INTERVIEW WITH
Mr. Gordon Kidd
by
Dr. Maclyn Burg
Oral Historian
on
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for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
OH-316  Kidd, Gordon

Gift of Personal Statement

Mr. Gordon Kidd

to the

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All right this interview is being taped in the Dominion Bridge Building, Vancouver, B.C. with Mr. Gordon Kidd. The interviewer is Dr. Maclyn Burg of the Eisenhower Library staff, and the date is January 19, 1973.

DR. BURG: Mr. Kidd, could I ask you to begin just by giving me an idea of your place and time of birth, the kind of education you had—and then just to sketch for me the way your career opened up? The kind of life that you took for yourself?

MR. KIDD: Yes. I was born in Saskatchewan in a farming community and grew up in this community during the Depression years and probably would never have got a formal education beyond high school if it hadn't been for the war.

DR. BURG: I see.

MR. KIDD: And after the war I went to university [University of Saskatchewan] and graduated in civil engineering.

DR. BURG: Now let me ask you about your war service if I may. When did you go in, and in what kind of capacity? What unit did you serve in?
KIDD: Well, I joined the RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: --in 1941, I guess it was.

BURG: Were you then eighteen, Mr. Kidd?

KIDD: I was eighteen then and went overseas in '42 and returned in '45.

BURG: Now your duty overseas--were you air crew?

KIDD: No, I was in radar.

BURG: Oh, ho, so a very new field--

KIDD: Yes, this was an absolutely new field when I went into it in the beginning.

BURG: Now had you been asked? I know about the service, and I shouldn't have asked that question. But were you asked--were you invited--to go into that technical field?
KIDD: Yes, as a matter of fact, I was.

BURG: Had it been anything that you knew a thing about? That is, had you heard about radar? Were you drawn to that kind of work?

KIDD: No, it was rather odd because a lot of us had joined the air force as radio operators; and then we were asked if we wanted to take this special course in this highly secret equipment. They sent us to university for, oh, six months and then finally on to a radar school in the area where we finally saw the super-secret gear—

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:--of the time. And incidentally America wasn't in the war at the time, and there was a lot of American people at Clinton taking these same courses.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: They were--it was run by the English, of course. The
radar was developed in England.

BURG: Right. Now you were being trained to operate ground installations?

KIDD: Well, no. Not really. The gear that I worked on then was primarily airborne gear.

BURG: So the sort of thing that might have equipped night fighters--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: --at that time?

KIDD: Yeah, and bombers too. You used--there was all sorts of navigational type equipment, of course. Then they were developing things $\sqrt{507}$ that now you could see a map the ground below you to allow you to pinpoint your targets. All sorts of funny names like H2S and Boozer and Gee and Loran.

BURG: Now Boozer, B-o-o-s-e-r, or z-e-r?

KIDD: z-e-r.
BURG: z-e-r. And the other one that you just mentioned--

KIDD: Well, we called it H2S. It was quite sensitive.

BURG: And Gee was--

KIDD: Gee was the navigational instrument.

BURG: G-e-e--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:--if I remember right.

KIDD: Yeah. It was very interesting because--

BURG: Yeah.

KIDD:--of the newness of it.

BURG: Now you then volunteered for overseas duty?

KIDD: Well, I don't think the question was ever asked; but that was
my objective—to be overseas.

BURG: I see. Because as I understand it, with the Canadian Army, at any rate, a Canadian had the option of saying whether he would go overseas.

KIDD: Well, I think that's true. I think that applied only to the draftees.

BURG: Those who had been conscripted?

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: Right, I see. Yes, of course, you would have volunteered for RCAF.

KIDD: Yeah, I think in volunteering you volunteered to go anywhere for that sort of thing.

BURG: But when you went overseas, where were you taken to? What was your duty assignment?
KIDD: Well, I spent virtually my whole Canadian Air Force career with the Royal Air Force--

BURG: Yeah.

KIDD: --attached to Royal Air Force squadrons. And spent all my time in England.

BURG: But not on flying status.

KIDD: Well, I used to do a fair amount of flying, testing gear and everything.

BURG: Oh, you did?

KIDD: Oh, yeah.

BURG: In what kind of aircraft may I ask?

KIDD: Well, I was on a mosquito squadron.

BURG: So there would be you and a pilot?

KIDD: Yeah.
BURG: Right.

KIDD: Yeah. Instead of the observer going up with the pilot I would go up and check out the gear. They always test flew the planes before they went on operations.

BURG: Oh, I see. I hadn't understood that.

KIDD: Yeah, always.

BURG: Right. The mosquito squadron was one that was doing night fighter work, or was it going with the bomber streams?

KIDD: Well the mosquito was quite a remarkable aircraft. It was made of wood incidentally--

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: --and made here in Canada. And it was very, very fast--

BURG: Right.

KIDD: --and could fly very high. We used it both for fighters--day fighters, night fighters--but also as a bomber. And they
would carry one great big four thousand pound bomb sort of thing.

BURG: And could do path finder duty—

KIDD: Oh, yes, yes. Very definitely.

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: In fact, the squadron that I was on in the latter part of the war was a path finder squadron.

BURG: Now at the close of the war had you gone over to the Continent, or was your squadron still operating out of England itself?

KIDD: It was still operating out of England, but after the war they arranged for some of us, at least, to have a low-level trip over the Ruhr and other parts of Germany just to see what had occurred. And—

BURG: I see.

KIDD:—it was quite interesting.

BURG: Right. So they actually flew you over there—
KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG:--and let you take a look at some of the places that--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--you'd heard pilots--

KIDD: Yeah, right.

BURG:--and observers discussing all the time.

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG: All right. Now at the close of the war you made a decision then not to take up the RCAF as a career?

KIDD: Oh, I think most people wanted out. They'd had enough of the--

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:--military.
BURG: Now what opportunities opened to you when you were demobilized? Was there, in Canada, for example, the equivalent of what we called the GI bill of rights that you could take advantage of?

KIDD: Yes. Depending on length of service, you were granted certain benefits, post-war benefits. You could go to university for the same number of years that you had been in the service—

BURG: Right.

KIDD:—if you wished. And I think they would have supported you further for post-graduate work beyond the equal years if you so wished.

BURG: And what was your decision at that point?

KIDD: Well, my decision was to take the university education.

BURG: And where did you attend? Here in—

KIDD: University of Saskatchewan.
BURG: I see. And in what kind of course?

KIDD: Civil engineering.

BURG: Now let me ask you this: Having been exposed to this technical and unusual development, you were not drawn further into electronics but went this other way. Could I ask you, Why that decision?

KIDD: Well, it's rather odd because I did start out with the thought of taking up electrical engineering. But after my second year I became quite friendly with another chap who had been in the air force, and we got talking about things and finally decided the civil field offered a great deal broader scope--

BURG: I see.

KIDD:--and perhaps more interest.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: I'm glad I took the civil now rather than the electrical.
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Electrical you get—you can get into a very, very narrow area. It may be interesting if you want to be purely technical, but my interest really wasn't to the pure technical—

BURG: Right.

KIDD:—aspects of the thing.

BURG: Were you married while you were at the University of Saskatchewan?

KIDD: Yes, I married an English girl during the war—

BURG: Oh.

KIDD:—and this is why we ended up in British Columbia. Although I would have been happy, I suspect, to have stayed in the prairies, my wife did not like the hot dry summers and the cold winters.

BURG: Yes, yes.

KIDD: So every year between university terms I would come out here to B.C. to work. Then when I graduated, I got a job here.

BURG: What lined you up with British Columbia? Did you have
friends here, contacts that caused you to turn this way?

KIDD: Well, no. I think it was to get away from the rather difficult climate of the rest of Canada. The west coast of Canada is perhaps the—well, without a doubt—the best part of the country to live in if you can—

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:—manage to get yourself located here.

BURG: Says a Washingtonian, "I'll buy that assessment."

KIDD: Well, it's delightful, and I would hate to live very far away from seeing all this country.

BURG: Right. Your summer jobs—what form did they take? Were they always with the same company after you'd established a contact, or what was that aspect like?

KIDD: Well, I got involved with hydro electric work with B.C. Electric and some of the contractors, and I'd come back to them each—
BURG: Right.

KIDD:--either one--either a contractor or B.C. Electric of that day.

BURG: Now could I ask you this: In what year did you graduate from Saskatchewan?

KIDD: In 1950.

BURG: In '50?

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG: And then came out here to take what job?

KIDD: I came out here and joined the provincial government in water resources service.

