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OBJECTIVES

1. Long-Range Objective: To bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent, and representative Government, friendly toward the U.S. and other countries of the free world, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

2. Current U.S. Objective: Pending achievement of the above long-range objective, (a) to assist the Republic of Korea (ROK) in order to enable it to make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area, (b) to prevent more of Korea from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or aggression, and (c) to develop ROK armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power.

3. To achieve these objectives through peaceful means, if possible to do so without compromising U.S. obligations, principles, or military security.

Agency Responsibility: The OCB has coordinating responsibility, State has general supervisory responsibility, and the other agencies involved

Courses of Action: As a general rule, courses of action designed to forward current U.S. objectives in Korea should contribute to, or at least not militate against, achievement of long-term U.S. objectives.

COURSES OF ACTION

1. Widely publicize the fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the
of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) have violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its inception.

Agency Responsibility: State and Defense assisted by USIA

1) Defense with the assistance of the Military Command in the field is responsible for producing as much clear and convincing evidence of Communist violations of the Armistice as possible, particularly in respect to violations of the reinforcing provisions.

2) Defense should instruct UNMAC to utilize on a continuing basis and to the maximum extent possible evidence of Communist violations of the Armistice in charges and protests which it makes in the MAC.

3) State should transmit evidence of Communist violations to the Allies of the U.S. who are involved in Korea and, to the extent that this evidence is unclassified, urge our Allies to make wide public use of the information.

4) State and Defense, in an effort to make clear in the public mind the fact and seriousness of Communist violations, should concert and, from time to time when appropriate opportunities arise, issue press releases or plant stories with reliable reporters constituting a general round up on the problem of Communist violations or an explanation of a more dramatic violation.

5) USIA, with guidance from State, should see that the evidence and
and seriousness of Communist Armistice violations is given wide and effective publicity in foreign areas.

5. a. Continue to observe the Armistice except as in b and c below.

b. Take such action as is necessary to deal with the situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice when it is determined:

(1) That the UN Command is at a significant disadvantage because of such violations.

(2) That the advantage of taking such action outweighs the military and political disadvantages thereof, including the possible non-agreement of the UN Command Allies to such a course. Prior agreement of our UN Command Allies for this action should be sought, but they should not be given a veto on U.S. action.

c. In the event of unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, take action in accordance with paragraph 5-g of NSC 5429/5, even though this may be construed as a violation of the Armistice.

Agency Responsibility: Defense and State
disadvantages including the possible non-agreement of UN Command Allies to such a course. Target date: [handwritten]

2. (c) In order to persuade our Allies to concur in a course designed to rectify the situation of Communist violations, (a) Defense should prepare a brief which presents convincing evidence, classified if necessary, of Communist violations, presents military reasons for taking such action including the military advantages which thereby accrue to the UN Command and the manner in which the military disadvantages resulting from Communist violations can thus be effectively countered. (b) Defense should also prepare a convincing brief which can then be used publicly by the U.S. and its Allies in justification of action designed to counter Communist violations. (c) State should add to the military arguments appropriate political arguments and has responsibility for diplomatic negotiations on these issues with the Allies. Target date: [handwritten]

(a) Action without the consent of our UN Command Allies should not be taken unless it has concordant military advantages.

PREVENTING OR COUNTERING THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING BY THE ROK

6. The U.S. should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew hostilities, by:

"a. Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders where circumstances necessitate that if the ROK unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone
Zone then:

(1) UN Command ground, sea, and air forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly.

(2) The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations.

(3) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately.

(4) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

b. Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under UN Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.

c. Making UN Command plans and dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to ROK leaders under a above and manifest U.S. determination to carry them out, in so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments to cope with a Communist attack.

Agency Responsibility: State and Defense (Basic coordination for actions under this paragraph should be carried out in the field between Embassy Seoul and CINCUNC)

Course of Action:

1. State and Defense should continue to coordinate and, when the occasion appears to require it, to make representations to ROK leaders with respect to the consequences of unilateral ROK renewal of hostilities.
2. State and Defense should continue to urge the ROK to maintain its forces under the UN Command as long as that Command has responsibility for the defense of Korea.  

7. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, despite all the actions taken by the U.S. under paragraph 6 above, the U.S. should take the measures stated in Annex A (Annex A to NSC 170/1 amended as reported by NSC Action No. 1340, and circulated only to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence).

Agency Responsibility: Operations plan provided separately

Also forward to be reported

Counts of Action: Operations plan provided separately

8. If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

   a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.
   
   b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.
   
   c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security and capability of UN Command forces to block ROK offensive action.

   d. Evacuate UN civilians.

   e. Notify the Communists that the UN Command will disassociate itself from the ROK action, but will defend UN Command forces against any
any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack
against the ROK threatens the security of UN Command forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN
Command forces.

f. Renew hostilities with the Communists only if necessary to
protect the security of UN Command forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of
the UN Command and, as appropriate, inform the UN of the actions taken
by the UN Command under UN authority to prevent or limit hostilities.

