INTERVIEW WITH
Mr. Roger Jones
on
November 8, 1976
for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of ROGER W. JONES.

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, ROGER W. JONES, of New Hartford, Connecticut, hereinafter referred to as the donor, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted on November 8, 1976 and prepared for deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

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This interview is being conducted with Mr. Roger Jones on November 8, 1976 in Hartford, Connecticut. The interviewer is Dr. Thomas Soapes of the Eisenhower Library. Present for the interview are Mr. Jones and Dr. Soapes.

DR. SOAPES: As I indicated before we started the interview, what I want to do is to supplement some of the interview that you did with Columbia University. One, and I believe you were a career public servant. You'd been in the government for, how long was it?

MR. JONES: I went into the government in 1933. And was a career man up to the time that President Eisenhower decided that he was going to make me, temporarily at least, a political officer.

DR. SOAPES: And you'd been in the Budget department?

MR. JONES: Yes. I entered government in the Central Statistical Board in 1933. That was transferred to the executive office of the President when it was organized on July 1, 1939, and I remained in the Budget Bureau, except for the war years, until President Eisenhower appointed me chairman of the Civil Service Commission in 1959.

DR. SOAPES: Now, were you involved in the transition from Truman to Eisenhower in any major way?

MR. JONES: I was deeply involved in it.

DR. SOAPES: Could you explain to me what your role was, and some of the problems that you had to deal with?
JONES: Yes, the whole idea of orderly transitions had been first broached by President Truman in 1948. He instructed the Budget Bureau, and in conference with several members of his staff, to analyze the presidential programs that were announced in his speeches, analyze the platforms, and be prepared in the event that there was a change in administration to provide a good deal of information to the incoming president. Of course, Mr. Truman didn't think he was going to get beaten, and he didn't, but that started the whole business of transition. Then four years later, when it was certain that there would be a transition to a new president, he clarified those instructions. He suggested that we work with the agencies to prepare briefing papers from the departments to be given to the new cabinet officers, and that we go through a process of rather careful delineation—not only of the positions of the man who would be coming into the presidency—but also of the relationship between those positions and the last Truman budget, which, of course, he had to prepare for his successor.

My part in this was concerned very largely with the unenacted parts of the Truman legislative program, the departmental legislative programs, and legislative initiatives, which could be derived from what we popularly called the "Ikelopedia", a list of the campaign statements that Mr. Eisenhower had made. The result was, I think, quite successful because one of the very first acts that President Eisenhower took was to appoint Joseph M. Dodge of the Detroit Bank as his incoming budget director. Within very few days after the
election, Dodge was on the job in the Budget Bureau reviewing the budget which was then in process for President Truman, and reviewing with me the legislative items of which there were several hundred, departmental and otherwise. We had more of a leg up that year than we had in 1948 by virtue of the fact that President Truman decided in 1950 that he was going to spell out his legislative programs in the budgets and that he was also going to put cost figures on them. Consequently, it was a relatively easy job for anyone to see what those programs were because a good deal of specifics were already in the budget.

The next step that was taken, and which was extremely useful, was Dodge's decision, taken with the incoming President, to have the cabinet members, as they were announced, come in for what you might call briefings and general discussion sessions about the budget situation, the personnel situation, the legislative situation, and to some small degree departmental constituency positions. These sessions were held with all of the incoming cabinet by Mr. Dodge and various people from the Budget Bureau, with the exception of the incoming Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson. That was a session which Dodge and Mr. Wilson had themselves without staff being present. It had been felt that President Eisenhower would talk personally about the defense budget with Mr. Wilson. I've never been sure, but I think that at least one of those conversations was held at the White House--no, not at the White House--at the--where was the headquarters in New York?
SOAPES: At the Commodore Hotel.

JONES: At the Commodore in New York, after the Wilson appointment was announced.

My own part in this was to stick to the legislative list to indicate those items to which either the outgoing President or the incoming President had committed himself and which were essentially similar. Also to give the incoming cabinet officers a view of the status of legislative programs of their departments in the closing days of the administration. I think they found this helpful. And there were some interesting little incidents, one of which I'll repeat. I recorded it for the Columbia tape. And that was the situation in the Department of Commerce with respect to the St. Lawrence Seaway. Secretary Weeks, we had discovered, had at least, I think, about eight times expressed his opposition to the St. Lawrence Seaway. President Eisenhower was committed to it. The Department of Commerce was expected by the Congress to be the agency that carried the ball, and Mr. Weeks was a little surprised, and I think a little discomforted when I had to tell him that he was committed to the St. Lawrence Seaway, or at least his department was. He handled it adroitly; he simply withdrew himself from the picture of being the chief advocate and turned the job over to his under secretary. But that kind of thing was very helpful. Mr. Weeks told me afterwards that this really kept him from making a bobble. He hadn't even picked up the fact that, I think, Eisenhower had endorsed the Seaway a couple of times during the campaign.
Then, after these sessions took place and after inauguration, the decision was taken—not by default but certainly without very extensive discussion—that the agencies would be free to go ahead with their legislative programs subject to Budget Bureau reservation on anything which they believed was of central importance to the President. A little bit later on after that, roughly in March, after inauguration, President Eisenhower decided that he himself was not going to have a number of special messages that year and was not going to unveil what you might call a massive Presidential legislative program. There was enough unfinished business in terms of straightening out the budget and in terms of getting the agencies and departments in key with the Congress and with their constituencies so that we would finesse a legislative program for the President. That didn't mean, of course, that he wasn't taking a position on a good many important items; he did. I don't have the figures in my mind anymore at this distance in time, but there were almost no legislative messages from the President that year.

SOAPES: Was that a similar pattern to what other Presidents followed in your experience?

JONES: No. Well, of course, President Truman took office after the death of President Roosevelt, and after the first few months, when the war had come to an end in his famous message of September of 1945 he unveiled a substantial legislative program which was the
backbone of the Truman administration from then on until the time he turned the office over to Mr. Eisenhower. And each year he put together a legislative program which the Budget Bureau had the ministerial job of collecting items for. We circulated requests to the agencies, to all of them, to come in with their recommendations for legislative action for that session of the Congress, whether it was a new Congress or a second session of a sitting Congress, and from those we distilled the items which we thought the President would be interested in. He reviewed those and the presidential legislative program was put together from that. The remainder of the things were turned back to us to work with the agencies on. In most cases the agencies were relatively free to go forward with anything we thought they really needed and wanted, but there were some cases in which the President definitely said, "no." But it was a presidential, "no"; it was not a Budget Bureau, "no".

Now, on the transition from President Eisenhower to President Kennedy, I don't know what happened because Mr. Kennedy had taken me from the Civil Service Commission and transferred me to the Department of State, and I was entirely involved with the Department of State's situation in the new administration and its legislative programs. So I really don't know what steps were taken. There was, however, a Kennedy legislative program that first year.
SOAPES: In making this transition, we've talked with some other people who were in positions similar to yours, they had been around the executive branch of the government for a long period of time and were intending to continue on. They have told us that they met with some, I suppose natural suspicion on the part of the incoming administration in terms of loyalty. Did you run into that problem?

JONES: No. I didn't, personally. The problem existed and posed I think, some fairly substantial threats to basic continuity. The incoming Republican administration, through three or four fairly major spokesmen, quite naturally wondered about the background of the continuing career force by virtue of the fact that we'd had Democratic administrations ever since the days of Mr. Hoover. Almost everyone had come in in the Roosevelt administration, at least those of us were relatively senior had come in during the Roosevelt administration. Above and beyond that there was a substantial demand for patronage from Republican people all around the country. Mr. Eisenhower himself was not particularly interested in patronage issues. Patronage more or less by default, fell to Arthur Summerfield, the postmaster general who had been the head of the Republican National committee. Other postmasters general for a number of years had had this same role, and Arthur was definitely suspicious of career people.

Some other cabinet officers took steps almost immediately, which frankly later they regretted--[Douglas] McKay, for example,
with Interior immediately disbanded his policy planning staff primarily on the ground that he was sure they were all public power advocates, great reclamation advocates, and so on and so forth, and obviously all must have been good loyal Democrats. Well, actually they weren't and before McKay left the cabinet he told me personally on two different occasions that he regretted that he had done that because it destroyed the continuity of purpose which the policy planning staff was in a position to give him. He had a whole new team and the result was that almost immediately he had, if not internecine warfare, some substantial jealousies among the bureaus of the Department of the Interior that would rear their heads. These gave the secretary some problems. His under secretary, however, was quite suspicious of the Budget Bureau and took the position that he didn't think Interior had any obligation to come to us to help them with their legislative program. Dodge immediately went to the President on this, and the President put them back in line very quickly and very definitely.

In the Budget Bureau itself we had no fear of this suspicion in the sense that we were sure that our job was to serve the President and the presidency. We were surprised when all of a sudden the proposal was made that the career assistant directors be assigned other jobs and replaced. Dodge opposed this vehemently. He went to the President and in effect he told the President that this organization and the people in it, the senior people in it, had
proved their loyalty. They had taken new instructions with respect to the budget; they'd redone it promptly in accordance with the Eisenhower format. And he [Dodge] saw absolutely no reason to destroy the President's ongoing managerial machinery represented by the career staff of the Budget Bureau. And that, in fact, (and he said this in the session that I was present at with Adams and the President, Governor Adams, Sherman Adams) he wasn't even in a hurry to appoint a deputy. That he had responsible senior career people in Fred Lawton and me. He happened to mention me because I was there, and that we could back him up until such time as he knew what kind of a deputy he wanted.