BURG: May I ask you in what capacity then?

KIDD: Well, then, of course, as a very junior engineer.

BURG: A junior engineer. And what kinds of assignments and duties were you doing as you started? You can sketch that in
for me.

KIDD: Oh, well, general water resource, hydraulics type work. I ran the snow surveys for British Columbia for three or four years. I ran a sedimentation survey on the Fraser [river] and I was lucky because I didn't get stuck with specific jobs. I had quite a variety of work to do in those first four years. And then in '54 I was appointed a project engineer for International Water Developments. This is when I first became associated with the Columbia River and was appointed at that time to the work group of the International Columbia River Engineering Committee, which was the field operation of the International Columbia River Engineering Board. Now this board was set up in 1948, if I recall correctly, under the IJC [International Joint Commission] who had been given a reference to study the Columbia from an international point of view.

BURG: And the IJC is International Joint Commission?

KIDD: Right.
BURG: Right.

KIDD: So at that time very little was known about the Columbia and Canada. Well, I shouldn't say that, but from a technical point of view there was very little by way of map and very little by way of water quantity records. So this first several years from '48 were spent primarily on data collection.

BURG: Now is it correct for me to say, Mr. Kidd, that on the Canadian side, the B.C. side, the Columbia River is a quite different kind of river? That is, the valleys are steep-walled; storage possibilities are perhaps enhanced. Whereas on our side, the valleys open out; the dams tend to be lower, broader—"a whole host of problems of this sort. Are there differences, that is, in what the river is and what might be done with it?

KIDD: Yeah. Well, of course, a major part of the flow of the Columbia River originates in British Columbia—

BURG: Right.

KIDD: And the only way you can control it is to control it in British Columbia. Because there, you know, we got Grand Coulee, of course, in the States—
BURG: Yes.

KIDD:--which is a big dam and a high dam and has a lot of storage; but it couldn't go beyond the international border at the time it was built--floods to the border and that sort of thing.

BURG: That is, yes, it could not flood Canadian land.

KIDD: Right.

BURG: Right. Now you had spoken of some of your early duty being snow surveys: that always to determine the amount of run-off that was going to occur--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--in the spring of the year?

KIDD: You'd forecast the run-off on the basis of these snow surveys.

BURG: Right. Now would rivers like the Peace, the Fraser--are
these rivers--I'm a non-technical type--I guess what I want to say is that they are more dependable in terms of forecasting run-off and a fairly steady stream of water--a head of water--and that the Columbia perhaps is not quite so predictable. Maybe that's what I want to say.

KIDD: Oh, no, I don't think so. We used to forecast the Columbia in Canada and get very, very good results on a volume basis, you know--seasonal volume basis.

BURG: Now--

KIDD: And, of course, the Americans forecast their own portion of the basin quite successfully.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: But the characteristics of the Fraser, Columbia, Peace are all--they're quite similar. They're snow-fed, primarily.

BURG: So the heaviest run-off comes spring, summer--

KIDD: Right, on these--
BURG:—on all of those rivers?

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: Right. And therefore the problem might be with that run-off when you’ve got your peak amount of water available for power, let’s say.

KIDD: Well, because of the run-off characteristics of the rivers, when the snow starts to melt, you get high run-off; and perhaps on the Fraser and Columbia you might get seventy-five percent of your total run-off occurring during May, June, July and August—four months. So this is why you want storage: so you can store these peak flows and then release them during the winter months when the flow is very, very low.

BURG: So if we’re thinking in terms of power—utilization of power—those rivers are providing, without the storage capacity those rivers would provide the peak amounts of power perhaps at a time when you don’t need—

KIDD: That’s right. Your loads are lowest in the summer when you got the maximum amount of water.
BURG: Right.

KIDD: Something like, I suppose, a guy that works four months of the year, and he has a heck of a good job for those four months which really pay him a lot of money. Then he has got to get by for the rest of the months, so he's got to make sure he banks some of that—

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:—money that he gained in the four months so that he can maintain his standard of living over the rest of the year.

BURG: Right. So if we talk about the utilization of any of these rivers in point of power and in point of flood control—storage—the ability to impound water for a period of time is a vital thing in this whole negotiation.

KIDD: Absolutely. These were the primary considerations: storage for flood control and for power and to some extent, irrigation.
BURG: Yes, right. Now could you describe for me then the way in which you became involved, that is, the sort of day-to-day, week-to-week way in which you were brought into this and the things that happened to you--as much as you can--the people that you come in contact with in the course of events--just your sort of sketching out how you became involved? And then later on, perhaps, you can tell me the particular views that were developing as investigations and negotiations went on.

KIDD: Well,--

BURG: Well, when did you first make contact on this kind of work?

KIDD: Well, as I mentioned to you previously, in 1954 I was appointed to the work group of the International Columbia River Engineering Committee, which was the field operation of the board which had been set up by the IJC under the terms of reference from the two governments.

BURG: And who headed that group?

KIDD: Well, they varied quite a lot. The work group itself--mainly federal people, I suppose, chaired it to some extent.
BURG: These are people from Ottawa?

KIDD: From Ottawa. And there was two representatives from Ottawa in the field in B.C.—one from Federal Water Resources; one from Federal Public Works—and then myself representing the province of British Columbia. Now this same sort of representation went through the committee and also the board.

BURG: A federal representation and provincial?

KIDD: Yeah, three members from each government. Oh, I'm sorry. I'll have to back up there.

BURG: O.K.

KIDD: There was only one representative from B.C. on the work group; one representative from B.C. on the committee; no B.C. representative on the board. It was all federal.

BURG: According to Canadian law, it is necessary for the dominion government to be—
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KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: —in negotiation with another power?

KIDD: That's right.

BURG: And B.C. could not enter in to any of that.

KIDD: Not directly.

BURG: Yes, right. All right. And do you happen to remember who the federal people were? If you don't, why that we can—

KIDD: Well, I can except that they changed from time to time, of course—

(Interruption)

KIDD: --on the board.

BURG: Mr. Kidd has shown me a report to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada. Its title is Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, and it was prepared by the International Columbia River Engineering Board in 1959. So we can check and see if that publication is in our archives or get it.
from the Government Printing Office, I would imagine.

KIDD: You could get it from the IJC or the Corps of Engineers.

BURG: All right. And I will put on the record that it contains the work groups, rosters of names, dates of service; and, therefore, it would be of great help to us in checking any matters concerning the personnel of these groups. All right, fine. That will give us a chance to get back at that.

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: Now the nature--

KIDD: And it also gives the terms of reference that the IJC was given to carry out this study--

BURG: I see.

KIDD:--from the exchange of notes between the two governments. It's down in here somewhere.

BURG: Now when you began your work, what kind of a job were you doing--you, yourself?
KIDD: Well, it was more a coordinating type of job inasmuch as we were collecting data and getting into the preliminary stages of defining projects; and to do preliminary design on these projects, come up with costs, consequences of development, and the benefits that could be derived from these projects.

BURG: Now when you did that kind of work, did you work at that stage—that would be, say, 1954—were you working with any American counterparts; or were you looking at these things strictly from the Canadian side and perhaps even from the British Columbia point of view?

KIDD: Well, of course, I was primarily concerned with the B.C. point of view, but we worked very closely with the American section of the work crew. We had held regular meetings to exchange information and carry out joint studies on the benefits that would result in the States, for instance, from the gain of storage—this sort of thing. The committee itself met approximately once a month. We'd report to the committee, and they would decide what course we should follow for the next few months or so. This went on to a point where the projects were becoming
fairly well defined in both countries. The basin was becoming well-mapped; we knew a lot about the water resources itself. And about '57, 1957, the IJC suddenly decided, "Well, let's really go to work and turn out a report. We're at that stage now where we must have a report from the board before we can proceed further." I think at that time they decided that they wanted to get into the negotiation stage. And I'm not sure if at about that time the then prime minister of Canada, who I think was Louis St. Laurent, had an exchange with General Eisenhower to the point of saying, "Well, let's get into discussions on the Columbia River Treaty for joint development." And it was about that time, too, that a rather peculiar little international meeting took place. Our politicians from British Columbia were invited by State Department--by External Affairs Department in Ottawa--to go to Washington to talk to a group of Washington federal senior civil servants about the Columbia--which we did. And nothing really came out of that at all. I think, perhaps, it was a feeling out process. And then it was decided that really there was nothing they could do until the work of the board and the IJC had been finished.
BURG: You recollect that meeting as having occurred sometime in 1957?

