C J E Y
August 1, 1952
EYES ONLY

ANNEX E TO NO. 6.
"THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM",
of NSC 135

PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD THROUGH JUNE 30, 1952

1. PLANS COMPLETED AND BEING EXECUTED

A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of
Communist Power in France. (PSB D-14/c).

This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1B)
were developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under
both plans are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans
resulted from extensive inquiry during the summer and fall of
1951, as a result of which the Board concluded that the French
and Italian communist apparatus, the two most powerful in western
Europe, constituted a serious threat to American foreign policy
and to NATO plans for defense of Western Europe. In consequence,
the Board prescribed specific courses of action for reduction of
communist power in both France and Italy.

Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Wash-
ington interdepartmental coordinating committee was established
under the chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and com-
parable panels were established in Paris and Rome. These groups
are in communication with each other with respect to implemen-
tation of the plans.

Analysis of the communist position in both France and Italy
resulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary
source of communist power was in their organized control over
trade unions. Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is
devoted to reduction of communist power over trade unions and
the encouragement of the free trade union movement. The most
important actions that can be taken in both countries are for
the government to give positive support to the democratic unions
in their struggle against communist domination of organized
labor, to stop subsidizing and to stop dealing with the communist
unions, and to work towards a more equitable share of the national
income for labor.
With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving the major objectives appears hopeful under the present Pinay Government. Unlike its predecessors, the Pinay Government has demonstrated far more courage and affirmative leadership, and on its own initiative, has been moving vigorously against the Communists within the last two months. However, this is no guarantee of stability. The government has given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and that it intends to take specific action to reduce communist power in the trade union field. While making known to the government our continuing interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative participation and are watching the French initiative with hope in its promise for the future.


As stated in connection with the similar plan for reduction of communist power in France reported in the previous paragraph, this plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Development of the plan, which was in conjunction with the development of the French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph.

With regard to progress concerning the achievement of the objectives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made high level representations expressing our concern over the continued strength of communist power in Italy. The DeGasperi Government has repeatedly assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to reduce the strength and influence of the communist movement. Up to the May 1952 elections, the government had done very little along these lines and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources of communist power in the trade union field.

The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indicated no diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support for the communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national elections, when this bloc polled 31.4%, it has for the first time made substantial inroads into the agricultural South. In contrast to this, the electoral support for the four democratic center parties was substantially reduced compared to 1948 due to a sharp fall off in support for the Christian-Democrat Party, while the extreme right received a sharp increase in support.
Since the May elections we have received renewed and more positive assurances that the government means to move against the communists and there have been indications of formal action. The government will put its main reliance on new legislation. The situation now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for a long time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the communists appear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government, we are hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initiative.


This plan, approved by FSB December 20, 1951, includes programs to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum possible utilization of escapees under Public Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of escapees into the U.S. Armed Forces. (For discussion of Phase "B" see paragraph 3A below.)

On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, $4.3 million dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to the Department of State, which had been given responsibility for the program.

The time since funds were made available has been used to build the organization and staff for the continuing administration of the program, and to identify and care for the most urgent immediate needs of escapees.

Organisation. Small staffs are being established and activities have begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Department of State have been established.

Resettlement and Supplemental Care. A general contract was signed on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organized in November, 1951) for the overseas transport of up to 14,000 escapees during one year at an estimated rate of $100 per capita. The number thus far moved under the program is negligible, but it is anticipated that a scheduled flow may be attained in August.

Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediate needs of escapees resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy, needs such as food, clothing, shoes, repair and de-contamination of barracks, and medical treatment. In every country of operation the immediate needs of the escapees are being met.
**EYES ONLY**

**TOP-SECRET**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Propaganda Utilization.** No general propaganda utilization of
the plans and activities of the escapee program is now contemplated
by State Department. Newsworthy projects and assistance to key
individuals will be used in media reaching iron curtain areas when
appropriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to
point to, the State Department plans more general treatment. Sim-
ilar policies govern domestic information activity.

**Funds.** Of the initial authorization of $4,300,000, an estimated
$1,500,000 was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An addi-
tional $1,460,500 is being requested to cover an increase in the
estimated number of escapees already requiring assistance.

**Accomplishment of Other Purposes.** As requested under this phase
of the plan, the Department of Defense has somewhat liberalized
the conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the
authorization of the Lodge Amendment. Of 519 applications,
3916 have been rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active
duty), and 982 are being processed.

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**D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons.**

*(FEB D-17d)*

In February 1952, following a series of conflicting state-
ments by public officials as to atomic and related developments,
the FBI approved and forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NSC,
recommendations for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public
statements with respect to certain weapons. On May 9, 1952, a
memorandum on this subject was issued by the President, setting
forth the criteria recommended by the FBI and directing compli-
ance therewith.* At present the FBI staff is reviewing the ac-
tion which has been taken by the agencies and the effect of the
application of the criteria.

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*NSC Action No. 622; NSC 126; and memo for NSC from Executive
Secretary, subject, "Public Statements with Respect to Certain

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**Annex 5 to No. 6**

**TOP SECRET**

**EYES ONLY**
2. PLANS COMPLETED BUT NOT YET BEING EXECUTED - STAND-BY PLANS

A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c).

This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on October 25, 1951. It is designed to establish special psychological objectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries, with respect to the Korean conflict. Some of the desired courses of action are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommended actions are directly related to the progress made in connection with the cease-fire. The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert network has been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as developments make this necessary.


This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951. It endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in order that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this necessary.

C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8b).

This plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 127. (As amended and approved by the NSC and approved by the President, this was circulated as NSC 127/1.) This plan was designed in order that the proper agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations in pursuance of prescribed national objectives during general hostilities. This plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the event of war or at such time as the President may direct.

This plan was approved by the Board on November 15, 1951. It sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt propaganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States by the USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which should be followed by the United States with respect to the world as a whole, the USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nations are set forth. This guidance has been distributed to the various departments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) has established an X-Day Committee which is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination of policies and operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used in the implementation of their planning.

3. PLANS AUTHORIZED AND IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapes - Phase "B" (PBB D-18a/1).

This project is concerned with the stimulation of defection and examination of the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the proper utilization of these escapes. Phase "A", concerned with the care, resettlement, and possible utilization of current escapees, is reported on in Paragraph 1C of this paper.

B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering Soviet Orbit Blackmail Tactics (PBB D-19/1).

The Board has had prepared an "Inventory of Cold War Weapons", consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (some of which are of a novel character). The Board has further directed study toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the Soviets by use of appropriate instrumentalities.

C. Psychological Operations Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Germany (PBB D-21a).

This plan is designed to prescribe certain courses of action with respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into
Western Europe, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSE D-22).

This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psychological operations a national psychological plan, taking into account both long-range and short-range considerations, in order to overcome or prevent instability within this area which would threaten Western interests. It seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their sovereign equality.

E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSE D-23).

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.


This plan is designed to study the actions the United States should take to develop the maximum psychological results at the time of Stalin's death.

G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W. Propaganda Campaign (PSE D-25).

This study concerns itself with the psychological problems which the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign have presented.


This paper was designed to devise the maximum psychological effect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or
foreign officials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet Communist control.


This plan is designed to develop a psychological strategy for coordinated psychological operations to strengthen Japan and other non-communist power in Asia. It would promote Japan's economic and military capacity to contribute to collective security, assure Japan's continuing commitment to close association and joint action with the U.S. and would assist in restoring Japan to a position of strength in a cooperative endeavor to secure the non-communist nations of Asia from communist subversion or attack.


This plan is designed to prepare national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U.S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to weaken Soviet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obstructing Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China through psychological operations.