INTERVIEW WITH
LeRoy Lutes
by
Maclyn P. Burg
Oral Historian
on
August 16, 1974
for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of General LeRoy Lutes.

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Col. LeRoy Lutes, Jr., of Alexandria, VA, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of personal interviews conducted with my father, General LeRoy Lutes, on August 16, 1974, November 12, 1974, and August 20, 1976 in Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, except that the portions of the transcripts indicated below shall not be made available until the dates shown, after which they may be made available as part of the transcript.

(a) Page 91, line 8 through the last word on Page 92, to be closed until 1990.

(b) Page 98, line 13 through Page 100, line 15, to be closed until 1995.

(2) The tape recording shall not be available for use by researchers during the donor's lifetime. After the donor's death, access to the tape recording shall be for background use only, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom.

(3) During the donor's lifetime the donor retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcript and tape recording shall pass to the United States Government. During the donor's lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcript (but not the tape recording) without the donor's express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcript, but not the tape recording, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request.
(5) Copies of the interview transcript, but not the tape recording, may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

Donor

Faye Richter

Date

August 28, 1981

Archivist of the United States

August 28, 1981
This interview is being conducted with General Leroy Lutes in the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C. on August 16, 1974. Present for the interview General Lutes and Dr. Maclyn Burg of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library staff.

DR. BURG: Now, General Lutes, you remarked to me before we got going that your father had gotten "propaganda" from my native state of Washington that caused him to sell out everything he had in Illinois and to move out to western Washington state near Bellingham. How old were you at that time?

GEN. LUTES: Sixteen.

DR. BURG: You were sixteen years old and you had been born in the state of Illinois?

GEN. LUTES: That's right.

DR. BURG: Now you had had your education in the state of Illinois, up through the high school level?

GEN. LUTES: Yes, up to that time.

DR. BURG: And what year was that by the way that you went out to Washington?
LUTES: 1906.

BURG: Did you complete any more education in the state of Washington?

LUTES: Yes, I finished my high school there.

BURG: In Bellingham?

LUTES: Bellingham.

BURG: I might ask you this before I move on; what kind of thing had they sold your father on; do you remember? Was it some particular kind of enterprise?

LUTES: No, he just was interested in the state. It was a western state that was being developed and he thought he might have a better chance out there. I don't think that's very pertinent though for this.

BURG: Ah, the only thing is that we have found out that many times the experiences that a man has in his youth, the circumstances of his family, the things that happened to him, the places he went, will be clues to his performance
later on, the things he does or the attitudes he has. So we try to fill in a little bit of this data. For example, clearly, if you had gone to the state of Washington and your father had become a lumber baron and owned a large sawmill, it would have altered the course of your life and the kind of education you could have had.

LUTES: That's true.

BURG: So your father had some difficulties there. Did your father remain in the state of Washington, after his reverses?

LUTES: No, he spent two years there and then he returned to Illinois.

BURG: But during that two-year period, your next door neighbor was a captain in the Washington National Guard.

LUTES: Yes, I wish I could remember his name. He later became a lawyer, and later became a colonel in the regular army in the Judge Advocate General's department. [Captain, National Guard, Lewellyn]

BURG: He was in the Second Regiment?
LUTES: Second Regiment.

BURG: They have now published a four-volume, paperback history of the Washington National Guard. I own a set; I'll look for his name and see if I can't find it.

LUTES: He was my captain.

BURG: You were sixteen, so he said he would waive the age requirements and took you into the Washington National Guard?

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Now you described to me how you wore the horseshoe blanket roll of--

LUTES: Weighed about seventy-five pounds; you know, that old Spanish-American War type--

BURG: Yes, like a sausage around the shoulder and down to the hip, with blanket, tent and--

LUTES: Yes, we all marched off onto a boat and were taken to our defenses, the coast defenses there in Puget Sound.
And the War Department apparently had prescribed that that infantry regiment would be trained as coast artillery for their summer camp.

BURG: So you were at Fort Flagler?

LUTES: At Fort Flagler, yes.

BURG: At that time, did they have Flagler equipped with disappearing guns?

LUTES: No, these were barbette.

BURG: Big, almost turret-type guns.

LUTES: I was so young, and so small, that I had to be given a job at the gun that didn't require heavy lifting.

BURG: So you weren't loading shells into it or powder bags into it?

LUTES: I was putting shells into it, but with the use of a derrick, which was handled by the regular army.

BURG: So you had mechanical purchase, mechanical advantage on your side.
LUTES: Yes, that's right.

BURG: How long did that camp run?

LUTES: Two weeks, I think. They integrated us with regular army batteries. In other words, our company became a battery which was about half regular army and half national guard for the training purposes. So we were right with them, and we slept with them behind the guns, with the regulars, and we went to drill with them. It was a very intense two weeks.

BURG: What is your recollection now, looking back on yourself as a sixteen year old; what was your impression of these regular soldiers?

LUTES: Well, they were very interesting. My tent mate was, --we literally slept in pup tents--my tent mate was a Finn who had been in the Russian army under the Czar. And the rest of them, most of these regulars, were Spanish-American War veterans.

BURG: Was there a fairly high proportion among them of men born overseas, fairly recent immigrants to the United States?
LUTES: No.

BURG: I see. And as far as the kind of men they were, did you find them pretty rough and uncouth?

LUTES: Yes, they were rather rough and rather uncouth. They reminded you of the old frontier days in a way.

BURG: I wondered. Probably that same kind of man had served in the regular army out on the Plains, for example, during the Indian Wars. Did you or your companions find them willing to help you as national guardsmen?

LUTES: Oh, yes, nightly, around the campfire and behind the gun, and they instructed me in manual of the arms and the rifle and in signalling with flags, and so forth. It was very interesting, but that wasn't what really led me to the army. I had had a neighbor, back home, who had gone to West Point and had gone into the Philippine Insurrection and who was wounded in the left arm, was shot. His name was Monroe Kerth; he later became a colonel and wrote one of the manuals for the army. But that was in Illinois and he always kept in
touch with me because he thought I should have gone to West Point; he was much older than I.

BURG: Now, you encountered him when you got back to Illinois?

LUTES: Well, I was in touch with him by mail. He wrote me occasionally all through my youth.

BURG: I was going to say, General, that being in contact with these regulars, at your age, gave you some kind of idea, long before you ever had a commission yourself, of the kinds of men you might expect to command; something about their character and what they'd be like.

LUTES: Yes, that's right.

BURG: Would you say, because of the technical nature of the artillery, that these enlisted men might have been, perhaps, a cut above the kind of men one would encounter in a regular infantry regiment in the early 1900s?

LUTES: I think the noncommissioned officers would be.

BURG: I see. After two years, you went back to Illinois with your family?
LUTES: That's right, and I went to military school.

BURG: Which school did you go to?

LUTES: Wentworth, it was one of the first ten in the country by federal recognition.

BURG: I see. Was that a two-year or four-year school, General?

LUTES: Four-year school, two-year junior college, yes.

BURG: So you would have graduated from that about 1912?

LUTES: No, I graduated in 1908, I did a little in one year and when I graduated I was the honor student in my class.

BURG: Oh, you were? Were you then commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant at that point, upon graduation from Wentworth?

LUTES: No, I accepted an honorary 2nd lieutenancy in the Missouri National Guard. No, I won ten scholarships by being the honor man of the class but I didn't take advantage of any because my parents objected. They had lost all previous children in early childhood and wanted me, the lone survivor, to stay at home.
BURG: I see.

LUTES: But I never gave up the idea of going into the regular army if an opportunity occurred, and I took all the subjects. I tried for an appointment at West Point, but my father was a Democrat and the congressman was a Republican and of the old school. He was a captain from Civil War vintage and the representative of the district. So they didn't have competitive examinations; he would appoint three men, the principal and the two alternates. If the principal failed, why, the appointment went to the second alternate, and so forth. Well, I was twenty-three years old when they got down to making me a third alternate and I was past the age limit for West Point. I continued my studies, however, while in the local company of the national guard. Company K of the 4th Infantry of the national guard from Illinois was in bad straits, so much so, that the governor from Illinois said that if the people of Cairo, this town, didn't get this company straightened out, it would be discontinued. And the mayor called on me, knowing that I was a graduate of Wentworth and had some
military experience, and he wanted me to take command of this company. So I did, and carried it through a very serious riot and had a commendation from the governor. At that time, this service was interfering with my work, which was at the biggest bank in town, and working through the bank, I had a pretty good chance there. I was just getting ready to go to New York for an offer to be an auditor, a bank auditor with a group of auditors, bank examiners. When I was ready to quit the guards and go, this Mexican War thing came, [Pancho] Villa's raid, 1915-1916.

BURG: Was this about 1915?

LUTES: Sixteen. So we were on orders to embark, all of us, and my company took all competitions in the brigade.

BURG: Were you at that time a lieutenant in the national guard?

LUTES: No, a captain.

BURG: You were a captain in the Illinois National Guard.
LUTES: I was a lieutenant before, but they made me a captain to take over. I accepted, two lieutenants and I, and I built the company up and we made a fine record on the Border, so much so that it attracted the attention of the regular officers of the Thirteenth Regular Army Division to which we were attached on the Border. We were so disciplined, I thought, in my outfit that we were selected to be the military police for a very long march, forced march, which made a record, too. So when I applied for the regular army these regular officers were happy to--I think four or five of them--to get me recommendations for the commission of 2nd lieutenant in the regular army. And that year Congress, or the year before, Congress had passed a law creating two hundred vacancies a year in the regular army to be filled from civil life or military schools, because the flames of war were very close. I went into the regular army in the infantry as a 2nd lieutenant. Of course, I had applied for the heavy artillery, coast artillery, which I wanted, but somebody balled it up in Washington and all the examinations came for mobile army and none for coast
artillery, although coast artillery had examinations in other places. A good many went to coast artillery in those days from civil life, particularly graduates from Yale and Princeton and Harvard, and some graduates from Annapolis transferred from the navy to coast artillery.

BURG: What made it such a desirable branch of service, General?

LUTES: Coast artillery? Just because it was more interesting to some people, I think, and more challenging than infantry life in peacetime.

BURG: It required a little more scientific and mathematical knowledge, and maybe a little more technology involved?

LUTES: That's right. I took a couple of studies from Armour Institute to prepare for it. Anyway, I took the examination and was mustered out of the national guard from my company, when it was called back. I was commissioned in the infantry and ordered to Port Leavenworth, to take a course (? with) 2nd lieutenants a class of two hundred.
BURG: I see. I think I've heard about courses like that.

LUTES: They called them provisional 2nd lieutenants.

BURG: Yes, right.

LUTES: If you didn't make good in two years, you were out. In other words, you had no strings on the government; you couldn't get a pension or any help from the government. If you left, why, you left. And if you stayed, you were going to be judged at the end of the two years and, maybe, dropped or they'd make the commission permanent. So, I finished that course and was ordered to the Fort Leavenworth class and went through that. It was all duck soup, sort of a basic training.

BURG: I see. Sort of an officers' familiarization course. How long did they run that?

LUTES: They drilled us in the use of rifles and just like we were starting out as basics.

BURG: A six-weeks course or eight-weeks?
LUTES: Three months. Also, we took equitation, incidentally, under a hard-boiled cavalry officer, Ben Leor; he really made us ride horses.

BURG: You encountered him that early in your career?

LUTES: Oh, yes. He was a captain teaching horsemanship. When I finished that course, I went on from there to the 21st Infantry on the Mexican border, which then was ensconced in the San Diego Exposition grounds. I wasn't there but about three months when they ordered me out to take command of a company in the mountains, about fifty or sixty miles away, opposite a Mexican town by the name of Tecate. That was interesting, but deadly. We had cossack posts out all night along that portion of the border, and problems.

BURG: Two or three men at each point?

LUTES: Two or three men at each point, and we had to go out and inspect them at night.

BURG: And they were not mounted, General? These were infantry.
LUTES: No, they were not mounted, these were infantry. Later then we had orders to move on into the valley beyond, into Mexicala, California, which was about 30 feet below sea level and very hot, the temperature was around 130 at midnight, some nights.

BURG: An assignment to an oven!

LUTES: Yes. We trained there for a long time and I put in for a transfer to the coast artillery. By the rules then, you had to find an opposite number, somebody else to transfer with you.

BURG: They would have to exchange? They would have to want infantry?

LUTES: They would have to exchange. I would have to want coast artillery; he would have to leave the coast artillery and go to the infantry, that was the idea. Or cavalry, or whatever. Any transfer between the branches had to be mutual. You had to find somebody to do it. And you had to take a drop in files of promotion, if necessary. In other words, you took his place on the promotion list.
BURG: So, you might have been a captain of infantry, and he might be a 1st lieutenant of coast artillery and, in effect, you would have to pick up his rank.

LUTES: Well, it happened that I found one all right, as a 1st lieutenant, I was a 1st lieutenant in the infantry by that time, and was transferred, but the transfer didn't occur until March of 1919.

BURG: You found him while you were on the border?

LUTES: No, no, he advertised in the Army-Navy Journal. There were quite a few advertisements in those days for transfers between branches, people who wanted to leave one branch and go to another.

BURG: Well, on the timing of this, when was it that you saw his advertisement, 1916 or '17?

LUTES: It was 1918, I think.

BURG: So it was during the war?

LUTES: Yeah, 1918; the latter part.
BURG: We had gone into the war in 1917, in April, and your duty post was still along the Mexican border.

LUTES: No, it wasn't across the border. My last one was at Columbus, New Mexico, 24th Negro Infantry.

BURG: I see. So, although you found him in 1918, it wasn't until 1919 that you could actually effect the transfer.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Did you ever meet him personally, General?

LUTES: No.

BURG: So, you never knew who he was and he never, later on, became noteworthy? So far as you knew.

LUTES: Not to my knowledge.

BURG: Now when you had made this transfer, when it became effective, did you then travel to his duty station while he traveled to yours?

LUTES: No, I was ordered to New Orleans to take command of
a--oh, I took about five jobs there, including meeting my old sergeant and gun commander from Puget Sound, after all the years. He was no longer with the guns; he was now a sergeant-major. They put me in command of a Panama replacement depot. The troops were coming back from Panama, who had been in Panama through the war, and new troops were being sent down to Panama. So, I served there two years and was ordered to Panama myself.

BURG: Two years in New Orleans and then down to Panama.

LUTES: Three years in Panama; by that time, I was a captain.

BURG: So you would have gone down to Panama about 1922, perhaps?

LUTES: 1921, I had been in the army three years.

BURG: Was your duty station in Panama anywhere near where General Fox Connor and Eisenhower were located?

LUTES: No, I think Eisenhower and Fox Conner were on the other side. I was on the Atlantic side with the coast
defenses at Cristobal. They have done away with the coast artillery now, you know. There is none, because the air force settled that. An airplane carrier can stay off the coast far enough, I mean, that they can bomb you from the carrier without you being able to reach them with a gun.

BURG: I suppose about the best range that one could have expected from the coast artillery piece would be what, fifteen, sixteen miles?

LUTES: Well I conducted a practice in Hawaii, later, before the coast artillery was done away with completely, and I had the testing of a system to fire beyond the horizon, with nothing but air observation. I developed the system and we did conduct practice at forty-two thousand yards. I think we could have been effective to keep off naval ships. They don't like to get mixed up with coast artillery. We have steady earth to hold our guns on and they don't.

BURG: Right. And your ammunition supply can be dug in much deeper.
LUTES: Well, now the air force has done away with all of it, you see. The coast artillery units were converted into anti-aircraft artillery and I commanded a battery of anti-aircraft artillery at the same time I commanded 16" guns in Hawaii. We were trained in 155 mm guns also, but we had to do both.

BURG: Now was that as early as Panama, General, or was that later on?

LUTES: Oh, 1930, ten years later.

BURG: Yes, I see. Now your duty in Panama--

LUTES: Fox Connor and Eisenhower were over, I think, it might have been in Gatun or over at Balboa.

BURG: And I don't remember the precise spot. I do remember Mrs. Eisenhower remarking that they were on the other side of the canal [Ed. note: at Camp Gaillard] from much of the recreation facilities and that they were fairly isolated.

LUTES: Well, then, if that's the case, they were at the field artillery station and Ike probably was an aide. Was he an aide at that time?
BURG: He was the executive officer in this unit.

LUTES: Well, he was an infantryman, Ike was, you know. And the field artillery was stationed at Gatun Locks, and I'm trying to think of the name of that fort. It was mostly mule artillery, jungles, hills, mountains.

BURG: Well, I think I'll be able to check that out.

LUTES: But there's also an infantry post there; it's a combined post.

BURG: General, you married at that time?

LUTES: In Panama? Yes, I was.

BURG: When had you married?

LUTES: I married in Illinois before, let's see, 1913 I believe.

BURG: Oh, and your wife was an Illinois girl from your town, Cairo?
LUTES: Yes, that's right.

BURG: Did you have any family by that time?

LUTES: Oh, yes, I had a son, he's a graduate of West Point, retired now from the army.

BURG: He was in Panama with you?

LUTES: As a baby, yes.

BURG: Right, so was your wife. Let me ask you this, because it would be nice to have a kind of comparison. What was social life like for you and your wife in Panama? What kinds of things did you do for recreation and social life?