The cause for the career service, however, did get into some difficulty in the Budget Bureau, so Dodge went to Phil Young who was the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. And he said, "Come in and study these jobs. Tell me whether these are basically career jobs or whether we should make them something else." (Schedule C had not yet been established.) Young sent over a team from the Civil Service Commission and after a pretty careful look-see, they said that all of the senior career jobs in the Budget Bureau should remain career jobs. That while they were in a sense policy-influencing because of the kind of analytical work they had to do, they were not policy jobs. The policy was controlled by the director and the, well they called him then assistant director, later deputy director, and that this was an institutional job
performed in an institutional way. By and large this satisfied people.

There was still some little fuss about it, and there was a great deal of fuss about careerists in other parts of the Washington scene, and some in the field. Herb Brownell, the attorney general, lined up pretty much with Dodge because he wanted, and in fact instructed and later, not very much later, Bill Rogers who was then the deputy attorney general, put into effect a career recruitment system for lawyers in the Department of Justice, which we could not do under civil service. Many years before the Congress had enacted a provision which denied the use of any civil service funds to examine lawyers, so they'd always been in the excepted service, in Schedule A positions.

By mid-summer this attitude of suspicion had pretty much quieted down; in the fall there was another a push on it. I do not remember the exact date on which Schedule C was promulgated, but at least the idea of it was gaining a great deal of currency by late summer, and several of the department heads again began to complain. They were sure that they weren't getting the kind of support that they ought to have, and I guess Jones became a bit of a guinea pig at that time.

The "Luce empire", if you want to call it that, decided that this was bad for good government, and Mr. Luce personally instructed Fortune to find a career civil servant and to write a good profile of him and show what this career service could do. After consultation
with the White House, I was picked to fulfill this role, and in the November, 1953 issue of Fortune there is a long article about me and my family and my background, my budget, what I did and didn’t do, what my hopes, fears, aspirations, and prejudices were, under the title of, "This is a Bureaucrat," written by a senior editorial member of the staff, Catherine Hammill, which apparently was successful.

I got something over, oh, I don't know, somewhere between three and five hundred letters, five hundred if you took the telephone calls and added them in, all saying, you know, "Good, stay in there. Didn’t know that civil servants did this kind of thing. It's great."

This satisfied most of the Republican members of the Congress. I'd had close relationships with them because I had been the congressional liaison officer for the Budget Bureau during the 80th Congress for no better reason than the fact that I was a registered Republican. And had come to know people like Senator Taft quite well. So we didn't really have any problems in the Budget Bureau. And the other departments did not have too much of a problem until Schedule C was put into effect. Then there was some confusion, temporarily.

Schedule C was an executive order of the President which allowed the departments and agencies, after clearing the job, its content, and the individual with the Civil Service Commission, to create excepted jobs on the ground that incumbents were either policy officers or policy-influencing officers or that it was essential for there to be a confidential relationship between the department or
agency head and the individual. This enabled them, for example, to make essentially, "political" appointments as secretaries. The Civil Service Commission administered this while Young was there, very tightly. They set a pattern which his successor, Harris Ellsworth, followed and which set a pattern that naturally I wasn't going to turn my back on after I got over there. Over time, we have had little trouble with Schedule C.

There were not massive moves to take jobs out of Civil Service. There were two or three potential forays from the field on the idea that most of the field jobs obviously were policy-influencing and that therefore they ought to be removed from the civil service. This got almost nowhere in the Eisenhower administration. It didn't get very far with Mr. Kennedy. A few moves in that direction were made by President Johnson, but the Nixon administration transferred the principal field jobs and a great many jobs of the domestic agencies into non-career positions. I frankly think they went too far, and I think the pattern will be reversed.

SOAPES: Back to the transition. Was Sherman Adams a difficult person to gain confidence of?

JONES: I don't know; I didn't find him so. Adams was, so far as I was concerned, a very typical Yankee. He was the kind of a person that I'd lived with all my life and that my ancestors had lived with from the time New England first was, so he presented no problems
for me. He was gruff. He could be very short. He didn't suffer fools gladly, but he could also be challenged. And if you challenged him, you usually got exactly what you were after. He didn't particularly like the part of the function which I had of reviewing enrolled bills and sending memoranda over to the White House because he didn't see why the President had to be concerned with all of the minor things. And on one occasion the Governor and I had to have a little discussion about the constitution and the President's role in the handling of legislation. It was very friendly and we had no difficulty with it. I was pretty well briefed because I'd had the same kind of a fuss with President Truman's doctor.

Truman, the only time he was sick in office was at the end of his administration, that last summer he was in Walter Reed Hospital for a bit. Dr. Graham decided that we couldn't send legislation out to him, and I had to tell Dr. Graham that, under the constitution, the President had to take a look at this stuff and if he didn't and if the Congress was here, it would be approved without his signature, if they'd gone home it would all be pocket vetoed. We had no more difficulty on that score. But Adams didn't quite see the point at first.

President Eisenhower himself was not initially terribly interested in the legislative process. He knew what his job was, he wanted us to see the memoranda on the enrolled bill, and then he took action. He didn't have the same kind of personal hobby interest in minor legislation that President Truman did, but as the administration wore
on he got more and more of it. In the early days I didn't have many contacts with him on legislation, and Adams couldn't quite see why he ever did anything different from what the agency of chief interest proposed. This straightened out promptly. But my own relationship with Governor Adams was full, it was friendly, it was free. On one occasion he didn't like a position we were taking on the so-called Bricker Amendment. We said that it interfered with the President's conduct of foreign affairs, and he said, "Well, I've got to know more about this. I've got a very full day tomorrow but we've got to talk about it. How early can you meet me?"

I said, "You name it."

And he said, "Well, I come down here occasionally for breakfast early in the morning."

I said, "I'll meet you any time you want to. I eat breakfast about six o'clock myself."

This was the kind of thing that you could do with Adams, if you weren't scared of the man. And he was no one to be scared of. He was an extremely bright man. He had a very quick mind. He could pick out flaws in arguments as quickly as anybody I ever saw. The President obviously relied on him extensively. But we had no troubles. He was an exercise buff. On occasion I'd go over and sit in the gym and talk with him while he was doing his exercise. Now other people didn't find him this way, and the people who felt that they could shove Adams to one side, got hauled up pretty short.
Later on, after the fairly elaborate but nevertheless pretty much military pattern of White House organization and cabinet secretariat were set up, the ground rules were understood a little bit better and the relationships with Adams were much closer by many people.

I think the only thing I could fault him on was he tried to do too much. And despite seeming impatience, he would stay with an issue. He would schedule a meeting for half an hour,—everybody assumed it would be a half an hour meeting. If Adams wasn't satisfied, it would go on, and people in the outer office were biting their fingernails. But again he had a loyal and wonderful staff who were working closely with him, and his number one secretary was a real diplomat, Ilene Slater, who subsequently went to work for Governor Rockefeller in New York. So I just can't say that there were problems. Now other people may have had them, but I'm not going to comment on them or the reasons for them.

Yes, at least he listened to them even if he didn't agree with them. And there was never but one occasion which he thought he had the right to chew me out. This was before Dodge left and Dodge just came right back at him, and in effect said, "Look, when I send Jones over here as my deputy, you listen to him."

SOAPES: You mentioned that your contacts with Eisenhower early on were not very great in the legislative field.
JONES: No. Not initially. Although, let me explain. The President, he was aware, he knew who I was because I'd done some work with him way back at the start of World War II in connection with organization of the joint staff planners before he was appointed Supreme Commander and went on overseas. So he knew who I was, he recognized the signature.

It was not long before Bernard Shanley, who was the Presidents' first counsel, wanted me to go over every enrolled bill memorandum with him, and presently these conversations with him led to, "Well, come along with me, we better talk with the President about this one." Although the President preferred to work on the basis of memoranda; sometimes you had to talk to him. Then a little bit later on well, one example. As I recall--I don't remember now what bill it was--Congress finally passed it about nine o'clock on the night of June 30th and if it had not been signed by midnight of June 30th, the whole program would have come apart at the seams. This resulted in Shanley and me making a ten minutes to twelve call on the President in his bedroom, which I think amused him and interested him because it brought home to him really the terrible responsibility that the President has in the legislative field when you run into a situation of that kind. They had chased all over town trying to find the Speaker to get the bill signed that evening on the Hill so they could get it down to us. My troops had all worked late. It was really one of the nicest experiences I had in
the Eisenhower eight years to be sitting at ten minutes of twelve in the President's bedroom talking to him about a bill that he had to sign before twelve o'clock. And from then on until after the heart attack, there were a number of contacts.

After the heart attack, and after Adams departed, Colonel Persons, who had been legislative liaison man for the Department of the Army and legislative liaison man for President Eisenhower, felt he was in a position, as indeed he was, to give as much oral background on many of these things as I could, and do it in an equally institutional way. And the contacts rather tapered off, although not entirely by a long shot. But they tapered off for another reason, namely that the President was getting ready to move me up. And he moved me up first to one of the statutory assistant directors of the Budget Bureau. I came out of legislative reference in 1957, and he then made me the deputy, later that year, in the Budget Bureau. So I didn't see him on legislation. Stans didn't particularly like cabinet meetings, so I occasionally went to cabinet meetings for him, and saw the President there, but without personal contact.

And then in the final two years, '59-'61, I was over at the Civil Service Commission as Chairman. And my contacts with the President from the Civil Service Commission were not on legislative matters, except on a few very major bills. The major bills were two pay bills, the health benefits program, the life insurance program and the Government Employees Training Act, one of the most
important pieces of personnel legislation that's been enacted in a long, long time. And in all of these the President was very much involved.

