution in the new developing nations and the apparently insatiable desires of these nations for acquiring modern weapons systems -- all contribute to the opportunities for the USSR to expand its influence rapidly.

The character of the U.S. Asia policy should be apparent to India from our many commitments in Asia today, including our continuing support of India in many fields. Conversely, India must appreciate that we attach equal importance to the regions west of India -- the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The support we have given and will continue to give to Pakistan is simply an integral element of our Middle East policy. It is entirely a coincidence that India and Pakistan have an unresolved territorial dispute that coincides geographically with the watershed of free world dispositions against the two major Communist threats -- China and the Soviet Union. This arbitrary line has taken on greater significance, in terms of U.S. strategic planning, as the Sino-Soviet rift has grown. The U.S. cannot, without sacrificing vital interests in both areas, accommodate its broader
strategic policies to this unresolved dispute between two great friendly nations. Both Pakistan and India must accept this reality of our analysis of the threat to peace and our strategy for dealing with it.

Turkey - Linch Pin of NATO and the Middle East

Austria, Switzerland and France now form a solid barrier of sovereign territory separating the northern European NATO countries from the NATO powers which touch the shores of the Mediterranean. Isolated from the main centers of NATO air and land forces in Northern Europe, Italy, Greece and Turkey have become, as a result of internal NATO developments, a weakened sector of the NATO defense line. The Cyprus problem has, since early 1964, further contributed to dissension and weakening of the NATO force in Southeast Europe. The credibility of the NATO deterrent in South Europe has become increasingly dependent on the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The elimination of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean and the elimination of the U.S. and UK air bases in the Mediterranean are short-term Soviet objectives. The development of political and military pressures to accomplish this objective is now becoming apparent in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy, in its military and economic aid programs and in the total effort of its overt and covert
instruments which can be brought to bear on this task.

The Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Balkan Communist countries and Southeast Europe is developing along lines that are, compared to the more rigid relationship in Central Europe, flexible and pliant; the neutralization of Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran and the creation of a mood of detente in Southeast Europe are the logical purposes of sharply increased Soviet aid, trade and diplomatic activities in the past two years.

In the Soviet view, the central foreign policy problem is "Germany and European security". The defection of France and the separation of NATO forces into "NATO North" and "NATO South" have created circumstances in which the Soviets can evolve a separate strategy for dealing with the two sectors of the NATO defensive alliance. Rapid change in the northern sector is, given the character of the German problem, unlikely. Soviet strategy is to reduce the geographical perimeter of what has now in reality become a North Atlantic and a Northern European defense organization centered on Germany and to further isolate it from "NATO South". Politically, the Soviets will now use all means available to sharpen the image of "peaceful coexistence" in the southern Danube Basin and the Eastern Mediterranean. Soviet policy
against Greece, the RCD area, and the Arab Near East, North Africa and the Red Sea Basin will set as its immediate goals in the period 1967-75:

a. The establishment of the Lower Danube Basin, the Mediterranean and the Northern Tier of the Near East as a showcase of "peaceful coexistence".

b. The elimination of "imperialism" and "colonialism" or "neo-colonialism" from the Arab Near East, the Red Sea Basin and North Africa through continuing support of "just wars of national liberation".

c. The neutralization of the RCD area.

d. The establishment of a decisive military advantage in the Middle East through (1) expansion of the Soviet "proxy military bases", i.e., "progressive" governments heavily armed with Soviet weapons and (2) preemptive military aid programs to reduce first U.S. and later European influence exercised through military aid -- sales and grants.

e. The elimination of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.

f. The extension of Soviet sea power into the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean.
and the Persian Gulf through (1) expansion of Soviet Naval and Maritime presence and influence, (2) expansion of Soviet "proxy naval bases" and fleets and (3) preemptive military, i.e., Navy, aid programs to reduce U.S. and European influence exercised in the role of supplier of naval equipment through sales and grant aid.