LUTES: Mostly, the officers, a lot of them, took swimming lessons, swimming in the harbor, which was blocked off for us by a shark net that prevented any sharks from getting in. Swimming, and lots of tennis, and lots of bridge. And those were the principal things. And once in a while, we'd go out on a boat and go across to a hotel in Colon and have a weekly dance. People from other army posts would come in for that.
BURG: Kind of a formal dance, General, that is, white uniform, dress uniform?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: My only standard of comparison is the sort of thing that one would see in a Hollywood movie.

LUTES: Well, you had to be in white at night.

BURG: And your contacts, I would presume, were basically with other army officers. Your social life was virtually entirely with army officers; you very seldom saw Panamanians.

LUTES: Down there, that’s true.

BURG: You lived in compounds, U.S. Army enclaves?

LUTES: Regular army post for the infantry and the coast artillery.

BURG: Right.

[Interruption]
BURG: Were the quarters for you and your family permanent quarters? That is, a solidly constructed single dwelling, or did you have paired quarters?

LUTES: Paired, they were paired.

BURG: What was the condition of those quarters?

LUTES: Well, then they were brand new, practically; see, I was down there years ago. I made a nostalgic visit there about five years ago and drove over that old post; the jungles have about taken it over. But the buildings are still there, they are used for jungle training of troops that are sent in there from all around.

BURG: Were the quarters built of brick?

LUTES: No, they were all frame, and it's a good thing they were, because it would have been very expensive to put brick quarters down there in Panama.

BURG: Frame, and how about the roof construction? Did they have iron roofs on them.
LUTES: Slate shingles, as I recall it. And the pillars under the houses were creosoted because of termites; the termites were terrible down there.

BURG: So the houses were up on stilts and creosoted. Do you recollect any problem with insect life inside the quarters?

LUTES: Oh, yes, we had some, a lot of it. Of course, you fight them all the time, ants, particularly.

BURG: And would you need, for example, mosquito netting at night?

LUTES: Oh, yes, preferably. It was safer to have it.

BURG: How old was your son during that period of time that you were there? Was he old enough to be in school, General?

LUTES: Yes, he went to school; he was about six when we arrived and nine when we left.

BURG: I see. Were there any illnesses in the family?

LUTES: My son had a case of malaria.
BURG: Did that reoccur afterwards? Did he have any more trouble with it?

LUTES: No.

BURG: Both you and your wife, however, had no malaria?

LUTES: No.

BURG: Since I don't know that station, I don't know what your medical facilities were, but do you--

LUTES: We had a doctor and a dentist.

BURG: And a hospital?

LUTES: A small dispensary and a hospital, a few hospital beds, yes.

BURG: In your unit, would it be common for one of the officers' wives, who was about to deliver a baby, to have it there, or would it be more common to go back to the United States to have it?
LUTES: Well, you got me there, I don't remember anyone having a child on the post when I was there.

BURG: Were the facilities in Colón better?

LUTES: There were facilities in Colón. There was a good government hospital there, and it still is.

BURG: So that might have been where they would have gone.

LUTES: That's where they would have to go.

BURG: What was your next duty assignment after Panama?

LUTES: I went to Fort Monroe, Virginia.

BURG: To command a unit there?

LUTES: Yes, I commanded a mine command then, a submarine mine command, which the batteries protected.

BURG: These were permanently installed mines?

LUTES: No, they were mines that had to be planted, and we used a mine planter to plant them. By that, I mean a regular
boat, and it was a technical job. You had to have what we
call a junction box from the cables to the switchboard, where
you fire a mine by closing a switch, and that switchboard
would be in a casemate.

BURG: Were these mines also fitted out with the finger type
exploders, contact exploders, so that a ship coming in there
might strike one and that would detonate the mine, or did
they all have to be fired from shore?

LUTES: These all had to be fired from shore.

BURG: And is that why it was an army coast artillery instal-
lation rather than a naval post?

LUTES: I always wondered why we had them at all, because
I thought it should be a navy job, and the navy took it
over after World War II.

BURG: Was that vessel that planted the mines, was she navy
or was she army?

LUTES: No, she was army.
BURG: An army vessel did this.

LUTES: Yes. You're going back in history, you see.

BURG: That's an intriguing thing, I hadn't realized that we had ever done things that way.

LUTES: Your young people in the army, nowadays, don't know a thing about all I've been talking about.

BURG: Well, it's going to be interesting to know that there was that kind of division of authority on something that most of us would have felt was purely a naval matter. That's almost as antique as Jefferson's gunboats for coastal defense.

LUTES: When General Eisenhower came back from World War II to take General Marshall's place, he talked to me about army transportation. We had a tremendous amount of transportation in the army, and if we had had the mine planter, he would have hit the roof, I'm sure. But we had already ditched the mine planter and the navy had taken that over.

BURG: Do you remember when it was you went to Monroe, would it have been around '26?
LUTES: 1924, on return from Panama, I arrived at Fort Monroe.

BURG: And, I would expect since Fortress Monroe was a fairly old installation, that there must have been a considerable change in the quality of quarters that you and your wife shared.

LUTES: Yes, we had brick quarters at Fort Monroe.

BURG: Right, rather attractive, I would think.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Totally different kind of social life.

LUTES: That's right. The post now, you know, is headquarters, has been headquarters, for the Continental Army Headquarters, but they have done away with that. I don't know what they're going to put at Fort Monroe at the present time.

BURG: I see. You were then a captain?

LUTES: A captain, yes.
BURG: Was your pay sufficient to allow you and your wife to get in here, into Washington, on occasion, for affairs that might have been held here? Or was your social life pretty much confined to Monroe?

LUTES: Confined right there. We all had friends in the local town there of Hampton, but we had quite a social life there. We had a brigadier general in command, General Callan. He was an old coast artilleryman and taught mathematics at West Point and, incidentally, General MacArthur was one of his pupils, had been.

BURG: Yes, and he was an old regular soldier then.

LUTES: Old regular, yes. He had administered a rather formal social life and we had to be either in a tuxedo or white uniform after four o'clock. And dinners were mostly formal; you knew who you were going to sit by, because it was always by order of rank.

BURG: I see, and as commanding general he had a great deal to say then about all such matters?
LUTES: Oh, yes, sure. I later became adjutant of the post and I had to write the orders for all these things.

BURG: So if there was going to be a formal kind of dinner, the 2nd lieutenants on the post had no doubt about where they were going to be seated with their ladies, they would be down at that end of the table.

LUTES: That's right. That was the way it was in those days.

BURG: Yes. It's interesting to reflect back on that kind of tradition, which I presume had built up over quite some period of time.

LUTES: Oh, yes, sure.

BURG: Let me jump ahead just a moment at this point to ask you, did World War II totally change that?

LUTES: I think so.

BURG: Much of that presumably went with World War II. Was there, going back then to Fortress Monroe, was there at that period of time, General, pretty strong regimental
tradition? Were you closely tied to a coast artillery regiment; that is, were your ties to regiments strong?

LUTES: Yes, they were quite strong and the officers club was in the old casemate, and in there they had the trophies, historical trophies. Incidentally, it seems ironical, but El Paso, Texas, was a cavalry post in those days, but the anti-aircraft artillery now is headquartered in El Paso, on account of the vast missile range there, you see.

BURG: I see.

LUTES: And so all the coast artillery trophies were sent down into this desert!

BURG: El Paso, the harbor defenses of the Rio Grande! The experience at Fort Monroe it seems like that, though I don't know all of your duties, General, but it would seem as though that particular period of time on that kind of assignment had really not advanced your career a great deal. I can't see a great future in a submarine mine defense.
LUTES: No, I didn't either. But I was ordered by the colonel of the post—I was adjutant of the post, as I told you, which gave me considerable insight to all the staff work on the post—to the advanced class of the coast artillery school, which was in preparation for Fort Leavenworth.

BURG: That was at the time when there was a branch school that you had to attend before you could be considered for Leavenworth.

LUTES: Oh, yes. So I went to the advanced course in the coast artillery school. The class averaged about 45 years of age.

BURG: Where was that held, sir?

LUTES: Right at Fort Monroe. The school building is still there, it's the building that, when I was last down there, housed some of the headquarters of the Continental Command.

BURG: How long was the course, General?

LUTES: One year; that was all.
BURG: Did it require a change of living quarters for you?

LUTES: Yes, it did. I had to lose my fine brick house and went to what we call the BOQ [Bachelor Officers' Quarters], in a small apartment along with other officers who were going to attend the same class.

BURG: Many of these people would have been brought in from outside, from other portions of the country.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Was the intention to bring all of you who were going through the course together into a group?

LUTES: It was the intention and, of course, we were all selected people. Everyone knew, when he got that course, that he was going to be sent to Fort Leavenworth to the Command and General Staff school.

BURG: It was the normal progression of events.

LUTES: Yes. And when you graduated at the General Staff School you hoped that you would be selected to go to the
War College some day. That was the ultimate, and you knew then that you had it made for the rest of your service.

BURG: Right. Now at the coast artillery school, I presume all of you were captains, maybe some majors?

LUTES: There were some majors, yes.

BURG: Was the training focused at battery level, the administration of that level of coast artillery work, or did it go--

LUTES: No, we left coast artillery work practically entirely. We went into problems pertaining to the General Staff School.

BURG: At the coast artillery school?

LUTES: Yes, we did.

BURG: I'm a little surprised!

LUTES: I was surprised too. Not only that, but we had our own equitation class for the cavalymen there; you see, we were still riding horses.

BURG: So that you would look fit and proper when you were
doing parades and things of this sort.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Now, was that staff work in any way associated with artillery and the kinds of problems that one might have with large artillery formations? For example, I could envision the problems of taking a battalion or an artillery brigade into action on the Western Front, and all of the supply problems of bringing up men and rations and trying to move guns forward in an advance; was it that kind of thing, or was it more general staff work?

LUTES: Well, it was more general staff work but, I don't know whether you have the right idea or not about the kind of staff.

BURG: Yeah, and I was so convinced that the artillery school at Fort Monroe would be like the infantry school at--

LUTES: Well, up in Fort Monroe the schools were divided into technical sections. There was an electrical course for non-commissioned officers, for example. And, well, that's
the principal, non-commissioned officers' course that they had, the electrical school. But we were trained as infantry, too, and the coast artillery later became required to fire and be trained with 155 [mm.] guns, and they did go overseas with 155's. And the coast artillery corps always furnished its percentage of overseas officers, even back in World War I. And they fitted right in to the 155 guns which were the medium artillery, not light artillery but medium, motorized artillery, mostly.

BURG: Yes. I had a picture of that coast artillery school being very closely related to firing problems from fixed positions on coastlines.

LUTES: That's for the battery commanders course, that's true.

BURG: But this school that you attended was a--

LUTES: That was a preparation for the general staff college.

BURG: And do you know, General, it seems to me that when I've talked to infantry officers, the kind of school they went to, and even those who were in field artillery, the
school they went to before Command and General Staff was sort of a heightened branch school. That is, a heightened sort of study, just a step above the battery commander or the company commander level, with some work on maneuvers, and this sort of thing. What you are describing is different, it seems to me. It sounds like maybe you had a little better preparation for Leavenworth than some of these other officers had.

LUTES: No, I don't think we did.

BURG: Don't you?

LUTES: I doubt that. As a matter of fact, I think probably not as well, because we had officers from the infantry or the artillery, field artillery, to teach our school, and conduct some of our classes.

BURG: How did you study? How was that course put to you at Fort Monroe? Was it in the form of problems, which a group of you would work on, or did each of you proceed as an individual?
LUTES: We proceeded as an individual at Monroe. At the War College, you worked on the other basis, with the problems.

BURG: Sort of as a syndicate. Well then, you're going as an individual student; you're sort of on your own in the various courses of the school for one year. Did they grade you at Fort Monroe? Did they rank all of you in the course, as was done at Leavenworth? Or do you remember how they ranked you?

LUTES: I don't know. I imagine they did but, if so, it wasn't published. I don't know. The only thing that I remember about the class at Monroe was that it was divided into those who were above the age of forty-five and those below, and I was not in the upper group. The older ones could only go one year at the General Staff School, and most of them never got anywhere in the army. The lower ones were, the lower half of the class, the younger ones, we had to take two years at Leavenworth. The first year was the infantry division, and the second year was the corps and army, you see. But they did away with that and went back to the one-year course at Leavenworth a few years later.
BURG: Now after the course at Fort Monroe, did you then draw another duty assignment, or did you then go to Leavenworth?

LUTES: Well, I was ordered to Hawaii.

BURG: After Fort Monroe?

LUTES: Yes, I graduated from Monroe in 1928. I went to Hawaii. I came back from Hawaii in '34 and I graduated from the War College in '35. Now, how did I do this? I guess I went from the General Staff School to Fort Totten, New York, assigned as a captain to an anti-aircraft regiment there, 62nd anti-aircraft regiment.

BURG: That would have been after Leavenworth?

LUTES: Leavenworth, yes. And I was only there a year when I was ordered out to Hawaii.

BURG: So you had done the two-year course at Leavenworth prior to Fort Totten.
LUTES: And then went to Hawaii and had three years in Hawaii, and was selected for the War College and came back in 1934. And then went to the War College, and after I graduated from the War College in 1935, I was held in Washington on staff for four years.

BURG: All right. Let's go back, keeping that in mind, let's go to Leavenworth, where you did the two-year course and there, again, you moved your family with you while you were there?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: And the first year you said you were doing mainly the infantry side of the course. You were part of a, I guess they called them a syndicate; that is, there were a group of you who--

LUTES: You mean at the War College?
BURG: No, I'm thinking now of Leavenworth.

LUTES: Well, we were just a class, we had to solve our problems ourselves.

BURG: Did you ever work with any other man or group of men?

LUTES: Oh, there was no objection to it. You could work with the next door neighbor, if you wanted to.

BURG: Right. Did you follow that technique, or did you work pretty much on your own?

LUTES: Mostly on my own.

BURG: Uh-huh. In your quarters, did you set up any kind of special study area for yourself?

LUTES: Yes, I had to, most everybody did; put a map on the wall with thumbtacks.

BURG: Let me ask you, how you remember that first year, for example. Was that a pretty tough experience, a great deal of hard work for you?
LUTES: Well, yes, it was, but not particularly tough though. It was very interesting, and because it was interesting, why, it was like any other game, if you're playing war games or something, or bridge, or anything of that sort. I didn't find it tiresome. I certainly didn't get bored with it.

BURG: At the end of the year, did they give you some kind of a report on how well you had done in the first year?

LUTES: No, but we were given a certificate of graduation.

BURG: None, whatsoever. How about your own feelings about it, did you feel that in that year you had done a creditable job and had learned a great deal?

LUTES: Well, I thought I had done a satisfactory job, yes.

BURG: Right. In the second year's work, you said that there you were handling problems more associated with army and corps.

LUTES: There's where you get what you were talking about awhile ago. The moving of guns, and G-4 work, was an awfully good thing for me to get, because that's what I did in the big Louisiana maneuvers. I was glad I had that Leavenworth
course, because I was not terrified of the maneuvers and the
size of the job. I would have been if I hadn't had the
course.

BURG: Because those maneuvers evidently were one of the first
times--

[Interruption]

BURG: You were saying to me that, having had that kind of
course at Leavenworth, it had saved your bacon in the
Louisiana maneuvers, and in those maneuvers we were coping,
really, for the first time ever, except maybe the Civil War,
of having that mass of people assembled, and the problems
of supplying and feeding and moving numbers of men like that.

LUTES: The only thing that happened, though, was that I got
tarred with the brush.

BURG: You did, because of Louisiana? It had marked you as
someone who could capably handle problems of this sort and
magnitude.

LUTES: I suppose so; that's what they told me anyway.
BURG: Listen, let me ask you this: we're going to jump up ahead to that period of your career, that period around 1940-41. When they told you that you had done a good job on that, when they painted you with that brush, were you pleased?

LUTES: No, I wasn't. I was, well, I don't know. I didn't mind the job. I did a tremendous amount of hard work, night and day, but I wanted to return to training troops.

BURG: Setting everything up.

LUTES: Setting it up and then following it through.

BURG: Now, I would judge that you had gone from captain to major, and by the time of the Louisiana maneuvers, were you not a lieutenant-colonel?

LUTES: Yes, lieutenant-colonel.

BURG: Didn't you, yourself, actually start your planning for the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940, a year before the maneuvers were held?
LUTES: Let's see now, in January, 1940, I was ordered to the headquarters of the Third Army in Atlanta, Georgia, and the first maneuver was a corps maneuver in Georgia, Fort Benning. I didn't have much to do with that, except preliminary planning, but then, I asked to be relieved and sent to the Philippines. It's a good thing I didn't go.

BURG: Good Lord! I should think so!

LUTES: But, I would have been a Jap prisoner, if I had.

BURG: Yes, you would have.

LUTES: But [Major] General [Stanley Dunbar] Embick was the army commander and he turned that down. He said he couldn't approve my leaving. He was going to have another big maneuver of seventy to seventy-five thousand troops, mostly national guard, and he wanted me to start planning on that and get busy, and so I did. I went on over to Louisiana and began to look over the ground there. General Embick then retired and--

[Interruption]
LUTES: --then I did a tour at Fort Totten and was commanding a regiment in the absence of the colonel. And the regiment was split and half of it was sent to Panama.

BURG: I'm sorry. I interrupted things, because we were at Atlanta in 1940, and I mentioned the fact that you had been for four years on staff work in Washington, and I was wondering why you had requested the Philippines.