For the first eight or nine months that I was at the Civil Service Commission, his personnel advisor was Rocco Siciliano, former assistant secretary of Labor and in the Nixon administration, an under secretary of Commerce. Rocco and I worked closely together. His staff had largely been recruited from my former colleagues in the Budget Bureau. Whenever we wanted to see the President, he arranged for us to go together.

After Rocco left to go into private practice of law, his successor was Eugene Lyons, a former assistant postmaster general, and former private sector personnel officer. Gene and I just didn't see eye-to-eye on a lot of things. We were perfectly good friends, we worked in great harmony, but he was a much more conservative man about personnel matters and personnel policy than, frankly, I was. And this created no problems except occasionally he was a little bit reluctant to let me get any kind of a view presented to the President in person; he'd prefer me to give him a memorandum and then he'd send his memorandum and the two positions were sort of lined out, but this presented no--

SOAPES: Conservative in what sense in regard to personnel matters?

JONES: Conservative in the sense that he did not believe that the government personnel were as far behind the private sector as we knew they were.
SOAPES: In terms of pay.

JONES: Well, not only in terms of pay, but in terms of benefits, in terms of, you know, general position on the totem pole. This came, I think, quite sharply into focus. The Health Benefits Act had been passed in—I mean the Government Employees Training Act had been passed in '58, and the process of putting it into effect fell to the Civil Service Commission right after I went over there, or started just before I went over there as a matter of fact. And the Lyons' position was that, well, the government training act should be used only where there was a clearcut case that by sending someone away for additional training you were going to fill a greater job need and it could be justified in terms of efficiency and economy. My counterargument was that that was not the purpose of the act, and that the legislative history was more interested in effectiveness than it was in efficiency and economy. It was quite necessary in many instances—the growth of technology and other things—to take senior government people and send them back to school, if you want to call it that, in order to bring them up to speed. Get them reacquainted with their own disciplines, their own fields, and to give them managerial training.

We wanted as early as 1959 to establish a civilian staff college, which President Eisenhower was willing to do because he knew the military staff college situation. In fact he said to me, "We did this kind of thing for the military; we ought to do it for the civilians." But Lyons opposed that and actually we didn't get it
off the ground. There was a yack about whether we could do it by executive order or whether it would require legislation and that wasn't really resolved until after the end of the Eisenhower administration. However, the ball was picked up by Kennedy and initial starts were made with executive seminar centers by Civil Service Commission by John Macy, my successor and long-time personal friend. We didn't really get a federal staff college in the sense of the Federal Executive Institute now in Charlottesville, Virginia, until the Johnson administration. But the idea was there; it had been talked about and I'd made speeches about it, one of which President Eisenhower congratulated me on as early as 1957.

Now on the other side—I hesitated there because you said, well, how would I define "conservatism" as far as Gene was concerned. I think I would have to say that also while he was aware of the fact that we had had to get around some of the pay problems by upgrading, he didn't really accept the fact that the government's spectrum of employment was becoming as wide as it was, that there was real need for as many of the kinds of people as it seemed to us in the Civil Service Commission and in the agencies that the government really required. Not that he thought everything could be done by "clerks," you know, he wasn't that kind of a man. But he just felt we were reaching too far, too fast, to adopt all kinds of things that the private sector used, that came from technological advance. I must say that by 1960 he'd begun to change his mind on this rapidly and
was a great supporter. He was a great supporter of the studies that were made by the Department of Labor that ultimately led to the enactment in the Kennedy administration of the Salary Reform Act of 1962. He saw that we did need to interrelate government salaries with the private sector; he did not quite see the need for interrelating civilian salaries with military salaries, but I think he would have come on that too, if he'd had more time in the job. He just didn't have very long in the job. After all he was there for an even shorter period than I was before the administration changed.

There was a little requirement, which was never closely followed in the Congress, that said whenever you sent forward a bill you should indicate what the personnel dimensions of that proposed legislation would be. Lyons felt that this was highly essential, but on the other hand he also felt that if he gave the agencies their head on this, they'd always be upping their personnel needs. The Congress wasn't too keen on it either; they'd much rather have a cost figure than a personnel figure. But this was another indication, basically, of what I think is a more conservative policy than my own. Gene was, certainly he was no McCarthyite, but he placed great stock in extensive investigation of even minor civil service jobs before the person was appointed. I frankly felt this was sometimes carried much too far. It was that kind of thing.
SOAPES: In regard to legislation—

JONES: By the way, has he been interviewed?

SOAPES: Yes, I saw him last March out in Colorado.

JONES: What did he say about this interim period of Jones at the Civil Service Commission?

SOAPES: As a matter of fact, I don't believe we mentioned you.

JONES: Okay. All right. Gene and I were good friends, but I think that he considered me an awful hair shirt. And I had some great support in this in my vice-chairman and Republican colleague, Barbara Gunderson, who'd been a former Republican national committee-woman from South Dakota. Barbara was right in there swinging for the girls all the time, for the women, for minorities, and so on and so forth, and Gene just didn't understand it.

SOAPES: That raises an interesting question about the interest in the Eisenhower administration in terms of blacks, women, other minority groups. I know we didn't have things back then like Equal Employment Opportunity Officers, and that sort of thing, but was there an effort into this?

JONES: Yes. Well, it's rather hard to typify it. President Eisenhower, after the war, got pretty deeply interested in this.
He had been interested in the employment of women much earlier, and I suspect that a lot of the impetus for that probably came from Mamie, I'm not sure. But I've always thought so from the way in which it was presented to me. I had to make two or three different reports to him on what was happening to the employment of women, what was the grade structures of affected women, why weren't there more women in important jobs and higher jobs. And in fact the number of women in higher scientific jobs grew quite rapidly toward the end of the Eisenhower administration.

On the side of the straight civil rights thing, the black situation, I think this was an issue which troubled Mr. Eisenhower deeply, but he was very definitely against the idea that you were hiring people just because they were black. So as a matter of fact were most of us at that time because the initial, well not drive, but the initial set of representations that were made to us by the NAACP and some of the others was almost what you had later on. "It's high time you set yourselves some quotas and started hiring blacks because they're black."

Mr. Eisenhower was disturbed, in fact we had one telephone conversation about it over the fact that the black people in the colleges couldn't seem to pass examinations, and he asked me to look into this. Well, I did but it was toward the end of the administration and this didn't really come into focus until later on which I picked up the same thing in the State Department, and we worked hard with
ETS, (Educational Testing Service at Princeton,) and with the then so-called predominately Negro colleges to try to find out why these people couldn't pass the examinations. Was there a racial bias in the examinations themselves? I think there was. But there was no real affirmative action program. The President had had some not too happy experiences with black personnel in the armed services, although he did feel strongly that the services were not doing enough to advance particularly the negro officers. He was a staunch supporter of more negro admissions for the academy and integration in the Army. And the word was "negro" then, it wasn't black. The term, "black", came to be used later on; that's why I used it.

This also came into focus with him in a different way not long after I went to the Civil Service Commission—it was late summer of '59 as I recall. The issue that brought it into focus was the Veterans Preference Act. And the President, in a note which I must have given back to somebody because I looked in my Eisenhower files to see if I had it and I don't have it, just a handwritten note from him. He wanted to know whether negroes who had five or ten points of veterans preference, he didn't, you know, define the points, he said who have veterans preference, were failing on the jobs to which they were appointed to. In other words, were they getting appointed by virtue of the veterans preference rather than by passing examinations. Well, we had no figures on it. We had no way of testing it. And I had to tell him we just plain didn't know. But you see, there was something there in the back of his mind all the time, and he had
a couple of very, very good negro people working in the White House. Working very effectively in the White House.

SOAPES: You made reference to his military experiences with blacks. Did he bring up specific instances?

JONES: No, he didn't. Paul Carroll, who was Andy Goodpaster's predecessor, who died most unfortunately of a heart attack, Paul said that there had been something which went wrong in France in 1944,

[Interruption]

...with some black support groups. Paul insisted, however, that this was not a matter which was ever of concern to General Eisenhower, but it had been a matter of great concern to the European head of the services of supply [inaudible]. [Inaudible]...other occasions than World War II. Because I had asked Paul. We had something or other, I've forgotten what it was now, I don't remember at all, something or other that brought up the color question in connection--I was still in [inaudible] at this time frame--about some kind of action on housing different people, and I'd been told, well, you can't expect open support from Eisenhower. He had an unhappy experience with them in France, don't expect him to be sympathetic. And I went to Carroll and said, "What's this all about?"

And Pete just said, [inaudible]
SOAPES: So in regard to these, to minority groups, there was concern, but it was something that was heightened, you say, by Little Rock?

JONES: Yes, I think so.

SOAPES: Was a turning point?

JONES: Yes.

SOAPES: Fred Morrow, who, of course, was in the White House--

JONES: Yes, Fred was one of the people I referred to without calling by name.

SOAPES: Yes, he in his book, I believe it was, made reference to the fact that he felt that Eisenhower simply didn't understand or couldn't understand anything about the black experience or the problem, and didn't feel he really appreciated what they were--

JONES: Maybe he didn't understand it, but he was very aware of it. This is a direct quote, it's one that's always stuck in my mind. President Eisenhower said to me on one occasion, "Roosevelt brought the negro into American society, we must accept that." Now that's literally true. And maybe he didn't understand it, but he certainly was aware of it. And he certainly thought that the black officers were not getting all the attention they deserved. Yet, on the other hand, I'm sure that he was unaware of the discrimination in the navy in terms of the Filipinos, the mess officers. And you know, the mess
personnel were all Filipino. He was interested in the women, very definitely.