KIDD: It must have been around '56, '57; and it was an odd sort of a little affair.

BURG: You had not expected anything like that?

KIDD: No, it came out of the blue sort of thing.

BURG: And where—in what building—do you recollect that that meeting was held?

KIDD: If I recall correctly, it was in the U.S.B.R. Building.

BURG: What building?

KIDD: United States Bureau of Reclamation offices.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: If I recall correctly.

BURG: Now do you remember any of the Americans who were present?
KIDD: No, but if I had my files back in Victoria, they would certainly tell you.

BURG: But that data is recorded?

KIDD: Oh, yes.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: Yes. It would be recorded in Victoria and probably in Ottawa—and I would imagine in Washington.

BURG: Yeah, in the Bureau of Reclamation, probably.

KIDD: Well, or the Corps or State might have been—state would probably have been in on it.

BURG: How many of you went?

KIDD: Well, there must have been about ten of us if I remember. And I think it was headed by /Francis/ Alvin /George/ Hamilton, who at that time was—oh, I forget now. Really I just can't—

BURG: That's all right. That—
KIDD: That's sort of going back a bit too far in time.

BURG: --gives us some leads. It was your--

KIDD: It was a Liberal government so it couldn't have been Alvin Hamilton.

BURG: Now the Diefenbaker government came in in '57, didn't it? June--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: --June 11th, I think, of 1957.

KIDD: Yes, uh-huh.

BURG: So presumably before--

KIDD: Art Paget might remember.

BURG: All right.

KIDD: The team from B.C. consisted of Art Paget, myself, Ed Bassett, who was the deputy minister of the department. And I think Ray Williston Minister of Forests, Education was along as well.
BURG: Right. And to your knowledge, this was instituted from Ottawa?

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: You didn't get any impression from those sessions that Washington had said, "Please send a group down here to talk with us"?

KIDD: I don't recall now.

BURG: Yeah. I just wondered what the reactions of that American team were--whether they were faintly puzzled at all of this or--

KIDD: It seemed to me that everybody was faintly puzzled at that meeting. As I say, it was rather peculiar little skirmish.

BURG: Yeah. Was this over a period of several days that you met?

KIDD: No, just one day.

BURG: One day. And walked away from it not knowing whether anything had been decided.

KIDD: Yes, really.
BURG: Well, something like three years or so had gone by of the preliminary kinds of investigations.

KIDD: No. Actually, the reference from the two governments was made in 1948. So they had been working on--

BURG: Ah.

KIDD:--this since '48.

BURG: But mapping and the survey work and this sort of thing was done by your people on the British Columbia side; Army Corps of Engineers on our side.

KIDD: Yeah, Corps of Engineers primarily on your side, but also quite an input from U.S.S.R. And the other member on the U.S. team was from the U.S. Geological Service.

BURG: And then this odd kind of meeting that didn't seem to accomplish much of anything.

KIDD: No, and seemed to be puzzling everybody really.
BURG: Right. And you returned then here following the same course as before, or after this meeting did changes take place?

KIDD: Well, it may have been a result of that meeting to some extent that this decision was taken to get on with the report and turn it out as soon as possible. Then we concentrated our efforts on producing the report of the board. Now this report is primarily written by the work group; but, of course, the board has the responsibility.

BURG: Was there some special section of that report that became your task to perform? Or did you assist generally?

KIDD: Well, we'd have specific assignments; and the, of course, we'd work as a joint group in finalizing a chapter. On the final report itself, I was responsible for the main chapter--called "A Special," I think--where it has assessed all the results. My main contribution I think. Yeah, it compared all the alternative plans and costs and benefits and so on and so forth. The IJC were actually required by the reference to turn out
recommendations and so were the board; but this was never done because it just came—well, the only thing you can make recommendations is on a negotiating basis. So the report only contains conclusions and recognizes the fact that there could be no joint recommendations other than to get on with negotiations and find out what the two countries could do that would be of mutual benefit.

BURG: Right. At that point in time, I presume you had in your own mind concluded certain things—

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:—that would be to the advantage of British Columbia—

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:—and Canada.

KIDD: Right.

BURG: Can you recollect, Mr. Kidd—and this may be a tough one to ask you—Was your own viewpoint at that stage one of best benefit for British Columbia, or do you recollect thinking in a broader spectrum of the best benefit for Canada at large?
KIDD: Well, the benefits accrue primarily in British Columbia--

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:--so you got to look at them from the benefits and the dis-benefits that result in British Columbia. So what was good for British Columbia surely would be good for Canada.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: But I think we all tried to think in terms of [the] international--there had to be benefits for both--

BURG: Right.

KIDD:--and the thing to do is to try and optimize it for both countries.

BURG: Exactly. So your--

KIDD: And there was a real effort, I think, to do this.

BURG: Good. It's good to have you confirm that. But this group to your present recollection was thinking on the broadest possible terms of the benefits that might accrue to both countries.
And was it your opinion then that the Americans working with you also seemed to see this side of the border, too, and took that into consideration as they did their work?

KIDD: Yeah, I think so. Because I think really on a river like the Columbia--

(Interruption)

KIDD: Well, optimizing the benefits in Canada in many ways optimizes the benefits of the United States.

BURG: Yeah.

KIDD: In other words, you've got to build storage in Canada to regulate the river for power and flood control, and this regulation was--it's the type of regulation that the United States wants.

BURG: As I read some of the things that concerned this and as I looked into the past history, it seemed to me that in past years--back into the 19th century--the United States had firmly considered its own benefits in any arrangements that dealt with
rivers crossing the border—rivers flowing out of the United States and into Canada—and that we had been quick to proclaim the right of a power to strictly govern and dispose of water resources within its own border. That right we had seen clearly while the rivers were flowing out of the United States into Canada, I think to the east—

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG:—eastern—

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:—half of the continent. Did our team give evidence to you that they now understood that the roles were reversed on some vital issues and that Canada presumably now that same right? We, I think, had announced always while it was our river—we always suggested that you had that same right. Did you see evidence of that?

KIDD: Well, yes, there was a lot of discussion about this, and
I don't think it ever was resolved. Certainly General MacNaughton and various other of the American IJC chairman--Len Jordan from Portland, particularly, at least--had great arguments about the rights of the separate countries as far as the resources concerned. I think Canada always took the view that we could divert the Columbia to the Fraser if we wished. And the Americans took the view, of course, that you couldn't. And there was some argument based on "party" in the IJC in the International Rivers Boundary Treaty between Canada and the United States. There's a peculiar thing in there on the spelling of "party"--whether it's with a large P or a small p. And this is where you can interpret whether or not you can actually divert the water in the upstream country without the need for approval by the downstream country.

BURG: Do you mean--

KIDD: This has never been resolved, by the way.

BURG:--by stating that word in an agreement as a capital P, "Party" is implying issues of sovereignty?
KID: Right.

BURG: I see, I see. I'd never heard that before.

KID: Yeah, well, it's--

BURG: And this you say is still not really resolved.


BURG: Uh-huh.

KID: 1908.

BURG: Now General MacNaughton's name has now come up. What position did he hold at that time?

KID: Well, he was chairman of the Canadian section of the IJC.

BURG: I see. And you worked with him?

KID: Yes.

BURG: Could I ask you to describe him to me as a man? What
kind of a man would I meet in terms of his character, his personality, his working style, quality of mind?

KIDD: Oh, General MacNaughton was a great man, and probably one of our great Canadians. I might say that he was a very dynamic man. Being a general, he was, of course, "I've made up my mind and don't try to change it" sort of man. It's not a kind thing to say, perhaps, but in many ways General MacNaughton has been described by people as Canada's greatest failure too, because he's never really been able to finish anything off, partly because--mainly, I suppose--because he was just too damned stubborn and he couldn't compromise. There was just no compromise in the man.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: But a very brilliant man; very articulate; a very, very strong Canadian view, and I would say probably had quite a suspicion of Americans and their strength.

BURG: I see. And a strong feeling then of--

KIDD: Very strong national feeling.
BURG: Right. Standing firm to protect Canada's interest--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:--in these matters.

KIDD: Yeah. But again, as I say, he couldn't compromise; and, therefore, he couldn't negotiate. And this was his failure in many areas.

BURG: And his own background was such, Mr. Kidd, that, let's say, any one of your group or any one of our group would have to listen quite seriously?

KIDD: Oh, very definitely, yes.

BURG: Because he is a man of skill in his profession. Is he an engineer?