LUTES: Well, I was at the War College you see. After the War College, I was kept here [in Washington, D.C.]. But I hadn't been to the War College until after I had my Hawaii tour. I went from Hawaii to the War College.

BURG: Maybe we'd better pick that up. I'd forgotten that that fit in there. The War College was a one-year course and you were, at that time, a major when you went to the War College.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Now that experience, let me get you on that. I'm glad you spoke of it, because I would have felt badly if I'd
missed that. Your War College experience, as you pointed out earlier, that rather marked you, too. Once a man had done that, he had a pretty good idea of what his future career would be. What kind of instruction were you given during that War College experience?

LUTES: Well, the problems were very general. For example, the last problem that we had at the War College, I happened to be chairman, head of one committee. It was that the Philippines had been attacked and war has been declared. An expedition is to be sent consisting of such and such body of troops, without any details of the commanders or anything of that sort. Just available to you, for your problem, was this certain size body of troops. But what is the next step, and what is the solution to this problem of getting ready for this expedition?

BURG: The body of troops were on the west coast of the United States, not in Hawaii?

LUTES: No, they were to be assembled. Then the second part of the problem would be, to get all details of concentration effected, you have them already arrived in
the area; the navy is protecting you, or something of that sort, up to a point, and the decision must be made as to which island you are going to attack. And they give you some intelligence information about certain parts of the island, and you make the decision and how you're going to attack. But in the preparation stage, we had a week to get that first half, the first section of the problem; we had to work fast. In other words, we actually had to telephone around and find out how many ships were in the harbors and how we could effect a concentration; where we could get our troops; where we could get our railroad stock, or the motor situation. We had to get all that data together in a very fast way. The weather report had to be taken into consideration, too.

BURG: That problem was given to you in the year 1934-35. Am I correct in understanding that as part of your problem, you men actually got on the phones and it was as though the Philippines had been invaded in 1934-35, and what you did was to call around the continental United States, just as though it were the real thing.
LUTES: No, we didn't have to do that much. We called certain offices that could give us data "how many ships?", on how many ships were in the harbors and available.

BURG: I see. But as of that date, just as though, these events had just happened. And within one week, we must respond to the events. And so you would call the officers that could give you the data you needed. That is really an intriguing thing. I had no idea that one of your War College problems was set up in that way.

LUTES: Well, the problem was set up so that you had to do all the thinking.

BURG: Precisely. In effect in, let's say, 1935, since that was the last problem you did, you were going through all of the motions that would have to be gone through in December of 1941.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: You would have to react to a situation.
LUTES: Well, of course, we were all split up into committees; all had the same problem.

BURG: Every committee had the same. Were there also, for example, on your committee, naval officers and air corps officers?

LUTES: We had some navy officers in the class. I don't think I had any outside of the army on my committee. We had about five navy officers in that class; there was only seventy-five men in the class, it was a very selective class. Of course, the army was small then, and competition to get there was tough, too, in a small army.

BURG: I'll bet it was. Were there, on your committee, men whose names I would be familiar with, because of their later service?

LUTES: I think so, a few on my committee became general officers.

BURG: All right, we can get back to that later, if you don't mind. You had one week, then, to respond to the general problem of getting troops out of the continental United States and on their way.
LUTES: It's what they would be doing right here in Washington, the general staff would have to be doing, in case of war right now, except that they have a hell of a big staff to do the pick and shovel work.

BURG: Yes. And perhaps a series of even more sophisticated problems to be solved in case of a war under today's conditions.

LUTES: More detailed work, right.

BURG: Right. Now the second half of your solution was focused upon the arrival of this "PEF" in the islands. You were given intelligence data to help guide your decision as to which island you would then reenter, or enter, and what you would do from that point on.

LUTES: True. About all, as I recall it, that they asked for on that was the decision. I can't remember exactly how they worded the problem. The decision was the thing, the ultimate decision. I found out, much later, what the decision was; one of the faculty told me. The decision was, were you going to attempt to bring in air force entirely,
or how much air are you going to use? What naval bombardment is available for you? And then, are you going to attack by the flank, or are you going to give up, as hopeless, trying to get onto this particular island? It was as I recall, Mindanao. So, the actual decision of the faculty was, you'd make a beach attack, and some of my classmates liberally criticized that when we presented it. We had to present it to the class. It was our decision, but the faculty never published that. But that was our decision; we were going to make a beach attack. The students criticized it on the grounds that the loss of life would be terrific. And I said that we based it on the fact that it would be the average loss of life that any beach attack would have and we had statistics on that, prepared by Colonel Love, I believe, of the Medical Corps of the army, on past actions of a similar kind. And that was actually the solution to it, too.

BURG: I wonder, had Colonel Love examined other assault landings. For example, the attack on Fort Fisher during the
Civil War, or the British attacks in Gallipoli during World War One. There would be a limited number of seaborne invasions in modern times that he could hark back to to compile his statistics.

LUTES: We had a reference book on casualties.

BURG: Let me ask you, General, was the enemy, which made the attack, specified by name? Was that enemy identified?

LUTES: No.

BURG: Do you remember, was the enemy attack a sizeable one? Did they give you the number of infantry they estimated the enemy had used?

LUTES: No, you didn't have any intelligence on that.

BURG: You had none on them. To your knowledge, did the faculty ever contemplate a solution which stated: We don't think the Philippines can be held at all?

LUTES: Well, I don't know. I didn't find out about anybody coming up with that. The faculty didn't have it, no. Nobody
on the faculty thought of that. They wanted you to fight!

BURG: Yes, well, we did, we did the best we could. It must have been a fascinating thing for you, General, just those few years later, when this exact thing occurred.

LUTES: Well, it didn't occur in the same way, really. The problem we were given was this one island, which was not Luzon, we were bypassing Luzon to move towards the enemy. We don't know, really, what kind of an enemy you had, what size it is or anything, except that we need to get that island, because it would afford the enemy a base for operations against Luzon if we didn't.

BURG: And I assume that the problem was worked in the expectation that the American battle fleet in the Pacific was still in existence and that we would have some control of the seas west from Pearl Harbor.

LUTES: Yes, but it didn't happen that way.

BURG: Which didn't happen! General, do you remember how much attention you and your colleagues gave to air power at that
time? Did it play a part, a large part or a significant part, in your deliberations?

LUTES: Not nearly the significance that it does now. It played some but, mostly, the air force officers who would be on committees would bring that up, but there wasn't too much of it. We had a lecture there by an officer who lectured on the--an Italian who had written a book on bombing, about winning a war by bombing civilian cities.

BURG: Was that Doubet?

LUTES: Yes, that's what I'm thinking of.

BURG: Oh, he was there?

LUTES: No, he wasn't there, but we were lectured on his theories by an outside lecturer and I remember, I thought it was repulsive, because my instincts are such that I wouldn't want to bomb civilians, indiscriminately, but that was this Italian's theory, that you could bring war to a sudden close by just bombing the big cities. Of course later in World War II it was done.
BURG: Terror bombing. No real attempt to hit industrial targets, railheads, or anything of this sort.

LUTES: I didn't believe in that because I had studied international law and all this sort of thing, and I thought that you had to have a little chivalry in war.

BURG: By that time—well, maybe not. I was thinking perhaps the Spanish-Civil War was pretty well under way and was it Guernica that was bombed during that war, a small Spanish town?

LUTES: Yes, that's where anti-aircraft came into being, too. By that time, I had graduated from the War College and I was held here. I urged the Chief of Coast Artillery to put more money into anti-aircraft, but he wouldn't do it. So I took it upon myself to write a letter to seven colonels around the United States. These colonels commanded anti-aircraft regiments of the National Guard and I told them that I had computed at the rate we were getting armament for anti-aircraft—we were only getting enough to equip one battery in every regiment
and training battery—and at that rate that we had been getting it, it would be seventy-five years before we had the National Guard anti-aircraft equipped. So they all wrote their congressmen, and one day the Chief of Coast Artillery called me up and said, "I want you to come to see me." He said, "What's this about this anti-aircraft business?" He said, "I've just been called up by the Chief of Staff." I've forgotten what his name was now, the Chief of Staff, knew it well at the time [General Malin Craig]. He said, "The Chief of Staff wants to be briefed on how we stand on anti-aircraft artillery," and he said, "I've got to go up there and brief him." And I said, "Well, you won't have any artillery in the National Guard for seventy-five years—it will be complete in anti-aircraft—and by that time we'll all be dead." He said, "Well, I just want you to know that if you get in trouble, I don't know you."

BURG: Did he know that you had written those letters?

LUTES: Yes, he did.
BURG: You must have been using smaller calibre guns at that time.

LUTES: Three inch is what they had.

BURG: Nothing like the later ninety millimeter guns that could reach up to great heights.

LUTES: No, no. But what I meant about the Spanish [Civil] War was that the German anti-aircraft guns were sold or given to Spain, and the Russians were backing up the other side, and the anti-aircraft guns did pretty good work on the planes flying at the low speeds that they were flying then, not now.

BURG: Were those guns in Vietnam the smaller calibre, rapid-firing guns for low altitude?

LUTES: No, they're high altitude. They reached right up after the bombers. The bombers really were getting jittery about it.
BURG: Their fire control systems, their director systems, must have been very, very effective, too, to operate at those kinds of altitudes.

LUTES: Well, anyhow that's a side trip we've made in our talk here.

BURG: You were here for four years after the War College on staff work. Who was your superior for those four years?

LUTES: They had thirty-five regular army officers in the National Guard Bureau and since I had been a captain in the Guard, they put me in there with the regulars, a group of regulars. The chief, under law, had to be a National Guard general; he was a man by the name of [Major General Albert Hazen] Blanding from Florida. But most of the staff were regulars.

BURG: So it was more or less your job, during that period of time, in the '30s, to do what you could to make the Guard combat ready?
LUTES: I had the equipment, and I wanted to get more field artillery into the Guard. I wanted to get 155 guns and I was blocked by the adjutant general of Maryland. You know, all the states that had horse cavalry just fought like hell to hold the cavalry; the horse cavalry was a dead branch because of machine guns.

BURG: But they still wanted to retain that?

LUTES: They did, but we finally broke that down, but it took time. But, I was fighting for those things, when I was on the staff here, changes.

BURG: So when you were talking about National Guard anti-aircraft artillery, for example, it's quite conceivable that the battery that I was in after World War II would not have had anti-aircraft artillery pieces; if they had followed the old routine, there wouldn't have been artillery guns for us for years.

LUTES: No. What they did was, almost the minute World War II broke out they ordered up these anti-aircraft batteries
from the National Guard, because at the moment they were
better equipped than the Regular Army.

BURG: They were? How did that happen, General? Because
you people were fighting for this?

LUTES: Yes, that's right. That effort that I made put the
first twenty-three million dollars through legislation for
anti-aircraft. They wouldn't have had any at all. To this
day--the Air Force fights it, of course--but the Air Force
admits its losses, the loss of planes in Vietnam.

BURG: And one tends to think that they lost them to ground-
to-air missiles, but from what you tell me, a good share of
their losses are to ground-to-air guns.

LUTES: That's right. But helicopters and low-flying planes,
they were something else again.

BURG: Right. Then your next assignment, after you did your
four years of staff duty with the Guard here in Washington,
that's when you went down to Georgia in 1940.
LUTES: When I went from here, that's right, but I had gotten as far as Fort Totten. I was up there commanding an outfit at Fort Totten on Long Island.

BURG: Oh, Totten first, then down to Georgia. And it was while you were there in Georgia that you made the attempt to go to the Philippines.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Was that strictly your idea? Did you think that you would like to spend some time out there, or what did you have in mind?

LUTES: Well, I wanted to get back to my regular business. I wanted to get back either to the sea-coast artillery or to anti-aircraft. And I knew the Philippines was one place I hadn't been. I'd had two foreign tours, three years in Panama, three in Hawaii, and the other big coast artillery concentration was in the Philippines.

BURG: So this was a chance for three more years of foreign duty in a place you hadn't seen yet.
LUTES: That's right, and where I would have people to train troops. But I'm very happy that it turned out the way it did, because I got a quick promotion. I jumped from a lieutenant-colonel to brigadier, you know, after the maneuvers.

BURG: I see. I hadn't known that you had jumped a grade. Now you were telling me earlier you first met Eisenhower in the Louisiana Maneuvers.

LUTES: Yes, that's right.

BURG: That was your first contact with him.

LUTES: Now, there's one little stretch in there to show you how that happened. General Embick, the army commander who held me in Atlanta, retired, and the army commander appointed was [Major] General [Herbert J.] Brees of San Antonio; everybody knew him in the old days. Brees flew over to Atlanta and told General Embick that he wanted me and he wanted George Barker and he took us over in his plane. He said he was taking us over to start a new staff in San Antonio of the Third Army. So George and I went with General Brees
over to San Antonio and we got quarters at Fort Sam Houston for our families. Then, the next step, I had to build up the staff and they told me we were going to have a maneuver. General Brees said, "We're going to have a large maneuver; it will involve about two hundred and seventy-five thousand men on the two sides—the Second Army and the Third Army—" and he said, "You will have to get started on it," and so we did. I wrote the men I knew in Leavenworth to give me the names of some of the good students who were coming out of the general staff college and I wanted them sent down for my staff as G-4s.

BURG: In effect, you were using what the British call the "old boy network."

LUTES: In a way, I didn't know any of them that they sent me, but I knew the course that they had had.

BURG: And you knew the instructors that they had had.

LUTES: Yes, I knew one of the instructors, that's right.

BURG: Do you remember who it was that you contacted, General?
LUTES: Gee, I don't know. Maybe I can find it some place in my things.

BURG: You might run into it in your records. So he gave you the names of the recent ones who had come out--

LUTES: That did pretty well. And I sent for them, and the senior one that I got was a fellow by the name of Loyall Haynes, field artilleryman, very good, and he did a good job. He was with me throughout the big maneuver.

BURG: And he was senior of this group that you got?

LUTES: Yes, I used him as the senior one over the office work. Then when we went into the field, I took the advanced section, because I wanted to be ahead where I could see what was actually going on. I'd give him my instructions, Haynes, as to what kind of orders I wanted and what division of the workload was to be given to these men who had offices. Then I did an awful lot of field work. For example, I took all the people involved in G-4 work with me on the plane and go
over the area first, so I could see it. Then I'd get them into buses below and go all over the ground. I took the senior doctor, the senior signalman, the senior quartermaster, all of them; I took them all over the place--

[Interruption]

LUTES:--at the same time we would be having meetings, map problems and maps worked out. But Ike didn't come down from up in Washington [State] until nearly June. He only had been there about, well, maybe sixty days. You may have a better record of that than I have.

BURG: Yes, I think you're probably right. He came down from Fort Lewis.

LUTES: I briefed him on the progress of the G-4 work up to that point, and after that, he didn't want to be bothered with it. He said for me to go ahead. I said, "Well, I need money." I said, "The signal problem here is going to be terrific. We're going to have a big telephone bill for the umpires; they are going to scattered from hell to
breakfast." I said, "The front of this maneuver is going
to be a hundred miles and a hundred miles is something that
we have never faced before." And we were going to have
something like eleven divisions in the Third Army. As I
recall it, that's what it was. And so we had as many men
at that time, incidentally, in Louisiana when the maneuvers
started, as Ike had in North Africa. So it was great
training for the G-4 people.

BURG: You're saying that the army telephonic linkups or
radio linkups weren't enough for the job.

LUTES: It wasn't complete, yes.

BURG: You would have to use civilian telephones.

LUTES: Yes. We had to have umpires all over the place, so
we had quite a bit of expenditures to make, and then we also
had the problem of destroying some of the farmers' bridges,
and things of that kind, that give way during the maneuver.
So we established a legal advisor, legal staffs, in each
parish or each county to handle that, and I listed all of
them. I had a hell of a job, but I had a pretty good preview in the seventy-five thousand [-man] maneuver--

BURG: That earlier one.

LUTES: That earlier one. I didn't keep many records of that.

BURG: It was your thought, for example, a tank crew might use a farmer's bridge and it would break down under the weight of the tank, and then you'd have legal problems.

LUTES: All those things had to be foreseen.

BURG: Let me ask you this, General, did your opposite number in Second Army also do the things that you did?

LUTES: I got orders from the corps area commander, administrative orders, that I would have to take care of some of that before he got down there, because he wouldn't get down there in time to do the preparations that we had to go through.
BURG: I see. So, actually, you did some of the briefing of the man who was going to be playing opposite you in the line, so to speak. It seems to me that these ideas you had, of flying your people over the terrain and then putting them on the terrain itself, were farseeing kinds of ideas.

LUTES: Well, those things come to you after you've been working at it for two years.

BURG: That's easy to say, but what a tremendous way to learn what the road networks were going to be like, to learn what the terrain was like.

LUTES: That's right, and that's what we had to do. I had to make a base some place, too, a supply base that had to be played this time, according to General MacNair, who was the chief umpire, and he told me he was going to trip me up. He said, "You better look out for me, I'm going to trip you up on this maneuver." And he said, "You'll never be able to meet what I'm going to give you." Well, he probably was kidding me, because I did meet it.
BURG: General, if he was kidding or not, would it have been possible for him to look at the maps and estimate where you were going to put the base and for him to see to it that the maneuver took the base?