SOAPES: In what ways did he express his interest in the women?

JONES: Well, in this issue of how many women did we have in the higher paid jobs? What about women scientists? The Civil Service League awards began to come into some prominence, as they did, the first one was in 1955 and I was in the first class. Quite out of the blue one day when we were sitting around the cabinet table, I don't remember now what we were talking about, I think some housing legislation or other, President Eisenhower commented that that first Civil Service League Award thing had included one woman. Now he didn't ask why weren't there more, but he commented on the fact that there was one woman. And I took that as significant.

When the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service was first put into effect, again I had the honor of being one of the members of the first class, and there were five a year, and no women in the first class. The first class was Loy Henderson, J. Edgar Hoover, Sterling Hendricks, William B. McLean and myself. Everyone of us had had contact with the President in one way or another with the possible exception of Hendricks; I'm not sure whether he had. He was a soil scientist with the Department of Agriculture, but the rest of us had had. And although the President said nothing about it at the time, Hopkins, Bill Hopkins, told me afterwards that in connection with the operation of the board which
picked these people, that the President had expressed interest in whether there was a woman on the board and whether women had been nominated. He never said this to me, but Hopkins did. I don't know whether you've ever talked to Bill Hopkins about this kind of thing or not.

SOAPES: We've done a number of interviews with him; I haven't personally, but--

JONES: Well, Hopkins is a great man.

SOAPES: Going back to the legislative process: We have, of course, at the library all of those packets on enrolled bills with all of the agency comments on each piece of legislation. I think I've laid my hands, personally, on every one of them.

JONES: You've had quite a job if you have.

SOAPES: It was the first job I was given on the archives staff was to open that collection. Could you explain to me a little bit about the mechanics of preparing these packets of agency opinions on bills?

JONES: Yes, I will. Let me add one thing on this question of women and minorities and so forth.

SOAPES: Okay, sure.

JONES: Another person who I am sure had some experience with this was Fred Fox, who, you probably know, was an ordained minister. He was the man who was responsible for the President's proclamation.
Have you talked to him at all?

SOAPES: I think he was interviewed by the Columbia Project, but I'm not sure.

JONES: Fred is now at Princeton; he was the recording secretary at Princeton, he's just been moved up to take charge of Princeton's archives. I saw him just a few days ago. But I'm sure Fred had some contact with this thing. I can't be precise about it, but I have the recollection somewhere in the back of my mind that Fred had talked to me about this, again, for some proclamation. Well, going back to the process. You mean primarily enrolled bills?

SOAPES: Yes.

JONES: After the Congress--well no, I've got to go back before that, because this was something that President Eisenhower did do on the major issues of legislation which were parts of the President's program. Again, of course, the things that he personally had recommended or sent a special message on or had included in the budget or State of the Union message and so on, he wanted to be kept advised through Persons's staff, Persons and Bryce Harlow and--a Taft man who was he?

SOAPES: Jack Martin?

JONES: Yes, Jack Martin. On how those bills were progressing. And they, in turn, wanted information from us on what the agencies
were saying. It wasn't a formal reporting, but I was keeping them advised pretty much all the time on the major Presidential items—how they were moving through the committee, what things I was picking up through a staff channel, and if there were problems that were looming in terms with either the timing of the passage of the bill or introduction of amendments which were definitely anathema to the President one way or another. Among others, the legislative veto type of amendment, about which Eisenhower felt even more strongly than Truman did. We had to let them know about that. So that as soon as the Congress passed a bill, we did three things. Number one, we gave a quick report to Shanley and Persons on anything in the bill which just obviously was out of phase, if it was a presidential item. The second thing we did on all bills, whether presidential or not, was to send copies, facsimile copies of the enrolled enactment, to any department or agency or all departments and agencies which had either a substantive or a procedural or sometimes even a political interest in the bill itself. We requested that they report back their views to us within five days so that we could get a memorandum over to the President—hopefully also on the fifth day because they'd come in, some of them come in a few hours, some of them took a few days. But we wanted the President to have five working days on legislation if he needed it. The third thing that we did was done, not surreptitiously, but it certainly was never done on the record, and that was to see if there were any special-interest angles. Our people seldom claimed that there were special,
special-interest concerns, [inaudible], which the departments for one reason or another had not referred to.

Now this was primarily political. If you had a piece of legislation for a multiple purpose dam, for example, and there'd been no indication whether the Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation or anybody else had had any specific contacts with the Congress, or something of that sort. We wanted to know that. And as I say this was not a formal process; it was flying by the seat of your pants so to speak. Is there something in this bill which obviously spells special interest and if so, why has it not been commented on? What's the pitch? And some of these organizations are pretty important; the American Medical Association, for example. And even that far back, the National Education Association and others. But this was not a formal kind of thing; and yet the chief thing was that circulation to the departments and agencies as soon as they came back in the Budget Bureau in a digest--you've read the papers, hundreds of them [laughter]--in a digest of what the agency views were, did a little digest of our own of what the bill contained, and ended up with a recommendation, either approve it or veto.

President Eisenhower didn't very often go against us. He seldom vetoed a bill on which we recommended approval he occasionally approved a bill which we recommended veto on, but this was a matter usually of higher political considerations than it was our job to pay attention to. Now, informally, as a result of this business of
checking up on who the people were interested in it, I would tell the counsel, either Shanley or later on Gerry Morgan—. Gerry as a matter of fact was more interested in this than Shanley was, and then at the very end of the administration—of course, I wasn't in the picture, but this was done by Sam Hughes for Dave Kendall, I'm not sure. I talked to Dave frequently; he would call me just to say, "Well, what about this, that or the other thing," because I had been in charge of legislative records for such a long period of time. And I'd let them know if I thought there was an interest which somebody ought to check out for the President on the politics of it. Our concern was with the politics of program and policy rather than the politics with a party or special interest groups. They could decide relative..., if there was something there we thought they ought to know about, they should be told.

The final part of the process was, (ninety cases out of a hundred) forwarding the bills and analysis to the White House. We responded early to the counsel if he wanted to talk about them or if we wanted to talk about them to the counsel. Then a memorandum would go to the President. I think not too often additional memorandum from the staff. Some people think that the staff wrote a lot of memoranda to the President. I've looked at enrolled bill files before they went to the White House, and I didn't find a lot. I don't know what yours found. [inaudible] The President liked to sign them at one time. A number of times when Shanley and I were there together, we didn't even sit down. The President would take
a look, scan the memoranda, he might ask you a question, he might not; or he'd say, he'd look at the title and, "Tell me about this." Give him a fifteen second review and summarize the memorandum on it.

SOAPES: Occasionally, I've seen memoranda from Budget Bureau signed not by you or someone in your, either your successors or someone acting in your absence, but by the Director himself. Were there somewhat special criteria for when the Budget Director would sign those?

JONES: I think you'll find there were more of those after I left than there were before I left. I don't say that egotistically, but [Philip S.] Sam Hughes had to work out a relationship with Stans. Stans was getting concerned that too much legislation was getting passed that put too many financial demands on the government, and I think he wanted to be in on a great many of the policy issues which he had not with me.

[Interruption]

I'd give Percy [Percival Brundage] the answer, and then he might say, "Well let me sign an enrolled bill memorandum for the President."

"No way." My problem with Percy was that he always wanted to address the President on these things. And that wasn't what Mr. Eisenhower wanted. He wanted the things kept institutional, to come over to Bill Hopkins. And by and large they did. So I don't think you'll find very many of them.
SOAPES: There aren't very many, but I had a question in my mind as to why all of a sudden the budget director—

JONES: Now, I think you would find that when the staff and the budget director were having their differences, and we did have occasionally, you'd probably find the director's memorandum then. In fact, I'm sure you would. I remember Maury saying on one occasion to me, "Damn it, what's the matter with you people? Don't you know when legislation ought to be vetoed?"

Well, let's stop there.

SOAPES: Okay. When you went into the President with legislation you said that he seemed to go through things rather quickly. Did you find that he took an interest in what this legislation was? Or was this frequently an irritant to him to have to—

JONES: No. It was not irritating. The idea that Eisenhower got irritated by legislation, which I've seen in all kinds of papers that were written by various and sundry people, I didn't find the case at all. He didn't like the "junk" legislation to come to him when he was on vacation, but that was just too bad. We had to send it to him. On the other hand there is a picture which I wish to goodness I had. I had a copy of it once which he signed, and somebody swiped it, of him sitting on a bench up in Estes Park, or someplace in Colorado, with the Social Security amendments, which I almost had to go out on because he was so deeply interested. Now if he'd been irritated by it, would he have stopped and spent three
quarters of an hour sitting on a bench in the park reviewing that thing? Obviously no. Would he have, as he did a few times, take me out to the south lawn when he was getting ready to hit golf balls and talk to me about legislation, if it irritated him? I think the answer is obviously, no.

Now, while Shanley and I--while I was with him, and I think Bern a good many times when I wasn't with him--would take him a bunch of stuff, it was because Eisenhower was an organized man. He didn't like this stuff feeding in a bit at a time. If it was legislation, all right, we'll give twenty minutes to legislation.

But there were a number of occasions on major bills in which the President not only wasn't disinterested and certainly wasn't irritated, he would take the enrolled a bill file, and he'd take it over to the house with him. Then later on, either that day or the next day I'd get a telephone call, "The Boss wants to know A, B, C, D." Usually this would come from the counsel, occasionally it came from Adams or Persons. So, I think he got irritated at the congressional habit of bunching, again, using the word loosely, the junk. I think this did annoy him.