KIDD: He has an engineering background.

BURG: By his training?

KIDD: Yes.
BURG: And could I ask you how old he was at this time? At the time when you're finished your working?

KIDD: Oh, he would be into his seventies. Very dynamic man; great story-teller too. Not much humor, but quite a remarkable man anyway.

BURG: It sounds that way.

KIDD: And went his own way. He would make policy speeches I'm sure that weren't approved by the governments. And finally, of course, he left the IJC over the issue of the treaty.

BURG: And his position is a federal position--

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:--in all of this?

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: So ultimately he would supposedly at least be responsible to the government in power.
KIDD: Absolutely, yes.

BURG: Because--

KIDD: But he was so well known in Canada and so highly respected that the federal government was very, very reluctant and fearful of crossing him although eventually they had to do it. Otherwise there couldn't have been a treaty.

BURG: In a moment I want to talk with you about the plan--the alternate plan--that he did propose. May I ask you, Was this man, who seems to have the capacity to be very adamant on things-- could he be adamant; and yet, in dealing with the American people that he had to work with, was his relationship with them a good one?

KIDD: Oh, I think it was a good one, yes. I think they recognized the general for what he was--

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:--very, very stubborn, very articulate man, very strong views.
BURG: But a man who could work across the table--

KIDD: Oh, yes.

BURG:--from you and hold his views--

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:--and still keep a relationship there--

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:--that worked.

KIDD: Very definitely.

BURG: Now to any extent is the American general--sorry I was going to say Isherwood, not--


BURG: Itschner. Is his position at all comparable on the American
side, or would it be safe to say MacNaughton's position was the higher one? that MacNaughton had the more responsible position in his country?

KIDD: Well, at this time General Itschner was chief of the Corps of Engineers in Washington--He was the top dog. And he really didn't come into the Columbia as far as the international aspects were concerned until the negotiations of the treaty were started. Then he became a member of the American negotiating team.

BURG: All right.

KIDD: But up until then, his prime concern was the corps; and, of course, he was involved because, if I recall correctly, he was on the board. I think he was on--yes, he was a member of the International Columbia River Engineering Board for the U.S. side.

BURG: Now I'll hope to be able to meet him then--

KIDD: Yeah.
BURG:—and talk with him and estimate what kind of a man he might be.

KIDD: Oh, you'll like General Itschner. He's a very—he's an opposite to MacNaughton, really. He's the new school: very diplomatic, quite suave, and yet with a hard military background but with not quite as—well, more of the velvet-glove-on-the-hand, I think, sort of thing.

BURG: A younger man, Mr. Kidd?

KIDD: Oh, yes.

BURG: I see. O.K.

KIDD: Oh, yes.

BURG: Now what, then, would be the next stage? You've issued your conclusions and feel that now it becomes a matter of negotiation. So what happened next?

KIDD: Well, then at that time as soon as the report was in—almost immediately afterwards—there was another exchange of notes between the two countries directing the IJC to come up
with principles for the development and the sharing of benefits between the two countries. And those negotiations went on for a year—approximately a year—almost to the day. And, of course, there’s no way that they could really come out with benefit principles that both sides could accept because they were negotiating at a level below the critical level. So many of the principles were written in rather an indefinite way and open so that when they got into the next stage, which was the negotiation of the treaty then there was leeway to interpret in a negotiating sphere. I might say before that—during the time that we were finalizing the or writing the ICREB report—that the Corps of Engineers were turning out their own report on their own water resources—how they could develop the Columbia River within their own country to optimize benefits without Canadian storage. We in B.C. were doing our own report on what we wanted to see developed on the Columbia in British Columbia, and the Canadian federal government were also carrying out their own studies on what they thought they would like to
see happen in the Columbia in Canada. So these side studies were all going on a basis for developing policy at the level of the three governments—separate policy of the three—three-government level.

BURG: Now do I understand correctly that there would be three independent sets of studies going on, and in addition to that there was the one—

KIDD: The international.

BURG:—the international one—

KIDD: Right.

BURG:—which was going on?

KIDD: Yes. And they were all quite independent.

BURG: Right. And then in—

KIDD: Then at that time when the exchange of notes took place
directing the IJC to come up with principles, the B.C.-Canada Police Liaison Committee was formed to try and develop a mutual policy. And this consisted of—if I recall correctly—two ministers from Ottawa and two ministers from B.C. along with their supporting advisors. So they would meet and try to develop policy and then direct the IJC—the Canadian section of the IJC—to take a certain approach on certain matters. There may have been something similar in the United States. I don't know. But certainly the IJC did receive direction on the road that the two—B.C.-Canada—governments wanted them to follow on the negotiation of these principles. Then this same liaison committee carried on through all the negotiations, advising the negotiators on the policy that they wanted followed.

BURG: Who were the two men from Ottawa, the two ministers?

KIDD: Well, they changed from time to time depending on—

BURG: Would it have been Howard Green, Mr. Kidd?

KIDD: Howard Green was—
BURG: Public works, I think.

KIDD: Yeah, Howard Green. And Alvin Hamilton was chairman of the Canadian committee, and Ray Williston and Bob [Robert William] Bonner represented British Columbia.

BURG: I see. Now at that time is there any pressure? Well, maybe it isn't pressure, but I'm wondering, I guess, to what extent this was the government of Premier [W.A.C.] Bennett of British Columbia? 

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: At this time?

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: And is Mr. Bennett's point of view being given to you to guide you or direct you in any of the work you're doing at that time?

KIDD: I don't know how much input Premier Bennett had in those initial negotiations leading up to the treaty itself. I'm not
sure how well informed he was by his two ministers or whether he wanted to be informed—whether he may not have wanted to retain his flexibility as he demonstrated later on. So how much of Premier Bennett's input went into this stage I don't know; I suspect not too much. And I would imagine that he said to Bonner and Williston, "O.K., get the best deal you can."

BURG: Both in terms of working with the Ottawa--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--people and then working with us.

KIDD: Right, yeah.

BURG: Now at what point does General MacNaughton introduce the specific plan that he had in mind? Is it at this stage, or does that come later that he--

KIDD: No, it's at this stage, really, that we started getting into trying to thrash out a Canadian plan that was acceptable
to both governments. And I might say that perhaps the hardest negotiation of the whole thing was between British Columbia and Canada. General MacNaughton wanted his plan, which included major developments in the Kootenay River in British Columbia; and British Columbia did not want to put that valley under water. So extremely hard negotiations went on between the two governments.

BURG: Now with regard to the B.C. government's point of view in the Kootenay. If I remember, one of the problems would be in use of the Kootenay: it would mean flooding land that had possibilities of productivity. I--

KIDD: Right.

BURG: --I don't know. Was it in your estimation good arable land. It seems to me I've heard disputes as to just how valuable that land might have been for agricultural production. I think it was grazing land, primarily, at that time.

KIDD: Yeah, it was being used for grazing primarily--

BURG: Yes.
KIDD:—at that time. But British Columbia took the view that being a very mountainous province, we had very little agricultural land and the Kootenay did represent potential arable land and they didn't want it flooded. The major developments that were being considered by the Canadian government would have flooded out a large part of the valley floor and would have lost that land forever. I'm quite sure there will be a higher use of that land as the need arises. At the moment it is primarily grazing land, but this is mainly because there is no economic development available as far as agriculture is concerned—or higher agriculture is concerned—in that valley. But we wanted to keep our options open. You can always flood it later if you want.

BURG: Yes, all right. I see. With regard to the point that it would have—the plan proposed by the federal government—would have flooded the Kootenay and would have created a block—transportation block—to east-west traffic—

KIDD: This was a major factor that was considered as well.
BURG: Did you feel that that was a valid kind of argument, or was the flooding of potential arable land a greater--

KIDD: Oh, I think the flooding of potentially arable land was the main concern. You could always get across the valley on the dams and narrow points of the reservoir could be bridged, I suppose.

BURG: Did the B.C. government in power then--well, do you suppose that that was advanced as merely another way to fight Ottawa, another way to dig in their heels a bit?

KIDD: I should perhaps qualify this to some extent. Unlike the United States, the resources are owned by the province; so the province was fighting from strength right from the beginning.

BURG: Now this was because--

KIDD: Canada could not step in and say, "You got to do this," because we owned--the province owned--the resource.

BURG: This goes back to the British North American Act--
KIDD: It's in the constitution.

BURG: --ninety-one--item ninety-one or ninety-two--that says--

KIDD: Right.