LUTES: Well, he had to know that. But the base that I meant was way back in New Orleans. I had to run a daily train every night; it had to come up at night time—what they call a daily train in the general staff school—and it can be a train, actual train, or it can be a motor convoy. Well, I had an extra train, plus the convoys, and we ran something like twenty-three dumps of supplies at night behind the lines. And they all had to be unloaded under darkness. Troops couldn't get their rations, except under darkness; they had to come there at dawn and get these supplies.

BURG: Simulated combat conditions.

LUTES: Yes. So all those preparations we had to make, and at the same time, we had to look out for the public relations, in case anybody got badly hurt, and so on. Under those circumstances, we had to inspect all our water supplies and
see to the ways of getting baths for the men, showers, and I was planning those things in advance. Some of this work belonged to other people, but I had to do it because other people weren't there to do it.

BURG: Medical facilities were required for men who were overcome by heat stroke or received snake bites.

LUTES: Oh, yes, we had all of that and actually used them, too; we had some snake bites.

BURG: Now, there was no firing of any weapons. That is, firing of blank rounds, or anything of this sort, during the maneuver? That was all simulated.

LUTES: Not to my knowledge.

BURG: How about that enormous tonnage of small arms ammunition and artillery ammunition; if there actually had been any firing, ammunition would have had to be brought up. Was ammunition brought up?

LUTES: We had ammunition in the field in dumps.
BURG: Right. So a truck driver bringing up small arms ammunition to an infantry outfit was driving a truck that had small arms ammunition in it. He would know what that weight felt like and any special conditions he had to follow to protect that ammunition.

LUTES: Yes, that's right.
This interview is being taped with General LeRoy Lutes on 12 November, 1974 at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC. Present for the interview are General Lutes and Dr. Burg.

DR. BURG: General Lutes and I have been talking, prior to this interview, and we had pretty well finished the Louisiana Maneuvers on our last interviewing session. General Lutes has pointed out that General Eisenhower was promoted to brigadier general right after the maneuvers, and General Lutes followed him with that promotion, going from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general about sixty days after General Eisenhower's promotion had come through. He also points out the interesting fact that he and General Eisenhower are the same age, with General Lutes being, he thought, ten days older than General Eisenhower, making General Lutes now eighty-four years old. When the maneuvers were over, what was the next move that you made, General?

GEN. LUTES: Well, Ike was sent to Washington, you know, to the War Plans section. I was given command of the 37th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, which was being assembled in California at Camp Hahn. And we were to defend the airplane factories in southern California.
BURG: Because the Douglas plant was down there.

LUTES: Some others, too.

BURG: And some other smaller ones there, too, yes.

LUTES: So I reported there under direct orders from General Marshall who was concerned about those factories, especially after the Philippines were attacked. And shortly after that—after the attack, rather—I was ordered to Washington on temporary duty and I talked to Ike to find out just what duty I was to perform, and he said he didn't know. It was very hushed up, but I was to come in to report to the chief of staff. So I did report, in General Marshall's office, to a General Moore, Major General [Richard Curtis] Moore, who was one of the deputies, and he told me that I was to go down the hall and report to [Lieutenant] General [Brehon Burke] Somervell. At that time he was the G-4 of the War Department staff. So I did report to General Somervell and he gave me quite an order. He wanted me to sit down and give him my idea on how the army ought to be reorganized, which amused me, and at the same time, I wasn't supposed to be the man to
do that. But he walked up and down the floor and told me his ideas of the army, and he would divide it vertically into three sections: the engineer corps for construction, and so forth; and combat people for combat; and supply people for supply; those three big sections with commanders at the head. But that's just a side issue, of course; that didn't happen.

BURG: Did he have particular ideas for choosing that tripartite division of the army? Did he think that would be the most efficient way?

LUTES: Yes, he did. He didn't like the broad general staff style. And he let it be known in no uncertain terms.

BURG: But he stayed on, General Lutes?

LUTES: Oh, yes. Yes, he didn't change anything to speak of.

BURG: But his ideas were not acceptable to General Marshall?

LUTES: I don't think he ever got those ideas to General Marshall. He was just talking to me about it, and I think he was letting off steam on something he knew perfectly well could not be done at that time.
BURG: Now did you ever have any idea what forces had moved you into General Somervell's office? Just a short time before, you had been a newly promoted brigadier general with an anti-aircraft outfit, and the next thing you know, there you are in Washington in Somervell's office.

LUTES: There's no question in my mind why they did it. I had made quite a big reputation in the maneuvers, you see. The Louisiana Maneuvers were big maneuvers and they hadn't seen anything like that since the Civil War.

BURG: And your contribution had been largely in the field of logistics and supply.

LUTES: Logistics. And, therefore, Ike told me, he said, "Most likely they'll snatch you off of your command, sooner or later."

BURG: Had he told you that while you were both still in Louisiana, or did he tell you that--

LUTES: He told me that after he got to Washington. Plus, when I got my orders to come here on temporary duty, I
contacted him to find out what was going on and why. Well, it turned out that my orders were temporary, in order to help General Somervell. And in fact, General Moore told me that. He said, "You're the only man in the army that has had a logistical problem of the magnitude we had in the Louisiana Maneuvers. And you're selected now to help General Somervell, who hasn't seen anything that big in the logistics field." So I reported to General Somervell and he told me to go off—he gave me an office—and told me to go off and work by myself and give him my ideas as to the reorganization. Well, I could tell that he was hostile to the general staff in a way. He wanted to go to the general staff officers, but he thought the general staff was cumbersome and didn't operate enough. So he asked me to do this and I got up a plan in which I would divide the United States into three big areas, with no interruption in the general staff at all, each area having a commanding general who would be held responsible for everything in the area. By that, I mean keeping the records of the personnel within the area and there would be extra, I would say extra large army areas, in which all the files would be pulled out of Washington,
and we would have a mobilization under these three commanders. They would mobilize.

BURG: This would be a geographic division of the United States?

LUTES: Yes. They would mobilize and would be charged with the training and the preparations for war. Well, of course, that didn't go over. It went over all right with the G-3 of the general staff; Marshall's G-3 thought it would be a pretty good idea. But Somervell didn't. And so the result was that he—what he was after was to get a vertical control of the logistics; there was no doubt about that. So I was ready to return to my brigade and I went to the chief of artillery, my artillery, to get me jarred loose from General Somervell. And he went to see General Somervell for me and he told my chief, asked him, if he could make me a major general and the chief said no, he didn't have a vacancy like that, and Somervell said, "Well, I can." [Laughter] I didn't hear all that until later. But, anyway, that was what happened. And Somervell asked me to stay an extra five days because his wife died, and he gave me charge of the
office till he got back. And then that had extended my so-called ten day temporary duty to about fifteen days. And I stayed to be near—the office then was in the old Constitution buildings, temporary war buildings on Constitution Avenue. And I stayed at the Roger Smith Hotel because that would be the closest I could get to it. So he came to the Roger Smith Hotel, the night before I left to go back to California, and had dinner with me in the Roger Smith Hotel and we had an old fashioned together. [Laughter] He then proposed my staying with him, completely, and I told him that I was not a Washington G-4: I was a field chief, and my experience had been in the field and that's where I thought I should be. So I went on back, but that didn't last long! In just about two weeks the orders came through for me to report to Washington to General Somervell.

BURG: [Laughter] Well, there was really nothing you could do about that.

LUTES: No, nothing I could do about it. So I thought, well, I'll do the best job I can for him. I was a brigadier general and he said, "I'm going to make you operations officer, plans
and operations officer, of my staff. And I'm going to try to organize all the technical services in one command under—and all the other chiefs of services, such as the finance department, and the adjutant general, and all these special services. So that the combat group can be free of those activities." And he said, "I have, I think, General Marshall's opinion of that, but that will be confirmed later." So he said, "You get some officers together and organize your own plan, and give me a diagram of how you're going to organize it, and also what you think your function should be as operations officer." That I did and he approved it. And then the first thing I knew, we were both on our way to England to deal with the British staff on the troops that would be sent into England for concentration purposes.

BURG: When had you drafted the paper that General Somervell asked for? This would be early 1942, I assume.

LUTES: Yes. The paper I drafted was the organization of my staff, not his staff, and doing my own work.

BURG: Right. Your staff as "plans and operations." Now he
wanted to divorce combat branches, such as infantry and field artillery, he would move them away.

LUTES: All of them essential to so-called ground forces, which at that time were under [Brigadier] General [Lesley James] McNair.

BURG: This is Lesley McNair?

LUTES: Yes, Lesley McNair. It was the easiest way to do it, because they fell into three great commands, you see. We had the Army Service Command, with all the services, all of them; and the ground forces, with all the combat troops; and the air force, with a like organization, that is, one very similar to the ground forces staff. And the air forces took some of their logistical operations from us, I mean their—we did all the procurement for them. I didn't, but I mean the procurement branch of Somervell's office did the procurement for both the air force and the army. And the air force had its own logistical service, something similar to mine, my own organization. Somervell's command to me was that I supply the troops overseas from the United States with the
same alacrity that I had done in the past in the field; that's all he wanted. Provided I made fifty-six percent of the time the correct decisions, he'd back me up on the other forty-four that was wrong. [Laughter]

BURG: [Laughter] That's a pretty interesting thing to reveal about him.

LUTES: Yeah, he was a go-getter and a very live wire; one of the smartest men I ever met.

BURG: Looking back on it, did you have any feelings about him and that job when you first heard about your ten days temporary duty there?

LUTES: No, I had never heard of him. I knew that he had been quartermaster, I believe, or chief quartermaster, for a while. I heard, after I got to Washington, that he had been a WPA man during the bad days of WPA after the recession they had. In New York. He had been in the New York area, New York state and city.

BURG: Right, I see. When you first walked into his office,
what would your recollections be of him? What kind of a man were you looking at in terms of physical stature, for example? Did he impress you?

LUTES: Well he impressed me as being very intense and very active, mentally and physically. He was about my size and leaning over his desk, as a matter of fact, and he threw down a pencil he had and he said, "Well, you finally got here!" Start like that, you know. [Laughter]

BURG: No smile on his face when he said it?

LUTES: No. Then he pulled an envelope that he had on the desk over and pulled out a Distinguished Service Medal ribbon and said, "What do you know about that?" He said, "Would you think that they would send that to me, just like that, in that envelope?" He said, "No word or anything."

BURG: Ane he had just received it.

LUTES: Just received it. So he sent for one of his stenographers to pin it on him, so there was no ceremony. I was the only witness.
BURG: And you had just walked in the office to join him.

LUTES: I had just walked in the office. I have had a lot of experiences at times like that; not with him, particularly, I had some with Patton.

BURG: Now, was he essentially kind?

LUTES: Somervell?

BURG: Yes.

LUTES: Yes, I never had a harsh word from him. Never. A lot of people thought he was very much so, very tough, but--

BURG: That's what I had heard.

LUTES: Very tough. And he exacted good hard work from people of his own. But I never had any—he never crossed me in any way.

BURG: Insofar as you know, within the organization, he was firm and a strict man, perhaps, but you don't recall towering rages or anything of this sort.
LUTES: No, no. No, I have no recollection of anything like that.

BURG: Let me ask you, before I forget, are you about five ten, five eleven?

LUTES: No, I'm five eight and a half.

BURG: And he was a man of, roughly, your stature and physique.

LUTES: Just about exactly my height. As a matter of fact, when he retired he left me his overcoat with the red lining in it, and this was the same as my branch of the service, you see. I kept my branch of the service all through the war but I wasn't serving with it.

BURG: So he had it lined with artillery red.

LUTES: Yes. Engineer red for him, because he was an engineer.

BURG: Let me ask you a personal question, General Lutes. Your rise was as quick and, it seems to me, as startling as what had happened to General Eisenhower. Because, in the maneuvers, you had a fairly limited role to play at a fairly
low rank and now, suddenly, within a matter of perhaps thirty to sixty days, give or take a little bit, you're suddenly handling a vast portion of the world. [Laughter] How did you feel about that? Was that a shock to you or did you adjust to that?

LUTES: No, strangely it was not, because the army—we had eleven divisions, for example, on the front in the 3rd Army in Louisiana. That meant a different corps, a corps of G-4s, people that I could do business with; and the front was a hundred miles, and I was used to a big organization by the time I got to Washington. But the organization wasn't going to be as big as the World War brought on but, really, the way to handle it was the same. It didn't frighten me at all.

BURG: That's interesting. It would assign another role to the Louisiana Maneuvers that maybe many of us have not yet thought about. The fact that, many made that step to that much larger size, even if only for those brief days that it lasted.

LUTES: Well the logistics in the maneuvers was pretty big
and entirely turned over to me. That was a point that is overlooked by many. [Lieutenant] General [Walter] Krueger didn't have a thing to do with logistics and neither did Ike. Ike said, "You handle it." And Krueger said, "You handle it." And I couldn't take a single question to them. They didn't want it. All they wanted to know later was how I did it.

BURG: If it worked. And if it didn't, I suppose they wanted to know what went wrong, too.

LUTES: Matter of fact, General Krueger knew that General Marshall was coming down at the end of the maneuvers and was on his way. And he, for the first time, got a little bit bothered about the logistics side of it. He wanted to know exactly how all this mass of vehicles came into the area, the mass of stocks that were put up to repair, tanks and motor vehicles. He had no idea of all that going on in the rear area. So he asked me how we did it and I just got started talking when General Marshall walked in, so I never got to finish it, facing Krueger. But it didn't make any difference, because I don't think General Marshall expected to get any line on that, except what he had already gotten
from people he sent down to go through the maneuvers.

BURG: As long as it was working, and it was working.

LUTES: Oh, yes.

BURG: Now let me ask you this, too, General, because I can see another problem that you faced once you had gone to work for Somervell. He asked you to pick the officers who would assist you. I would like to know who you picked.

LUTES: I tried to keep some of the officers that he already had, in many respects. I got a few from the outside, but I tried to get Barker, who had been G-3 of the 3rd Army staff, but neither Krueger nor Ike liked Barker.

BURG: They did not like—

LUTES: Well, they weren't satisfied with his work. And I don't like to have that on the tape.

BURG: What was his name?

LUTES: Barker.
BURG: The first name; Arnold, did you say?

LUTES: No. I've really forgotten his first name. But, anyway, I wanted him. I would have taken him to Washington, because he was a good G-3.

BURG: Your opinion of him simply didn't coincide with that of Krueger or Eisenhower?

LUTES: No, no.

BURG: Now let me ask you, sir--

LUTES: But I couldn't get him, McNair refused to release him.

BURG: Did his future career bear out your opinion of him?

LUTES: No. McNair was so mad at him for wanting to be relieved that he blocked him right and left. But I don't like to leave that in here.

BURG: Well, that's all right, sir, because you can certainly seal that portion for as long as you wish. It goes into our security vault and nobody sees it. Because we value your opinions.
LUTES: I picked out some very good men and got them around me, but none of them were men that I—I tried to get my right hand man in the maneuvers, a man who had been in charge of the office in the rear. And I went out with the troops and went along the line to see the results of our plans, and to check on whether they were carrying out everything that we were telling them to do. I would then go back to the rear in the evening with my own staff and go over their work and tell them what's going on up front; in other words, liaison.

BURG: Who was that man?

LUTES: Loyall Haynes, he became a brigadier. I don't know what he did.

BURG: Because you weren't able to get him.

LUTES: He didn't want to, that's all. I offered him the job, but he didn't want to do that.

BURG: He preferred to stay with troops?

LUTES: Yes.
BURG: Now, some of the men you picked up from General Sommervell's staff; they were already there. How did you choose them, General?

LUTES: Based upon their background.

BURG: You read 201 folders and talked with people about how they had performed?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: The ones that you brought in to assist you, in some cases, like Haynes—you weren't able to get Haynes or Barker. How did you choose men from the outside? You had served in the army, of course, a long time. Did you pick people that you thought might have a flair for this kind of work, or how did you make that choice?

LUTES: No, I didn't pick people that I thought had a flair for it. I picked those who I thought were intelligent and were capable of taking most any kind of a job and doing it. And I'd put them in the group to show them what their job would be.
BURG: So you didn't worry about whether they had previous experience in G-4, you were just looking for bright men because you felt they could be trained?

LUTES: Yes, sure.

BURG: And you, yourself, were something of an example of that, too. Out of the artillery and into that work without much real training for it, except that one--

LUTES: Well, I had gone through General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, of course. I had two years there and we got up as far as the corps, division and corps, there. And then I had been to the War College, too. In the War College, you went up to the Washington level. So I was pretty well educated for the mission.

BURG: The men you picked from outside, these were people that you had met, or were some of them people of whom you'd heard by reputation?

LUTES: Well, sometimes they were people I had met. But others were people who I heard were looking for jobs. I would look into their records.
BURG: Now, by and large, were you pretty successful in getting these people attached to you?

LUTES: Yes, I had no trouble in that.

BURG: Because there must have been a great scramble for the brightest minds in the army at that particular time.

LUTES: Oh, yes, there was.

BURG: Competition would be heavy. Let me ask you this, sir. As you think back on it, did any of these men fail you in a significant way? That is, did they exceed the forty-four percent?

LUTES: No, I would trust all of them again. Well, I had one man in a purely administrative position, handling papers and clerks, but it was not on the level of where I required tough action. By that I mean, night and day work if you had to. Sometimes, Somervell and I would be working there at ten o'clock at night, and sometimes till three o'clock in the morning.