But there again, after, and I've forgotten who did this--I think it was Bill Rogers as I recall--after cabinet meeting one day told the President about the consent calendar. No, it was one of the men from the Hill told him about the consent calendar, I thought I detected a change in attitude. I don't suppose he'd ever focused on the fact that when they called the consent calendar that you could
shove anything through that didn't cost more than a million dollars roughly. And that meant a "peaking". And, of course, there was always a "peaking" when they were getting ready for recess or when they're getting ready to go home.

I think President Eisenhower's view was this was an untidy way of doing your business. And it did annoy him when the appropriation bills didn't come through before the end of the fiscal year. Now I've forgotten how many there were in his administration. This became almost a pattern later on in subsequent administration, and a very costly pattern. But again he was fussing about the process. The irritation was at delays which he thought were unsound. Just as he would fuss at the--you know we all broke our backs writing those damn cabinet papers for him, briefing things. He would fuss when those things didn't come in in what he thought was exactly the form, but there were sometimes when his forms simply wouldn't fit what you had to do. Then Andy Goodpaster had to be the guy who went in to explain.

SOAPES: In regard to those cabinet papers--that's another collection that I went through page-by-page--

JONES: Well, you sure must have them all because one of the last things he did was order us all to return all of them. Broke my heart; there were some of them I didn't want to return, frankly. [Laughter] You don't play games with the President of the United States. If he tells you to turn your papers in, you do.
SOAPES: Right. In regard to those, did you write those when you were at BOB as well as at the Civil Service Commission? Or--

JONES: What do you mean?

SOAPES: Cabinet, on the cabinet papers.

JONES: Oh, yes, I wrote a few of them at the Budget Bureau. Of course, none of them ever had my name on them because you didn't have names on cabinet papers except, oh, they might have been on the covering note. And I wrote a cabinet paper on the implementation of Health Benefits Act. I wrote an implementation paper on the Government Employees Training Act, which were informational papers. In fact I expected to make a presentation on them, but the cabinet secretary didn't think they were worthy of taking the time of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission to make a presentation.

SOAPES: After you were at the Civil Service Commission your relationship with the cabinet secretary on papers like this, was it an easy relationship?

JONES: Oh, very easy, very easy. And as a matter of fact, we had a little informal group of legislative liaison people all of the first Eisenhower administration, and I guess pretty much all of the second, that used to meet at the White House fairly frequently. While I at first tended to kind of drop out of this, I hadn't been at Civil Service Commission more than a couple of months before I
decided this was bad business, so I just traded on my goodwill and went over and sat with the boys. And I made it a habit of eating at the White House as a member of the White House Mess at least one and usually two days a week just to keep the contacts because it was a long way from 7th and F Streets to the White House in more ways than one. I no longer had a White House phone on my desk, I wasn't where I could walk across the street, I didn't have a White House pass any more. In the most literal sense, I had one, of course, so I could get in and out, but not to the extent that I had when I was in the Budget Bureau.

SOAPES: When you moved up from the assistant director for legislative reference to, the official title I think was assistant director—

JONES: Yes.

SOAPES: --at that time, how did your duties change?

JONES: Well, that's a little hard to say. My successor had been my deputy, Sam Hughes, I had no doubts about him at all. But the director wanted me looking down Sam's throat, and I had to make at least a pretense of doing this so—I was only in that job about six months—so to some extent I was still in the legislative business particularly in the legislative development business. But the chief change was that I had to take on the responsibility for a very considerable amount of program coordination among the agencies which
were working in the same field. We had already begun to get categorical grants, which are one of the most awful things that ever happened in the federal government. You'd have Labor and HEW, maybe two or three other people, involved in the same kind of subject matter under the categorical grants. I began to work in that field somewhat. I did more contact work for the director with the people who wanted to come in to see him. In legislative reference I'd taken a pretty hands-off or arms-length attitude toward that because I didn't feel it was my job to listen to all the special interests [inaudible]. The director, if anybody wanted to see him, well, he felt somebody had to see them, and I took on some of that.

I was, oh, floating around the edges of a number of inter-departmental things that were already pushing in personnel directions because I'd been much interested in the personnel field. The Department of Defense was doing some worrying, very substantial worrying, about year-end strengths, the whole problem of whether the Eisenhower technique—which was not personnel ceilings but rather across-the-board personnel reductions expressed in percentage terms—whether this sort of thing could be applied to the military. In other words I was messing around with problems not only of man strength but the composition of the forces, so on and so forth. I don't know—whatever Stans wanted me to do, and some of it was boring.

Legislative reference is one of the best jobs in Washington. You're into everything all the time, but you don't say no when the President wants you to do something else.
Now when I moved up as Stan's deputy, which I was for one budget season, my chief responsibility was running the director's review, which Maury didn't like to do, but under fairly tight rein. And under such tight rein that, in connection with Arthur Flemming and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, I wasn't a plenipotentiary at all in this considerable contest between Stans and Arthur on the size of the HEW budget and what they were appealing and what they weren't appealing. Maury didn't want to take a personal part in it; I was a kind of a intermediary. Every time somebody made a ploy, I'd run and see Maury before I could give Arthur an answer.

SOAPES: You mentioned the director's review. Could you define what--

JONES: Well, the director's review is when the budget divisions, the substantive divisions, come in with their recommendations for what you do to the submissions that have been made by the agencies, and you arrive at a position which the director then recommends to the President. In many cases the President's delegated the authority on little stuff, and you just tell agencies what allowance they've got and then they have to go back and settle it with our examiners.

SOAPES: Did you have much close contact with Eisenhower when you're in the number two position in terms of budget making? Did you get his attitude towards the budget?
JONES: No, except insofar as this was expressed in the formal meetings. We did—I presume the cabinet records would show it—we did do fairly frequent budget presentations to the cabinet. To the best of my recollection, I never made but one of those. Stans did. Well Brundage, and the others, all of them had. I don't think any of them did them with the skill that Joe Dodge did. Joe did it very skillfully and usually doubleteaming with the Council of Economic Advisers people and occasionally with the Treasury. Although Dave did not like Humphrey's desire to get proprietary about the budget and kept him at arms length.

SOAPES: That does raise the question in my mind of the role that cabinet officers would play in the budget-making process and the possible problems between the departments and--

JONES: Well, there wasn't a great deal of problem. If a cabinet officer fussed too hard when we came back at him with what we had presidential approval on, of course, he had the right of appeal to the President. Which usually meant in the first instance a right of appeal to Adams, who would then decide whether it was going to get in to the President. After Persons took over,—Jerry didn't exercise quite so tight a rein. But the President made it pretty clear that he didn't welcome these things. And there weren't very many appeals.
Arthur Flemming appealed to him because Arthur and Maurice Stans were just like this [gesture] in terms of where HEW was supposed to be going. Each thought they had a pretty clear charter. Maybe they did, I don't know.

But you did not have the shut-off from presidential review of an appeal that you had in the Nixon administration in which the Budget director really reigned supreme, and which I think was a great mistake. After all, presidential program and policy are involved, and he is the chief executive and on anything as important as his budget, he should be given a shot at something on which there is great disagreement.

Now, Eisenhower was not the student of the budget that Truman was. He went over the Defense budget, of course, with a fine-toothed comb, but Truman really knew his budget. In fact Truman ran his own budget seminar, when the press came in. Eisenhower didn't. And the budget directors eventually came to having other people present at those sessions which again I think could have been handled a little bit more adroitly than it was. I don't say this in particular derogation of either George Humphrey or Rowland Hughes, but Rowland took the attitude that George Humphrey was a very important person and he should have his full say on the budget and Humphrey and Hughes sometimes didn't agree. So this created a problem.

SOAPES: Yes, there's that famous Humphrey--
JONES: Oh, yes, there was!

SOAPES: --a deficit that will "curl your hair" statement.

JONES: Yes, there surely was.

SOAPES: You recall the reaction that was within the White House to that incident?

JONES: Well, I don't know how accurately I recall it, but there was, perhaps the word, "consternation", is too strong, but there was definitely a feeling that he put both feet in his mouth when he shouldn't have. Now whether he was chided for it, I couldn't tell you. Mr. Eisenhower was not loath to let people know when he didn't like something they'd done.

SOAPES: That does raise the question in terms of his style of administration, his way of handling people. Did you regard him as one who definitely gave strong leadership to his administration?

JONES: Yes. Very definitely. Well, it was an entirely different kind of leadership from what I'd seen before or saw afterwards, but the people who think that Eisenhower wasn't a strong leader and wasn't innately a good politician are just plain wrong. His instincts, his political instincts were a heck of a lot better than the positions that many of the people took with him. A particular reference to Mr. Summerfield, Mr. Wilson, and in some respects, even though he admired him and respected him very much, George Humphrey. But George
came around very fast. He talked pretty much on the President's wave length. [Laughter]

Well, the President's instincts, for example, on personnel legislation were terribly good. He vetoed a couple of pay bills just on the grounds we couldn't afford it. But he recognized what the political cost was, and he discussed the political costs, whereas the people who were yowling, "We can afford to spend the money," refused to consider this as an issue and Eisenhower did. He said, "Well, I'm hurting the people who work for the government. I know I am." And he was. One occasion on which he, only time I ever saw him really get, I think angry at, or irritated at least, at a cabinet meeting--

[Interruption]

JONES: We were putting together some ideas on housing and Social Security legislation, and the President expressed his basic agreement with the proposals that had been made, and Arthur Burns started to argue. And it was apparent, one of the signs that Mr. Eisenhower was reacting to it was he started doodling. And he started doodling and pretty soon his face got a little red. He told Arthur he didn't want to hear anymore about it, and Arthur dropped the subject. But that's the only time I ever saw him publicly in a large group express irritated displeasure. And I suspect that ten minutes later he was apologizing to Burns.
Now, as I say, Eisenhower had a temper, he could get upset, but it was a pretty personal matter when he did, and he did not embarrass people openly. And I think you can see this all the way through his career. Look at the way in which he handled the slapping incident with George Patton, for example. Or the way in which he handled the dismissal of a corps commander after Kasserine Gap. This was the man who had not only a great sense of compassion, but also a great sense of what you did appropriately to tell people where you stood without making them feel as though they were utter failures.

