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Action

Control: 14397
Rec'd: AUGUST 21, 1959
4:39 P.M.EUR
Info
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MCFROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: POLTO 330, AUGUST 21, 8 P.M.

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NIACT

REFERENCE: TOPOL 316

RMR LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

GENERAL NORSTAD, THURSTON AND USRO HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED QUESTION RAISED IN TOPOL 316. THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN KEPT UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW HERE SINCE THE DULLES MEETING WITH DE GAULLE OF JULY OF LAST YEAR, (SEE ESPECIALLY POLTO G-1209, JUNE 27, 1959). THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS OUR JOINT VIEWS.

WE FEEL THAT "DESIRES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES" AND "EUROPEAN TREND" MIGHT MORE CORRECTLY BE REPLACED BY "DESIRES OF FRANCE" AND "FRENCH TREND". IN FACT, AS THE RESULT OF A WIDE RANGE OF DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT OVER A LONG PERIOD, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE US TO ASSIST IN CREATING A "FOURTH NUCLEAR POWER" AT THIS TIME WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES VIS-A-VIS EVERY OTHER COUNTRY OF THE ALLIANCE.

"THE DESIRES OF FRANCE" IN THIS REGARD INCLUDE THEIR WISH FOR:

- 1) FRENCH NATIONAL CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
- 2) FRENCH INDEPENDENT CONTROL OVER SUCH WEAPONS RATHER THAN NATO OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANY COLLECTIVE CONTROL;
- 3) DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH NUCLEAR MILITARY POWER.

WE ARE

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Authority NLE 2006-113 #2

By MMK NLDDE Date 3/9/11

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-2- POLTO 330, AUGUST 21, 8 P.M., FROM PARIS

WE ARE CONVINCED (GENERAL NORSTAD HAS PARTICULARLY DEEP-SEATED CONVICTIONS ON THIS SCORE) THAT:

- 1) IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE US UNDER THE ALLIANCE TO ESTABLISH ANY NEW SYSTEM COMPOSED OF SOMETHING LESS THAN NATO AS A WHOLE; E.G., A RESTRICTED "THIRD FORCE" NUCLEAR BLOC;
- 2) IT WOULD LESSEN CONFIDENCE IN THE US AND WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE TO TURN OVER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, ON A BILATERAL BASIS OR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SMALL NUCLEAR BLOC, THEREBY ACCELERATING (BY PERMITTING DETAILED INSPECTION OF WARHEADS) THE GROWTH OF ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR MILITARY POWER, ESPECIALLY IN COUNTRIES WITH ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.

GIVEN THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, DEVELOP OR SUBMIT PROPOSALS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO THE FRENCH WISHES IN THIS MATTER.

WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING STEPS TO IMPROVE AND BROADEN THE NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WERE INITIATED BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN 1957 - - STEPS WHICH WOULD FORTIFY GENERAL CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE FOLLOWING STEPS BE CONSIDERED TO MAKE EVEN MORE TANGIBLE THE ALREADY MANIFEST DESIRE OF THE US TO INSURE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE AVAILABLE TO MEET FULLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY THAT AN ATTACK UPON ONE IS AN ATTACK UPON ALL.

1. THE US SHOULD TURN OVER TO THE ALLIANCE THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH SHOULD NORMALLY BE DEPLOYED IN NATO EUROPE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF APPROVED NATO MILITARY PLANS. THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE AND TYPES OF WEAPONS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE FORMULATED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO EXECUTE SUCCESSFULLY THE FIRST INTENSIVE AND DECISIVE ATOMIC PHASE OF A WAR, A REQUIREMENT THAT COULD BE RELATED TO A SPECIFIC TIME PERIOD IF NECESSARY.

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2. THE US SHOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO WITHDRAW THESE WEAPONS FROM THE ALLIANCE FOR THE DURATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, AND TO MAINTAIN THEM DEPLOYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED NATO PLANS.
3. INFORMATION REGARDING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION ON THIS NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE, AS IT GROWS AND CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED NATO MILITARY PLANS, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A PERIODIC BASIS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO AND TO A SELECTED COMMITTEE OF PERMREPS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (PERHAPS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF STANDING GROUP COUNTRIES PLUS TWO ADDITIONAL MEMBERS TO GIVE APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHICAL AND COMMAND REPRESENTATION).
4. THE US WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE APPROPRIATELY TRAINED MILITARY PERSONNEL, RESPONSIVE TO NATO AUTHORITY, TO MAINTAIN PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE WEAPONS.
5. AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF THE WEAPONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED NATO PLANS WOULD DERIVE FROM THE ALLIANCE, THEREBY ELIMINATING THE UNNECESSARY FEATURE OF A DOUBLE US CONTROL AND PLACING THE PRESIDENT OF, LET US SAY, FRANCE ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE US SO FAR AS AUTHORIZING THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS IS CONCERNED.
6. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SO TRANSFERRED WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR USE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED NATO PLANS AND POLICIES, BY NATO FORCES ACTUALLY SUBJECTED TO DIRECT ENEMY ATTACK.

WE BELIEVE THAT A PLAN CAST ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL NATO COUNTRIES, WITH THE PROBABLE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE. EVEN IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, THIS PROPOSAL SHOULD MEET SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS, IF NOT THE DESIRES, OF THAT COUNTRY. THE SUGGESTED ACTION, WHICH WOULD RIGHTLY BE REGARDED AS A GENEROUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP ON THE PART OF THE US AND ACCEPTED AS A FURTHER ACT OF FAITH IN THE

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FAITH IN THE ALLIANCE, MAY IN ADDITION HAVE AN APPRECIABLE
EFFECT ON THE STRENGTH AND SHARPNESS OF THE FRENCH DEMANDS.

EMBASSY HAS SEEN THIS MESSAGE.

NOLTING

DRJ/23

NOTE: MR MAGILL (EUR) NOTIFIED 5:30 P.M. 8/21 CWO-JSW

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