BURG: And he did not measure up? That one officer did not
measure up?

LUTES: He measured up all right. He did his administrative work within hours, but I mean he was a man who you wouldn't give one of these jobs to that you turn their back on and know that it would be completed by tomorrow morning, regardless.

BURG: If he had to stay there till three o'clock in the morning to do it. So he lacked, perhaps, some of the dedication that other officers had, some of the professionalism that others had.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Do you remember, were there any officers, in that group who worked under you, that you viewed as outstanding? More outstanding than any of the others, in terms of his capabilities and the work he did for you.

LUTES: Some of them, yes. But those that were really outstanding, I could get promoted and did, except for two officers. And I tried to get General Carter Magruder
promoted so he would stay with us, but, somehow, I never could get Somervell to approve him. Somervell wouldn't approve him. Carter Magruder was a West Point graduate, and he turned out later to become a full four-star general, because he left--

[ Interruption ]

BURG: Magruder didn't get his promotion until General [Joseph Taggart] MacNarney asked for him and he went with him?

LUTES: [lost this phrase] concerned and he went to Europe, but then the war was nearly over.

BURG: You never heard from Somervell why he refused to okay a promotion?

(The following portions have been closed in accordance with the wishes of the interviewee as set forth in the legal agreement.)
LUTES: Well I had a [Lieutenant] Colonel [Orrin C.] Krueger who was one of the subordinates of Magruder, plans section.

BURG: Do you remember his first name, General?
LUTES: Yes, it's, I think it's Orrin.

BURG: Orrin, all right. We'll look for that. We should be able to find him; he's an immediate subordinate of Magruder's.

LUTES: Well, not immediate, but one of Magruder's staff. And Frank Bogart, who after the war transferred to the air forces, and he became a lieutenant general of the air forces. Frank Bogart was part of the planning section and a very good young man. He's a graduate of West Point, too.

BURG: Did either of those men, Krueger or Bogart, did they specialize in some particular area within plans?

LUTES: No, it was just in the general area. Our plans were, frankly, to--the plans that I wanted were the plans that we could use quickly, in case the general staff's were changed. I can give you an example, for example, of that: We weren't getting our plans that the general staff were making in time to do much good, because the lead time we needed to get the equipment, and to know which direction they're going, and to have the ships, and so forth, whether it's the movement of a division across the United States to the Pacific coast, or
whether it's an expedition to North Africa. We've got to know those things in advance to start computing supplies for that outfit: the amount and number of vehicles, the number of rounds of ammunition, and what kind of artillery they are taking, what kind of climate do we have, and what medical supplies.

BURG: Tropical clothing, arctic clothing.

LUTES: Everything. All that has to be—and we couldn't get them out of the general staff, and we never were able to find out why, either. They just dragged their feet on it. So our plans were quickly made in rather simple elements. One of the best ways to show it is the time that they had the Teheran Conference with Stalin. I was over in Egypt with Somervell at the time and we had the conference with—the Prime Minister of England came, and China, Chiang Kai-shek came over, and Stillwell came in from China. So when they got up to ask Stalin to come down to the conference, and he refused to come down to Egypt, they held it in Teheran. So they went up there. They went up to Teheran, and he insisted on some action. Insisted that something be done, without delay,
to take the monkey off the back of his armies. And the Nazis then were making good headway into Russia. So I had a telegram from Egypt, signed "Somervell", "Send up plan for invasion of south France." And nobody else there with the general staff at the conference had any plan for the invasion of south France, but I had one. [Laughter] We had one for every place in the world we could think of. The ships were available in North Africa, fortunately. The fighting had been slowed down in North Africa, we had the artillery ammunition in North Africa, and the fighting in Italy had slowed down. We could make that invasion of France without any difficulty with what we had. Fortunately, the ships had been unloaded in Egypt, some of them.

BURG: In Egypt?

LUTES: In Egypt, yes. So, that plan was accepted on the spot, and that's what they went forward with, to the chagrin of the general staff. [Laughter]

BURG: So it was based entirely on the logistical plans that your office had created, just in case?
LUTES: Just in case, and you have to have a thing like that. You can't wait for all the details. So we had it and it was simple, and I'll agree it was not a complete plan. So many ships, so many bottoms to fill, and so much equipment that we had available and stockpiled right there in Egypt, which would be transferred slowly over into Italy. We had seventy-five ships in Naples harbor at the time, in Italy.

BURG: But was there a problem with landing craft? I suppose that would be the big thorn in--

LUTES: We had landing craft, too, because we had landing craft in Egypt, and we had landing craft assembled from both Italy and Egypt--and North Africa, I mean--so we had the landing craft, and the Coast Guard was there to cooperate--some of the coast guard officers--to handle the landing craft.

BURG: Now this would have been in 1943 that you were setting that plan up--

LUTES: '43, yes.
BURG: --which actually did not come to pass until 1944, August of '44, I guess it was.

LUTES: Oh, we'd been on that--. Could be, I don't remember when the attack on south France was made.

BURG: Yes, I think that was August. I think Eisenhower wanted Normandy and southern France to occur just about simultaneously, and then it was a question of--

LUTES: Oh, no, he didn't; he couldn't do that very well.

BURG: Well, I thought that he had hoped for that but the shortage of landing craft--

LUTES: Well, the shortage of landing craft postponed the final phase of the war to early '44.

BURG: Yes, but in '44--what was that one in southern France called? I think it was AVALANCHE I'm not sure of its code name but I think it was AVALANCHE. [Editor's note: this invasion was first called ANVIL, but it was later given the name DRAGOON.]
LUTES: I didn't know you want to know all those things; I'd have had them available for you.

BURG: We can easily check that out. But I think they wanted to make simultaneous thrusts up from southern France and in from Normandy. But if you had the landing craft for Normandy, you didn't have enough for southern France; and if you took them for southern France, it left you short in Normandy. So I think the southern France invasion came, I believe, in August. It had to come about a month and a half or two months after.

LUTES: I know the southern France invasion was considered an easy one to make and they didn't expect the resistance that you would get in Normandy.

BURG: Yes. Right, very definitely.

LUTES: And we—well, I think I had to go over, you know, to be with Ike for the checkup of his equipment before the Normandy invasion. I spent two months with him.

BURG: Right. I should go back in time, too, before we get
up into that area. One thing struck me that I wanted to ask you about. The general staff was dragging its feet in making you aware of what its plans were, which means that you can't really set up anything in advance that has merit. All you can do is sort of guess what their intentions may be. Now you must have told General Somervell that you weren't getting--

LUTES: Oh, Somervell knew it.

BURG: He knew.

LUTES: Yes, and we discussed this whole thing, you know.

BURG: Well, why was it that he wasn't getting cooperation? He must have gone to General Marshall; he must have made his case.

LUTES: He undoubtedly did. I'm sure he did, but he didn't tell me about that. But I know that he was terribly upset about it, and that's why the plans division was organized, our plans division.

BURG: To try to cope with this--
LUTES: To try to cope with the lack of prompt information.

BURG: Well, when one thinks of the number of operations that were being carried on as early as 1942—well, earlier than that, of course; from the moment the war began. When one thinks about what we did just in 1942, in the south Pacific—

LUTES: I was down there.

BURG: —for example, up in Alaska; out on the Aleutian chain, with the Japanese landing there; as well as in Europe, the preparations for North Africa. There, just right off the top of my head, three geographic areas of tremendous differences. And you would have to take into account soldiers clothing; special, well, rust inhibitors for some parts of the world that you are going into—

LUTES: Six million things, actually. Six million items that we had to worry about during the war.

BURG: On the list of materiel.

LUTES: Things that the troops demanded.
BURG: Yes. Well, I can well imagine. There's the difference between the tropical butter that you are going to have to take into some place like Guadalcanal; the white smock that the infantryman needs on Attu, or maybe on Kiska, if it comes to that. And something to keep an engine from wearing out in North Africa, with the sand going straight into the mechanism. And to not receive any advance notice, so that you can begin to take care of these things, simply forced you to improvise techniques to handle literally anything.

LUTES: Well, in a broad way. Specialities, like you're talking about, could be tacked on later. But you've got to have a basic plan of some sort and that's what we made. We made the basic plan. And if it was going to be in the Pacific, why we would have the special equipment that has to be held for the Pacific. We would have that in the plan, for action in the planning stage.

BURG: So there, too, your people had to think as—well probably it was being done before the war, but I would gather that the impetus for this doesn't come until the war has broken out.
Once war has come, then your people would simply say, "Now we know we're going to be fighting under tropical conditions, under arctic conditions, under desert conditions so, regardless of what the general staff has in mind, we had better start laying in certain supplies of clothing, items of equipment, foods."

LUTES: Well we did that. We did that from the beginning of the war. And we had just, what you might say, a package for every division; just what they would have. But the trouble with that; you get over-supplied that way so, toward the end of the war, we had to be more precise and began to cut down. For example, in sending a package of hospital supplies--that's all the things that go for a hospital--down to the South Atlantic, on Ascension Island, as I recall it--they found some radiators and plumbing not adapted to the climate; they found dust pans and dust brushes for a hospital that's not in a tent. So a lot of foolish stuff gets into the early packaging deal.

BURG: So they had a table of equipment that really was a little
rigid, and some of that stuff went off to places where there would be no earthly use for it. One can see how that could happen. And I suppose that the oversupply problem would come because you might not, for example, be too sure of how many divisions might be sent, let us say to the Aleutians, which would call for particular special clothing issues. So your tendency might be to say, "Well, that might take five divisions," so your group would then be lining up a package for five divisions: arctic shoes, special windbreakers, and this kind of thing. And then, perhaps--

LUTES: It would be surplus.

BURG: --yes, we'd only use, maybe, two divisions up there.

LUTES: Well, we tried to avoid making that kind of planning, because we didn't think we needed five divisions up there. I can give you an example of motor parts. I went around the world all the time, often to check on the troops and my question was, "What are you not getting that you absolutely need?" And I would find out there had a surplus of some things and a shortage of others. Well, in North Africa there was a
whole field, a field of automobile parts that were not being used. I went over to Italy, where they were fighting, and the mud was so bad that they were shouting for steering wheel parts. The steering would break down in the mud, and so I sent word back to see if they could get any of those parts in there, and I also sent word back to the United States to get more of that on the way. If you're going to have a campaign--and those campaigns developed things that were not thought of in advance.

BURG: Yes, because one has the picture of "sunny Italy"; I suspect we all do.

LUTES: The mud was terrible, and the rain.

BURG: Yes, the accounts of wintertime in front of Cassino and other areas--what was that line? The Gustaf Line--weeks and weeks of unending rain and muck. And so steering mechanisms, the wheels twisting back and forth, simply couldn't stand up.

LUTES: I thought it was one of the worst that I saw around in any of the theaters. I went to all the theaters, but I never
saw any battlefields as really bad as the one north of Naples in the mountain chain. The Germans looking right down your throat.

BURG: Yes. Yes. A campaign that never got a great deal of attention at the time. Here in the States, we never knew much about it. Now, going back then, I stopped you before your first trip overseas—I believe it would be your first one—in early 1942, when you went to England.

LUTES: May, I think.

BURG: Now could you tell me the purposes of that trip?

LUTES: Yes, the purposes were to discuss with the British what they could furnish to us in the concentration over there, things that we would not need to ship; that is, from my viewpoint. I visualized that one of the greatest problems that we would have would be gasoline in the initial fighting in France; we would need gasoline to get the troops forward. And the British had had some experience in that because they had had that big retreat, when they were knocked out of France. And they had been using jerry cans, they called them, just cans of gasoline that they put in the tanks.
BURG: Each can holding about five gallons?

LUTES: Yes, something like that. And so I told Somervell I thought we ought to buy some of those and stockpile them, since they had them, and we wouldn't ship over the cans. Because our engineers--once you get established on the ground--would put in their gasoline tanks, in larger quantities, and pumps to pump it forward through pipes, lay the pipes, which we did, eventually. But in the initiation of the fighting, the advance, we had to use jerry cans. So that was one of the examples. There's a lot of other things, but I'm just giving you examples that might stand out to illustrate the problems that we discussed with the British. We went and visited their warehouses and, of course, they didn't have much warehousing that we could use.

BURG: Was it tied up with their own material?

LUTES: Mostly, yes. Mostly with their own material, or quartermaster stores, as they called it. Somervell had a great conference with the American staff over there. He wanted to get them to organize more along the line we were
organizing here. But they didn't want any part of it.

BURG: Now this would be [Major] General James E. Chaney's group?

LUTES: Yes, he spent some time on that while we were over there, and I was too busy with the British staff to go into the organization of our troops in England.

BURG: I see. So you were not sitting in on the conferences. I suppose that General Somervell would have had them with General Chaney himself.

LUTES: No, I didn't sit in on them, I was too busy.

BURG: Yes. Well, perhaps I can ask General Bolte to help me with that; he may have been there to listen in. Did you ever hear General Somervell indicate why Chaney's staff, or Chaney, did not seem to be too interested in reorganizing?

LUTES: Well, no, I have never heard anything about that. I know the whole army, for that matter, didn't like it. They didn't like the organization.

BURG: It would be breaking from tradition?
LUTES: Tradition, yes. They wanted to keep the staffs just as they were.

BURG: Right. I was thinking, one of the big things that you saw in the future was the necessity for gasoline, then, and ways of getting the gasoline forward with the armies. You must have also been concerned about what other things the British could furnish. Would that include food, General?

LUTES: No, they could hardly—they furnished some food, but they'd be very limited.

BURG: Basically, it had to come then from us, or from the dominions.

LUTES: The food had to come from the United States and, also, we needed to find ground to store all our vehicles; ground to store field equipment repair shops, mobile repair shops, and in those we needed to have ground, of course, for camping and ground to store the ammunition. We stored a lot of ammunition right out in the open; we had tarpaulins over it. And those were the questions I took up and, also, I took up with the British the question of refrigeration for
meats. So that I could tell a quartermaster back here in the United States what hope he had of refrigerating meat in England, and how you were going to get ice, and what they could let us have. And made arrangements to get some. But they were almost a Socialist state over there at that time, you know; everything was controlled by the government, such things as warehouses, refrigerator plants, and all that. You had to get the authority of the civilian government.

BURG: They had been, in effect, nationalized for the duration of the war. At that point, were you also interested in how we would use the existing communications network that existed in England?

LUTES: Yes, we went into that. We went into that early and went into it more later, as a matter of fact. We went to their signal school and found that they were using the same signal system in the navy and in the army and the air force, and they were training them in the same code and training them in the same methods. Somervell thought that that was a good idea, that we do the same thing. We did initiate as much of it as we could.
BURG: So that we, too, then began to use the same code system and training methods, and all, in all those branches. Let me ask you, that new system that we put in, was it pretty much along the British lines, so that one could say the British operators are trained that way and so are the American operators, or did we continue to use our own variations?

LUTES: We used our own variations. I don't think we changed our system at all in that respect.

BURG: Let me ask if you remember who the British officers were?

LUTES: Well, I got a table of it somewhere but I don't remember.

BURG: Right. Okay.

LUTES: My papers are here in the archives.

BURG: In the National Archives. You have them on courtesy storage there, General?
LUTES: No, I let them have them. But I can check them out. They told me that not long ago. I could check them out to my house if I wanted to.

BURG: So the papers are there and a scholar can consult that and find out. How long were you there on that trip?

LUTES: On that trip, two weeks.

BURG: Two weeks. It must have been a pretty jam-packed period of time.

LUTES: It was jam packed. We visited Liverpool and all the docks. Looked at the docks to see what the spaces were, and we toured their installations in that time. I had a little excitement once in a while; we had a few bombardments from Germans.

BURG: Courtesy of the Germans. While you were at Liverpool?

LUTES: No, not at Liverpool. We saw the effects as we traveled though--we traveled by train sometimes--but some of the depots were bombed out, some of the cars had been smashed--

[Interruption]
BURG: Now the very enormity of what you had to do in England, I find that staggering. Because, literally, it covered almost the full gamut of human endeavor. In the two weeks that you're there, you're trying to estimate all these things that you need to know with respect to an American force that was going to come to several millions of men.

LUTES: Well, to a certain extent but, of course, we established good contacts and relations with England at that time, so that we could get a lot done by Telex.

BURG: Back and forth between Washington and London. What was their reaction, as you now recollect it—these British officers—when you and your people arrived? Were they a very helpful group of people?

LUTES: Yes, they seemed to be helpful but they were very pessimistic, because they had been defeated, you see. I'm speaking now of the professional officers. They had been beaten and they were discouraged and sort of depressed, the ones that I talked to. But they were perfectly willing to cooperate, in a sort of an humble way, too.
BURG: Oh, really!

LUTES: They had been humbled a bit by their defeat in Africa.

BURG: Right. Because some of them, in certain circumstances, seemed to view us as the green hands, the new boys at school. Did you run into any of that in '42, or were you spared that on that trip?

LUTES: Well, I think they ran into it sometime after we settled down in France and the British staff, at Eisenhower's level, was together with our staff.

BURG: They had some wins under their belt by then, too, which probably changed their viewpoint.

[Interruption]

BURG: General, following the trip to England, you then returned to the War Department in Washington.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: Now you were bringing back, I would imagine, an enormous
amount of data that you had collected about all facets of the American presence, if I can use that term, the American presence in England, as we began to move men in. Now, did you report to General Somervell?