The Soviets probably see Turkey, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and, of a lesser scale, a potentially resistant Iran as the strong points which obstruct the open road to the south. Unless the Shah, who is realistic and restless about Soviet designs in the area, takes action which interferes with Soviet short-term designs in the Arab world, the USSR will wait for the Shah to pass; meantime, they will continue their quiet penetration of Persian society. "Peaceful coexistence" in the southern NATO countries and the realities of growing Soviet power in the Mediterranean sooner or later will cause the Americans to withdraw their fleet from the confines of the Mediterranean. Until this is accomplished, the Sixth Fleet will be a worrisome factor always presenting a risk of U.S. involvement in a Middle East "brush fire war" which the Soviets do not want -- knowing

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it could have adverse affects on Soviet 1967-75 strategy for the area. But it is Turkey which, in the long run, poses the single most serious obstacle to Soviet strategy in the Middle East. Astride Soviet egress from the Black Sea and ostensibly one of the nations of the world most resistant to Soviet influence, Turkey appears to be a strong point that may have to be bypassed and isolated.

Soft spots such as the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea Basin and -- once the Sixth Fleet is gone -- Libya, pose for the Soviets only the question of when and not if or how. A wrong sequence or bad timing in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Ethiopia could set in motion a chain reaction bringing a unified U.S., Turkish and Iranian alliance into being aimed not, like CENTO, at containing Soviet forces within the borders of the USSR but at the containment of Soviet influence exercised through Soviet surrogates, subversion and "proxy military bases".

The Soviets have thus far not exposed their attitude to the idea of a disarmament arrangement -- including the possibility of a "nuclear free zone" for the Middle East and possibly, by extension, the Mediterranean and Africa. Certainly the objective of any disarmament scheme of interest to the Soviet Union would initially be to eliminate
U.S. military power without sacrificing Soviet superiority in arms for "liberation wars".

Also, as the separation from Northern Europe of "NATO South" progresses, the Soviets may contemplate -- as a last resort -- a limited war involving Turkey with Soviet and Balkan military power as the best way to reduce the proportions of the Turkish problem and as a means of demonstrating to the NATO nations of Northern Europe that U.S. strategic nuclear power will not be used to defend Europe. The risk of such a war would obviously remain far too high as long as Italy, Greece and Turkey remain closely associated with the central NATO military command and the Sixth Fleet remains in the Mediterranean.

The central importance of Turkey in any U.S. strategy to maintain any vital U.S. interests in the area appears to be self-evident. This premise has not, however, always been evident in U.S. policy decisions during the past five years. Cyprus, our troubles in NATO, U.S. preoccupation with the Southeast Asian war, rising nationalism in Turkey, Turkey's status as "the poor man in NATO", our dwindling ability to subsidize the Turkish military establishment and the growing Soviet presence and influence on all sides have produced strains in a bilateral
relationship, closely associated with NATO, that remained exemplary until after the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962. In spite of this, Turkey remains the strongest and most reliable ally in the Middle East; our common interests and the basis for a satisfactory relationship between the U.S. and Turkey remain intact.

Greece and Italy are probably regarded as very manageable foreign policy problems within the Soviet strategy which has been outlined. Both have weak governments under growing pressures from the left. Each is remote enough from Berlin and Aden to have no deep sense of commitment in the tests of strength that lie ahead in Germany and the Arabian Peninsula. Geographically, neither has an identifiable conflict with the USSR. There is an emerging atmosphere of trade, tourism and "peaceful coexistence" in Europe's sunny south. Assuming that the Soviets calculate that they will be able to pursue, with expectations of success, a softer policy toward Greece and Italy than toward Turkey, the Soviets probably will remain highly flexible on Cyprus, ensuring that the initiative slowly moving Cyprus toward independence and association with the Afro-Asian nations is homegrown and not a policy too openly encouraged and supported by Moscow.
The struggle for control of the oil-rich and strategically important Arab Near East and its contiguous water passage has reached an advanced stage. Soviet hopes are pinned, by their own admission, on President Nasser's Arab Socialist Movement and his active support of Marxist indoctrinated subversive and terrorist groups in virtually every other Arab country. Domination of the entire Arabian Peninsula, Syria and the Tigris-Euphrates valley is the objective of the tough, flexible but persistent Soviet effort.

