

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5906/1.

Overall Evaluation. Between June 1959 and June 1960, there was little change in either the magnitude or character of major U.S. combat forces. Newer weapon systems will be more evident during FY 1961. All Services find it necessary to maintain adequate forces equipped with weapon systems of proven capability to satisfy security requirements and, at the same time, to provide for the development of new systems of yet unproven operational capability. There are two main aspects of this problem.

The complexity of modern weapon systems has resulted in extraordinarily long procurement lead times, and greatly lengthened technical training programs.

Development and procurement of these new weapon systems become more costly each year, and so it has become increasingly difficult to accomplish modernization within available resources.

General War. In evaluating our general war capabilities, the JCS note the requirement for forces capable of both nuclear and conventional operations. While these forces now have a greater capability for delivery of nuclear weapons than ever before, this may not in itself represent a net gain in relative military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Our deployed forces are subject, with little or no warning, to attack by significant communist forces. Within the near future, the Soviet Union may bring into operational readiness intercontinental ballistic missiles with the capability of attacking our base complex in the United States. The security of our long-range, land-based nuclear retaliatory forces will be increasingly dependent upon such factors as adequate warning, airborne alert capability, hardening and mobility. During FY 1961, two of our ballistic missile early-warning installations (Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska) will be operational. One site has an initial operational capability today. Full coverage is not scheduled for completion until the U.K. Station becomes operational in FY 1963. The latter site is needed to cover missile launchings from sites in southwestern USSR against targets in the eastern U.S. To augment BMEWS, research and development effort increased in FY 1960 on the satellite-borne ICBM attack alarm system MIDAS. Good progress has been made in satellite programs which are essential to our reconnaissance and intelligence activities. We have no active defense against ballistic missiles but development effort on NIKE ZEUS continues at the highest priority. A coordinated Soviet attack against our long-range nuclear retaliatory forces, our deployed land-based forces, our logistical base, and our naval forces at sea would be extremely difficult to execute with complete surprise, and only a coordinated attack with almost complete surprise could endanger our effective retaliatory power.

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Limited War. As the Soviet nuclear, ballistic missile and conventional capabilities grow, the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced in Communist dealings with the rest of the world. In their continual probing of the strength and determination of the West they will be more aggressive in their use of political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. Although the Communists probably would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor as to make clear that further involvement would incur serious risk of general war or political disadvantage, the chances of their miscalculating such risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing. Our military capacity to counter a single local aggression supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to meet national security requirements. Dependent upon the location and size of force required, we would be hard pressed to execute limited military operations simultaneously in two or more areas of the world and maintain an acceptable general war posture. In the latter event, national measures providing for a degree of mobilization and augmentation of lift capabilities might well be required. If sizeable forces were involved in such situations, our capabilities for limited war are such that authorization to use nuclear weapons selectively would probably be required. Our capability to conduct non-nuclear war is very substantial and although it has not kept pace with our growing nuclear capability it has increased. Additionally, we must continue to rely, to a considerable extent, upon indigenous forces to cope with guerrilla and jungle warfare.

Cold War. Unified Commanders have formulated plans and are active in assuring increasingly effective utilization of their resources in the cold war. MAAGS, missions, attaches, rotational forces, pre-stockage of equipment, exchange officers on military staffs and in military schools, weapons demonstrations, show of force, official military visits and assistance in national disasters contribute to the over-all cold war effort. In order to limit the Sino-Soviet initiative in cold war, the United States must develop a broad range of capabilities whereby it may counter Sino-Soviet Bloc and communist activities in many parts of the world. Portions of South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are areas of particular vulnerability.

Mutual Security. In both limited and general war, a substantial contribution is expected from our allies. Military planning takes cognizance of the limitations and capabilities of indigenous forces. Although our national security is predicated upon the concept of collective security, the United States must continue to develop adequate strength and a strategy for its employment to deter or successfully wage war, survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny, and to maintain the leadership of the Free World.

Statements in

Summary. *^* The previous annual reports and evaluations⁵ by the JCS recognized the probable diminishing relative military advantage of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the position we occupied with a great manned bomber fleet supported by a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons, at a time when the Soviet Union was very limited in long-range bombers and nuclear weapons, it was to be expected that our margin of advantage would certainly decrease. *But* our over-all military power continues the greatest in the world today.

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Our task is to maintain our effective retaliatory capability and to improve our ability to defeat or contain local aggressions. The probable strength of the Soviet Union in ballistic missiles calls for major effort on our part to increase the survivability of our retaliatory strike forces. This need has given emphasis in our programs to increase warning, quick reaction, dispersal of bombers, and hardening, mobility and concealment of missiles.

In last year's report it was stated that by the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present U.S. and Soviet trends and programs, and with no major breakthrough, each side may be expected to possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions. It concluded that in such a situation an advantage, possibly conclusive, could accrue to the side taking the initiative. Although this is possible, the progress made in our programs referred to above, to make certain the survival and readiness of effective retaliatory power, gives reasonable assurance that in the period ahead no enemy can expect to launch an attack against us without inviting his own destruction.

With respect to limited and local aggression more adequate provision has been made for Army modernization and for airlift. Also, since the end of fiscal 1960 our readiness has been increased by the deployment of an additional attack carrier to the Mediterranean and the Far East, the deployment of the first POLARIS submarine in the Atlantic, and the achievement of a capability to mount a significant airborne alert.



The ICBM site activation program suffered some delay in construction and initial installation and checkout of equipment. Delay in operational readiness occurred at the first five (5) sites. Scheduled target dates will be met from March 1961.

The GAM-77 (HOUND-DOG) is a supersonic air-to-surface missile designed to be used as a primary target weapon or as a penetration aid at a maximum range of 650 n.m., thereby enhancing the striking power range and operational life of its carrier aircraft, the B-52. The first two B-52 squadrons were scheduled to be equipped with operational missiles by December of 1960. However, additional testing is required to improve reliability and some slippage is occurring. The first B-52 squadron with 18 operational missiles is participating in testing at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The present program involves 29 B-52 squadrons, all scheduled to become operational by September 1962.

~~A. PROGRAMS FOR NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCES. The first objective of the U.S. Military Program has dictated maintenance of strategic nuclear retaliatory striking forces, tactical nuclear delivery forces, and deployment of forces as appropriate, all acting in concert to deter general war or to prevail in the event general war occurs.~~

~~The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has the largest capacity for nuclear retaliation and is charged with primary responsibility for exploiting the U.S. current superiority in nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems against selected targets and target systems at the outbreak of general war. Total SAC force has been reduced from 43 (11 heavy, 28 medium and 4 reconn.) wings of bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at end FY 1959 to 40 (12 heavy, 25 medium, 2 reconn. and one strategic missile) wings at end of FY 1960, 2 reconnaissance wings and 3 B-47 medium bomber wings having been inactivated, and one each B-52 and strategic missile wings activated. Programmed changes in FY 1961 will result in inactivation of 4 more B-47 wings and activation of the first B-58 medium bomber wing. This trend of decreasing aircraft wings will continue for the next few years as missiles are introduced into the inventory.~~