LUTES: Yes, but I accompanied him on this trip for two weeks. To all the visits to Liverpool docks, and Glasgow, and the trip to the estate of the Duke of Argyle in Scotland, where we saw the jeep tested and saw the landing craft tested. That was one of the features of our trip. The latter part of the trip, also, we checked in on the signal corps, the way they were handling their signal corps.

BURG: The British signal corps.

LUTES: The British signal corps, and that's where we left off, I think. When we got back, we did assemble a lot of data and briefed some of my key people on staff as to what we had done, because they didn't accompany me. And for the next two or three months we were busy with the ordinary activities of the war. In other words, every day and every minute there was something going on in the way of troop bases to be considered, and the problems of getting troops out, and
things of that sort. The day-to-day routine, but then I was ordered to go down to the south Pacific, because General Krueger was down there and there was a division in Australia being trained.

BURG: Was that the 41st Division?

LUTES: I don't remember his division number.

BURG: The "Rainbow" division. They were one of the earliest American infantry divisions to go down there, I believe.

LUTES: Well anyway he was there. But I didn't go primarily to see him, I went primarily to talk to MacArthur. MacArthur had just gotten out of the Philippines and he was in Brisbane.

BURG: Was this the spring of 1942?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: And really at that time--

LUTES: Fall of '42.

BURG: It was the fall of '42. After the battle of Midway in June and, actually, after Guadalcanal in August, I think, of '42.
LUTES: Yes.

BURG: So we were on the way back then; we were recovering from the blows that we had suffered and we were on our way back up the ladder, in a sense.

LUTES: That's right. We were concentrating down in the Australia and New Guinea area for the later push up. I wanted to get plans from MacArthur as to what he needed for the advance north. And I had the sad story of telling him that he wasn't going to be the commanding general of the effort in Europe. [Laughter]

BURG: You got that task?

LUTES: Well, I did it, because he asked me who it was going to be.

BURG: Oh, he did!

LUTES: He did. And I assumed that he should have known, and probably he did know, but he didn't let me know that he didn't know. He asked me, and I told him that it was General Eisenhower. I'm not going to tell you what he said in return
when I told him that.

BURG: I think I can almost guess a lot of what he would have said at that particular point. And he effected not to know? He made you tell him.

LUTES: I told him, yes.

BURG: Yes. Now you saw him in Brisbane?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: Had you known him before, General?

LUTES: Oh, yes.

BURG: Had you had any close contact with him?

LUTES: Yes, he used to come down to Fort Monroe, where I was stationed, and greet me. He was, at one time, brigadier general commanding the coast artillery district of the Chesapeake Bay, and all through this area, Washington area and Baltimore area. And he came down on inspection trips, frequently, and I invariably saw him every time he came down.
BURG: Right. When he saw you in Brisbane in the autumn of 1942, he would know that you were an emissary, not from General Marshall, but from General Somervell.

LUTES: Oh, yes, he knew that.

BURG: And so really, in effect, General, he was asking you for scuttlebutt.

LUTES: He was asking me for scuttlebutt and I suppose it was scuttlebutt to a point, because Ike hadn't completely—it wasn't completely known but we knew pretty well—at least I knew—that he was going to be appointed.

BURG: So General MacArthur just flat out asked you who had been given that appointment to command the American forces in England at that time.

LUTES: And Europe.

BURG: And when you laid General Eisenhower's name on General MacArthur, he did not, let us say, burst into a merry song, nor did he dance?
LUTES: No.

BURG: Uh-huh. Well we know there was a certain amount of friction.

LUTES: He told me that he had been informed by the joint chiefs of staff that—I'm sure he had been. I didn't—that the main effort was going to be made in Europe, and that he, MacArthur, would have to take it easy with what he had and the small number of troops he had. Well, I had a three-hour talk with him. He'd walk the floor and talk to me about all these problems. It was his belief that he was in a very formidable position; that he did not have enough troops to guard the coast of Australia and, at the same time, Guadalcanal was not within his command, it was within the northern section. And he said that if the Japs could come in there now they could take the whole coast line, and if they took the coast line, they would take Australia because most of the population was in the coast line cities. And I said, "Well, General, you're a far greater strategist than I ever hope to be, or am, but I've been over to Guadalcanal and I've been through the islands in the south Pacific."
BURG: You had gone there first, General, before you went to Australia?

LUTES: Yes, yes. And I had been to Esperitu Santo, which was forming a large naval base that Admiral Nimitz had asked me to visit. And I said, "I just can't think that the Japanese have got it. Logistically, we're in a more powerful position than they are. We've got the greatest manufacturing economy in the world, and our lines of communication are stretched to the limit right now with what we can do. And I don't believe they can do any better than we are. In fact, I don't think they can do as good. I don't believe they've got the logistics support to take the South Pacific islands."

BURG: Let alone Australia.

LUTES: Let alone Australia. He didn't like that. He took me to the map and talked to me a good while about it. But that was my belief. And, if I may say so, I also told him at the same time that I didn't approve—from my viewpoint; it was none of my business—but I didn't approve of the business of trying to capture each island in succession.
With the naval power we had, and the air power we had, I thought we ought to bypass some of those islands and cut them off from the line of communication with Japan, and that should be the strategy.

BURG: Starve them out on their islands. Just let those garrisons--

LUTES: Let those garrisons sit there, and bomb them once in a while and keep them from building any airplane fields that they could use. But that was not within my sphere of influence, so I bowed out on it after that.

BURG: How did he take that suggestion from you?

LUTES: He didn't say a word about that; he was doing an awful lot of listening on that. Of course, he did, somewhat, do that after he got through in New Guinea. New Guinea--but that's not, that doesn't hinge on Ike, so let's stick to Ike. That's your mission. You're working for the Eisenhower Library. [Laughter]

BURG: Yes, but keep in mind that my man had spent all those years with Douglas MacArthur.
LUTES: Yes, I know he had.

BURG: In the War Department out here--

LUTES: I can't tell you what he told me about Ike--

BURG: I wish you could, because--

LUTES: --and I know I was offered a big sum of money by a newspaper editor on that some years ago.

BURG: Well, if you should ever feel that you want that in the record and sealed away our mission, as you know, is not to collect just the good stories but, rather, to get the impressions and opinions. And, of course, no man probably stood closer to Eisenhower, or had more effect upon him for that period in the 1930s, than Douglas MacArthur. And it is no secret that the two men's temperaments clashed and that MacArthur's opinion of Eisenhower was not sweetness and light, and Eisenhower's opinion of General MacArthur was not always of the highest. I think there were certain elements of General MacArthur's character for which he had the greatest admiration and respect. There were other things that clearly
irked Eisenhower, and vice versa, I'm sure. But we would accept that statement and be happy to seal that as long as you wish. You may be the only man who heard that view.

LUTES: I'm the only man who heard that exactly expressed the way he did, because there was nobody present but MacArthur and myself. This was in MacArthur's office and I had just arrived in a torrential storm, South Pacific storm. And I was dripping wet when I got into his office at 4:30 and I didn't get out of there until eight o'clock.

BURG: No dinner during that period either?

LUTES: No, no dinner, not until after eight o'clock.

BURG: An immediate conference, in effect.

LUTES: Immediate, yes. Well what he wanted, of course, was more troops and more equipment, more landing craft, and my job was to try to smooth that down and tell him he had to live off the economy of the South Pacific as much as he could. That we would furnish seeds to Australia to grow food, which we did. That we realized his handicap. We were trying to
get all the landing craft we could for him but had been hamstrung, in a way, by the navy, because the navy had contracted in the factories in the United States for motors for small craft, and they had a corner on it and they were not breaking it away. It took a long time to get them to review and release information as to how much they did have in the navy.

BURG: That's interesting, General; that says that there was no overriding, single body to set priorities.

LUTES: No! When I came back from this trip, I held on to see that, some day, we had unification. I started it right then, that year, because I found so much of that sort of thing. I went to Esperitu Santo and here the navy was building roads, concrete roads--and their Seabees, they had thousands of Seabees working. We didn't, the army didn't. I found the army doctors in their hospital tents sawing off legs and arms and doing the surgical work under the hardest of facilities.

BURG: Almost sounds like the Civil War, doesn't it?
LUTES: With tents, and wooden planks on the floor, and the navy was starting to build the concrete frames of posts for buildings that they were going to have their hospital in later, but they didn't have one. And, of course, they're supposed to take them in their hospitals on shipboard, but I don't know whether they did or didn't. But I asked them what was being done to coordinate, so that the air force and the army, who were bombarding the Japs, fighting daily—in fact, I had to stay in the air for a long time to get down in the field, due to the bombers coming back from an attack.

BURG: At Espiritu Santo.

LUTES: At Espiritu Santo. And I told him about these things, and I told him that he was going to have to understand that the first priority would be Europe in all the planning that we could do. That was the general policy; that Germany had to be defeated and then we would turn on Japan and defeat Japan, which is exactly what we did and what carried it out. And I told him that I would do what I could, but I wanted him to understand that, and we would like to have his plans as an approach to this in the near future. And that I was asked--by
Somervell particularly—that we get a logistics meeting on what he was going to require, for a minimum he was going to require, for a movement north toward Japan. Well, that didn't mean that he would get to Japan in twenty-four hours or one year, but that meant a plan of some size, some depth and time. Well, that's the way it ended. We discussed those things and we parted amicably. He had known me before, and he said, "You come down here again, I'm going to keep you." But I did come down a year later, and he said, [laughter]—and I was with the Under-Secretary of War then, on that trip a year later—and he said, "Well,"—put his arm around my shoulder—he said, "I can't get you."

BURG: Oh, he had tried?

LUTES: Well, I don't know. He said it.

BURG: Evidently he had. Now, he knew before you got there that "Germany first" had been decided in the War Department—

LUTES: I would think so. He didn't tell me that, but I had to discuss it on those lines, because I wanted to show him where I stood, and where we stood in our responsibility; that
we couldn't give him everything he wanted.

BURG: He had to know that, General.

LUTES: He was asking for troops, he was asking for transportation, he was asking for all sorts of things. Of course, I don't blame him, that's the thing a commander must do. But we could give it to him, in priority, as far as we could. For example, we had a new weapon; this bazooka came out. We gave him half of it; we split that between Europe and the Pacific.

BURG: Oh, he got half of the production?

LUTES: Of the bazooka. But we got into other equipment that we couldn't always give him his percentage.

BURG: I get the impression that, during this three-hour conference, or more than three-hour conference that you had with him, that he received this news, can I say, with reasonable grace and acceptance?

LUTES: Yes, he accepted it gracefully, as he normally would, because he's that temperament, but he showed that he was very glum about it.
BURG: But he did not fly off into a rage?

LUTES: No, no. No, no. MacArthur never lost his cool, as the saying goes.

BURG: I see. I know he had a tongue, and he had a pen, and he showed that side of himself on more than one occasion. I wondered how he had greeted you, because the news you brought obviously was bad. It was disappointing. And he had had a long succession of bad news from December the 7th, '41, right up almost to when you got there. It had not been good. When you finished that conference with him, what was the next step for you? Did you tour a bit in Australia? Look at our installations there? Or should I say, did you check with any of his staff?

LUTES: Oh, yes. I checked with his G-4 staff, but I was limited in the time I could stay in Australia. My chief, General Somervell, told me he didn't want me down there more than three or four days. I spent some time in the South Pacific but I went to Efate Island, I went to Fiji, I went to Esperitu Santo, and they all take time. And in each
one of those places, I discussed their problems. And I sent back a cable, a radio message, to Washington that I recommended that we put a large depot in Fiji, because if the Japanese were successful and the fleet came down in the area of Caledonia, New Caledonia, we would have a base then in Fiji to work against them. New Caledonia being farther toward Australia than the mainland. And that was accepted. We did put some supplies into Fiji to make it flexible, because if later on we defeated the Jap fleet, we could move supplies from Fiji right on over, without any trouble, to New Guinea or to Australia. And that decision was made and I made that before I ever got to see MacArthur.

BURG: When you talked to MacArthur's G-4 and that staff, did you receive from them requests of the nature--I could visualize each of those men, the G-4 and some of his staff, each one saying to you, "We could certainly use more shells of that calibre. We could certainly use more engine repair parts." Was that kind of an approach made to you?

LUTES: Not too much. I tell you what I did find. There were a large number of ships in the harbor. They were all loaded
with equipment, and they knew that the equipment was there for everything—for the size of the troop bases we had in Australia at that time, and for the South Sea Islands—we had the equipment down there—

BURG: In the Australian harbors?

LUTES: --and the greatest worry they had was the one that I was particularly worried about, and which I wanted to get corrected, was this business of so many ships sitting out there like sitting ducks in the harbor and not unloaded. They didn't have the piers to unload, they didn't have the space, they didn't have the harbor facilities for unloading those ships in New Caledonia. Fortunately, they had a change in command of the naval fleet down there. Halsey took command, you know, he immediately put some of his fleet to sea to find the Japs and fight it out, which they did, the Battle of the Coral Sea. That happened while I was there and I saw these ships limping into port for repair, and some were sunk. I brought back with me a captain in the navy that didn't have a thing but a G-string around his waist and a pair of pants and a shirt. I took him up to report to Nimitz.
BURG: At Pearl Harbor?

LUTES: At Pearl Harbor, on my way back. But that was their greatest worry. What can we do to facilitate unloading these ships? Well, one thing I wanted was to get established a coordinated, joint navy-army-marine corps committee ashore to clear this thing out, to adjudicate the space that we did have and the unloading facilities that we did have. Well they did that and Nimitz approved it, too, when I got back, and that was the first joint logistic staff that was formed, right there, while I was there.

BURG: For that limited part of the--

LUTES: Yes, Halsey agreed to it.

BURG: --theater of war.

LUTES: And, for example, they had one little railroad that ran out into the aluminum mines, bauxite rather, which could be used to take supplies back and camouflage them along the line, where they moved them in later, and get them out of the ships. And when we tried to adjudicate the use of that little road--and the business of craft having to go out and
unload, partially, some of those ships in the harbor by putting the cargo into the lighters to bring it ashore-- [it] was a slow process. And here you were fighting an air fight up in Guadalcanal, daily. And that required certain airplane parts to be, possibly, brought out from the ships. And that was the highest priority. Things like that had to be adjudicated to keep some fellow from hogging all the boats with supplies and things that he wanted that somebody else was needing very badly.

BURG: Because each of these ships would be loaded with a variety of things.

LUTES: Yes, well, something like seventy-five of them and they made a terrible bombing target. It was very poor judgment in the early part of the war, and I just got down there in time to work on it. And when I got back to San Francisco, I worked with the navy in San Francisco to see if we couldn't get a system of routing these ships in on schedules, so they wouldn't be all clustered up down there and in all the confusion that they had at the time. I stood on the dock and watched the marine trucks coming down to
take some supplies on and off the lighters, and alongside would be the army and alongside would be the air force; here's these three services, and who knows what the priority is, really, between the three. Is this fellow over here loading junk that he shouldn't be, or is this other man under pressure for real combat.

BURG: Of course. The marine corps driver may be there for rifle ammunition, and the air corps driver is there for engine parts, and another driver is there for mess furniture for the officers' mess.

LUTES: Exactly. You can't tell what they were doing there. That was a confusion that had to be straightened out, and that was my principal work in the ten days I was in the South Pacific.

BURG: Is it fair to suggest too, General, that these ships—you spoke of seventy or seventy-five ships—were not combat-loaded in the sense that ships would have been combat-loaded for the North African invasion or Sicily. That is, loaded in a reverse order so first priorities came out first.
LUTES: Yes, that's right. That is what we did when we went to North Africa; later we did that, and not only that, but we went through a rehearsal on it.

BURG: Was what you did in North Africa, in part, a result of your experience down there in the South Pacific, seeing these cargo ships, which I presume were just carrying--

LUTES: Yes, but of course those were just, truly, cargo ships. They weren't carrying a division, or a corps, of soldiers. When you went to North Africa, you--

[Interruption]

BURG: We didn't meet much resistance.

LUTES: Well, considering the situation that followed later, the fighting was later, not at the beach.

BURG: Right. So that, in effect, in North Africa in the autumn of '42, we got a rather cheap lesson in how to mount an invasion. How to handle the logistics and everything else.

LUTES: That's right, I think so, yes.
BURG: And probably learned from it. When you came back, you had seen Admiral Nimitz on your way out?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: You had stopped at Pearl Harbor? Let me ask you how Admiral Nimitz struck you. Was that your first meeting with him, sir?

LUTES: Well, I had met him in Washington at one or two meetings, but I didn't know him well. But I thought very highly of him. He's, particularly, a man of good judgment and he had his feet on the ground and he, as you might say, kept his cool. He wasn't too excitable about anything.

BURG: Now you found him cooperative with you?

LUTES: He was, but he had to refer a great deal to the navy department.

BURG: I see. He couldn't really operate on his own.

LUTES: When it comes to trying to get into coordinated work with the army, he had to go back to the navy department to
discuss it. For example, I recommended that he have an army officer on his staff, maybe two, as a matter of fact, he accepted two. He had to ask the navy department for that. He did and he got it.

BURG: What rank were these officers, General?

LUTES: Oh, one a brigadier and one a major-general. Major General [Edmond Harrison] Leavey is the one that I sent out there to join his staff.

