OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD  
Washington 25, D. C.

October 24, 1956

CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO THE TEXT OF OUTLINE  
PLAN OF OPERATIONS ON VIETNAM

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DECLASSIFIED with deletions
Authority: NLE 2014-13 #7
By: NLDDE Date 12/3/15
OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. References: (1) U.S. Policy Toward Mainland Southeast Asia, (NSC 5612/1), Approved by the President September 5, 1956.
(2) NIE 63-56, July 17, 1956.
(3) NSC 5602/1.
(4) Executive Order 10575.

B. Special Operating Guidance:

1. General. The implementation of these courses of action should depend upon the amount of cooperation displayed by the Government of Vietnam. Maximum efforts should be made to cooperate with the Vietnamese in all operations to avoid the appearance of U.S. unilateral action. Aid programs and programs of technical advice should be joint enterprises, rather than American conceived and American executed projects. U.S. operations should sustain the strong pro-U.S. orientation of the Vietnamese Government and should help solidify its position of leadership with the Vietnamese people. U.S. operations should seek to satisfy the Diem Government's eagerness for dramatic progress in economic rehabilitation and development, in order that the Diem Government might demonstrate both to its own subjects and to those north of the 17th Parallel that close identification with the Free World is advantageous in terms of security, material progress and social advancement.

Care should be taken in developing U.S. operations that sufficient resources are provided for an effective military establishment while leaving sufficient margin for sound economic development. U.S. aid should be managed
so as to prevent disastrous inflation which might frustrate the achievement of U.S. objectives and nullify many of the benefits otherwise provided by aid programs. U.S. aid should be implemented with enough speed and flexibility to produce tangible benefits which can be seen and appreciated by the Vietnamese people and Government.

In connection with educational exchange programs, plans should be made to help avoid racial discrimination by selecting schools where the students would be less likely to encounter discrimination and by securing civilian or military sponsors or hosts to take a personal interest in the student. Consideration should also be given to diverting as many of these exchange students as possible to areas in which good race relations prevail, such as Hawaii.

2. Special Situations:

a. Armistice Situation. Operating agencies must take into account for the time being the existence of the Armistice Agreement and the supervisory role of the International Commission to which the Vietnamese Government has pledged cooperation. While the Commission offers certain obstacles to some U.S. operations it serves to discourage communist efforts to alter the status quo.

b. American Presence. Although the U.S. and its citizens continue to enjoy great popularity in Vietnam the large scale of American representation in that country presents a potential source of offense to Vietnamese sensibilities. American personnel should be limited to the absolute minimum required for effective operations and should be made fully aware of the necessity for discreet and circumspect personal behavior. While the general attitude toward the U.S. is friendly, extreme nationalism and concomitant anti-Western feeling are not far below the surface.
c. **Possible Neutralist Trend.** If American aid does not speedily completely satisfy Vietnamese aspirations, the Vietnamese might feel so disappointed that they would provide less support to U.S. objectives. American agencies should be aware of this possible development and should be prepared to achieve maximum performance in all operations. Speed is more important than magnitude. Delay has been one of the greatest weaknesses of U.S. programs.

d. **Relations with Cambodia and Laos.** Although Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have taken substantially different paths since the conclusion of the three separate Geneva armistice agreements in 1954, it is to American advantage to maximize the inter-relationships between these three countries and U.S. operating agencies should take into account the effects upon Laos and Cambodia of the courses of action they pursue in Viet-Nam. While relations between Viet-Nam and Laos have not been marred by any special difficulties, Cambodian-Vietnamese relations have recently been embittered on a number of issues, and the U.S. has extended good offices to effect gradual resolution of some of these issues and improvement in these relations.

e. **American Private Activities in Viet-Nam.** Although the Government of Viet-Nam is highly nationalistic and anxious to secure full economic as well as political independence, it is now and will probably at least for a time, remain highly receptive to increasing American private activities in the country, particularly private capital investment by U.S. foreign investors. U.S. agencies should strive to maximize U.S. private participation in the economy of Viet-Nam whenever consistent with the goals of U.S. policy and should accordingly provide maximum possible assistance to U.S. private investors and businessmen interested in Viet-Nam both in the U.S. and in the field.
C. Major Commitments:

1. Vietnam was designated in the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty on September 8, 1954.


3. A pentalateral agreement for mutual defense in Indochina was signed at Saigon on December 23, 1950, providing for the establishment of a Military Advisory Assistance Group.

