August 12, 1960

WRITTEN AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
THE US, USSR, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 3, 1960 the US Air Force in Turkey reported that a
U-2 weather plane from the US air base at Adana, Turkey, was
missing. Addressing the Supreme Soviet on May 5, Khrushchev
asserted that an American plane had been shot down over the USSR,
but gave no details of the locale, circumstances, or fate of the pilot.
In Washington, on the same day, a brief State Department press
release reported that a weather plane belonging to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was missing. NASA
on May 5 also issued a press release, a lengthy announcement
giving the route of the "weather plane" in Turkey and stating that
the pilot had reported oxygen difficulties. On May 6 a US note to
the USSR asked for information on the plane and its pilot. This note
was the first of a series of official communications, both written
and oral, exchanged between the US, the USSR, and other govern-
ments in connection with the U-2 incident.

This paper presents, in chronological order, the texts of all
such communications. Press releases and other unilateral state-
ments are not generally included unless of particular significance.
For convenient reference, this paper is also broken down on a
country-by-country basis. An unclassified addendum presents
the texts of Department of State press and radio briefings relating
to this subject.

SECRET/NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLE 2006-135 #23
By NHLK NLDDE Date 12/22/10
I. USSR

May 6 US note refers to Khrushchev's May 5 Supreme Soviet Statement and US May 3 announcement on missing aircraft and asks information on plane and pilot. (Document No. 1)

May 7 Khrushchev, addressing Supreme Soviet again, announced that U-2 pilot was alive and had confessed the plane's reconnaissance mission. (Text not included)

May 9 Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky warns that in event of future flight the USSR would retaliate against countries from whose bases they took off. (Excerpt, document No. 2)

May 10 US note request permission for Embassy officer to interview U-2 pilot. (Document No. 3)¹

May 10 Soviet note protests "aggressive" U-2 flight, warns of "retaliatory measures" if similar acts repeated. (Document No. 4)

May 12 US note in reply to Soviet May 10 note denies flight for intelligence purposes had aggressive intent. (Document No. 5)

May 13 Vershinin letter (dated May 12) to General White (USAF) "postpones" former's scheduled visit to US until "a more suitable time." (Document No. 6)

¹ Further correspondence regarding the pilot (including the US aide memoire of July 11, the US note of July 30, and the Soviet note of August 4) were published in the Department's Press release No. 433 of August 6.
May 16  Soviet note denounces US "policy of aggression and 
provocation" and warns that not only will future intrud-
ing aircraft be shot down but bases from which they come 
will be struck against. (Document No. 7).

II. PAKISTAN

A. Pakistan - USSR

May 13  Soviet note to Pakistan charges that U-2 took off from 
Peshawar airport in Pakistan, refers to the "dangerous 
policy" of allowing foreign armed forces to use Pakistani 
territory and warns that repetition would necessitate 
"retaliatory measures." (Document No. 8)

May 24  Pakistani note to the USSR denies participation in 
preparation of flight, notes US assurance that no such 
incident would be allowed to take place in the future, 
and refers to Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. 
(Document No. 9)

June 22  Soviet note to Pakistan rejects claim that GOP unaware 
of intention of flight from Peshawar, rejects "ground-
less" claim that Soviet violated Pakistani airspace, rejects 
statement about US assurance with reference to "mendacious" 
assertions by US in connection with U-2, and states 
that USSR will hit bases in event of future flights. (Docu-
ment No. 10)
B. Pakistan - US

May 14  Pakistani aide memoire to US states that if plane which had taken off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR, Pakistan would have cause for 'bitter complaint.' (Document No. 11)

May 19  Pakistani note to US states that May 14 aide memoire might be considered a complaint from GOP. (Document No. 12)

May 22  US note to Pakistan gives requested assurance. (Document No. 13)

C. Pakistan - Afghanistan

May 16  Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)

June 4  Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalls the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)
June 21  Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, Document No. 16)

