MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 20, 1959

Others present: Mr. Allen Dulles, General Cabell,
Mr. Bissell, Secretary McElroy,
General White, Dr. Kistiakowsky,
Dr. Killian, General Goodpaster

Mr. Dulles said the group had come in to report further concerning
a successor aircraft to the U-2. Exploratory work has been con-
ducted over the past six months, utilizing the $6.5 million made
available by the President. Two aircraft had been investigated.
The first, studied in greater detail, is the Super-Hustler, a small
ramjet to be carried aloft by a B-58 and air launched; the second is
a very advanced turbojet.

The former was evaluated to be feasible (subject to one point
mentioned later); it will have a radar cross-section so low that the
probability of hostile detection and successful tracking would be very
low. It would have a 4000-mile range at mach 4, with 90,000 feet
altitude.

The second development, by Lockheed, was carried out because of
a difficulty in operating the air-launched Hustler. The normal B-58
lacks the thrust to bring it to speed to start the ramjet, and would
have to have modified engines installed. The Lockheed proposal is
for a vehicle using a J-58 engine; it will have a larger radar cross-
section than the Super-Hustler, but the cross-section will still be
about 1/20th of that of a B-47. Its operating altitude will be 85,000
feet at the start of the mission, rising to 95,000 feet toward the close
of the mission. Speed will be 3.2 mach initially; this will be raised
to 3.5 mach in a later version. We must anticipate that the presence
of the aircraft would usually be known, although there would be a
great deal of confusion arising from its height and speed, and there
is very little likelihood that successful tracking could be carried out.
This aircraft would have a great advantage of being operated by refueling from North American bases, which could be chosen for security.

If a decision to go ahead with development were taken today, the first flight for each of these could take place in January 1961. The costs for development and production of twelve aircraft, including engines and flight testing, would run about $170 million for the Lockheed aircraft and $160 million (including cost of conversion of B-58s) for the Super-Hustler. In FY-60, $100 million in obligational authority would be needed. $75 million has been earmarked and is available in Department of Defense funds; $25 million could be drawn from CIA. Mr. McElroy commented that the Defense budget for FY-60 did not make allowance for expenditure of any of this $75 million.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that in an emergency the Lockheed aircraft could be fitted out to be used as a dual purpose plane, bombing from 90,000 feet. General White had some question as to the practicability of such a plan.

The President said he thought we should keep this development moving along, both for the use of the aircraft that is being proposed and also for its use for reconnaissance purposes in case of war. His only point is that we must weigh this usefulness against other things in the military program in order to be sure that we are making the best use of our funds. He asked whether the expenditure implications had been discussed with the Bureau of the Budget and whether consideration had been given as to where to "hide" the funds. From the discussion it was clear that there had been broad consideration of the matter, but more detailed discussion was needed.

Dr. Killian said that he felt this plane would represent a really important advance in reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. The President said that it looked to him as though the $6.5 million had been spent on the Super-Hustler, with $100,000 on the Lockheed proposal, and the outcome was an expensive lesson that the latter is the more promising. He asked that the group look into questions of timing and details of financing. He confirmed that we want to have the finest reconnaissance aircraft that we can provide. Accordingly,
he thought it would be a good thing to go ahead, but asked that there be conversations with Mr. Stans personally about these aspects.

The President asked what arrangements would be made for supervising the contract and the development and production operations. He stressed the importance of close technical supervision. After discussion he agreed that the best course would be to adhere to the pattern of the development of the U-2.

After the meeting, on Mr. McElroy's suggestion, I met with Mr. Stans to let him know that the President viewed this project favorably but wished him to discuss it with Defense and CIA representatives to consider the expenditure implications and how the funds might best be carried. I also informed Mr. Stans that a team structure comparable to that for the U-2 was to be employed.

A. J. Goodpaster
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