In the present phase of the second Arab revolution, Soviet aims are limited to the reduction of Western presence and influence to a level that will permit the Soviets to seek Arab unity through the extension of the Arab Socialist Revolution to this entire area. Soviet priorities within the Arab Near East are not based on a fixed pattern; whether the flag of the Arab Socialist Revolution flies first in Aden or Jidda, in Kuwait or Amman, is merely a matter of immediate tactics; in encouraging the Arab revolutionaries, the single Soviet caveat is that a military confrontation with the U.S. must be avoided. Although Soviet influence is exerted through all the instruments of aid, trade and political action, the Russians
know, in the final analysis, that Communist writ does not run unless supported by Communist arms. Unable to parley Soviet holdings at the end of World War II into agreement to keep Soviet troops in the Middle East, the Russians have had to fall back on a proxy military presence -- Soviet arms in the hands of the revolutionary regimes. The critical elements of Soviet strategy are these "proxy military bases" and "liberation wars" fought with Soviet arms. Ultimately, the success or failure of the Soviet Middle East policy in the period 1967-75 will be decided, in the first instance, by Soviet arms.

"Proxy Bases", "Proxy Wars" and Geopolitics

In North Vietnam skies American air power is taking the measure of a hastily organized Soviet air defense system built around the familiar MIG-SAM complex. Soviet technicians continue to play a key role in the missile system. In Tonkin Gulf and occasionally along the North Vietnam coast, small North Vietnamese naval craft sally forth for direct attacks on the ships of the U.S. carrier fleet. This confrontation of American air and naval power with a Soviet weapons system in this "proxy" Moscow-Peiping war in Southeast Asia joins an issue that is central to Soviet strategy in the Middle East, Africa and
the Mediterranean. At stake is the viability of the concept of the Soviet "proxy military bases" that stretch from Algiers to Hanoi as defended safe havens and support bases for what Khrushchev called the "just wars of national liberation".

In recent weeks official Washington has been hit by the sudden realization that the British really were going to leave Aden within the next year and were increasing the tempo of British withdrawal from her few remaining bases along the sea lanes that served the Empire. From India to the Mediterranean, the Russians are on the move to the south, hastening the British departure from the "Rimlands" of the "World Island" as the great land mass of Europe, Asia and Africa has been described by the most eminent geographer of the 20th Century, Sir Halford Mackinder. Communist Russia may be succeeding where Czarist Russia was left with only unfulfilled aspirations to extend her borders to the warm water ports on the Indian Ocean.

The modern Russians of the USSR have an impressive array of advantages over the rulers of the Russian Empire before the Revolution: (1) The British Empire has collapsed in the years since World War II; the last vestiges of British power, which in the 19th Century
contained Russian expansionism, are being swept away.
(2) Technological changes in communications and transport have given the USSR, as the great land power of Eastern Europe, a rapidly increased ability to extend her presence and influence into the "Rimlands" of South Asia and the Near East. (3) In conventional air and land power, the USSR has an overwhelming superiority which is magnified by her favorable interior military communications lines; the U.S., the only potential Great Power opponent of the USSR in the Middle East, has virtually no military forces in the area; its ability to support and supply friendly forces is rigidly limited by the length and vulnerability of U.S. military communications lines stretching back to the United States or to "NATO North". (4) From the Red Sea to the Bay of Bengal there is virtually no country that can be described as a naval power; nor is there British and U.S. naval strength now positioned between Southeast Asia and Suez of real significance. Furthermore, few countries -- Saudi Arabia and Iran are possible exceptions -- are prepared to assume the political liability involved in providing a U.S. Fleet the type of base and communications facilities that are required to maintain permanently major naval elements half-way around the world from the United States. Joint U.S. and UK consideration of possible measures to improve
the facilities to support a naval force operating in
the Indian Ocean do not, in this sense, appear to be
of great significance. Even a modest introduction of
Soviet naval power, including Soviet naval equipment
in the hands of military aid clients of the USSR, would
leave the USSR the strongest naval power in the Indian
Ocean. (5) Politically, the entire area has fragmented
in the wake of the British withdrawal; instability is
endemic and growing. (6) Communism provides ideological
commitment and indigenous support to what might other-
wise be Great Power imperialism as practiced by the
Czrist Russians.