SOAPES: The sense of perspective about the incident and its significance.

JONES: Yes. Now, you know, people say they never heard Eisenhower express anger about the McCarthy thing. Well, that's false, too. I've heard him express great anger about McCarthy, but he felt this was a matter for the Senate to handle. It was not a matter that the President of the United States—this business about getting into the gutter, that's rubbish, that wasn't his attitude at all. This was a Congressional matter and separation of powers required him to keep out of it unless he personally came to have a stake in it. I don't think he was happy with the way in which Foster Dulles reacted, but on the other hand this was Dulles's relation with the Congress that was involved, not his.
SOAPES: Was it his attitude that the various department heads then had an independent relationship with the Congress?

JONES: Oh, very definitely. Eisenhower didn't want them running to him every time they had a difference of opinion with Congress. Now this is in sharp contradistinction to the attitudes that you had, for example, from Lyndon Johnson or for that matter from Nixon. In the Nixon administration, the White House had to settle everything even if it was not the President; in Johnson's administration, Johnson had to settle everything himself. And it was apparent, I mean you couldn't have a meeting with Johnson that he wasn't on the darned telephone, picking up the telephone calling somebody on Capitol Hill when he might just as well as had the clerks do it. I sat with him a dozen times in which that telephone hanging right by the President's chair was on to the Hill.

SOAPES: Okay. You had, I assume your closest relationships on the staff, from the Budget Bureau were with Shanley, Gerry Morgan--

JONES: Well, Shanley on the counsel side, Shanley and Morgan, and then later on [Dave] Kendall after he moved into the picture and with the people who supported them. Roemer McPhee worked a great deal on legislation, the military stuff, either Paul Carroll or Andy Goodpaster were usually in on in one way or another. I tried to keep track of what the heck was on the mind of all the legislative liaison people and seeing them frequently because of these various legislative liaison meetings. I tried at least once a week to have
a conversation with either Max Rabb, or Brad Patterson, or Bob Gray for a while, on what was coming up by way of cabinet papers what we were interested in. We were trying to do an eyes and ears job, not only for our boss but also because we could sometimes bring perspectives to bear that the White House needed. And the White House was a pretty tidy operation both under Truman and Eisenhower. It wasn't the large, amorphous kind of a mess that you began to get into with the Kennedy administration which has just escalated every since. If one of the things Carter does is cut back on the size of the staff, ...but I don't know whether he will or not.

SOAPES: One of the things we like to do frequently in these interviews is to get some idea of the personalities that we're dealing with. And I'd like to go through a couple of those names--

JONES: Go ahead!

SOAPES: --and just get your reactions to those people. First, Shanley.

JONES: That's a hard question to answer. Shanley was a successful lawyer, successful not so much in terms of personal outstanding intellect as in terms of capacity to instill confidence and loyalty in others and to recognize when he had an awfully good product coming up the line. Bernie was, and still is, basically a politician in many of his reactions to things, but he had enough respect for the intellectual honesty of other people and for the
institutional product so that he would submerge the political kind of thing. I liked him; we got along fine. Now, in part, as I think I said when I talked to the Columbia people, this was through the happy accident of the fact that one of his partners had been a close colleague of mine in World War II, so that I was coming in a known quantity who'd already been introduced to him so to speak. I saw him very early. I saw him literally the Saturday after inauguration; I spent all morning with him. And other people, I had to argue with. They didn't like to go see Shanley. They didn't think he was quick enough on his feet, and he had to have the other people around all the time. But I didn't have this feeling. Morgan was working with him very closely; McPhee was working with him very closely; and oh, he's now at Harvard--

SOAPES: Areeda?

JONES: Yes, Phil Areeda was working with him closely, and a good many people thought, well, the only way to get to Shanley and make sure he understands is to go to one of them. I didn't feel that way. Partly because Bernie thoroughly enjoyed a few minutes of a small talk. "What's the attitude in the committee on this one? Have you seen how Congressman so-and-so, what he said under such-and-such circumstances? What do you think of that staff director that they've got in this that and the other committee? Is Bob Taft really snarled up with the rest of the Republicans on this issue?"
HEW being one of the things on which he asked me that question several times. I found Bernie honest, open, and with me if he didn't understand an issue, he told me so. Other people said he didn't; that they thought he'd missed the point and they'd have to go back through somebody else. I didn't think so.

SOAPES: Okay. How about Morgan?

JONES: Gerry is also, or was because Gerry's dead, was also an enigma to me. He had almost none of Shanley's self assurance. Gerry Morgan was a shy person. He was a person who was acutely uncomfortable in situations that involved a lot of people. On one occasion he came over to have lunch with the senior staff of the Budget Bureau and out of the clear sky the budget director asked him to talk. He was almost tongue-tied. He wasn't prepared for it. Not only prepared in the physical sense, he hadn't known this was coming.

Well, he also used the staff well but in a different way. Bernie would ask the staff to give him an answer to a certain question; Gerry used the staff in terms of, "Am I right or wrong in thinking so-and-so?" Shanley's method was essentially deductive in handling legislation; Morgan's was essentially inductive. Again, my relationship with Morgan was on a personal level. Of course, I guess even more intimate than it was with Shanley in that Gerry would invite me to his house. I don't think I ever saw the Shanleys
in their own home. Of course, part of that's because his wife wasn't in Washington a great deal of the time, she was up in New Jersey.

Gerry had a kind of a boyish sense of humor; Shanley's was an extremely sophisticated, sort of politician kind of sense of humor. Gerry would get a big kick out of telling you about what had gone wrong at the St. Francis chapel choir practice. The last thing in the world you could expect Shanley to do.

Gerry was interested in the view of the little guy as he interpreted it. That's why I say he would use this, "Well am I right in thinking this, that, or the other thing," or "Am I wrong in thinking this sort of thing?" Shanley's analysis of people was much fuller and much more sophisticated. I think Morgan definitely had a better mind than Shanley, for getting almost immediately to the nuances. And I think that's one of the reasons why he used this, "Am I right, am I wrong" sort of approach. I don't know--am I doing what you want?

SOAPES: Yes. Very much.

JONES: I respected both of them. I think the Shanley relationship with the President was rather easier than Gerry's. Shanley just wasn't awed by people. Gerry was. In a perfectly honest way. I've been with him, with President Eisenhower and with Adams when Gerry gave the impression of being uncomfortable; I never saw Shanley in that pose. In fact I've often wondered what would have
happened if I'd had to go over at midnight to see the President on a bill with Morgan rather than with Shanley. Both were hard workers, but Gerry a harder worker than Shanley. Gerry was in there early—he lived way out in Potomac [Maryland]—but morning after morning he was in there by ten minutes past seven or so. I occasionally drove in for breakfast with Adams and Gerry was in there. Bernie was more relaxed about it.

SOAPES: What about Dave Kendall?

JONES: I didn't have enough contact with Dave to really give you any estimation of him other than the fact that he was just an awfully comfortable guy to have around. Intellectually, I don't think he was the peer of either of the other two. Not that there wasn't the intellectual capacity, but Dave was an accident as counsel. He knew he was, he wasn't going to be there very long, and he still had a lot of Treasury interests and things that he was working on. But he was a terribly informal, very relaxed kind of a guy.

SOAPES: Now you also said you worked with Roemer McPhee.

JONES: Yes. Hard-working, shrewd analyst, tended to be either suspicious of or dissatisfied with what you might call the institutional answer because he wasn't quite sure that it had really been examined enough from the point of view of political impact. Very useful guy to have around. Extremely valuable, much more so than any of the three counsels. Roemer would talk a position through.
You'd sometimes have a hard time following him. Well trained. I think he would make a better courtroom lawyer than either Gerry or Bernie Shanley would, in the sense of really dredging into what was in the back of the minds of the opposition. And yet there was a strange little streak in Roemer of capacity to be just annoyingly superficial at times. Now whether it was because he had something else on his mind, I'm not sure. But he and I never fought about it, but we occasionally talked about it in the sense of, "Why aren't you interested in this?" If superficiality is an indication of lack of interest.

SOAPES: Were there particular subjects where this would show up?

JONES: Anything that had to do with military. Roemer was really willing to talk politics though. Roemer was frequently asking what my point of view was on politics. Now in contradistinction, Areeda—total intellectual approach. You could almost see the dissecting knife working in terms of winding up stuff in the comparative anatomy type of a—yet, not a cold personality, but the approach to anything was absolutely nothing except a straight analytical approach. There was no small chit-chat before Areeda got into something. Very, very interesting personality.

SOAPES: Goodpaster.