Agency Responsibility: State, Defense, and FCA

1. Defense and FCA, in consultation with State, should immediately
act to take the steps outlined in this paragraph, as are necessary.

2. Defense should be prepared to take actions (paragraph 8c above)

3. State should seek the support of the other members of the UN
Command, and notify the UN of the steps taken by the UN Command to pre-
vent or limit hostilities.

COUNTERING THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING BY THE COMMUNISTS

9. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the U.S. should:


b. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration* by calling upon the
signatories to carry out the commitment that, if there is a renewal of

* Signed July 27, 1953
the armed attack, challenging again the principle of the UN, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the Armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

2. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war to China by air and naval action as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the UN and our security commitments to the ROK.

3. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 100A, January 8, 1951, *#*

4. Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to the expanded war against China.

Agency Responsibility: Presidential, State, and Defense, NSC, OD/IN

Congress of Action

1. State and Defense should prepare appropriate recommendations for the President to send to the Congress.

State

State will invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out their commitment.

4. If decided that the hostilities cannot be limited to the Korean peninsula, State, Defense, and USIA will prepare and conduct a program of publicity on public information demonstrating the necessity of expanding the war.

4. Defense,

* See Annex C.
4. Defense, State, and DCM will implement the action called for in NSC Action No. 100. Target date: (cont'd)

Stt. State will table appropriate resolutions in the UN designed to justify and to enlist support for the UN Command counteraction. Target date: (cont'd)

ACHIEVING A POSITION OF STRENGTH

10. Pending a political settlement in the absence of a renewal of hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the ROK in carrying out its agreements with the U.S., the U.S. should:

Agency Responsibility: State, Defense, FOA

Object of Action: Keep under constant assessment the degree and manner in which the ROK cooperates by carrying out its agreements with the U.S.

a. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military action. (of 11 Nov)

Agency Responsibility: See paragraph 7. (cont'd)

b. Continue to develop the ROK as a military ally.

c. Maintain the general security position of the ROK by increasing the combat effectiveness of its active armed forces and developing an effective reserve in order to permit a reduction in the size of its active armed forces at an appropriate time.

Agency Responsibility: State, Defense, and FOA

1. Defense should continue to cultivate and retain the friendship toward and confidence of ROK military leaders in the U.S. Target date: (cont'd)

2. Defense
2. Defense should continue to provide training assistance with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the ROK forces.

3. Defense should restrict development of ROK forces to increasing the effectiveness of existing action units and to development of an effective reserve. In view of the adverse impact of military requirements on the economic situation, keep the size of the ROK active forces under constant review with the objective of reducing them as rapidly as the political and military situation permits.

4. Defense should prepare plans for a reduction in active ROK divisions to being as soon as the ten-division reserve is achieved; the goal of such a reduction shall be ten active divisions, backed by 20 reserve divisions, and the reduction shall go forward by substituting five active divisions per annum for the ten-division reserve. Actual implementation of the above plans to be prepared by Defense shall be affected only after a review of the current political and military factors involved.

5. Defense, State, and FOA should at every appropriate opportunity make efforts to persuade the ROK of the desirability of reducing its forces to a level which it could more nearly support and which would permit adequate pay and allowances.

6. In connection with 7 above, Defense should develop information on the diversion in Korea of ROK military supplies of U.S. origin to the civilian economy and to other areas.
In connection with 7 above, FOA should give urgent attention to bolstering those sectors of the Korean economy (woods, fuel, gasoline, etc.) in which the black marketing of the ROK Army fills a genuine economic need.

Seek to continue the military involvement and thus the political interest of other nations in Korea and to give greater force to the Joint Policy Declaration by persuading the other UN members to maintain at least minimum armed forces within the ROK in order to preserve the UN Command.

Agency Responsibility: State and Defense

1. State and Defense when approached by our Allies should emphasize the importance of maintaining their forces without further reductions in strength in Korea.

2. To underline the significance which the U.S. places in maintaining a portion of UN strength in Korea, the U.S. should not make further reduction in U.S. combat personnel without careful joint consideration by State and Defense of the political as well as military aspects of such measures.

3. Defense and State should make clear in public statements and in diplomatic conversations /avoid implications to the contrary/ that the U.S. desire that UN forces in Korea is in no way motivated by a policy of keeping an international strategic military reserve in nearby readiness for use in possible hostilities with Communist China.
in

e. Working and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the Government and democratic institutions of the ROK.

f. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and the other free nations of Asia as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the U.S. for political and moral support; endeavor to develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and also with the Philippines and the Republic of China through the offer of U.S. good offices to help resolve outstanding problems and by encouragement of joint cooperation; and encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS.

Agency Responsibility: State, Defense, and FCA

(1) State should take steps to work out a satisfactory reduction in the representation of UNCURK in Korea by getting the agreement of UNCURK members to the establishment of a subcommittee of three (preferably Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand). Such efforts should be abandoned, however, if it appears they will result in a premature debate in the UN or a change in the composition of UNCURK less favorable to the U.S.

(2) State
(2) State should encourage appropriate representations by the UNCURK sub-committee where such representation might help alter ROK behavior so as to (a) strengthen the ROK Government, (b) enhance, or prevent deterioration of, ROK international prestige, or (c) achieve other U.S. objectives.