History, since the October Revolution in 1917, and
particularly the events of World War II, has set the
stage for the present Soviet expansion of power fore-
seen as logical and inevitable by Sir Halford Mackinder in
his essays published in 1919. Marx, Lenin, the 1917 Re-
volution, the decline of the British Empire, Soviet con-
trol of East Europe at the end of World War II and the
technological revolution of the 20th Century all favor
Russian aspirations in the Middle East.

The "Heartland" as Mackinder eventually defined it
had boundaries that included "The Baltic, the navigable
middle and lower Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor,
Armenia, Persia, Tibet and Mongolia" -- areas that the Communists control or have attempted to control since the end of World War II. In answering those who question why the Soviets would be interested in South Arabia, one should not overlook Mackinder's conclusion that "a great military power in possession of the Heartland and of Arabia could take easy possession of the crossways of the World at Suez".

Anyone who has travelled repeatedly in the past decade along the countries lying contiguous to the Balkans, the Soviet Union, Sinkiang and Tibet cannot have failed to observe the pattern of dramatic improvement in the lines of communication and transportation that tie Central Asia and Eastern Europe with the traditional sphere of British influence "East of Suez" -- Mackinder's "Rimlands". Not only are the north-south lines of communications proliferating and modernizing, but tied into these is a modern east-west transport and communications network connecting Northern Persia, Afghanistan, Northern Pakistan and the northern reaches of the Indian sub-continent. Mackinder noted that "the facts of geography remain, and offer ever-increasing strategical opportunities to land power....particularly as technical developments in transport and military mobility....make possible the political integration of larger and larger land areas".
In the past decade the Soviets have given massive military assistance to non-Communist regimes in the Afro-Asian world. Initially, they placed arms in the hands of regimes which had come to power through revolution and were sympathetic to the Soviet policy of support to "national liberation movements" and "just wars of national liberation". In each instance, the USSR has appeared willing to provide an air defense complex built around MIG's and Surface-to-Air-Missiles, accompanied by large quantities of conventional but first-line arms for ground forces and, except for land-locked Afghanistan, small but modern naval equipment. Such bases have been developed in the UAR, Algiers and Syria in the Mediterranean. In Cyprus, the Soviets have a foot in the door with a SAM agreement in late 1964 which has not been completed; more recently the Czechs have sold conventional arms and provided trainers. The UAR has provided some clandestine training in the operation of Soviet equipment and has handled some phases of Soviet deliveries to Cyprus.

On the Red Sea, Soviet "proxy bases" are
developing in the Yemen, in Somalia and, of course, in the UAR. East of Aden, India has become primarily dependent on the USSR for planes, SAM's, tanks and some naval equipment. Pakistan is getting some Soviet military equipment. Afghanistan is, like India, heavily armed with Soviet gear. Iran has just completed a major purchase. Iraq, critically situated at the head of the Gulf, has long been a principal military aid client of Moscow. Nepal, strategically situated between India and the historically contested areas between China and Russia, is the latest addition to the USSR arms clientele.

The concept of the "proxy base" supporting a "proxy war" is moving into the final and decisive phases in Southeast Asia and in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus far, the UAR, massively armed by the USSR, has remained an inviolate base; likewise, the airfields, ports and major military facilities of the Yemen have been free of external military pressure. In Vietnam, the Soviets have fared less well; starting with the incident at the Tonkin Gulf, the U.S. has step-by-step
increased the military attacks on selected targets in North Vietnam. That the Communist world sees in this a danger to the basic pattern for providing armed support to "wars of national liberation" is dramatically apparent in the hue and cry that has been generated around the world to "stop the bombing" in North Vietnam.

In the Middle East, the U.S. has carefully avoided any suggestion that U.S. military power would be used directly on any "proxy base" from which attacks on other countries have been made. Beyond this, it has been explicit U.S. policy that American arms provided to one country for defense purposes must be used exclusively for that purpose. Thus, unless a Soviet-armed revolutionary regime attempts to support an armed "liberation struggle" within a country which has been equipped with U.S. weapons, it is unlikely that U.S. arms in the Middle East will be used against a "national liberation" force armed with Soviet weapons.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Middle East, including the area from India to the Mediterranean, is one of the world's strategically important areas; through it pass the main air and sea lanes connecting the Atlantic Community with Asia, the air, sea and land routes connecting Eastern Europe and Central Asia with the Indian Ocean and Africa. The region contains 70% of the known oil reserves of the world. In terms of the balance of power derived from advanced weapons systems, control of the area that stretches along the southern borders of the Soviet Union still remains of critical importance to the adversaries of the USSR and thus to the USSR.

