Specific Recommendation C. 4

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these sources."

2. Discussion:

The problem of ascertaining the validity of information concerning the USSR, collected through various sources available to us, is a continuing one in the intelligence process. Thus, while no attempt has been made in the past to prepare a comprehensive estimate concerning Soviet attempts at deception, and the effect of such activity on the validity of National Intelligence Estimates, a considerable amount of research and analytical time has been expended. This effort could fruitfully be brought to bear in the preparation of a study of Soviet success in penetrating our most useful techniques of intelligence. A comprehensive study will be initiated through an appropriate mechanism. Our initial investigations do not reveal any requirements for additional personnel or funds for the accomplishment of this task.

Specific Recommendation C. 9

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"The growing principles and technology of information retrieval will advance and may revolutionize the handling of large masses of intelligence data. Their applications should be sought out more actively."

ANNEX C
NSC 5522
(Revised 7/26/55)
2. Discussion:

Since 1947 the CIA has engaged continuously in active search for new techniques and equipment which would facilitate the retrieval of information from large masses of intelligence data. The Intellofax System installed by CIA in 1949 was the product of research and development carried out jointly by CIA and some six or seven selected industrial concerns whose capabilities and know-how enabled them to contribute usefully to the project. The system, which is unique, has been improved steadily during the past five years and has been serving all agencies in the intelligence community.

Intelligence Headquarters of the Air Force entered into contract with Eastman Kodak in 1954 for the development of a system to be known as Minicard which, if successful, will be a great advance over CIA's Intellofax System. There has been the closest of cooperation, on an almost daily basis, between CIA, the Air Force and Eastman Kodak in the prosecution of this endeavor, and its ultimate success now seems almost assured. CIA is planning at the present time to convert from Intellofax to Minicard.

Other agencies of the intelligence community have kept in active touch with these developments. Before installing similar systems of their own, they will doubtless weigh carefully the considerable cost in dollars and manpower against the probability that the CIA will be able to continue to provide for them a large measure of the services which they need.

The use of automatic indexing and sorting equipment and systems such as, for example, well-known IBM systems should also be noted. The adaptability of these and other systems to meet the expanding needs of the intelligence community is a subject of continuing study.

It is safe to say that both CIA and the Air Force are keeping abreast of all new developments in this field which could be of value to intelligence, and that every avenue which may offer promise of improvement will be explored.

Specific Recommendation C. 10

1. This recommendation reads as follows:

"A heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence."

ANNEX C
NSC 5522 A47 TOP SECRET
2. Discussion:

This recommendation, as amplified by the pertinent discussion in the report, has implicit in it the expansion of clandestine networks in non-communist areas looking to the time, perhaps even twenty years from now, when some of these areas may be critically important. It suggests the slow and careful preparation of agents in the event of a political coup, a threatened coup, or some similar governmental crisis; and finally, the use of such agents in legal travel operations against the communist countries and in the penetration of communist and pro-communist groups outside of the communist-controlled areas.

It is noted that a recent recapitulation of high-level intelligence efforts with long-term potential shows that the CIA possesses several score agent assets of this type situated in almost every sensitive non-orbit area of the world and in many areas which, though not presently significant, could become so in the years to come. It is this type of agent facility which has contributed to the success of certain political operations which have been reported to the NSC.

The CIA accepts and endorses the emphasis placed in the report on the importance of using individuals of great intelligence, training and experience to earn the confidence of the Communists and to live or travel legally within the Soviet Union. This type of activity has been a part of our operational program for some time but it clearly deserves an effort above that which we are now putting forth. It is most difficult to locate people who are not too selfish, too insecure, or too naive to produce material of value within such a program. The security precautions erected by the Russians, the Chinese and the Satellites have imposed very rigid requirements in the selection of such individuals. Therefore, an expansion of our present activities is certainly called for, including the availability of additional manpower to make possible slow and careful development of highly intelligent penetration agents.

Laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations in every country available to our agents, to the extent outlined above, would require additional effort through intensification and limited expansion of our U.S. case officer selection and training facilities, an increase in our case officer corps, and a limited broadening of our several support structures (administrative, communications, and technical). A general estimate of the proportion of the required increases in terms of case officer personnel would be approximately 10%.