JONES: In many respects the star of the entire White House staff.
Thoughtful, provocative, one hundred percent loyal, more capacity to see over the horizon than almost anybody else on that staff working at that level as he was at that time. With a circle of friends and acquaintances in the military that meant that on two minutes' notice on almost any subject he could get what the President wanted and get it very quickly. Proud of the fact that he could meet the civilians on their own ground because he was a Princeton Ph.D., too. A man that from the very day that most of us had our first contacts with him—and I had no contact with Andy until he came onto the White House—. We've had continuing, extremely close contacts ever since. The automatic answer was, "Well, Colonel Goodpaster? This guy's going to be a four-star general in five years." And he was. Low key, but extraordinarily persistent. Until he got the answer he wanted, he would drop nothing. But you weren't aware of the fact you were being pressured. A greater capacity than any of the others to synthesize as opposed to compromise on issues. He could synthesize points of view with the kind of skill that I've seen in very few military people, with the exception of a couple of good close friends of mine, Abe Lincoln, in the Department of Political Science at West Point for years, and General Marshall himself. Very aware of the perrogatives of his office and insisted on maintaining that insofar as he was the prime contact with the Pentagon, both military and civilian. And an end run around Goodpaster could end up in the cutting of things off at the rear very, very fast. Stuck to his own
last unless you went to him and said, "Andy, here's something I'd like to get your view on, I think you ought to include yourself in this." And if you asked him to do that, he would. He was the author of, I think, the first satisfactory response which President Eisenhower had from the staff on how to put together papers for him. In fact he wrote a little pamphlet on preparing staff papers for the President which showed a knowledge of Eisenhower that, I say a little grandiosely I guess, I think few in Washington had. But I think I did have, and I welcomed the fact that Andy put that together.

The confidence which the President had in him, of course, was very apparent. It was apparent to Mr. Eisenhower's successors because he was the liaison with Eisenhower for both Kennedy and Johnson. He knew instinctively when to tell us to ease off on things, and would do so. I was fussing around because the President had told me if I could get the Veterans Preference Act repealed, I was free to do so, if they could find a way to introduce the bill. I wanted to go back and talk to the President about it, and Andy said, "Listen, ease off. He told you what his position was, now don't bother him." I think my chief reaction to Andy Goodpaster that I had at the time, and certainly it has not diminished in the years since, is this capacity to look over the hills to see what's on the other side.

SOAPES: Were there other personalities that you dealt with very closely that I haven't brought up?
JONES: Well, I was dealing with all of these men. I was in and out of the White House all the time. Much more in the Eisenhower administration than any other administration in terms of multiplicity—. I had all kinds of contacts in the Truman administration with Charlie Murphy but not with very many other people. Some with Don Dawson and a lot with my former Budget Bureau colleagues who were working for Truman—Dick Neustadt, Dave Bell, David Stowe, and Russ Andrews—all of whom had worked with me at one time or another, and Milt Kale. But that was on a personal basis and in the Eisenhower administration, while there was some personal relationships which none of us ever let get into a close personal friendship type of thing because it just wasn't fitting to do it in my kind of a job with them in their kind of a role. It would have created problems for them and for me. But I was with the legislative liaison staff as I indicated, every week or so.

SCAPES: Persons—

JONES: Persons, Harlow, and Jack Martin.

SCAPES: What was your estimate of their operation?

JONES: Well, Jerry ran a magnificent operation. He recognized the essentiality of having a Martin who could, after Taft's death, maintain that kind of contact with the Senate from the Taft point of view and so on, and he used Jack very skillfully. Bryce, who had been on the House Armed Services Committee and with whom
Jerry had close personal contacts, he [Jerry] cut him loose in the same way to wander around on the Hill and do whatever the President wanted done. Harlow had a great many more contacts in terms of frying Congressional fish than Martin had, because a lot of people thought Jack was—. They'd come to him on something that they thought was the kind of thing that Taft would have had him do. And yet Persons maintained a type of arm's length relationship himself that came into focus only with the meetings with the legislative leaders in which he was very forceful and very good. It was a good operation.

On the cabinet secretariat side, Max Rabb was at first like a big puppy dog who never grew up to his feet in some respects. Max was just terribly enthusiastic about everything that came along and never inclined to challenge anything until after he saw what the results of the initial enthusiasm were. This was interesting, but it was about as strange a reaction as you could have in terms of working for Eisenhower. He used to create some amusement with all of us. Brad Patterson, just a good nose-to-the-grindstone civil servant. Bob Gray, Homer Crouther, Fred Morrow, relationships with all of them, but basically they were all pretty much a team. They didn't go off on very many tangents. Of course, Adams kept them in line pretty well, but the President himself did, more than many people would believe.
SOAPES: One thing I did want to raise in terms of internal communications within the White House. There was an operation which I think Al Toner ran called "Staff Notes", in which—. Another one of those collections I had to process page-by-page when I was on the archives staff. Agencies, departments would submit frequently a great deal. I saw very, very little from the Bureau of the Budget. Was there a reason why Bureau of the Budget didn't use "Staff Notes," as something that did go to the President on a daily basis?

JONES: Frankly, we didn't think this was a very good operation. Al was always looking for motives and frequently there weren't any motives.

SOAPES: Motives in terms of why someone would want to put something into the "Staff Notes".

JONES: Yes, yes, yes. I frankly found them boring. I stopped taking them. I don't know if Stans used them very much. And I didn't have very close relationships with Toner. He was around, you know, you were aware of him, but Al kind of liked to be the mystery man some of the times. And I don't think he ever fitted very well with the Budget Bureau's approaches.

SOAPES: We've covered--

JONES: Who else you got on that list?
SOAPES: Actually in terms of personalities that's the end of my list.

JONES: Well, the only thing I want to add is, and you've already talked to him, you said, two or three times, don't overlook Bill Hopkins. One of the really great civil servants. I knew his predecessors, and I've known his successors, and not one of them had the sense of presidential priorities, the ordering of those priorities, the way in which he wanted things organized in terms of flow of paper to him, the capacity to know almost instinctively when something wasn't there that the President wanted. You'll get the same view from Goodpaster. Now he wasn't used that effectively by Kennedy, and Johnson came to appreciate him fairly late along the line, but once he did it was very deep appreciation. Bill had really come up under Truman, he learned the ropes under Truman.

SOAPES: Right. I think he started there in the Hoover administration.

JONES: Yes, but he hadn't been the executive clerk or whatever his title was then.

SOAPES: Right. I think that was his title, yes.

JONES: Until I think they gave him another title later on, Johnson finally gave him another title when he gave him the decoration which he well deserved. And whether Bill will express judgment on all these
people or whether he'll express judgment for the record, I'm not even sure if some of this I ought--I want, you know, released at the present time. I've tried to be frank with you, but I've given some perhaps more negative opinions than history can bear me out on.

SOAPES: Well, that's one of the purposes here is to get as many points of view as possible.

JONES: Yes, I know. I understand that.

SOAPES: The historians, then, sift it out. In our last moment or two, a general comment on the White House staff under Eisenhower in terms of level of competence. Would you rate it extremely high or ordinary for Presidential administrations?

JONES: I would rate it high, not extremely high. Now the reason I say that--well, I think there are three reasons why I say it. Number one, there was not the degree of personal "you do this", "you do that," "I'm looking to you for this," "I'm looking to you for that", that you had on the Truman staff which brought out, while it was a smaller staff, all of the potential greatness which existed in people like Charlie Murphy, like David Bell, like David Stowe, like John Steelman. David Lloyd was another one, George Elsey was another one, to a lesser extent Don [Donald S.] Dawson, who served a different kind of role. Every one of them had the kind of personal charge from the President that enabled them to
make the very best that they were capable of in carrying out that charge. There was not quite that same—well, in fact there wasn't at all that same kind of a relationship.

[Interruption]

JONES: Between many of the working staff people in the Eisenhower administration, the general area was blocked out, as I say, more or less along military lines. You had a G-1, you had a G-2, you had a G-3, you had a G-4, you had a G-5, really. And all of these involved a team effort. The staff was larger than it was under Truman, and their order of competence was high in their own general areas, but there wasn't as much of the interplay relationship as there had been in the Truman administration. It was seldom that you got all of the Eisenhower staff around the cabinet table to chew over an issue that didn't affect them in some way in the area in which they were operating. And this was not true in the Truman administration. Truman would come in and sit down and bat things around. Now when I say it was high competence, it was high in the sense that, well, if it was an issue which primarily came in the counsel's bailiwick, why the counsel and the assistants, the Areedas, the McPhees, and so on and so forth, would do a very good job on it. But it did not occur to say the cabinet secretariat, if they had a paper which obviously had counsel implications to want to sit down and chew the thing over with the counsel's office, as I could observe.
After the Eisenhower illnesses, there grew up very rapidly this business, "we've got to protect the President." And Eisenhower didn't want to be protected. At least so far as I could determine. And I think this keeps me from giving them the highest recommendation. Not that they attempted to sign off on things, but they attempted to put off things. This was in sharp contradistinction to the Nixon administration, the Haldeman-Erlichmann approach, and even in the Johnson administration. Joe Califano and his colleagues were deciding things, and deciding them in the President's name, and, of course, with, I assume, with the President's backing—, if he knew anything about it. I sometimes wondered if he knew what was going on, but that's neither here nor there. Now you didn't have that; you had a tendency in—. Of course, in the last two years I saw it from a different point of view, and my issues were really pretty mild even though I didn't think they were, civil service issues. But before the last two years there had begun to develop an attitude to well, "let's push it off, we've got to protect the President".

Now in terms of devotion, loyalty, by and large an intellectual capacity, sure they were the peers of the Trumanites. You didn't have quite the same kind of intellectual brilliance which you found in a [McGeorge] Bundy, for example, under Kennedy, or Califano. But within their own spheres they did a very good job. You certainly can't say that the level of analysis, the level of the times of nosiness and almost interference that took place in the Security Council staff under either Bundy or for that matter Kissinger or for
that matter Walt Rostow was met by the people who did the Security Council work for Eisenhower. And they tried to stay out of Bobby's [Cutler] hair as much as they could.