British withdrawal following World War II was followed by a decade in which new governments were taking their first steps, a combination of British and American aid and assistance linked with mutual security arrangements provided the essential support for early development and a degree of stability; the Soviets, concentrating in Europe on consolidating their position and at home on recovering from the war, did not pose an immediate threat to the area. In the 1958-57 decade, the Soviets, accepting for the present the status quo in Europe, have turned south to concentrate their major efforts outside of the
Bloc in establishing the USSR as the dominant Great Power in the Middle East. In this decade, British power in the area has all but collapsed; the U.S., never militarily strong "East of Suez", has moved into a period of retrenchment and disengagement based partly on lack of agreement within the United States Government on the nature and seriousness of the threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, partly on limited resources and partly on a conscious readjustment of policy toward a less militant resistance to the expansion of Soviet influence into the area.

The thrust of Soviet power and influence to the south in the past decade and Soviet potential for becoming the dominant influence in the area in the next decade reflects: (a) the historical and unaltered aims of Czarist Russia to expand the Empire to warm water ports in the south, (b) an appreciation by the modern Soviets of the geopolitical advantages which, while always inherent in their control of Eastern Europe, have been improved by technological developments and the geographical expansion of the Communist Empire as a result of World War II, (c) an appreciation by the Soviets of the geopolitical disadvantages of any Great Power -- particularly the U.S. -- which might attempt to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and (d) Soviet pragmatism in exploiting the apparatus
and ideological commitment of the Communist movement.

The United States should, for the foreseeable future, regard the Soviet presence and present Soviet policy in the Middle East as the primary threat to vital U.S. interests.

The impact of Soviet and Chinese Communism on free world interests is cumulative; however, the existence of the Sino-Soviet rift and geopolitical realities dictate that the U.S. deal separately with the Chinese and Soviet threats. In examining its Middle East interests and policies, the U.S. should proceed from a central assumption that the Soviet threat is greater and predominant west of the Indus Valley; the threat from China is dominant east of the Indus in India and the rest of Asia. While it is recognized that the India-Pakistan and Pakistan-China relationships will influence the behavior of Pakistan, we should primarily regard Pakistan as a member of the Middle East bloc of nations threatened primarily by the USSR. India, on the other hand, should be regarded primarily as a member of the Asian bloc threatened primarily by Communist China.

Estimates within the United States Government on the character of the Soviet threat in the Middle East to our vital interests range between the identification of the threat as being real, but tolerable (see Assumption A) to
the gloomier appraisal that an extension of the current trend will, within a few years, see the demise of U.S. influence and the destruction of U.S. interests in the area (see Assumption B).

Assuming that the United States Government is not prepared to abandon the Middle East to the Soviet Union -- a decision which would be tantamount to a return to a policy of isolation -- the U.S. policy must for the present be based on the more pessimistic of the two Assumptions while making allowances for the more optimistic.

In early 1963, after two years in office, President Kennedy identified Soviet announced policy of supporting "wars of national liberation" as the principal remaining obstacle to a satisfactory relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. The Soviets have continued to pursue this policy; the main threat to peace and to U.S. interests in the Middle East remains the revolutionary regimes, massively supported with Soviet arms, who continue aggressive actions against other Middle East and African countries.

While the Soviet presence consists of a combination of political, economic and military activities not unlike those of the United States in many Middle East countries, the critical element in Soviet strategy is the combination of Soviet "proxy military bases" and their unswerving commitment to support "just wars of national liberation".
This concept is being severely tested in Vietnam and in the Yemen; in each area the struggle is entering a critical phase. The Soviets know that the writ of Communism does not run unsupported by Soviet arms; thus, their "proxy military bases" and "proxy wars" are ultimately the element of Soviet policy in the developing areas which, they are aware, will spell success or failure.