4. An economic cooperation agreement between the U. S. and Vietnam was signed on September 7, 1951 and entered into force on the same date, providing for a U. S. economic aid mission in Vietnam, and amended March 7, 1955 by an exchange of letters.

5. By an exchange of notes in April 1955, the U. S. accepted responsibility for assisting Vietnam in the organization and training of its armed forces.

6. The U. S. Government has officially informed the Vietnamese Government that for fiscal year 1957 U. S. aid will be forthcoming at a level of $250 million in Defense Support ($170 million for military budget support, $80 million for economic projects), and $45.5 million for technical cooperation.

II. ACTIONS AGREED UPON

NSC Citations

Para. 13.

OCB Courses of Action

1. Popularize throughout Southeast Asia the image of a genuinely independent Vietnam striving by its own will and through prime reliance
OCB Courses of Action

on its own resources to maximize its ability
to defend and strengthen its independence.

Assigned to: All Agencies
Target Date: Continuing

2. Publicize the benefits derived from U.S.
ad programs, regional defense pacts and Free
World trade.

Assigned to: All Agencies
Target Date: Continuing

3. Strengthen Vietnamese relations with and
representation in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
and pay special attention to furthering rela-
tions with Burma and particularly an appreci-
atation in Burma for Vietnam’s efforts and poli-
cies. Promote unofficial contacts between
Vietnamese and Malayan leaders and sponsor the
establishment of relations between Vietnam
and Malaya after the Federation obtains inde-
pendence in foreign affairs. Encourage closer
relations between the Government of Vietnam
and the Government of China in all fields and
similarly Vietnamese relations with the Repub-
lic of Korea. Promote further understanding
of the Vietnamese situation in Indonesia. Sup-
port visits by high-ranking leaders and offi-
cials of Southeast Asia neutralist countries
OCB Courses of Action to Vietnam.

4. Encourage Vietnam to participate in a regional training center.

5. When a permanent military planning staff is created to assist in the preparation of military planning studies for the defense of the Treaty area, Vietnam should be encouraged to participate.

6. Encourage Vietnam to send military observers to SEATO military exercises.

7. Make periodic demonstrations with U.S. forces in order to increase consciousness of their deterrent effects. Make periodic public respect to announcements with U.S. forces in order to have a deterring influence on possible aggressors.

8. Prepare planning studies in conjunction with other SEATO nations, and gradually include Vietnam in such planning for the defense of the Treaty area against overt communist aggression.
OCB Courses of Action

Assigned to: Defense
Support: State
Target Date: Continuing

9. Prepare planning studies under SEATO with respect to countersubversive and military action which might be taken to thwart any communist attempt to seize control from within.

Assigned to: State
Support: Defense, 3.3(b)(1)
Target Date: Continuing

10. Continue the Vietnam 1290-d program, providing a substantial quantity of police equipment for the police and other security civil organizations. Continue intensive training of the Vietnamese police in all phases of police administration.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, Defense, 3.3(b)(1)
Target Date: Continuing

11. Continue the large economic and technical assistance program. (1) Capital projects directed at rapidly increasing production, primarily for local consumption. Such projects might comprise large scale highway rehabilitation and improvement, the restoration of internal waterways, improvement of port facilities and the proposed construction of industrial facilities such as a sugar refinery,
OCB Courses of Action

textile plant, paper mill, cement factory and other facilities using local resources. Survey Vietnam's power needs and consider extending assistance in connection with the building of large-scale power facilities. (2) Improvement in rural life. U.S. might consider technical assistance and some form of financial support for a land reform and land tenure program. U.S. might continue to aid in the resettlement of refugees, displaced persons, and peasants now working in marginal lands in new settlements in fertile areas. It might include the creation and extension of rural credit facilities at reasonable terms. Educational and health services provided by the Government might be focussed increasingly on practical improvement in village life. (3) The training of additional Vietnamese technicians and administrators in every field of activity might be undertaken. Some financial support for the foregoing might be obtained through an Export-Import Bank loan.

12. Continue to exert influence to persuade the Vietnamese Government to allow maximum private participation by Vietnamese and
OGP Courses of Action

foreign investors in the organization and management of new industrial enterprises. In advising the Vietnamese on the terms of new investment legislation, attempt to secure provisions attractive to private investors and see that any such legislation is fairly and liberally administered.