BURG: --the province has control over resources. Is that the way they put it: resources and civil rights?

KIDD: They own--

BURG: Property rights.

KIDD: --the crown province owns the resource. Now there is a clause in the constitution that says that Canada can intervene upon matters of national interest. And this was threatened at times, that it was in the national interest to step in and take over that resource.

BURG: Threatened, but not carried out.

KIDD: Not carried out; and I don't know how serious the threat was.

BURG: Do you remember from your own knowledge of Canadian history
where the federal government had done that in the past on some major issues such as this?

KIDD: I don't think it's ever been done as far as interfering with the provincial rights were concerned.

BURG: Right. So then Mr. Bennett and his government where in a position of great strength--

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:--in all of this?

KIDD: Right.

BURG: Now, Mr. Bennett, himself, and his government. Most Americans, unfortunately, would not know much about Mr. Bennett as well as this aspect of Canadian provincial-federal relationships; and I don't know very much about Mr. Bennett except a few things that I've read--a man who has been, or had been up until very recently, I guess, in power with a Social Credit government--

KIDD: Yes.
BURG:--and strongly devoted to British Columbia?

KIDD: Very strongly, yes.

BURG: And from that region, was he not, from the interior of British Columbia?

KIDD: His home was in Kelowna, which is in the Okanagan Valley in British Columbia, although he originated from Alberta. There are very few native British Columbians; most of us are imports.

BURG: Yes, I suppose so. So he's been touted to me as a showman--

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG:--and--

KIDD: He's a political animal in the strictest sense--very, very politically orientated.

BURG: With an instinct for knowing what--

KIDD: With a real political instinct on what should be done and with the courage to carry it out--regardless.
BURG: Regardless.

KIDD: Very strong man. Incidentally, if you're interested in following this up a little more, there's a great book on Bennett written by Paddy Sherman. It might be well worth your while to talk to Paddy if you get a chance. He's the publisher of the province now, but at that time he was a legislative reporter in Victoria, so he got to know these political people very well. He was a pretty good friend of mine, incidentally. And he knows how they think—knew how they thought—knew Bennett quite well. And quite a large part of Paddy's book is devoted to this Columbia negotiation. So there's another insight for you—

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:—if you want to follow it up.

BURG: Yes, indeed. Because the more I read and examine material connected with this, the more interesting Bennett's role seems to be.
BURG: Now at that stage was this Peace River development in the offering? Were you, for example, aware of that kind of plan for utilization of a river flowing entirely within British Columbia? Was it the Two Rivers Project they called it?

KIDD: Eventually, yes.

BURG: The Peace, and what was the other?

KIDD: Columbia.

BURG: And the Columbia. Was there a plan for a linking of those two?

KIDD: Well, not really. They were separate rivers.

BURG: There was no diversionary--

KIDD: No, no.

BURG:--aspect to the Peace River?
KIDD: No. Bennett had great visions of opening up the north; and although we knew about the Peace, it seemed to be too far away to really make it a viable project.

BURG: That was your feeling?

KIDD: Yeah. And there was really no real indication that that was what Bennett intended to do although he kept saying he was going to do it. We thought, you know, if the Columbia came in before anything started on the Peace, that there was just no way that we could go for two rivers—seemed too much for a province like British Columbia with only two million people.

BURG: More cost--

KIDD: Oh, yeah.

BURG:--than you could handle.

KIDD: Yeah. And its proven out really. Tremendous inflation we've had in the province over the last ten years.
BURG: I gather an inflation that has upset predictions as to when things could be accomplished, when dams might be constructed, and--

KIDD: Well, fortunately, British Columbia is a very wealthy province and has been able to survive in spite of the great stress it's placed on our resources.

BURG: Now--

KIDD: So anyway the negotiations on the Columbia proceeded--and now I'm talking about the actual negotiating stage of the treaty itself--proceeded on much the same basis except that it was an entirely different negotiating team than had ever been put together before. Davie [E. Davie] Fulton headed the Canadian team with two senior deputy ministers assisting him and with deputy minister of Lands and Forest from British Columbia representing British Columbia. So we had a four-man negotiating team. The Americans had a three-man team composed of General Itschner, Ivan [E.] White, who was from State, if I recall correctly, and I've been trying to think of the chairman's name since you came in this morning, but I can't at the moment.
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Well, I can't get it. I think I can find it. He was a top notcher, incidentally. Real good hard negotiator. He and Davie hit it off real good. Yeah, Elmer Bennett, under-secretary of the Interior.

BURG: Right. Before I came on I believe they got some oral history work with him.

KIDD: Oh, did you?

BURG: We missed Douglas McKay.

KIDD: Yeah. Is he dead now?

BURG: Yes. Again because of the lack of funding--

KIDD: Right.

BURG: --we weren't able to do anything.

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG: Then it was too late.

KIDD: Yeah.
BURG: It was one of the tragic things about this. Yes.

KIDD: Well, he could have told you a lot about the general--

BURG: Right.

KIDD: --because he was very much involved with this.

BURG: Now those negotiating teams--where did they meet?

KIDD: They met in either Ottawa or Washington. They alternated between the two capitals and, of course, were supported by quite a contingent of advisors at all meetings.

BURG: And you were among that team of advisors?

KIDD: Right.

BURG: Again charged with any particular and special responsibilities for purposes of the negotiations?

KIDD: Well, to advise the negotiators each side set up a technical team of three or four people. I represented B.C. Gordon McNab--or Ralph Purcell at the time--was chairman of the group from Ottawa. There was Chris Christenson, who was an
economist with the federal government, and someone from IJC. And then on the U.S. side there was Charley—I forget his name now—from the U.S. Corps, who headed up their team.

BURG: Corps of Engineers?

KIDD: Yeah. And it was Gordon Fernald from Portland and Henderson MacIntyre from the Bonneville Power Administration.

BURG: What is MacIntyre's first name?

KIDD: Henderson.

BURG: Henderson MacIntyre. O.K.

KIDD: So as the negotiations proceeded we would advise our negotiators through the B.C.—Canada group primarily, and the U.S. technical people would advise their negotiators. Then they put us together, and tell us to work out certain things jointly and come up with the consequences of this course of action. So always between negotiating meetings we would have quite a few meetings where the technical efforts went on to sort out things, run power studies, run various investiga-
tions to determine what the effect of doing this would have on the benefits in each country. Then we would report back, and we'd go then into another negotiating session.

BURG: All right, now, now let me ask this kind of question—and we would appreciate anything that you can tell us, in terms of physical setting and the way this job affected you as one of the technical experts, were you basing yourself in British Columbia and then going to Ottawa?

KIDD: Yes, very definitely.

BURG: So--

KIDD: I was on a dead-run all the time.

BURG: Right. You go back to Ottawa or down to Washington. How long typically would you be there, Mr. Kidd? In Ottawa, let's say, or Washington?

KIDD: Well, I might be in Ottawa for two or three days; might go to Washington for a day. And then we'd meet quite often out in Portland where we had the computer and where we did a
lot of the studies, the system-power studies.

BURG: This would be more likely the teams of technical advisors--

KIDD: Right.

BURG: ---would get together there. All right. Now because I want to see this through the eyes of someone who's actually doing it--not only the things that are accomplished but the way in which they are accomplished--a typical thing is that you're told of a meeting coming up, or it was scheduled in advance?

KIDD: It would be scheduled at the previous committee meeting. And then we would--the technical people would--be told that they wanted certain things done, and then we'd schedule our own meetings in between.

BURG: How long a period of time might exist between meetings in Ottawa or Portland or Washington?

KIDD: Well, they ran almost monthly. I think there was something like ten negotiating meetings in the year that negotiations went on.
BURG: Right.

KIDD: The final meeting they decided that this was going to be it. And—

(Interruption)

BURG: Yes, we're on again.

KIDD: All through Peace [river project], even the development of IJC principles, the development of the Columbia River Treaty itself, and the development of the protocol that followed the treaty—all seemed to come to a head just about Christmas time; so you're always fighting to get it done and get-home-for-Christmas sort of thing. In fact, on the negotiation of the protocol I think we finished it just the day before Christmas. In any case we'd had to give up our airline reservations home, and Paul Martin [Canadian Sec. of State for External Affairs] arranged for the Canadian Air Force to fly us home—including the Portland people.

BURG: I see. What year was that? Christmas—
KIDD: That was '64.

BURG: Christmas of '64. Now you would be housed in a hotel--

KIDD: Uh-huh.