BURG: He was a man willing to cooperate, willing to listen to your viewpoints, but he would in some cases have to check that with navy.

LUTES: Yes. And, of course, his staff had a considerable influence. They were gunshy of any change in the supply of petroleum. I was concerned about petroleum supplies, too, because the tanks in the army need one type of oil, one type of fuel. The navy submarine needed a different type, and so forth. They moved us on to some of this modern equipment that we had then, and you had to have the right, what do you call it? The name slips me at the moment, sort of like—-but anyway, they wanted the army to be able to draw on the navy for some of our fuels and he cooperated in that pretty well,
but not in a general way. He wouldn't agree to a joint petroleum staff or anything of that sort.

BURG: I see. I suppose it must be inbred in them--

LUTES: Well it's the lifeblood of the navy, you know, your fuel.

BURG: Precisely. Yes, that fuel extended into cruising speed equals range and that equals striking power at any given place.

LUTES: That's right. So we had these two officers of the army on his staff to assist in coordinating what our requirements were for certain things that the navy would furnish.

BURG: Were there also naval officers on Douglas MacArthur's staff?

LUTES: No.

BURG: Not at that time, when you were there.

LUTES: Not at that time.
BURG: I think that came later on, perhaps.

LUTES: Not to my knowledge, anyway. But I was supposed to do business with a naval officer [laughter] who I was supposed to pick up on my way down. I won't mention his name, but when I got to Nimitz headquarters this officer had already gone down to the South Pacific. And when I got down to MacArthur's headquarters, he had been there, but he dealt with, he had seen MacArthur's G-4. And I wanted to be with him at that time, but I wasn't with him because he went to the dog races. [Laughter] He didn't have anything to say about anything as long as he was in Australia. So I never caught up with him at all until finally, G-4, MacArthur's G-4, told me, he said, "So and so has now sent a message in that he'll be in my office this morning. Would you like to be there?" And I said, "Yes, I will." So I was there. And he came and I tried to talk business with him and he said, "I can't do anything with you at all as long as I'm in Australia. When I get to New Caledonia, we'll discuss things." He said, "Can you take me with you to New Caledonia?" I said, "Yes, I'll take you to New Caledonia." So I flew him
with me, because I had to get back to the United States anyway and it was on my way. So I got into a meeting with him there and found out that the reason he was waiting was that he wanted to wait until he got his promotion. He was going to be a three-star admiral, and I was only a two-star general and, therefore, he would be chairman of the committee! [Laughter]

BURG: Isn't that something! So he just ducked out of Pearl Harbor ahead of you, went down, and stayed out ahead of you.

LUTES: And stayed away from me until he could get that promotion! But in the meantime, Halsey got wise and evidently instructed him to cooperate on this joint logistics staff ashore. So he had to prove that, and that was one step that I succeeded in getting. And that was the first joint army-navy staff that they had had in either place in the army for a while.

BURG: And that doesn't come until the autumn of 1942. Almost a year after we had entered the war.

LUTES: That's right.
BURG: When you got back to Washington, D.C., you would, of course, report to General Somervell.

LUTES: All of these actions.

BURG: Yes. Did you also report to General Marshall, or did General Somervell pass on your information to General Marshall?

LUTES: Well Somervell did. He passed on all the information and it brought up a storm, too, because I told Somervell that I thought we ought to get something started on the unified command at the top, so that these things could be adjudicated in policy, the policy field, the policy level, and Somervell thought so, too. And he talked to Marshall about that, but the navy got up a big storm on that; I was in the doghouse with the navy for years afterward.

BURG: You were? Did you ever find out who took the most violent exception to your idea? Would it have been Fleet Admiral [Ernest Joseph] King? Or was it down from King's level?

LUTES: I'm sure it was Admiral King and, also, others in the lower echelons. They resisted that. They were afraid that...
we were going to try to take over the logistics of the navy, which was not true. We didn't want to. We had one radical in the army, Charley Gross, Major General [Charles Philip] Gross, who was violently opposed to the navy having anything to do with the carrying of any supplies or equipment to the army. He thought all the transports should be the army. Well the army had a transport corps. And he thought we should take over that. Well the navy, of course, got hold of that and it spoiled all the rest of it for us, and those of us who were thinking of the supply and logistics, because the navy just riled right up on that.

BURG: Thinking back on it, do you think that that General Gross' idea was a good one?

LUTES: No, I told General Eisenhower, when he became chief of staff of the army, I told him how many boats we had. We had eleven hundred and some odd boats.

BURG: After World War II?

LUTES: Yes. And I said, "I think we should turn the whole damned thing over to the navy; it belongs to them. It's the
navy's job and they should be held responsible for it." And he agreed. And so the Army Transport Service was turned over to the navy. But that was after the war.

BURG: Right. During the war we operated two maritime transport systems, the navy handling one and the Army Transport Service being the other. Which, again, is quite a division of effort.

LUTES: That's right. Of course, a lot of the ships that the army operated were charter but they were operating under army command.

BURG: Right. Merchant marine vessels that has been taken over.

LUTES: Merchant marine, and they were held in New York from time to time by the navy, rightfully. The navy would be carrying the protection of the convoy, they'd go over with these ships to Europe and to the South Pacific. And they had the convoy responsibility. So it had to be coordinated to that extent. Now I might mention at this time the organization that I established for this world-wide system of supply.
BURG: Yes, please do.

LUTES: See, I had a plan, an early plan, right away, early in '42, spring of '42. We took New York and gave it the responsibility of supplying Europe and North Africa, and Norfolk was to assist on that; certain elements, certain percentage of ships would be handled through Norfolk. And we had responsibilities in South America, because we had to have a line of communications to Africa by way of South America.

BURG: Brazil and--

LUTES: Yes, that's the only way we could do it until we conquered North Africa. And I went down to Brazil, I might say, the same year, '42.

BURG: Would that mean that you had also given some sort of status to the port of New Orleans?

LUTES: Yes. We had a smaller staff there. Now each one of these staffs consisted of a representative of the quartermaster corps, representative of the ordnance corps, representative of the signal corps, representative of--I don't remember
whether we had a chemical or not, or whether we let ordnance handle both chemical and— but all these technical services had a representative there. And then we had a line officer who would be there to coordinate them. The line officer representing the overseas commander. And then we established contact with the overseas staff, Eisenhower's staff, who, of course, was being handled by General John C.H. Lee in England in the early days. And that staff was to send us their requisitions in priority of need, the priorities that they wanted shipped. And that was to be handled by this staff in New York. And the transportation people had nothing to do with it, other than to load the ships according to that priority. I didn't want the Transportation Corps in the port taking over transportation. I mean, over the decisions on supply, because that was found in World War I to not work. And I had a hard time on that at first. It took a knock-down drag out with General Somervell and General Gross and myself. And it was finally decided that the port commander would command these men only in relation to the ordinary administration of their living and working in his port. But the supply staff, under the line officer, would have the say so as to how these shipments would be made.
BURG: Were they divorced from the port commander's organization totally?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: All right, now let me ask you this, General--

LUTES: They had to be, because I had to fight for it, but I can give you an example as to why. At the very beginning in North Africa, we had a shipment of, more or less, equipment delivered to one port, but partially delivered in another port five hundred miles away. We had cases of artillery and ammunition being separated in different ports in North Africa. And, of course, those things infuriated me. We had to get this thing straightened out, and we did.

BURG: Yes. So General Lee in England would be required to notify that special staff in the port of New York as to what his priorities were, or did he notify you in Washington?

LUTES: No, he notified the port. And my job on that would
be to inspect the port occasionally and see that they weren't shipping surplus, and see that they were sticking to just the requirements that the troop bases in England called for. And I had one trouble in beef on that. I found a quartermaster, Ike's quartermaster, Eisenhower's quartermaster, sending in these requisitions and directives to the quartermaster at the port and he was getting them shipped to him. And the quartermaster in charge of procurement of beef came to my office one day, wringing his hands, and he said, "In thirty days, I'll be out of frozen beef." He said, "I don't understand it." I said, "Well, have you seen to it that you keep the port from shipping more than just troop bases over there?" And he said, "Well, no." he said, "I haven't gone to the port or done anything about that." I said, "I will. It'll be shut off in a hurry. And you should know that you have a representative in the port of New York, and you should know that your troop bases should govern the beef that is going over," and the beef was being pushed out to the civilians, and everybody else in France, at that time. Well, I'm just citing these things.

BURG: This is in 1944?
LUTES: Yes, and I'm just citing it as an example as to why we had this staff and why we were trying to regulate it.

BURG: Now what rank would that staff have? For example, the line officer--

LUTES: Well most of them were colonels, or lieutenant colonels, most of them. The line officer was Goodman, William Goodman, who was ex-artilleryman or, I mean, an artilleryman wearing general staff insignia. He was not a quartermaster officer; he wasn't a transport officer. He also had the job of coordinating the shipping with the navy for convoy. In other words, the navy was to notify him when they were ready to take that convoy.

BURG: Because it might take days for a convoy to assemble, and its escorts to assemble, and even though there would be ships in the convoy that were army transportation ships, they would have to follow the navy guidelines. You might want to ship them out today, but the navy is going to say "no."

LUTES: Yes, that's the idea. They must be the whole
responsibility, because they're the ones that fight the
submarines.

BURG: Sure. What was Goodman's rank?

LUTES: A major-general.

BURG: So the man in charge of that special group probably
had enough weight with--

LUTES: He was a very excellent man.

BURG: --the two-stars.

LUTES: I chose him, personally.

BURG: And his ability and the general staff insignia would
mean that it would be pretty tough for anyone to buffalo him.

LUTES: Yes, sure. And he was very shrewd anyway. I knew
him and Somervell told me to get somebody that I wanted up
there to head that staff and I chose Goodman.

BURG: Now my understanding is that Lee, in the example you
chose, Lee was probably able to get that beef--he was not
going through Goodman at all. He went through the quartermaster
in that special group.

LUTES: Yes, this quartermaster did it. The quartermaster was dealing with a quartermaster here to get that beef.

BURG: Friend speaking to friend.

LUTES: That's right. We got it stopped but it's a good thing we did. [Laughter]

BURG: Or you'd have been feeding a beef diet to all of France and, probably, a good bit of Luxembourg and Germany if it had gone on.

LUTES: Yes. Oh, we had all kinds of problems like this spring up. But, anyway, that was the general system; I wanted to map it out for you. We had the same thing in San Francisco.

BURG: And how about Seattle?

LUTES: Seattle, we had one in Seattle; smaller, but we had one.

BURG: Now, if we use the term "port of embarkation", is that the term that was used for Seattle, New York, Norfolk,
San Francisco, New Orleans?

LUTES: Yes, it is always that because it could be that you might have to embark troops from there.

BURG: Yes. Those would be the five major ports that concerned you and your organization throughout the war?

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: I see we've only got five minutes before your appointment. Maybe we should close at this point. I think we should if you're to get to your appointment.
This interview is being taped with General LeRoy Lutes in the Army-Navy Club, Washington, DC in August 20, 1976 and present for the interview are General Lutes and Dr. Burg of the Eisenhower Library staff.

DR. BURG: I just said to General Lutes, we were discussing what had passed in our last interview, and we were at the period of World War II where we're probably in the early weeks or months of 1943 by which time General Lutes had already made two extensive, and I would figure probably very grueling, trips; one to England and a very long one to the South Pacific, checking on logistical matters at that stage of the war. So the next question would be: You came back to Washington, DC, probably late 1942; what was the next major problem or area of responsibility that you had to take care of?

GEN. LUTES: Well, I'll have to go over my own files to find out.

DR. BURG: I know you did a lot of trouble-shooting in effect during the war.

GEN. LUTES: Yes, all through the war.

DR. BURG: Right. We don't have to take it in chronological order either, General.

GEN. LUTES: I suppose the most important work that I did in
between my two trips was supervising the system that we had established for supply of troops overseas. And that involved inspection of the depots and the question of ironing out problems at the ports, these supply ports you spoke about. And to also educate the people in the Army in the United States just to the arrangement so that they would know how this thing was operating. Otherwise they might be in a [inaudible] wouldn't be fast enough.

BURG: That would then have been quite a problem, wouldn't it, because you're dealing with a certain number of officers out of the inter-war period who--they're older men and they are not accustomed to the speed at which these things were moving.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: And would have to be brought up to standard on that. Now would that mean that you would have to travel around yourself?

LUTES: No. I traveled only when I had to because [Brehon] Somerville was using me as his right hand--Brehon--and as a matter of fact, you know, I succeeded him in the end.
BURG: And so you had to stay fairly close to home.

LUTES: In between trips.

BURG: Yes. And what it would mean then, I suppose you would have to talk, or instruct, officers in the War Department, make sure that they knew what the routine was.

LUTES: I had to do that, yes.

BURG: And then send them out to the various training installations. Am I right in thinking that during the war our divisions, for example, and our corps were brought to particular camps to be given their final training, let's say as a division.

LUTES: I don't know about the training, but they were brought to feeder camps to feed them into the ports just like the supplies, and there were feeder depots--depots that received the types of things that had to be assembled and we had that bit to contend with. It's hard to explain to you--for me.

BURG: Well, it was a complex kind of thing.

LUTES: Yes, it was.

BURG: What I wanted to ask, too, and it seems to me that it
fits in here--. I'm trying to think back to your own personal record and when you did things. The North African campaign, which began in the autumn of 1942, was in early '43 coming to a close. That was the first, for us, just about the first major problem in logistics that we had to solve.

LUTES: Oh, we had all sorts of problems then, daily problems in logistics, you go into that much of our time was taken up in--General Somervell's time I mean and mine, too--was taken up by trying to find out from the general staff in time what the plans were. And had the damndest time making them understand that we had to know in advance. Well, of course, they had secrecy and what all; they didn't like to give it away. But nevertheless we had to have it and as a result of that I formed a planning division in my office, among other sections of the staff, to get up rough plans for any emergency--whether we were going to try to invade the south France, or not; or whether we're going to go through Greece and up that way through the Balkans. And at this time you're speaking about--.

BURG: Without respect for what the actual plans at the top might be--
LUTES: Yes, we had those done.

BURG: --your bright young men were just sort of free-lancing it. They set up plans for as many contingencies as they could think of.

LUTES: Yes. I had them do it, and I looked over every plan. As a matter of fact when I went to the meeting that they had in Cairo, Egypt, I don't know whether we've come to that before--

BURG: No, I don't think so, General. I don't think so.

LUTES: Well, Somervell went to the Cairo meeting and so did I. And he wanted me to be there. And he went on the battleship with the President, and I flew so I was there before Somerville and before anybody. I was the first officer of the crowd to arrive in Cairo, had my assignment to a plane and the plane went over the south front. We had to go down to South America, across to the African coast to Akorn--Accra, rather--and then across Africa to Khartoum, then up to Cairo.

BURG: That route was the one that you went down to Brazil, I think, and then--
LUTES: Well, it's the same route.

BURG: Right, Ascension Island and on across.

LUTES: Yes, that's right.

BURG: Seems to me we were ferrying a lot of aircraft that very way.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: But in 1943, you'd have been one of the pioneers along that particular route. It seems to me it wasn't established very long when you flew it.

LUTES: Oh, no, I think it was established all right. The only one I really established was the one up in the Arctic Circle. That was the one, I went on that one--

BURG: Found that one pretty hairy, eh? Well, when you got to Cairo who housed you then?

LUTES: The British.

BURG: The British took care of you. And did you have any meetings with them before the rest of the Americans arrived?
LUTES: No, I had them take me around so I'd be oriented and that was all.

BURG: And how much extra time did you have there?

LUTES: Three days.

BURG: Before everyone else came in. It hadn't been planned for you to be there early--it just--

LUTES: No, I was told that I was to be on the leading plane and be prepared for it. Told me the hour I should have my stuff at the Pentagon and be picked up, and I took with me Lyman Whitten who was in the air forces, who wanted him there. He was in the G-4 of the air forces.

BURG: And he flew in the same plane with you? He went?

LUTES: He did, yes.

BURG: But neither one of you had to set anything up prior to the conference. That is, you didn't have to handle any of the physical arrangements?

LUTES: No, I was going to tell you that--I'm leading up to the
fact that Stalin never came to that meeting down at Cairo.
He wouldn't do it. So they all had to go up to Tehran, Persia.
You remember that?

BURG: Right, right.

LUTES: And Stalin demanded something be done to take the enemy
off his back. Remember he was besieged.

BURG: Indeed.

LUTES: And so Somervell was with the President and with
Marshall, General Marshall, and the British group, which was
headed by the senior officer of the British--

BURG: Was that Alan Brooke? You know, I think he may have been
there.

LUTES: He might. But Churchill was one too, Churchill was
there. Well, I got a frantic telephone call from--or rather a
radio, from Somerville saying that he wanted a plan for invasion
of France, the south, and there wasn't any plan except the one
I had. And so I said, "Take it out of the trunk." I had an old
trunk full of plans, I took them with me and three of the men
who made the plans with me, and so here it was. Now we only had a rough plan—by rough I'll show you what I meant. We had two corps and enough ships and enough shipping for that, and prepared to do it, but we couldn't furnish more than that.

BURG: Physically that was all that the United States had to put into the kitty.