13. Send an exhibit on Peoples Capitalism.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: State
Target Date: Continuing

14. Encourage the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to follow up its recent economic survey of Vietnam with the maximum number of competent technicians to assist the Vietnamese Government and to train Vietnamese specialists. This type of program activity to be most efficacious would be closely coordinated in the field with U. S. programs. Encourage the Colombo Plan countries, particularly Canada and Australia, to expand their programs of technical and economic assistance to Vietnam.

15. Sustain the Vietnamese Government in its determination to avoid any economic contact with communist countries.
OB Courses of Action

16. Continue the U. S. surplus disposal program to benefit Vietnam by providing vitally needed commodities for local currency and by making available French francs through triangular arrangements thus permitting Vietnam to receive a considerable percentage of U. S. aid in currency most familiar to Vietnamese importers.

17. Continue to finance Vietnam imports during the next few years. Continue to make U. S. commitments available on the Vietnam market so that the Vietnamese will develop a greater taste for U. S. products.

18. Continue to emphasize and expand technical assistance. Continue to educate Vietnamese technicians through improving training facilities in Vietnam and through sending several hundred Vietnamese annually to the U. S. and other countries for training. These training activities should cover every field of activity, among them teacher training, vocational education, highway construction and maintenance, health and sanitation techniques, office management, statistics, vocational agriculture, animal husbandry, police work, etc.
OB C ourses of A ction

19. Efforts should be made to increase school space quotas for exchange students in the continental U.S.

20. Encourage, within the limitations of available spaces, attendance of Vietnamese military personnel at schools of the U.S. armed forces and at appropriate foreign schools operated or sponsored by the U.S. armed forces.

Assigned to: ICA, Defense
Support: USIA, State
Target Date: Continuing

connection with NSC

21. As indicated in para. 22. above, the rural life improvement program might be a major component of U.S. aid. Include in this program land reform, improved credit facilities, irrigation, better roads and canals, and extension of improved elementary education and health services to the villages. Continue the village self-defense corps to emphasize self-help improvement projects, organizing protection against Viet Minh terror squads, assisting the villagers in reorganizing their communities along democratic lines and planting grass root supports for the Diem regime.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

-11-
OCB Courses of Action

22. The demand for U. S. technicians by the Vietnamese Government, and the growth of the economic development program will probably require a larger staff both of U. S. employees and of contractors. New personnel should be carefully screened to secure persons who are properly qualified.

Assigned to: All Agencies
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 28.

23. (For courses of action see the Outline Plan of Operations on Overseas Chinese)

Assigned to: State
Support: USIA, ICA
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 29.

24. (For courses of action see the draft Outline Plan of Operations on Overseas Chinese)

Assigned to: State
Support: USIA
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 30.

25. Continue covert operations to assist in the achievement of U. S. objectives in the area.

Assigned to: State, USIA
Support: State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 31.

26. Induce the Vietnamese and Japanese to agree to a reasonable settlement of Vietnam's reparation claims against Japan. Continue to purchase in Japan a substantial portion of
OCB Courses of Action

U.S.-financed aid goods in the Vietnamese program on the basis of lowest competitive price. Attempt to encourage Vietnamese willingness to receive Japanese capital investment on reasonable terms.

Assigned to: ICA, State
Support: State
Target Date: Continuing

27. (See courses of action stated in OCB paper on Regional Cooperation).

Assigned to: ICA
Support: State, USIA
Target Date: Continuing

28. Continue to support Vietnamese Government by diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological means. In these efforts the main object should be to maximize the attractiveness of Free Vietnam in contrast with conditions in the communist zone of North Vietnam. Vietnamese economic needs should be studied on a long-range basis with a view to reconstructing the country and promoting its long-run development as an economic as well as political showcase of the Free World.

Assigned to: All Agencies
Target Date: Continuing

29. Change the main emphasis in economic aid from provision of consumer goods to provision
OCB Courses of Action

of capital goods.

Assigned to: ICA
Target Date: Continuing

30. Give psychological, financial and material aid to Vietnamese political, fraternal, commercial and other organizations which demonstrate moral integrity and patriotism.

