GEN PALMER: It is quite a pleasure to have this opportunity to not only greet General Norstad but our component commanders as well. The schedule is divided into two parts, the first part by General Norstad after which we will have a break and then continue by the staff. General Norstad.

GEN NORSTAD: General Palmer, I am delighted to have the chance to meet with you, the staff and the component commanders. I should take this opportunity, Clyde, to express great regret that you are leaving after a relative short tour of duty. You are going back to Washington. There are compensations by moving back. We will have a friend in court. We will have another graduate in the Army.

Thinking about what I might usefully discuss with you, the ten-year plan. As most of you know, the United States at the December NATO meeting proposed that we should give some thought to the organizing, plans and policies of our allies. This was an American proposal. If the United States, as well as other countries, attempts a study on this subject, I would say particularly the State Department, Professor Bowie (Harvard) was brought as chief of policy planning group. It is my observation that one of the problems of our times is that military must do more fundamental thinking on basic military philosophy than is being done by the military. It is being done outside the military.
service. I have no quarrel with people in other fields. I think this is a failure, Clyde; I hope you take this back with you. I was very pleased to work with Mr. Bowles. I was shocked to find there was no active participation by the military. We will have to come up with our own ten-year plan. I point this out as I think we can stimulate it from here. We must in order to do justice to the business we are in and not leave this exclusively to the people from the outside. I think some organizations such as the Harvard Study Group is a great contribution to our profession.

To get back to specifics, in Washington, Professor Bowles has drawn up a draft of a report. Everything in it is a punch, every sentence. It is a result of a distillation process. It must have taken 24 hours a day, it is extremely impressive. I would say, part of it, is extremely dangerous.

I think the Bowles report is a very useful thing. Now, some of the actions are far-reaching from our standpoint, extremely important. I would say in general that the draft of the Bowles report, for instance, represents the thinking of those who believe that there should be no atomic weapons in a tactical sense and they should be exclusively seaborne for political reasons. I think in order to give validity to the program, we must have an MRBM force. I think we should talk about MRBMs which can be copied.
as a matter of keeping pace with developments and functions we are now performing. Ours is a replacement program, basically. My view on this is a recommendation that I have made - the first slice of this (80-150 missiles) should be seaborne, most desirable from deep submarine. The atomic submarine is a significant weapon of our time. We need it. It gives us flexibility and balance. We must have for the second slice land based, highly mobile missiles. I presently favor production of a land based missile for our purpose and one that can be built at a cost and weight of say half the Polaris weight. It could be put on wheels to move the total weight not being more than the Polaris itself. With these complementary forces, this would give us what we need by 1964. Some very considerable progress - one of the subjects and the present US thinking, I think, was discussed at least in part by Mr. Spaak two days ago, the morning of the 4th. This cable for the assignment by 1963 of five Polaris submarines to NATO in peace and war. I think it is a very interesting development. The US offers to commit to SACEUR as an interim NATO deterrent force five Polaris submarines to be deployed prior to the end of calendar year 1963. The US would consider the five Polaris submarines as a permanent contribution to the NATO deterrent force to be established in accordance with para 5 below, and would undertake not to withdraw them from NATO assignment without NAC consent during the life of the treaty.
SECRET

This interim deterrent force would be available for use:

A. By order of SACEUR in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on
the NATO area; or

B. In other contingencies, in accordance with existing NATO
procedures or any other procedure approved by the NAC; or

C. By order of the US in self-defense (Defense Reserve
position) the US would undertake to provide such advance authority
as may be needed to use the missiles in conformity with a or b
above.

In making this offer, the US expects that other NATO governments
will want to join in the creation of the NATO deterrent force referred to
in para 5 below, and that they will contribute 100 additional MRBMs in
order to help meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements through 1966. It would
appear desirable, in terms of maximum deployment security, that this
initial requirement be met through sea-borne deployment of Polaris
missiles.

This cable takes care of the first slice.

Third proposal some of you may have seen, about a year ago,
I was supporting NATO as a fourth atomic power. That was based upon
the Europeans for many reasons must be given reasonable control of the
weapons during the life of the alliance. There are two general solutions.
You can bull through (that is not a success even now) or you can go to
a system of bilateral agreements where you create several atomic powers.
The third alternative is multi-lateral as opposed to bilateral agreements. The United States would state to the allies we will give to the allies a certain number of weapons for NATO functions, one, two or five, the number necessary, a certain basic number to be worked out, and agree that they would not be moved for the life of the alliance. They would be used as NATO directs. These weapons would be in the custody of America, otherwise you would start the maddest atomic race in history. To set up facilities, to set up production must be retained by America who would be responsive to NATO direction rather than to United States direction. This would have a tendency to give sense of direction to the allies. I speak advisedly of that because I have talked to people who represent European thinking. There was one leader, great European, told me four weeks ago that the effectiveness would be hard to mesh, would be difficult to assess. The current comment, the current concern - that the United States is pulling out anyway. It is something that is being exploited by some people.

Any change in the system is going to make it more complicated. I think it must be done. Now, what is the status of this? There are proponents and there are opponents. Exactly what will come out, I do not know. Some decisions will be taken along this line or toward this objective. It may very well come out before the December meeting.
So much for the long-range planning.

One of the functions which we are interested in is the annual review procedures in the alliance. I am critically interested in what the United States is going to do. I have been assured that there would be no reduction in the ground forces, no change in normal forces. I do not think we can change the program as far as general contributions from the standpoint of combat strength; I do not think you can lower the overall strength. I so stated. I think in the last analysis, the United States contribution will be a good one. I think by the time it gets to the highest level, the United States cannot take the position of doing less. One final point, Admiral Smith and I were back for targeting conference in Omaha. It doesn't change our responsibilities here to any significant degree or the manner in which we discharge those responsibilities.

I have established under this plan at Omaha, a representative, Colonel Long.

Point of view in summary, we face an extremely critical year.

This is certainly going to be a very critical period. I think, however, that our position is a good one from the standpoint of guidance we get. I think it is clear and strong. I think that firmness, coupled with military
strength, will permit us to make our contribution and defense should it become necessary. I would feel that this is a critical time, that we must be particularly careful to maintain our strength, at the same time to avoid getting any signs of nervousness which could cause difficulties. We always have to be on our toes. We must be extremely careful that we do not go too far in that we might cause considerable trouble. I am pleased to have the chance to tell you I think very considerable progress has been made. I want to congratulate you