CENTO represents an extension of U.S. policy aimed at the "containment of Soviet military power" spelled out in the Truman Doctrine twenty years ago. In the past decade, the eastern anchor of the CENTO line in Pakistan has been turned; the strong western flank solidly anchored in NATO has been weakened. Soviet "proxy bases" have been established to the rear of the "Northern Tier"; the CENTO powers are, without exceptions, following the U.S. example of seeking a detente with the USSR in matters of aid and trade -- including the first steps in purchasing Soviet less-sophisticated arms.

Ambivalently the U.S. has sought, in the past five years, to maintain some cohesion and militancy among those countries of the Middle East who have remained committed to oppose the extension of Soviet influence while cultivating and aiding the revolutionary regimes closest to the Soviets and intermittently making the detente with
Moscow the main theme of U.S.-Soviet relations. Torn between these two active policies, we have lost some credibility with all parties. The revolutionaries, noting our ultimate unwillingness to join them or even sanction their assault on moderate regimes, have moved steadily closer to Moscow; the moderates, frustrated by our unwillingness to recognize, identify and join them in opposing what in their view is a Soviet threat to the entire area, are unhappily thrashing about in search of alternative arrangements. In the process, the Soviet influence among both the revolutionary and moderate regimes has grown; the influence of the United States has diminished.

Nationalism and neutralism are growing forces in virtually every country. They are probably strong enough to keep all Great Power influence -- whether Soviet or U.S. -- at a level tolerable to their and our interests provided the Soviet "proxy military bases" in the hands of revolutionary forces do not become the dominant military power in the area. Soviet economic aid, trade, propaganda, subversion and manipulation of the Communist Parties will not together ensure the Soviets the degree of influence they seek; the critical ingredient is Soviet military regional predominance exercised through "proxy bases".

The major obstacles facing the Soviets in this strategy are (a) a tough, militarily strong, strategically
situated and traditionally anti-Russian Turkey, (b) the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and (c) an Iran which, though softer and less hostile than Turkey, shows some inclination under the Shah's leadership of becoming militantly involved in opposing the Soviet surrogates in the "liberation struggle" in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

The elimination of U.S. sea and air power from the Mediterranean is a Soviet objective integral to Soviet Middle East strategy. The defection of France from the NATO military structure, the isolation of Italy, Greece and Turkey from the main body of the North Atlantic elements of NATO, the intensification of political, economic and propaganda efforts to involve the Greeks and the Italians in more advanced phases of "peaceful co-existence", the extension of Soviet military and political influence in the Arab countries bordering on the Mediterranean add up to a Soviet "carrot and stick" policy to weaken "NATO South", un hinge the tattered CENTO line and bring about the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean.

The immediate Soviet objective is to support the efforts of revolutionary regimes to replace the British in South Arabia, undermine the British position in the Gulf, extend Soviet influence in the Arabian Peninsula and in
the Red Sea Basin. Concurrently, they will continue
their efforts to replace British influence in the areas
"East of Suez", preempts where necessary the limited
U.S. role in military arrangements.

The Soviets wish to avoid, at almost any cost, a
major Middle East confrontation with the U.S. as long as
the U.S. has maintained any real capability for military
action in the Near East. The Red Sea Basin, the Yemen
and South Arabia are regarded by the Soviets as areas in
which the U.S. has demonstrated little interest; the
expansion of Soviet influence in this area through direct
Soviet non-military measures combined with Soviet-armed
"national liberation forces" is regarded by the Soviets
as an acceptable risk. On the other hand, the Soviets
will be reluctant to see the "liberation struggle" reach
the point of armed conflict in the Mediterranean Basin as
long as (a) the Sixth Fleet is there, (b) the troops of
the south wing of NATO remain a viable military force
closely associated, within the SHAPE military command
structure, with the main NATO forces in Northern Europe
and (c) CENTO remains even at its present level of credi-
ability and cohesion.