BURG: --all your paraphernalia, your briefcase. The meetings
would be held in what kind of surroundings? Were you meeting
in a federal building in Ottawa, federal buildings in Washington,
D.C.?

KIDD: Yes, most of the meetings in Washington took place in
offices of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation--very nice conference
rooms there.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: Most of the negotiating meetings in Ottawa took place in
one of the conference rooms in either the Parliament buildings
or the east or west block. Generally, the east block since
that's where external affairs had their offices.
BURG: Now one can visualize the work at the conference table as being fairly informal by a group of people who by now knew each other--

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: --fairly well. Are there social interchanges between the technical advisors on both sides during the days that you would be in Washington or that you would be in Ottawa?

KIDD: Not so much the technical people, but certainly during negotiation meeting of the principals there would be--

BURG: There would be there.

KIDD: --counter entertainment.

BURG: So you weren't really carrying on any kind of informal conversations at social gatherings with the American team?

KIDD: Well, yes, to some extent 'cause we were all pretty good friends. Sure we'd go to the bar and have a few drinks, go to
dinner together—this sort of thing.

BURG: Kick any of the problems that you were working on--

KIDD: Oh, yeah.

BURG:—around at these sessions too?

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: At the close of a working session new problems would have arisen, and each of you would take away from these sessions assignments--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:—to work on when you returned home?

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: And your base was here in Vancouver--

KIDD: No, in Victoria.

BURG:—in Victoria at that time. Would this take you out into the field?
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KIDD: No.

BURG: Others might be sent out perhaps?

KIDD: No, the field work was all done. We were just--

BURG: That was all finished?

KIDD: --the office work from then on.

BURG: Could you give me an example of one of these problems that you'd have to work on when you returned to Victoria?

KIDD: Well, I suppose it was really a two-pronged thing because we were still negotiating between B. C. and Canada, and we met always before each international negotiating meeting. So the Canadians would come up with a proposal for "Let's do it this way." And we would say, "Well O.K., we'll take that back and have a look at it, but we think we should do it this way"; and they'd take that up and sit in Ottawa and look at it. So we would be negotiating at that level and carrying out studies of "Well, suppose you put in a Low Arrow Lake rather than a High
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Arrow Lakes what would be the consequences." And then, growing out of the international negotiations, they would make certain amount of progress. And they would say, "Well, look, we want to look at the effect of, oh, this declining value of storage in relation to thermal-power development in the United States—what is the effect?" and come back and tell us.

BURG: Could you explain that to me a bit?

KIDD: Well, one of the things built into the treaty was that when the water resources in the Pacific Northwest area are used up, they're going to have to turn more and more to thermal generation—whether its nuclear or conventional thermal.

BURG: I see. The idea being that when you say "the using of water resources," you mean that you reach a point where you've damned up—stored up—

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: -- to a point and generated--
KIDD: You can take all the energy out of it—

BURG: I see.

KIDD: --that is available.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: But once you get a large thermal base in there, then by adding more generating units to your hydro power plants you can use the water more as it would come naturally. You don't need storage any more. 'Cause what you'd do is generate when you got lots of water and shut down the thermal plant to save fuel. And this was a view—a negotiating view—that the Americans took with us: that "O.K., it's great, you know. Your storage is going to be just terrific for us in these early years; but later on when we get this big thermal base, why it's not that valuable to us any more." So the benefits actually declined. There's a formula written into the treaty by which you measure this decline. So that was one of the problems: to try and get an assessment of just how these benefits declined over the next
fifty years so that Canada and British Columbia could say, "Well, look, at least we know we're going to get this much out of it." And the Americans would now know, "O.K., this is the value we're going to get out of it." So there's all sorts of these sort of things that came into it. The Americans at one stage took the view that "Well, storage really is nothing much more than a pile of coal or similar to it; and, therefore, there's no capacity benefit or peaking benefit from it." Well, we fought that one to a standstill; and, of course, the treaty does contain both energy and capacity benefits. Now you won't understand what I mean by capacity.

BURG: No, not at all.

KIDD: But to put it briefly, it's the rate at which you use energy. And you have to build your transmission lines or power plants to be able to carry your energy load at its maximum.

BURG: Yeah.
KIDD: Like, for instance, you know yourself that from about five
to seven your wife is cooking and people are using the elevators,
and so you get a peak in the use of electricity. But your aver-
age over the day is very much less. But to be able to meet
that peak you got to build facilities to serve it. This is
one of the problems you're having in New York at the moment.
You haven't got enough capacity, and when all the air condi-
tioning comes on in a heat wave in the summer, why you run
into problems—get blackouts, brownouts.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: So anyway we were able to convince the Americans there
was a capacity benefit. This took a lot of work, a lot of—

BURG: You use the term "a capacity gain." What was our position
there that—

KIDD: Your position was that you could provide the peaking you
wanted from your own resources, that you didn't need Canadian
storage to accomplish this.

BURG: And your feeling was that even if that happened to be true at that moment in time, given another ten, fifteen years—the population growth, industrial growth—that it would not be true.

KIDD: No, I don't think so. I think we believed right from the beginning and throughout the negotiations there would be capacity gains.

BURG: But you didn't think that we saw that.

KIDD: Well, again it's a negotiating point. It's a point of negotiation at this point.

BURG: I was trying to get at whether our people felt that the thermal plants—perhaps nuclear plants—would take care of our future needs.

KIDD: Yeah, well, I think the main point here is that hydro is very, very flexible—extremely flexible. You can shut it off;
you can start it up—whereas the thermal plants—once you got them cranked up—it's pretty hard to shut them down. Once you shut them down, you just don't bring them back on the line immediately, whereas hydro can pick up load and drop load and you've got no problems—do it instantaneously.

BURG: You mean through diverting out of the generating plants and--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:—letting it run over the dams?

KIDD: Well, you'd store the water sometimes.

BURG: Or store it.

KIDD: And then when these peaks come along, why you'd automatically pick up the load. Very, very flexible—immensely flexible.

BURG: I see. I hadn't realized that from an engineering standpoint that these generating plants that would be based, say, on
nuclear power didn't have that--

KIDD: Nuclear power, particularly, is non-flexible. It's the stuff that you put on line and just let it--well, just run it. You don't have flexibility. You do, to some extent, with conventional thermal but even it is a far cry from the flexibility of hydro.

BURG: Well, these examples that you've given me explain a great deal, then, of what you're doing through the course of that--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--of that year.

KIDD: Right.

BURG: One can then visualize a host of these problems, and what it sounds very much like is the planning stage for OVERLORD.

KIDD: It was really the planning strategy which the negotiators then took and tried to work out some sort of an agreement on.
And I might say here that was in principle, at least, because the negotiators were non-technical people; and, therefore, they couldn't negotiate in detail on it. So the treaty itself is primarily a document of principle, leaving the entities who were named in the treaty to work out the details at the technical aspects. I was primarily involved in the implementation of the treaty at that level. I guess we come up with a stack of documents—agreements—like that—

BURG: About eighteen inches high.

KIDD: —which came out after the treaty—which we developed after the treaty in order to implement it.

BURG: All right, now let me ask you this then: can you give me your views on the end result of the negotiations and conversations that were held between B.C. and Ottawa and on the final treaty which is put together? How do you feel about this? Could you summarize what you feel it accomplished for Canada and
whether this means places where you prevented us from accomplishing some of the things that maybe we had hoped to win in this bargaining? Include that. I'd be very interested in having your assessment of the results.

KIDD: Well, I think the treaty itself was a good document and a fair document, and it was based on Canada—or British Columbia—bringing back to British Columbia the downstream benefits that were generally in the United States—power benefits. Now Bennett later decided that he wanted to sell those in the United States. He didn't want to bring them back because he wanted to develop the Peace River. And he made the decision to develop the Peace River, so he couldn't use the energy from both rivers at the time.

BURG: So then he would sell, outright—sell—

KIDD: Yes.

BURG:—future benefits—

KIDD: Yes.
BURG:--to achieve a lump sum which could be then used--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:--with the Peace.

KIDD: And without concern for the consequences that the two-river development might have on escalation on inflation and the value of those benefits once they had been sold in the United States for a lump sum. Now if he had brought the benefits back, then the value would inflate with the inflation of British Columbia; so we'd have had a buffer against the future if we'd brought them back into the province and used them ourselves. I think this is where the mistake was made if there has been a mistake.