Assigned to: All Agencies
Target Date: Continuing

31. Increase training of Vietnamese technical and professional personnel in U. S. schools and in U. S. staff schools in Vietnam.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, Defense
Target Date: Continuing

32. Continue to assist the Vietnamese to develop a strong and stable government, particularly through assistance in the field of public administration. Major activities in the field of public administration are handled under a university contract with Michigan State University. Michigan State University works directly with the Vietnamese Government through the National Institute of Administration, and provides detailed technical assistance in police administration and in governmental organization. Extend the Michigan
33. Support the Vietnamese Government's psychological warfare program against the communist zone with a view to inciting dissention and encouraging defections.

   Assigned to: USIA
   Support: State, Defense
   Target Date: Continuing

34. Seek to persuade Vietnamese Government increasingly to stress in its propaganda championship of the peaceful reunification of Vietnam under anti-communist leadership. Provide to the VN press translations into French and Vietnamese of press reports from Singapore, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, in which communist subversion is being successfully identified and countered.

   Assigned to: USIA
   Target Date: Continuing

35. Develop broadcasts toward the North Vietnamese audience with the objective of sowing dissatisfaction among those people with the Viet Minh regime and of attracting them toward
36. Through diplomatic means, in consultation with the Vietnamese Government, explore the possibilities for voluntary dissolution of the International Commission and suspension of the Geneva Armistice Agreement with the understanding that a new ad hoc international commission on elections would be established in Vietnam. Persuade the Vietnamese Government to take the position that it favors reunification through free elections after it has been satisfied that an independent international agency has determined that good conditions required for such elections exist.

37. Within the temporary MAAG ceiling develop through training the maximum combat capabilities of the Vietnamese national army including its logistical support services and be prepared to assume additional training functions for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force if the French relinquish such functions. Similarly,
OGS Courses of Action
continue to develop the resistance potential
of the para-military forces. The present
Vietnamese Army-force level of 150,000 should
not be decreased in the foreseeable future,
but this figure should be kept under constant
review and efforts should be made to cut the
man-year costs of Vietnamese troops far below
the present level.

Assigned to: Defense
Support: ICA, State
Target Date: Continuing

38. Continue to train and equip the Vietnamese
Army and provide budget support for the bulk
of its local currency costs.

Assigned to: ICA
Support: Defense
Target Date: Continuing

39. Seek to influence Vietnamese defense plan-
ning so that it will be consistent with U. S.
and SEATO plans.

Assigned to: Defense
Support: State, Continuing

40. Discourage the establishment of Viet Minh
representation of missions abroad by persuading
governments and international agencies with
which the Viet Minh seeks contact of its com-
munist-bloc satellite character. Encourage
OGP Courses of Action
Vietnam to strengthen diplomatic representation in strategic countries. Where, as in Cambodia, an attempt is made to establish dual representation from North and South Vietnam, the latter should try to exclude its rival by confining its representation to those fields in which it has special relations with the host country.

Assigned to: State
Support: USIA
Target Date: Continuing

41. Continue to impress Viet Minh with U.S. willingness to defend free countries of South-
east Asia in case of aggression or subversion from within; persuade non-communist govern-
ments in Asia, particularly governments of Laos and Cambodia, of the continuing Viet Minh objective of seeking communist hegemony in the area; enlist the full assistance of the gov-
ernments of Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines in efforts to strengthen Lao and Cambodian willingness to resist communist approaches.

Assigned to: State
Support: Defense
Target Date: Continuing

42. Endeavor to have news and announcements of U.S. deterrent forces published in the North Vietnamese press.
OCG Courses of Action

Para. 67. (cont'd)

43. Expand broadcasting to North Vietnam to play heavily upon national sentiment and historical animosity between Vietnam and China, and other appropriate themes.

Assigned to: USIA, [Blank]
Support: Defense
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 69.

44. Consider suggesting to the Vietnam Government that it employ a U.S. advisory group specifically to assist it in developing a vigorous psychological warfare program directed at North Vietnam. This group should be very small and headed by a first-rate U.S. psychological warfare specialist.

Assigned to: State, USIA, ICA, [Blank]
Target Date: Continuing

Para. 70.

45. Study the possibilities of restricting U.S. exports, shipping, and assets to North Vietnam in conformity with existing U.S. policies in other areas.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA, Treasury
Target Date: Continuing

II. ACTIONS NOT AGREED UPON

NONE.

III. ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP

NONE.