I think we've found to our sorrow that the level of competence in the Nixon administration was badly hampered by two things, so that you can't give them high marks. They refused, absolutely utterly refused to look at anything that appeared to grow out of an institutional approach. In Johnson's case you didn't want to demonstrate too much capacity in the presence of the President. Now that's all right--different Presidential styles. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, didn't want his G-2 messing into operations. All right, same thing worked in Eisenhower in the White House in the same kind of way. The personnel function was discrete or the general intelligence of what was going on thing was discrete, and you know, e-t-e not e-e-t, until the Toner operation came along. I'm not quite sure exactly what that led up to. In a rough and ready way Adams was keeping his finger on the pulse, but the final product was so frequently colored by Adam's own approaches in many respects, except in mine--I can't say he ever bothered me very much--but I think this created some kind of a problem. Although it was not the same kind of an operation that you had with Joe Califano under Johnson, or that you had with Haldeman and Ehrlichmann under Nixon.
SOAPES: Okay. Well, is there anything else that you would particularly like to get into the transcript?

JONES: No, I don't think so. I've been criticized, people tell me I've got stars in my eyes, that I refuse to look at Dwight Eisenhower objectively. I honestly don't think that's the case. I had the opportunity to see a side of Eisenhower that either other people ignored or were disinterested in. And that was Eisenhower as the chief executive. And to my dying day, I will insist that he was a hell of a lot better politician than the people who were supposed to be his politicians—Arthur Summerfield, Herb Brownell, Doug McKay, Charlie Wilson, George Humphrey, for that matter Maury Stans.

SOAPES: Politician in terms of--

JONES: Eisenhower's political instincts were almost infallible. He didn't need to take polls on pieces of legislation. He could sit in the legislative leaders' meeting and then ten minutes after the meeting was over, he'd tell you whether he thought you had a majority on that bill or not, and then he'd tell Jerry to go check it out. But there wasn't this conscious head counting that Johnson did personally, that Nixon did through his legislative liaison staff, and that Kennedy did through his legislative liaison staff. And yet here was a man who didn't come from Capitol Hill.
Now another side: Eisenhower knew how to use the career service and used it very, very effectively. He was a careerist himself! He'd worked with these people all his life; he didn't have the Hill biases. He distrusted—even though I didn't like his substitute—this business of mandatory personnel ceilings which were a strange manifestation that comes with a Congressional mind, the kind of mind that you'd had from Truman, from Kennedy, from Johnson, from Nixon, who were products of the other end of the Avenue.

Eisenhower had a sense of timing, I think perhaps best illustrated by his realization that when he came into the presidency that America needed and wanted more than anything else kind of a breathing spell. This wasn't because Eisenhower was a dolt and didn't have ideas what might have been a massive legislative program. He did have. But his sense of timing was good, he knew when to push things and when not to push things. He knew how to delegate and to hold your feet right straight to the fire if you didn't come through on the delegation. And the results could be pretty drastic if you didn't. And he didn't like a kind of political chit-chat that you so often associate with White House operations. And although he wanted to use the cabinet, he got irritated when the cabinet members got themselves into things that he didn't think they knew anything about. We were talking about a housing issue in connection with the housing program that he sent
forward in 1954, and Summerfield was hanging crepe all over the place, McKay was tut-tuttin', and Charlie Wilson was saying, "Well, this isn't very good because it looks like you'll get more money than the military, why are you cutting the military back?" And Joe Dodge finally couldn't take it, he said, "Mr. President, if you'd tell McKay and Wilson and Summerfield to go sell a few Chevrolets, we could get this issue decided." [Laughter]

Well, Joe knew the President well enough to know that this, took off the pressures, took off the tensions. And he recognized that the President wasn't particularly happy about the developments that were coming into the picture.

But another thing Eisenhower had, he had a very great capacity to see what the weaknesses were in the people he picked to do things, and then he would hem those weaknesses in so that they didn't have to irritate him or interfere with the job. Now this, sometimes, will work. A military commander, I think, has to do that to some extent. But frequently you don't get too much success in the civilian situation of trying to overcome another guy's weaknesses by appointing somebody else to do part of the job. Well, Eisenhower didn't do it that way; he just very adroitly kept them from being in a position where their weaknesses were going to show. Now this is not a sign of a man who was not a good politician, or a good leader of men. Just his memory of people and what they were interested in. We had a party on the occasion of his 75th birthday up at Hershey.
I don't know whether you heard or had any reports on that or not.

SOAPES: No, I don't think we have.

JONES: He wasn't feeling very well. This must have been, what? This must have been in 1965 when he was 75. He hadn't been feeling very well, and he and Milton were upstairs in the room until just a half an hour before we sat down for lunch. Ike came downstairs, he went around that entire room, he spoke to everybody, he called them by name in almost a Jim Farley kind of exercise, he had something personal to say to each one of them. Saw me, came over and shook hands, "Jones." Of course, he was a last name man in military tradition, I don't believe he ever called me by my first name, except in my letters from him and once at a stag dinner. But here, you know, I guess two hundred or more of us—"Jones, how are things on the personnel coming? What's happening in personnel management?" Now this is not a politician, this is a man with great political instincts. His statement to me when I told him that Kennedy wanted me to go to the State Department, "You're not basically a political officer, go do whatever you feel you want to do and can do,—don't compromise your utility with the new administration." That's an understanding of a career point of view. The care with which he picked career people for certain kinds of jobs.
So frankly I'm an admirer, and I don't deny it. But I don't think I'm totally unobjective about Mr. Eisenhower any more than I think I'm totally unobjective about Harry Truman on whose bandwagon I was preaching the gospel of here-was-a-great-constitutionalist long before most of the country was willing to accept Harry Truman as anything other than a Pendergast politician from Missouri.

SOAPES: You've spoken of Eisenhower's strengths; what about weaknesses? Can you isolate a weakness that stands out in your mind?

JONES: Well, if it's a weakness, his attention span on small issues was extremely short.

SOAPES: Small issues being--

JONES: Anything he wasn't interested in. [Laughter] Now, that's elliptical, but there were some kinds of things that President Eisenhower didn't really understand or want to understand. Inter-departmental infighting was one of them. He didn't understand or wasn't willing to admit that if he said, "Stop it," it wasn't going to stop. I've often thought of that supposedly wisecrack of Truman's about--

SOAPES: He'll snap his figures and they won't respond.

JONES: Yes. His sense of timing and how long it would take to do certain kinds of jobs, while certainly not a weakness, sometimes in both directions indicated that he hadn't followed through very carefully.
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He'd either give you a big job to do with no time to do it in, or he'd say, "Oh, well, come back to me when you get ready," and you knew damned well that if you didn't come back sooner than that there was going to be trouble. In that kind of a situation, President Eisenhower let people take advantage of him. But despite the temper, he was a very kind man, and I can't feel it a personal weakness that he could turn the whole thing off and plunge himself into a western story or a detective story or go out in the back yard and hit golf balls regardless of the fact that people were gawking through the fence and watching him do it. I think this was important. George Marshall once made the comment at the State Department, "Don't come to me after five o'clock in the afternoon. Neither I nor you have good ideas after five o'clock in the afternoon." Effective approach. Well, there were times when I think President Eisenhower was relaxing when he shouldn't have been relaxing, but it was his way of doing business and nothing very drastic ever happened because he didn't. I think he had, at first, and I do think this was a weakness, too much of a belief that the President's job was ministerial rather than executive, and well, he let the Congress go its own way. But after we began to explain to him things like the legislative veto and the conflict with the Bricker Amendment, he fast became a great constitutionalist in his own right. I don't think as great as Truman was, who looked at everything from the point of view, "What does this do to the President?" Eisenhower did not do that, but I don't think that was necessarily a weakness, but I think he started in with a weakness there.
SOAPES: Yes. There's a situation where the staff had to educate him on the issues.

JONES: Yes, but you know, bless his heart he was willing to be educated. Which is more than I can say about recent Presidents. And I'll be very interested to see how this thing works with Mr. Carter because here's a guy that doesn't know a thing about government and his people close to him didn't.... Now you see, there again Eisenhower was pretty shrewd in the way in which he put together a staff that knew government. The cabinet picks, every single one of them, with the possible exception of Charlie Wilson, which I've never quite understood, no with definitely the exception of Charlie Wilson, it was a presidential look at him from the point of view of what kind of contacts had he had with government. What kind of a role had he played in government. People thought the McKay appointment was a bit of a dud. It wasn't because McKay had been a leader as governor in the whole reclamation thing about which Eisenhower had very grave doubts—whether some of this business that we played games with on reclamation projects makes sense. If, you know, imputing a fifty-year life to a dam which you knew very well was going to silt up in twenty-eight. Now that's the kind of thing. Eisenhower was no engineer, he was an old dough boy, but he instinctively understood that kind of thing, and he expected something from McKay that he didn't get from him. Summerfield was of more use to him as Postmaster General than he would have been if he'd
stayed the chief honcho of the Republican Party. Sinclair Weeks, a kind of contact with the private sector that Eisenhower did not have. Weeks was not his initial choice for the job, but he felt that Weeks could bring a point of view to bear that many other people couldn't. It's the same reason for the appointment of Joe Dodge. This was a hell of a good operation. And hasn't been the like of it since. And the replacements are the same kind of thing. Well, I've taken too much of your time.