BURG: My understanding was that the Ottawa government had persistently tried to avoid any large scale and long-term commitments like that into the United States and that they then suddenly I guess under John Diefenbaker reversed their stand.
KIDD: No, not under John Diefenbaker. The Conservatives——

BURG: Was it under——

KIDD: ——would not accept this, and Davie Fulton was the prime advocate of not leaving the benefits in the United States. He wanted to bring them back into British Columbia. And Davie got himself into a pretty bad position on this one because Bennett, being the character he is and with the political astuteness that he has, made Davie look pretty bad. And then there was quite a campaign mounted to get around or to get this policy of no-export broken—the Canadian policy of no-export to the United States of electrical energy. And Hugh Clewellyn Keenleyside was, of course, one of the main people that got this thing changed by making speeches on it. And there were others too.

BURG: Did that activity center in British Columbia by and large?

KIDD: And then when the Liberal government came in, they in their throne speech, I think, gave the first indication that this policy would be changed.
BURG: That would be Pearson's--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--Pearson's government that followed Diefenbaker.

KIDD: And then they also accepted the fact that Bennett wanted to sell in the United States--eventually, three years later. And this second negotiations took place in which the protocol was developed. Davie Fulton and Diefenbaker made their mistake in not getting an agreement with British Columbia before they signed the treaty. So Bennett had them by the short hairs then.

BURG: It's not a case of their thinking that this was all taken care of. They actually should have--

KIDD: Well, B.C. owned the resource, you see; and Canada signed the treaty without having an agreement with British Columbia.

BURG: I thought they had. I thought that they had an agreement. I haven't talked with Fulton about this because Mr. Fulton and I have just discussed up to about 1956 in his own career.

KIDD: Oh, yeah.
BURG: So I haven't talk to him about this.

KIDD: Well, he'll bring it out and recognize this as a mistake that they made.

BURG: So then--

KIDD: So the Liberals when they got into this second round of negotiations--it was preceded with a second round of negotiations with British Columbia where an agreement was made.

BURG: And the nature of that agreement? What was the agreement made for this second round?

KIDD: Well, it set down specific things that British Columbia would do and specific things that Canada would do. One thing was that if the benefits were sold at a place suitable to British Columbia, British Columbia undertook to build the projects at no cost to Canada--this sort of thing. The agreement was signed by Bennett and by Pearson, as I recall; and negotiated by Paul Martin, who headed up the Canadian negotiating team on the second
round—protocol negotiations.

BURG: So then we would have some Canadian ministers standing there with red faces, having negotiated with the United States in good faith and having set things which had been accepted.

KIDD: Poor Davie Fulton got really, really—it destroyed him politically.

BURG: 'Cause you then have to come back to—

KIDD: Well, I think perhaps by—he demoted Davie Fulton anyway; I'll say that.

BURG: Out of external affairs?

KIDD: Well, no, he was minister—

BURG: I'm sorry—minister of justice.
KIDD: --of justice, and he demoted him to minister of public works.

BURG: Yes, I had read that in one of the books that deals with

the Diefenbaker--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: --period.

KIDD: And I think he said, "Well, O.K., you failed, man! and,
you know, I'm not going to support you."

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: And we never did meet Diefenbaker; but we did meet Pearson,

who was a delightful man.

BURG: So you have no comparison to offer between those two men.

KIDD: No, not on a personal basis.

BURG: And do you have any estimation that you can give of

working in the role that you played with the Diefenbaker govern-
ment in power? Could you, yourself, notice any distinct differ-
ences between the kinds of support you had, for example, under the Diefenbaker government by comparison with the Pearson government?

KIDD: Yeah, well, I think the Liberals had learned by experience and therefore operated more to satisfy British Columbia, whereas the Diefenbaker Conservative government wanted to do it their way, really. And they found it very, very difficult to agree with British Columbia--extremely difficult--partly because of General MacNaughton, I suppose but partly because, well, there's friction there between Davie Fulton and Bennett as well.

BURG: Oh, there was?

KIDD: Yeah. So Pearson who—or not Pearson; the external affairs minister there at that second round of negotiations, Paul Martin—he's a very astute political animal something like Bennett but much suaver. And he recognized there was just no way that he could go ahead with the treaty unless Bennett agreed; and he fully recognized that
B.C. rights had to be respected and that if he was going to be successful as "the great Liberal government finally getting this treaty on the road" sort of thing, that he would do what British Columbia wanted. And he did it. He made it go.

BURG: Your own feeling was that a disappointment was letting that benefit go?

KIDD: Oh, I think it was one, yes.

BURG: Do you have any other disappointments concerning the treaty?

KIDD: Well, I think a major one—and I've got a memo on file which never went anywhere; probably should have—I feel that once the decision had been made to build the Peace, that this changed the thing so much for British Columbia that the treaty should have been renegotiated—and renegotiated from the point of view of removing Arrow Lakes from it.

BURG: And why was that, Mr. Kidd?

KIDD: Well once you got Portage Mountain built with that huge
reservoir up there, it added tremendous flexibility to what you could do on the Columbia. And, really, you didn't need that storage in British Columbia on Arrow Lakes any longer in my opinion because you could firm up the flow--the Columbia River power--using Portage Mountain. You didn't need Arrow Lakes downstream from the Canadian generation plants to reregulate the flow to suit the Americans.

BURG: So you would--

KIDD: This is rather complicated to explain, but Portage Mountain provided the flexibility in the system such that Arrow Lakes was no longer required to protect the Canadian generating ability to suit B.C. requirements on the Columbia.

BURG: Even taking into consideration possible future demands?

KIDD: Right.

BURG: I see. So that meant that capacity was provided at cost--high cost--that you feel was an unneeded expense then?
KIDD: Yes, not only that, but the Arrow Lakes cost escalated pretty well. At the time the treaty was negotiated in '60 there hadn't been much development, but then a major pulp mill went in at Castlegar and changed the economy there. And consequently relocation costs and other costs--such as we had to put a navigation lock in Arrow Lakes Dam to suit the forest industry requirements--and costs of Arrow Lakes project increased tremendously.

BURG: I see.

KIDD: --for that and other reasons. And initially--there's so much left out and so much, so many, complicated factors that it's very difficult to--the one reason Arrow Lakes went in initially was--oh, a negotiating point was--that the first added storage is the most valuable storage because it allows you to firm up a smaller base on it. Although it doesn't produce any more energy, the capacity gain is good. So a part of the negotiation was--initially in the treaty itself--was the Americans took the position: "Well, O.K., we need power. We can build Libby in five years. We'll get the first added gain out
of it; and you can build Mica [Mica Creek] in ten years; and we'll have to take its position in the preference on benefits at that stage." We took the view: "Well, O.K., maybe you can build Libby in five years; but we can build Arrow in three years, and, therefore, we're going to get those first added benefits for Arrow." So that was a negotiating point.

BURG: It seems to me that it was suggested at the time that Mica might not take as long as was originally projected.

KIDD: No, I think everybody recognized that Mica would take at least seven years to finish.

BURG: Yeah, well, I guess it was one of your journalists, [Charles Farrar] Ripley--

KIDD: Oh, yeah.

BURG: Do you recognize the name?--he did something, I guess, for MacLain's Magazine?

KIDD: Yeah, he publishes a technical magazine that is--
BURG: Yeah, whose title I can't remember, but a fairly long title.

KIDD: Well, I forgot the title, too.

BURG: But devoted a whole article to--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--this. And I think that's where I encountered this remark. And I knew nothing about it, of course--that Mica instead of taking ten years could conceivably be done in far less time; and I wondered about that.

KIDD: There's no way. We did consider building it a year earlier once the treaty had been signed, but that was when I was with B.C. Hydro.

BURG: But the main thing was that Arrow, Arrow Lakes--

KIDD: Could be built quicker than any other project.

BURG: Right.
KIDD: Arrow and Duncan.

BURG: That became a very strong bargaining point--

KIDD: Yeah, right, yeah.

BURG:--to counter this American--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:--remark, yes.

KIDD: And we used this also to even get Mica in ahead of as far as the sharing of benefits was concerned.

BURG: Now does any other disappointment--and I understand--at least, I think this is your attitude: that your feeling is that when you're negotiating on something like this between two powers, clearly each side is going to give something--

KIDD: They have to; otherwise there's no--

BURG:--they will have to, or you don't accomplish anything. So when I ask you about disappointments, I realize that there are
going to be some things that you won't get that you would have liked to have had; and I realize that in the nature of things you're just not going to get them. But were there any other disappointments that come to your mind about the treaty?
Were you--

KIDD: No, I don't think so. I think the treaty is a good treaty, and I think the protocol is O.K. other than the fact that we sold our benefits for a lump sum. I think my disappointment is that the treaty was not renegotiated when the decision was made to build the Peace because the Peace had a great influence on the Columbia and on the benefits from the Columbia.