III. TURKEY

A. Turkey - USSR

May 13  Soviet note to Turkey notes that plane had been permanently based in Turkey, and warns of retaliatory measures in the event of repetition. (Document No. 17)

May 26  Turkish note to the USSR states that Turkish airspace not used for the overflight and that Turkey was responsible only for its own airspace, reaffirmed Turkey's right as a sovereign state to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies for purely defensive purposes, and notes that there had been complaints of Soviet overflights in Turkey. (Document No. 18)

IV. NORWAY

A. Norway - USSR

May 13  Soviet note to Norway states that despite Norway's earlier assurance that under Norwegian rules allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norway east of 24 degrees latitude Norway was an accessory to the US overflight,
and warns of possible countermeasures if such flights continue. (Document No. 19)

May 27 Norwegian note to the USSR states that no Norwegian authority had cooperated with the flight, denies that Norwegian territory was at the disposal of the US Air Force for overflights. (Document No. 20)

B. Norway - US

May 13 Norwegian pour memoire to US protests that permission to land U-2 at Bodoe had not been requested and that landing of U-2 at Bodoe would have been against principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing foreign reconnaissance planes, and asks US to take steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. (Document No. 21)

May 16 US pour memoire replies that permission for a U-2 landing had not been requested, and that if such a landing had been made it would have violated the principles followed by Norwegian authorities. US will continue to abide by those principles. (Document No. 22). Department telegram to Oslo 1124 authorized US ambassador "to state to Lange that final sentence in PM is designed to be responsive to Norwegian request that 'American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in future.'"
V. AFGHANISTAN

A. Afghanistan - US

May 18  Afghan note to US protests violation of Afghan airspace by the U-2, and requests assurance that such action would not be repeated. (Document No. 23)

May 20  US reply regrets that RGA interpreted a certain ex parte version of the flight as an unfriendly action. With regard to assurance requested, note quotes President Eisenhower to the effect that flights would not be resumed. (Document No. 24)

B. Afghanistan - Pakistan

May 18  Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)

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failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, document No. 16)

VI. US - JAPAN

May 9 Department informs MacArthur, US prepared to (1) conclude specific undertaking with GOJ no intelligence missions will be flown over non-Japanese territory from US facilities in Japan without prior consultation GOJ, (2) give Kishi assurances U-2 in Japan used only for legitimate scientific purposes, (3) make public statement to this effect. (Document No. 25)

May 10 MacArthur informs Vice Foreign Minister Yamada substance of US proposal. Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary to enter into formal agreement for consultation in case of intelligence overflights, suggest simple "legitimate and normal purpose" statement by US. (Document No. 26)

May 10 US issues "legitimate and normal purpose" statement. (Document No. 27)

May 11 MacArthur transmits text of US May 10 announcement to GOJ. (Text not included)

May 12 Fujiyama acknowledges by note receipt of text of US May 10 announcement. (Document No. 28)
May 21  Fujiyama informs MacArthur of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. Requests assurance that no US plane (U-2 or other) has conducted overflights of Soviet territory from Japan. (Document No. 29)

May 28  Department informs MacArthur he can give assurances to Kishi or Yamada that there have been no overflights of Soviet territory by U-2 or other US plane from Japanese territory. (Document No. 30)

June 2  Vice Foreign Minister Yamada given verbal assurance by MacArthur of no US overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 31)

July 11  Foreign Minister Fujiyama told a press conference that the government had been informed that the U-2 planes had been withdrawn from Japan. (Text not included)

July 21  Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense staff shows MacArthur forged US document regarding U-2 overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 32) Verbatim text of forgery (Document No. 33)

July 21  Embassy Tokyo issues statement denouncing forgery. (Document No. 34)
A. Italy - US

May 20 Department replies to Italian Ambassador's inquiry stating that U-2 pilot had no instructions to the effect that he might in an emergency use an Italian airport.

(Document No. 35)