(3) Conversely, State should discourage or seek to modify UNCURK activities or representations which may have the effect of weakening the ROK Government; reducing its international prestige; or militate against particular U.S. objectives.

(4) State should encourage ROK participation in as many of the specialized agencies of the UN as possible and ROK attendance at international conferences.

(5) In view of relative ROK responsiveness to American press opinion, State and Defense should encourage unattributed press stories where they may appear to be helpful on placing indirect pressure on the ROK to conform to a greater degree of democratic practices (a case in point which might have been so handled was the suspension of the important newspaper Tong-a-Ilbo).

(6) U.S. and foreign democratic institutions should be encouraged to support comparable institutions in the ROK but this should be done with a view to avoiding efforts which the ROK Government would resist as threat to its stability, resent to the point of active resistance, and which would create resentment against the ROK in the outside benevolent institutions.

(7) Direct
TOP-SECRET

USIA, FOA and other as appropriate

(67) Direct U.S. material and financial support of ROK democratic institutions such as politically independent newspapers and educational institutions should be continued by USIA, FOA, and other agencies concerned, but only in cases where it is reasonably certain that such support will not ultimately weaken the ROK Government or because of the resentment of that Government of the adverse effect on the institutions being so supported. Target date: continuing

(68) State should encourage the ROK and other free nations to exchange diplomatic missions. Target date: continuing

(69) USIA with State guidance should explain to other free countries the logic and basis of Korean national attitudes, while avoiding the appearance of serving as an apologist for the ROK. St. - USIA and others

(70) Public information output by State, Defense, and USIA designed to strengthen the ROK Government or ROK democratic institutions should avoid providing the Communists with testimony to the shortcomings of the ROK. Target date: continuing

(71) Until the possibilities for improvement in ROK-Japanese relations becomes substantially greater than at present, State, Defense, and FOA should refrain from active encouragement of a ROK-Japanese conference, while maintaining a position of willingness to make U.S. good offices available, it should be made clear whenever appropriate that this cannot be done until there are reasonably good prospects of success. Target date: continuing

TOP-SECRET
"G6 Continue to strengthen the ROK economy by implementing the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UN Command. The program should be designed:

(1) To establish living standards approximating the 1949-50 levels, which the ROK should be able to support with a minimum of future external aid.

(2) To increase the investment component as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability, placing greatest emphasis on projects contributing most immediately to increased productivity.

(3) To permit the ROK to assume an increasingly greater proportion of the cost of supporting its armed forces.


(1) As it is probable that the objective of a 1949 standard of living has been accomplished, further increases should be avoided, insofar as possible without jeopardizing other essential U.S. objectives. (Further increases in the standard of living will make more difficult the problem of eventual ROK self-support). Target date: immediate.

(2) Substantial price increases in the ROK economy are inevitable at this time. While there is no way of forecasting with any degree of accuracy the point at which inflation becomes unmanageable, the great and urgent need for developing ROK capacity to assist in its support
support and necessitates carrying out the investment program to the maximum extent possible without provoking an inflation which will in itself result in a reduced total investment.

(3) FCA and its successor, ICA, should make every effort to assure the rapid and effective absorption of aid goods by the economy with

Seeking to obtain satisfactory agreements from the Communists

11. In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and representative Government friendly toward the U.S., established through the holding of genuinely free elections under UN supervision for representation in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea, the U.S. should be prepared to:

a. Engage in political negotiations between the Communists and the UN side (with the ROK associated with the latter), if it appears such negotiations would be productive.

b. Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other nations as are concerned to guarantee the political and territorial integrity of a unified Korea.

c. Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

d. Forego
d. Forego all rights granted to the U.S. under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and to refrain from stationing U.S. forces and maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign forces are granted these rights or maintaining such forces and bases.

Agency Responsibility: State and Defense

Course of Action:

(1) U.S. dedication to the attainment of a unified Korea by peaceful means should be reaffirmed from time to time by U.S. official spokesmen. Target date: As appropriate.

(2) State, in its relations with our UN Allies, should continue to make clear our insistence on, and seek support for, the position set forth in the Declaration of the Sixteen at Geneva as the basis for any further negotiations with the Communists on the question of Korean unification. Target date: Continuing.

(3) At every appropriate opportunity, the legitimacy and independence of the ROK as compared to the puppet regime in North Korea should be stressed by U.S. spokesmen and through the U.S. information outlets. Target date: Continuing.

(h) State and Defense should also avoid actions which would give the Armistice Agreement and the Demarcation Line the appearance of permanent political arrangements. Target date: Continuing.

State should continue to emphasize to the ROK the desirability and eventual feasibility of peaceful solutions to Korean problems. Target date: Continuing.
12. Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S. economic and military assistance to Korea.

13. Pending achievement of satisfactory agreements with the Communists:

   a. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of the U.S. forces in the Korean area.

   b. Continue diplomatic efforts to persuade our Allies to accept U.S. courses of action with respect to Korea and to contribute to their support.