MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable,
George A. Morgan,
Acting Director,
Psychological Strategy Board.

SUBJECT: Proposal for Encouragement of Additional Single
Male Youth to Defect from East Germany.

BACKGROUND

Current U.S. policy (NSC 86/1) with respect to active
efforts to encourage defection from satellite areas including
East Germany is limited to "key personnel." This was inter-
preted in the FSB Psychological Program for Germany (FSB D-21)
to include "selected political personalities and key industrial
and technical personalities" and selected "members of the East
German military and para-military units". When HICOG Bonn asked
the Department of State in July, 1952 for policy guidance re-
garding East German youth, the Department advised them that it
did not favor encouraging the mass flight of East German youth
at that time. HICOG Berlin questioned this decision, and FSB
asked that we reconsider our policy. The Department of State
asked HICOG to re-examine the matter and forward its recommend-
ations. These are contained in HICOG Bonn Despatches 2075,
January 22, 1953 and 1738, December 18, 1952.

DISCUSSION

1. The primary advantage of encouraging male youth to
defect is that each youth that comes over adds one man to our
side and subtracts one from the communist. The merit of the
plan is not so much that we gain as that they lose. While the
Federal Republic does not yet have urgent need for these men,
East Germany can ill afford to lose them. It has had a chronic
manpower shortage, and any substantial defection of young men
would affect it adversely. This is particularly true in view
of the planned expansion of its armed forces.

The loss

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The loss to the communists of a large number of youth would be by no means limited to its effect on their immediate military potential. For they are obviously pinning their hopes and basic program in East Germany on youth. Their recent propaganda response to the present heavy flow of refugees clearly suggests their embarrassment and growing concern over this problem.

The primary arguments made against encouraging youth to defect are the following four: (a) It might force the communists to accelerate their program of isolating West Berlin; (b) The Federal Republic might object to such a program; (c) the other refugees would resent preferential treatment for the youth; and (d) encouraging youth would cause other age groups to flee in even larger numbers than is already the case.

Without dismissing these objections completely, it may be pointed out that the precise impact of this program on the Soviets, Federal Republic, other refugees, and people in the Soviet Zone (and hence the validity of these objections) will depend very greatly on how it is carried out. In any event we do not believe the Soviets will greatly change their timing re Berlin (point (a)) because of an additional flight by youth.

The State Department believes on balance that the potential advantages of encouraging unaccompanied male youth to defect from East Germany outweigh the potential disadvantages, if the program is carried out in such a way as to minimize the disadvantages.

2. The pressure for the defection of youth already exists in conditions in East Germany. This could be capitalized upon by a combination of overt measures in the Federal Republic and covert measures in East Germany. They would receive indirect encouragement to defect by favorable conditions of reception and integration into the Federal Republic. The youth are already given special treatment by the Germans, within the limits set by their resources. If the Germans expanded their facilities for youth and improved them, word of this would filter back to East Germany. Our covert media could be used to inform the youth of the conditions they would meet in the Federal Republic and encourage them to flee to the West while such flight is still possible. While overt media might also be used, CER believes this would be too obtrusive in view of the strong position recently taken by various German leaders, including Chancellor Adenauer and All-German Affairs Minister Kaiser, in urging all Germans to remain in the Soviet Zone unless absolutely necessary for their personal safety.
The State Department believes this program can best be carried out - while at the same time minimizing its disadvantageous effects - by using indirect and covert means.

3. Even if we decide to use indirect and covert means to encourage these youth, there are still certain major hurdles to clear.

   a. We must obtain the cooperation of the government of the Federal Republic and of the SPD. This may not be easy. As noted above, Chancellor Adenauer has attempted to discourage further increases in the flight of persons from East Germany. The Chancellor has, however, sent us an aide-memoire asking that Germans be included in the Escapee Program. While it would not be desirable to handle the youth through the Escapee Program, which is overt, the Chancellor's request might provide us an opening for getting his cooperation for the youth program. In addition, if plans are devised to give additional assistance to the Federal Republic for refugees in general, it may become easier to get cooperation for a youth program. It should be pointed out again that the Germans already give special treatment to the youth, so it is a question of their improving and expanding their facilities, in order to attract and accommodate additional youth who are encouraged to flee.

   b. We must be prepared to give the Germans financial assistance in order to get their cooperation. The cost of this program would depend on the cost per refugee and the number it induced to defect. HICOG reports that it costs DM 100 for each refugee up to the point of his or her "recognition" in West Berlin. There are additional expenses involved in transporting and settling the refugee in Western Germany. If we assume an additional DM 100 for this, the total might be about $50.00 per male youth.

   It is hard to say how many additional youths would defect under this program. While there are about 1,400,000 male youths still in East Germany between the ages of 16 and 27, it is unlikely we could induce anything like this number to leave. A fair guess might be an additional 50,000 before the communists completely isolate West Berlin. The cost for 50,000 youths might be, then, about $2,500,000.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Department of State recommends that:

1. The following
1. The following statement should be adopted as United States policy:

"It is the policy of the U.S. to encourage additional unaccompanied male youth of military age to defect from East Germany."

2. The Department of State should approach the government of the Federal Republic and the SPD, with a view to obtaining their necessary cooperation for the implementation of this policy.

3. In order to obtain German cooperation, $2,500,000 should be made available to the Department of State. These funds should be used to assist the government of the Federal Republic in meeting the cost of receiving these unaccompanied male youth and integrating them into the Federal Republic.

4. The Department of State should inform the government of the U.K. and France, after the Germans have agreed to cooperate, of the fact that the U.S. plans to give financial assistance to the Federal Republic for assistance to refugees from East Germany.

5. The CIA and the Department of State should cooperate then in taking those measures which will encourage additional unaccompanied male youth of military age to defect from East Germany, using those means which will minimize any possible adverse affects of such a program.

We would like to emphasize that speed is essential. In view of communist moves to isolate East Germany from West Berlin, if a policy such as the Department of State recommends is delayed and adopted only some months from now, it is questionable whether it could be implemented in time to be effective.

Walter B. Smith
Under Secretary