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SECURITY INFORMATION

Copy No. 6

February 24, 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Mallory Browne  
FROM: Charles R. Norberg  
SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Soviet Occupation Troops  
from Europe.

I agree with Walter Lippmann's observation in this morning's Washington Post that we should adopt a policy that European liberation is to proclaim the hope of the withdrawal of the Red Army behind the frontiers of the Soviet Union. It is only by the withdrawal of the Red Army that the captive peoples can be liberated, at least from the physical presence of that army.

Lippmann states:

"There is no need to have our position misunderstood. It is easy enough to make it quite clear that the ending of the occupation is the object of our whole European policy, that we have no thought of destroying Europe by a military campaign to drive the Russians out of Europe. We can make it quite clear that we mean to keep arguing that the Russians do not belong in Europe, and that they should leave Europe, and that while we shall take into account their own vital interests as well as our own, we shall keep pressing continuously for the negotiations which will induce the Russians to leave Europe. A policy of this kind pursued with energy and imagination would enlist immense and growing popular support in Europe and throughout the world, and it would become increasingly difficult for the Soviet armies to stay. For we should be asking only what the captive peoples--even the Communist leaders among them--want, namely national independence from the Muscovite empire."

PSB 091.715 (24 Feb 53)

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For the past four years there has been a debate within the Government over the issue of whether or not the military forces of the USSR intended to launch an attack upon Western Europe and to sweep to the English Channel. There was no doubt of their capability to do so. The question remained, however, as to their intentions. There was no question but that a prudent regard for the security interests of the United States Government and, as well, our allies required taking all appropriate measures in the light of adopting the hypothesis that the Soviets might very well attack Western Europe. To fail to take such security precautions would have been to abandon the protection of our interests in a gross and unforgiveable fashion.

However, another strategic consideration which continuously must have been borne in mind beginning some four years ago was the possibility that the Soviets intended not to attack Western Europe. This hypothesis was predicated on several basic factors in the total situation, the most important of which were: (1) that the Soviets could not win such a war in the long run; and (2) that they would be content to consolidate on a political basis their strategic gains in Europe. Notwithstanding the fact that security considerations required the NATO and SHAPE effort, together with the rearming of ourselves and our allies, it had always seemed to me that the true intention of the USSR was not to attack Western Europe, was to consolidate her position in the areas of Europe which she had overrun and to continuously prepare those portions of Europe and herself against the day when she would be forced to withdraw from Europe.

I think it is perfectly clear that the Soviets never intended to abandon their position in Europe until they were forced to abandon it. Nevertheless, a very good case can be made from Soviet actions and propaganda that they recognized the fact that one day they would have to leave Europe and, in consequence, were preparing for the day when that would have to occur.

Without going into detail, I think that the analogy to Northern Korea is equally applicable and appropriate to the Soviet occupied portions of Europe. The Soviets intended to leave Northern Korea, prepared vigorously against the time when that action came and ultimately departed Northern Korea accompanied by a tremendous fanfare of accolade and acclamation from the Northern Korean populace. Press reports at the time recited that hundreds of thousands of signatures had been affixed to a petition from the Northern Korean people to Stalin thanking him for the benefits conferred on Northern Korea and thanking him for withdrawing from Northern Korea.

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The example of Korea is something which I think we should bear constantly in mind as a possibility for duplication in Germany and Europe by Soviet action in withdrawing its troops. If it does so, it probably will do so before an ultimatum is forthcoming from the United States or NATO and it will do so under circumstances which achieve a tremendous propaganda and psychological warfare impact. I think a careful inspection of the intelligence available to us will indicate that the Soviets have continuously prepared the groundwork for such a withdrawal.

For our part, since the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Europe must be a principal objective of our European policy, I suggest that we do all in our power to hasten such a day. The Republican campaign speeches together with the President's recently submitted draft resolution to Congress with regard to the "captive" peoples have begun to lay the groundwork for further action. We might now consider a declaration by the Under Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary of Defense that of course it has been the long-standing policy of the United States to assume that the armed forces of the Soviet Union would leave Europe. We have a variety of mechanisms which could be useful to begin building up a campaign to force public opinion to help drive the Soviet armed forces out of Europe, e.g., NATIS; each one of the U.S. armed forces psychological warfare services and the CIA operating through the FOC; and the PSB mechanisms in Germany, France and Italy.

I suggest that this is an appropriate matter for Steering Group consideration and that PSB might well explore on a staff study basis the problem of a national psychological strategy for the "liberation" of the captive peoples, limiting this to the concept of causing a withdrawal of the armed forces of the Soviet Union now in occupation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

cc:Mr. Taylor  
Dr. Craig

PSB/C: *mm* *mm* berg:vc

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