If, within the Middle East region, the military
balance of power between the revolutionary and moderate
forces can be established and the Soviets denied an
extension of influence through Soviet "proxy military bases", the Soviet threat can be reduced to a tolerable level. Stated simply, most of the countries of the Middle East region are capable of withstanding the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as it is known in Western Europe; the Middle East cannot withstand the combined pressures of "peaceful coexistence" and Soviet support of "the liberation struggle" in the Middle East with massive Soviet arms aid.

The Soviets will not abandon their Middle East policy of creating "proxy bases" to provide support of the "liberation struggle" as long as it appears to be unopposed and carrying promise of success. Effective opposition does not exist; the Soviets continued support is a measure of the favor with which they view it.

In general, the U.S. has opposed the extension of Communist power through "wars of national liberation". One of President Kennedy's first acts in office was to establish a task force to develop "a U.S. strategy for dealing with Communist wars of national liberation". His first defense message to Congress in March 1961 proposed the expansion of armed forces capable of dealing with "sub-limited war". Twice in the Congo the U.S. has acted to deny the Soviets victory in the "liberation struggle in the Congo". In other places in Africa and the Western
Hemisphere, the U.S. has supported again and again the efforts of threatened governments to eliminate, in an early vulnerable stage, precariously established Soviet and Chinese "proxy bases". Finally, the U.S. role in the war in Vietnam is the ultimate evidence of the U.S. opposition to the expansion of Soviet and Chinese Communism through a "proxy war".

In the Middle East -- in contrast to our posture in Africa, in Southeast Asia and in parts of the Western Hemisphere -- the U.S. has been unwilling to describe the Soviet massive arms aid to the revolutionary regimes in terms of supporting "wars of national liberation"; additionally, the U.S. has not discriminated, in its conduct of U.S. foreign relations in the area, against those regimes which receive massive quantities of Soviet arms and are actively engaged in efforts to export their revolution.

A U.S. Middle East policy based on Assumption B, i.e., the pessimistic American viewpoint, would probably look very much like an up-dated version of the Truman Doctrine -- applied to the Middle East. Those revolutionary regimes armed by the Soviets and engaged in aggression against their neighbors would be identified and, in context of U.S. foreign policy, be the objects for discriminatory treatment. However, Assumption A in our planning, taking a more optimistic view of things, dictates that we
prudently move away from consideration of this extreme measure and search for a more flexible variation of our "containment" policy of twenty years ago. What is needed is a more subtle means of achieving the same credibility which our earlier policies accorded. In searching for this variation, we must be certain that we provide the Soviets and such Middle East leaders as President Nasser of the UAR with a full appreciation of both the best and worst light in which we see their current intentions and capabilities and of a corresponding flexibility in our U.S. policy.

To gain credibility for our hard-line policy based on our more pessimistic planning assumption we should do everything possible to preserve the internal Middle East military balance of power. This will involve the retention of a credible U.S. military deterrent force in the Middle East.

Concurrently, we should undertake the beginnings of what might be termed a Reischaueran approach to dealing with the Middle East. In many ways this would be the logical extension of our posture in 1965 and 1966 throughout the area. Without jeopardizing our short-term policy objective of maintaining the internal Middle East military balance of power and persuading the Soviets and their military clients to abandon the arms race, we
should look toward "minimizing our military involvements and military commitments", avoid alliances, encourage nationalism, "not sponsor political, economic and social change", "avoid the role of leader" in the Middle East and, in general, play the role of "friendly outside supporter" responsive to the constructive initiative of the countries of the Middle East.

The U.S. should withdraw from the role of mediator and self-declared neutral in the struggle between moderate nations and the revolutionary client regimes which are closely identified with the Soviet presence and policy aims in the area. Openly the U.S. should continue to articulate our belief in the basic principles of U.S. policy that are universally applicable -- bilaterally and within the framework of the United Nations Organization. In quiet diplomacy we should pragmatically associate ourselves with all regimes which are not actively involved in furthering Soviet aims. The two principle criteria for identifying a Soviet "proxy base" should be (a) close identification of a regime with and active support of the "national liberation struggle" and "liberation wars" as defined by Soviet Communist doctrine and (b) the status of a primary Soviet military aid client. The U.S. should avoid if possible the position of direct involvement in the opposition to a Soviet client regime.
engaged in "liberation warfare". The U.S. should maintain correct and friendly relations with Soviet client regimes always leaving the door open for a readjustment in relationships. The U.S. should provide no aid to any Soviet client regime. Quietly we should encourage the development of the RCD as parallel to but not as an alternative to CENTO. The U.S. should not discriminate against Soviet client regimes in matters of trade, cultural and educational relations. We should maintain a posture of preparedness to adopt in the Middle East -- once the Soviet threat subsides -- a policy along the lines advocated for Asia by Professor Reischauer.