BURG: To both countries?

KIDD: No.

BURG: To Canada?

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: Yes. So as a Canadian that would be the--
KIDD: It would be a different treaty if we'd known at the
time that Portage Mountain was going to be built.

BURG: And didn't. So the problem never arose; the question
never arose. There was no chance to do any of this; there was
no chance for renegotiation, you think?

KIDD: Well, I would think there was probably a chance; but
governments being governments--

BURG: It wasn't done.

KIDD:--it wasn't done. They didn't want to. They had a treaty
signed and sealed: "Let's not reopen it." This was a political
decision.

BURG: Was it your impression at the time that had it been re-
opened, the United States would not have been in a position
where it could have said, "Well, nuts to that noise on renego-
tiating"; or do you think there might have been a little—that
we might have been interested?
KIDD: Well, of course, Canada always took the chance that if they did reopen the treaty, the United States would walk away from it.

BURG: One of the things I'll have to find out from the Americans is whether that was in the cards.

KIDD: It could well have been. I don't know.

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: 'Cause they're under a certain amount of criticism, too, for the treaty.

BURG: Yes. One of the Americans who is accustomed to getting it all and not giving very much, probably.

KIDD: Yeah, uh-huh. So this was the concern that if you reopen it, maybe you end up with nothing, whereas as it is you have got a treaty and it allows you to develop the Columbia for your own advantage—the Columbia in Canada—which could never have been done, I don't think, without giving large benefits to the United States.
BURG: So your feeling would be that there would have been very serious repercussions without the treaty had Canada tried to do—British Columbia tried to do—with the Columbia what was—as far as I can see by international understanding—at least understandings between America and Canada—the United States and Canada—that you had the right to do it.

KIDD: No, I don't. No, no, from that point of view. We had the right to develop the Columbia in Canada in any way we saw fit. We even argued that we could divert it to the Fraser—

BURG: Yes.

KIDD:—but certainly it was no argument on the part of the United States that we couldn't develop it in its natural state in any way we saw fit. But if we went in and built, say, Mica with that large block of storage, then the Americans would automatically get benefits because we were regulating the river to their advantage. So politically this was unacceptable in Canada. We just cannot develop that river and give the free benefits to the
United States. If it's going to be developed, it has to be done on a cooperative basis; and the United States have to pay their fair share--

BURG: Right.

KIDD:--for the benefits they receive.

BURG: You just wish that--

KIDD: So at least it has accomplished that.

BURG: Right.

(Interruption)

KIDD: It has allowed us to develop a major resource in our province at a low cost. And that's our major benefit.

BURG: Right. And you felt that--

KIDD: It also provides subsequent benefits.

BURG: Right. And the possibility of much assistance being given to us in that same way regarding flood control.
KIDD: Right, exactly.

BURG: And this I believe also carried with it monetary compensation for the amount of loss avoided by aspects of control that were built in Canada that would save on the American side potential flood damage.

KIDD: Oh, yes, very definitely.

BURG: There were monetary adjustments for that too.

KIDD: Yes.

BURG: Right. O.K. Well that sounds very good. May I ask you then, What course did you follow after this—after the protocol was done? What was the course of your life?

KIDD: Well, I was still with the government in--well, I'd been back and forth between B.C. Hydro and the government. I was back at that time as controller of water rights. And since I was the--I guess I could say I was the only Canadian technical
person that went through all phases of the Columbia River Treaty negotiations 'cause the federal team got broken up from time to time; but I went through all aspects of it. So when the protocol was signed and there was "systems go" B.C. Hydro finally talked me into going back to them to help with the implementation of the treaty.

BURG: They had by then, of course, been nationalized.

KIDD: They had been named as the entity for the treaty--Canadian entity.

BURG: Had been nationalized by the Bennett government?

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: Right. So what was your position then with B.C. Hydro?

KIDD: Well, I was assistant manager of what was called Major Resources Division and also participated as part of the Canadian entity and was chairman of several of the international committees and task forces that were set up to
negotiate and develop this pile of documents--

BURG: Yes, yes.

KIDD:--to work out the details implementing the thing, making it work.

BURG: How long did you do that?

KIDD: About five years. And it was pretty well completed when I left. There was only one major aspect that was yet to be done.

BURG: And what position did you then take?

KIDD: Well, I'm director of water resources and hydraulics for this firm of consulting engineers--

BURG: I see.

KIDD:--on a national and international basis.

BURG: Right. And have been doing this kind of work ever since--

KIDD: Yeah.
BURG: --when it becomes advisable.

KIDD: Yes, for the last two and a half years.

BURG: Let me ask you this personal question: Although this is closely related to what you have done and is certainly in the pattern of your life, what decided you to leave B.C. Hydro and to come into—may I describe it as private practice, really—private engineering practice?

KIDD: Uh-huh. Well this is rather a long story. I'll make it brief though. When I first worked outside of the provincial government, I was with what was then known as the B.C. Power Commission, which was a Crown-owned corporation. And then when Bennett decided to do the Peace, he decided also to take over B.C. Electric—which he did because he had to control the marketing agent for the power. B.C. Electric wasn't cooperating with him.

BURG: Was that because Peace River power was going to come to them at a greater price than they were at that time getting it?
KIDD: Well, the B. C. Electric, which was a privately owned utility, decided that they didn't want any part of the Peace River. And I'm sure this was a negotiating position that they took 'cause they were, "O.K. if Bennett wants to build Portage, let him go ahead; and we won't buy it except at our price from him." So anyway he took over the B. C. Electric, and then he amalgamated the B. C. Power Commission and the B. C. Electric and set up the two co-chairmen, Dr. Keenleyside and Dr. [Gordon Merritt] Shrum as co-chairmen.

BURG: Now how did Shrum spell his name, Mr. Kidd?

KIDD: S-h-r-u-m.

BURG: All right.

KIDD: And he has just retired last month. Now so you had a two-headed monster, eh. And they also adopted the policy that everybody from both organizations had tenure, so you ended up with a manager of a division and an associate manager.
BURG: Combined from the--

KIDD: From the two.

BURG:--from the two.

KIDD: Yeah. So you never--the thing still functioned as two separate agencies to some extent--very, very little cooperation between the old private utility people and the old Crown corporation. So it was a pretty deathly atmosphere, and when the stage came where--. I was fine because I had this implementation work which was extremely interesting, and I wanted to see the thing finished and through.

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: But when that work was coming to an end, I couldn't see much future in the organization. They still were at loggerheads and only attrition will cure this problem. And it's gradually coming now with retirement and death of a few of the very senior people. It's a better relationship now. But the
fact that they amalgamated the two--of course, the work had to be divided up too--and the strong side--so a lot of people were sitting off in little corners and really doing nothing. You've seen this thing--

BURG: Yes.

KIDD: --in government.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: And there was no way I was going to let that happen to me, so I decided to try this consulting game.

BURG: Right.

KIDD: And I've always wanted to work on a national basis, and I'd like very much to get into international work. That's my objective now--get a little of this consulting under my belt and perhaps try and get into world work.

BURG: So your aim then is consulting work with foreign governments
that perhaps have--

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG:--large projects in mind and--

KIDD: Right.

BURG:--could draw upon your experience in life, which sounds very intriguing to me. Well, thank you very much for talking with us and giving us this information.

KIDD: I'm glad to do so. I'm only sorry that so much has been left out. But there are two documents that you should get a hold of, and unfortunately I've only got one of them here.

But at the time of the External Affairs Committee hearings in Ottawa--once the protocol was signed, it had to receive parliamentary approval. So they held what were called External Affairs Committee hearings in Ottawa, and this External Affairs Committee is made up of members of all parties. So we went through a very long process of justifying the treaty
in front of this committee with the opposition parties trying to kill it, of course. Two documents were prepared for it.

One, this one here—


KIDD: And the other one is a blue book the same size as this, and I just don't recall the title of the damned thing. But it contains a lot of the background data and information that went into the development of the treaty.

BURG: And would have been issued by the same—

KIDD: Yeah, by the same agency.

BURG:—same agency.

KIDD: Yeah.

BURG: All right. Well, we should be able to get a hold of that.
KIDD: If you like, I could send you one, or Ralph Purcell may have a copy in his office.

BURG: All right.