More specifically, in the formulation of a new Middle East policy to cover the period 1967-75, we should examine the feasibility, relevance and usefulness of the following courses of action:

a. NATO should be preserved and encouraged to view the Soviet threat to the Middle East as a threat to Western Europe.

b. CENTO should be preserved as an instrument which offers a political rationale for cooperation vis-a-vis military arrangements (overflights, stockpiles, communications facilities, joint military planning and exercises and a U.S. military presence).
c. The USG should quietly encourage RCD as a genuinely nonaligned regional organization. The U.S. should not become associated with it in any way. The U.S. should tolerate and tacitly approve military collaboration among the RCD countries as a legitimate regional security arrangement which will act as a balance within the Middle East to the Soviet-supported "national liberation forces".

d. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq are the four great oil producers in the Persian Gulf. These should be encouraged to join in a dramatic development project for the "Iran-Arabian Gulf" region which would include all of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. The Shah and Faisal should jointly take the initiative in this; Kuwait and Iraq should be asked to join. The U.S. should be "responsive" to their initiative. Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Jordan and other countries with a vested interest in stability in the area should be lined up to immediately announce support for the concept. The UAR should, with other countries on the Red Sea, be encouraged to associate with the enterprise -- but not within context of the Soviet-sponsored "liberation struggle". Faisal
and the Shah are believed to favor this type of development. Initially, the U.S. should agree to match a $500 million commitment by Iran and Saudi Arabia. (The U.S. balance of payments benefits by more than this amount each year from Saudi Arabia alone.)

e. The establishment of a U.S. carrier force in the "Iran-Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Arabia" (avoid any reference to "Indian Ocean") appears to be an essential temporary measure to discourage a surge of Soviet military influence into the area via its current policy of preemptive military sales to Iran, Pakistan and India plus its growing support of "Proxy Bases". Preferably, the launching of the "Iran-Arabian Gulf Plan" should precede the action to put a U.S. carrier force into the area; the UK offer to put a carrier force off Aden for some months following independence provides an interim solution.

f. Turkey is the key to any U.S. strategy to remain a Great Power in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean; it should be given top priority in the allocation of U.S. military and economic aid.
g. Iran, at least under the Shah's leadership, is vital to any U.S. strategy in the area; if the U.S. intends to engage NATO more deeply in the Middle East problem, Turkey can provide a bridge between NATO and either the RCD or CENTO. The USG should quietly reach an understanding with the Iranians and the Turks that we place great reliance on the two to strengthen the south flank of the NATO defense. Where we wish to emphasize the NATO interest, Turkey should take the leadership; alternatively, when we wish to encourage either CENTO or the RCD to act, we should encourage the Shah to assume greater leadership -- free of any NATO political coloration.

h. The retention of Pakistan in CENTO and the RCD should be regarded as a basic policy aim. While the Pakistan-India problem will complicate this effort, we should patiently support all reasonable measures to keep Pakistan with us.

i. Any U.S. policy vis-a-vis India which includes a credible U.S. military capability -- nuclear or conventional -- must be based on the assumption that the U.S. will remain a Great Power in the Middle East. The demise of U.S.
influence from the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the diminution of the U.S. role in NATO (particularly "NATO South") would destroy the credibility of any U.S. policy vis-a-vis India's defense against China.

1. The period 1967-75 will be decisive for the political forces contending for control of the area between Asia and Western Europe. Geopolitically, on the availability of resources and vis-a-vis the apparent level of current commitment, the advantages rest with the Soviet Union. In the absence of any early basic decision by the United States, Western Europe and those free Asian countries with interests in the Middle East to meet the Soviet challenge there, it appears inevitable that the U.S. position as a Great Power in this region can be written off by the end of this period.