LUTES: To that point, on that front. And so I sent them that plan, but believe me I used it as a whip over the general staff when I got back to the United States. When I lectured at the War College later on, I pointed out that thing—that delays on the general staff in putting out their plans and getting people informed in time to do things, because it takes time to get shipping. You know we were just in luck there because we had the ships in the Mediterranean to do it.

BURG: But you—well not you, it would have been Somervell and Marshall and the President could have been sitting there with egg on their faces. It was your—

LUTES: They did, they sat there with egg on their faces because
they didn't have a plan except the one I had and--

BURG: It was your foresight and the work of these young officers that you had put to work and that was the only plan then we had for southern France was this thing that you had put together, yourself.

LUTES: Yes, that's right. That's correct.

BURG: And certainly not part of the duties of your position in the War Department.

LUTES: No, but I was always doing it. [Laughter]

BURG: Yes, I remember you did it with the anti-aircraft artillery, too. You even wrote letters there to everyone you could think of. But that's an astonishing thing. Was this in Tehran, by the way? Were you all in Tehran or was this--?

LUTES: No, I wasn't. I was down in Cairo.

BURG: You were in Cairo.

LUTES: I wasn't allowed to go to Tehran; nobody but the top.

BURG: The top ones went.
LUTES: The top.

BURG: Okay. So the wire, then, came from Tehran to Cairo to you--

LUTES: To me.

BURG: --to, well, Somervell knew you had been doing this sort of thing.

LUTES: Oh, yes, he knew I had a trunk full of plans.

BURG: You know, it must have been a little embarrassing for George Marshall.

LUTES: I should think it would have been.

BURG: Because he has to turn to his supply and logistics man, I presume, in order to get a plan he can wave.

LUTES: Sure, sure, sure. No, this had to be planned first.

BURG: That is incredible, General. That is incredible. Has that appeared in print?

LUTES: No, except in my diaries and in my talk at the War College.
BURG: So for scholars using the Lutes oral history interview, checking with the War College is one way to get a fuller report on this rather remarkable incident that late in our participation of the war. Did a change then occur as a result of this embarrassing situation where supply and logistics are the only ones in possession of a plan for southern France? When everyone was back in Washington, DC was something done about this situation? Was planning really undertaken?

LUTES: Oh, yes, they were very bitter in the general staff, those who knew about it, and they were very bitter that we have a planning division. They didn't like it at all, of course, but nobody ever stopped us after that. But we were doing it all the time. We had to, anyway, I had to out guess them, that's the only way.

BURG: Almost as though you were not part of the same army...

LUTES: Yes, you would think so.

BURG: with everyone else. And you then continued to estimate what the general staff was likely to do.

LUTES: Yes, sure.
BURG: So that you could at least halfway be prepared.

LUTES: That's right. And when they had the invasion of France we had the shipping, used it, had the ammunition in North Africa for the combat there, and we'd had it there. Therefore, we had a large reservoir of supplies to put for expedition to south France. I'm getting at the point here, this point, you understand south France hadn't been invaded before by us.

BURG: Right.

LUTES: We'd crossed it above--

BURG: Yes, we've now moved ahead to 1944, actually.

LUTES: Well, I don't know; it's 1943 I think.

BURG: Well, we were talking about Cairo and events in '43 and then the invasion of southern France. I think it's August the 17th or 19th of 1944.


BURG: But you already had large quantities of supplies--

LUTES: Oh, yes, we had it there then. Motor vehicle parts and
we had the ammunition for the guns.

BURG: And we, by then, had gone into Sicily and went on into Italy, were fighting up the Italian peninsula.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: On that African trip, after the Cairo meeting, did you come back home right away or did you tour the North African, Tunisian, Algerian area? Do you remember?

LUTES: I went along the coast. Oh, I've forgotten, I'd have to have a map, but then I flew over to Italy and went into the rear area to check on the field installations there. What I would do, for example, is I'd go into a division rear area and go through their methods of keeping their inventories of supplies that we had sent them, the United States, and if they had what they needed, all right. If they didn't have it, I wanted to know the reason, whether it broke down within their own outfit or with supply of the troops at the front. And from there I did go to Mark Clark's army over there and flew on then to India. And went from India to the air bases in Assam, taking this fellow
Whitten with me, and then from Assam over the hump to China, to Stilwell. And I refereed a fight between [Joseph] Stilwell and [Claire Lee] Chenault, they didn't get along you know.

BURG: I understood they didn't, and I guess they didn't call Stilwell "Vinegar Joe" for nothing. I guess he was kind of peppery.

LUTES: Yes, he was peppery.

BURG: Did you know him from before, General?

LUTES: Yes, I met him on numerous--

BURG: So you were known to him.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: How did you handle his disposition?

LUTES: Oh, I had no trouble with him.

BURG: Didn't you?

LUTES: Oh, no. I sat up all night talking to him in his tent trying to get him straightened out. [Laughter]
BURG: Would he take—well, I don't want to say criticism—did he take your advice?

LUTES: I didn't criticize him; I criticized the lack of cooperation between Chenault and Stilwell because I talked to both of them about that. And told them we couldn't afford what they wanted, and they couldn't afford to—. They had no roads, so they were building a road. I went all the way down that road as far as it'd been built in Burma with an inspection of it.

BURG: The Burma Road.

LUTES: The Burma Road. And they hadn't gotten into China with that road.

BURG: So it was being flown in.

LUTES: Yes, so all the supplies were being flown in. We couldn't—Chenault, he wanted steel for the Chinese, he wanted me to recommend to rebuild the railroad from eight hundred miles down to the sea for the Chinese. And I told Chenault, I said, "We can't get locomotives and stuff like that over here, over the hump to China." Well, I know what he was thinking about, he's
thinking about after the war—and he married a Chinese, you know.

BURG: Yes.

LUTES: And he was all for helping the Chinese develop their economy. Well--

BURG: General, it's hard to conceive of a military commander of his rank putting those kinds of demands on his own government. On you, but through you on his own government.

LUTES: Yes, sure, well, that's ridiculous and I told him so.

BURG: Had you know him before?

LUTES: Never had known him.

BURG: Never met him before.

LUTES: No. I knew Stilwell but I didn't know him.

BURG: Did Chenault and that kind of attitude, did that come as a total surprise to you? Or had you been warned?

LUTES: Oh, I was dumbfounded by him. Now Chenault he was an
airman, and he had been the head of the Tiger air line, you know.

BURG: The Flying Tiger.

LUTES: The Flying Tigers, that was his outfit.

BURG: And he didn't seem to see anything illogical or--?

LUTES: No, he was--I thought it was ridiculous myself.

BURG: General, what was his reaction when you pointed out that there isn't--?

LUTES: Nothing. He just shut up; I suppose he felt, "Well, I'm not going to get anything out of this fellow so I'll quit talking to him." Which was all right with me.

BURG: Yes. One could imagine the effort that would have to be expended to get a locomotive over the mountains.

LUTES: Or enough steel to build another locomotive in China.

BURG: Yes, or the rails themselves, when you think about it.
LUTES: Yes. This railroad is all torn up; it's an old road, old rusty rails and had been, I don't know, big patches of it gone.

BURG: Well, now was Stilwell's problem, his main problem with Chenault, was it that kind of thing, that Chenault was rather unreasonable and Stilwell was having trouble trying to cope with Chenault's attitudes and views?

LUTES: Well, I think--. No. I think the things that they were quarreling about was tonnage over the hump.

BURG: And who got it?

LUTES: Yes, who got it. And Chenault wanted more gasoline, he wanted to get more fuel for his planes over. I can understand that. The way that could have been done, and eventually it was done, I think, was to pipe it over. Put down the pipeline that pumps it from Burma. But there was no way to fly it over or to fly it in and to--but I suppose that was what Chenault wanted, or else he wanted more planes and less supplies for the army.

[Interruption]

BURG: All right, there was this problem, then, with Stilwell
that you had begun to tell me about.

LUTES: Well, of course, you remember China was having a civil war at the same time. And he said that, Stilwell told me, he said, "I'm having a hell of a time with these Chinese because there are very few division commanders that are worth anything." He said, "There's so many of them are corrupt. Men die and they still leave them on the payrolls." And he says, "They're all up in the northeast there in an area nearest Siberia and I'm down here. I can't get them loose."

BURG: He couldn't get them to come down and--

LUTES: Get down and guard the--Stilwell was fearful that there'd be an enemy invasion there with the Japs and overrun the air fields, army air fields, Chenault's air fields. But Chenault didn't care, he didn't feel that they would. I asked Chenault about it. After I talked to Stilwell I asked Chenault, and Chenault says, "I'm not afraid," he says, "I don't think they'll do it."

BURG: Was that just a happy thought that he had, or was it based on some firm intelligence and some knowledge?
LUTES: I don't know, I wondered myself afterwards, but then I felt that was his--. Some credit could be given to that thought of Chenault because the Japs had such a long line of communication to support between the south Pacific islands and the lower coast of China. And I felt that we were having a hell of a time, the United States in our production and long lines of communications, shipping from the United States to the south Pacific, shipping to the Mediterranean at that time. And the submarines sinking a lot of our ships, too.

BURG: Right.

LUTES: Everybody had a tough time, and I said, "I think the Japs will have it just as tough with our navy out there, I think they're afraid to try any invasion of south China."

BURG: So as part of your work, you had to take a good look at your enemy and what his--

LUTES: Oh, sure, I had to take a good look at all problems on the side, you really did.

BURG: --at what his capabilities were.
LUTES: Yes.

BURG: And what you thought he might be able to accomplish with the resources that he had, which just doubles the difficulty of the work you're doing.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: When you came through on your way to see Stilwell and Chenault, did you have any work to do in India, or was that merely a stop on the way that you--?

LUTES: Well, no, I sampled a few things because I wanted to know what--for example at Calcutta we had a depot, and this depot was to help supply the troopers, various troops of the Indian troops and our own troops up in Assam. That's where their fields were, and I stopped to find out what was clogging up and the slowness of that and try to get that broken up. I told the commanding officer at Calcutta that if he didn't get off his tail that he'd have to come away from there. And as a matter of fact he was relieved. I don't know how to put it whether I relieved or had him relieved.

BURG: Was he an army officer?
LUTES: Oh, yes.

BURG: In command of that place. And was it pretty much his ineffectiveness that was clogging it up?

LUTES: I don't think there's an--. It was his laziness, I don't know.

BURG: Okay.

LUTES: Someone had to have a fire built under them, I think. But that was a long line of communication there, I must admit, from Calcutta up to Assam. It was not easy by any means. We were barging a lot of stuff up there, up the river.

BURG: Were the Indian rail lines adequate for our purposes?

LUTES: Not really, no.

BURG: We made no attempt to put in our own rail lines there.

LUTES: No.

BURG: We used theirs or we barged or we flew material.

LUTES: That's right.
BURG: Final question along that line: Was it possible to use trucks and truck convoys in India, for example up to Assam to deliver supplies?

LUTES: Some.

BURG: I didn't know what the quality of Indian roads might be in that area. That's the northeast of India, isn't it? So off towards the Burma--

LUTES: Yes, toward Burma.

BURG: Yes. But evidently trucks were not the major way that you--

LUTES: Not the major way, mostly barging.

BURG: Once you relieved that man and put in a new man, did it improve?

LUTES: It did improve, yes.

BURG: And did it improve quickly enough so that you figured it was the man and not circumstances?
LUTES: No, I'm not sure about that.

BURG: You are not.

LUTES: No, that part I'm not sure about.

BURG: But you weren't going to waste any time making a decision. You had to have things moved.

LUTES: I had to have it get started; had to break that bottleneck.

BURG: Yes. Now when you went out there, when you left the Mediterranean, was it Somervell or Marshall or both who sent you down to India, Burma, China?

LUTES: Somervell.

BURG: Somervell. And had you reported to him that you, you know, "I've got some bottlenecks down there that I want to look into," or did he--

LUTES: He knew about the bottleneck and I knew about the bottleneck, too. But he didn't give me any direction at all as to what specific things or anything he wanted. He just told me, he said,
"Roy, you've got to go over to China and see what's going on over there now as long as you're over there this far.

BURG: And was there enough of a Stilwell-Chenault fight going on so that both you and Somervell knew that that was something that had to be looked into.

LUTES: Yes, that's right, we knew that.

BURG: So you, under General Somervell you had a great deal of latitude, didn't you?

LUTES: I had a lot of latitude, yes.

BURG: Which speaks very, very well for you and the kind of work you had been doing. If you're turned loose like that and--

LUTES: Well, I was on--. He changed the organization of the service forces repeatedly, now I think four or five times during the war and each one he set me up. So I was actually--on the organization map I was a part of his office.

BURG: Yes, right. And pretty close in line beneath him, too, it seems to me.
LUTES: Yes, yes, somewhat.

[Interruption]

LUTES: Well, San Pietro was pretty well licked, but they were still firing cannons when I was there and still taking out wounded soldiers because I went up through one corps. I think the corps commander was [Geoffrey] Keyes--I've forgotten.

BURG: Yes, Geoff is the first name, yes.

LUTES: Well, he wasn't at his headquarters, but he left word for his aide to take me up to the front if I wanted to go, so I went. It was a rainy, foggy day and we went up to the hills of Tiber. We were cannonading but when we got to the top the aide says, "General," he says, "I don't think we ought to go any farther because it's too foggy, and we might get picked up by the Germans." He says, "We're right by them here."

BURG: So you were up that close.

LUTES: Yes, the 36th Division headquarters was just on my path--and I checked their supply situation with their G-4 to
find out how he's getting along, what I could do for him.

BURG: General Lutes, when you would arrive at the 36th Division in Italy, would the commanding officer of that division know that you were coming?

LUTES: Well, he might and he might not.

BURG: And the G-4 might or might not know.

LUTES: That's right.

BURG: Was it your experience that the G-4 was absolutely candid with you? In other words would he tell you, "I need this kind of ammunition?"

LUTES: Oh, yes, there's no question about that. Anything they needed and wanted, they just come out and talk about.

BURG: So, I presume that you outranked the G-4s in every case.

LUTES: I expect I did.

BURG: Yes. But still they had no hesitation in telling you in no uncertain terms, "Here is what we're not getting and can't
you guys do something about it."

LUTES: Yes. I'm sure of that, and I wouldn't want them to do anything else. I wanted to know.

BURG: Right. I was just wondering if there was ever a case where you talked to a G-4 and thought that he was trying to snow you by saying, "Oh, I don't need—we're just fine here, General, we don't need a thing."

LUTES: No, no, I didn't have anybody like that. No, this was war and all and—.

BURG: And the incompetents had been weeded out by then.

LUTES: Oh, I think so.

BURG: When you speak of Clark being in Capri it will be treated as a confidential remark here. Your own feeling, and this too is confidential, was that while the firing was still going on and some kind of offensive was still going on, he should not have been in Capri.

LUTES: Well, speaking, that's just my opinion.
BURG: Right.

LUTES: And I think, I have no doubt that Clark was sure that he had a victory there at that particular time and that particular spot, and this is the holiday season, you see, in the Christmas time.

BURG: But it's not a thing you would have done?

LUTES: No.

BURG: As I say, we'll close that for whatever period of time. Speaking of Clark and leaving you--leave you in China for just a minute, at lunch you and I mentioned the name of George Patton and this was a man that you had had contact with. When had you first met him?

LUTES: Patton, I first met in the peacetime maneuvers in which I was the G-4 of the 3rd Army--

BURG: In Louisiana?

LUTES: --in Louisiana.

BURG: So that was the first real acquaintance you had with him.
Was that the occasion when you first ran into Dwight Eisenhower, too?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: That was the first time for him. How did Patton strike you on first acquaintance, General Lutes?

LUTES: Well, you put your finger right on it—flamboyant.

BURG: Even then, in 1940 before we were ever in war?

LUTES: Oh, yes.

BURG: Had you ever heard much about him before that time?

LUTES: No, I hadn't.

BURG: And by way of contrast had you ever heard anything much about Dwight Eisenhower prior to meeting him?

LUTES: Only I had heard that Eisenhower had been on duty in Washington a good deal in his younger days and that he had been an aide with MacArthur in Washington when MacArthur was chief of staff. And that something had happened in the Philippines, and he was back in the United States.
BURG: Yes, he had been asked to stay on, but he felt that war was on its way to the United States. He had missed it in the first World War, and he wanted very much to be back here and a part of something.

Now the two men, of course, varied greatly in their personal styles. One could hardly find perhaps two men further apart than George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower. Did you have to deal with Patton in the same way that you'd had to deal with Stilwell and Chenault and others? That is, did you go to his units and seek to know their supply needs?

LUTES: Oh, yes, sure.

BURG: Did you also meet General Patton on those occasions?

LUTES: I sure did. Yes, I had dinner with him.

BURG: In North Africa or was it--

LUTES: Not in North Africa but in--Patton had just slapped a soldier in--remember the--

BURG: Yes, in Sicily.
LUTES: ——Sicily, and I was going along the African coast there trying to get all the information I could on their depots. And lo-and-behold Patton comes to the same billet that I was in on the—-just finished having a talk with Eisenhower who had suspended him from his job for the time being. And he was pretty glum and I had a talk with him and, as a matter of fact, somebody took a snapshot picture of us together on the roof of this stucco house.

BURG: Was that virtually the same day that Eisenhower had relieved him or had that been a day or two earlier?

LUTES: No, a day or two afterwards.

BURG: Yes.

LUTES: And he was glum about being relieved. The next time I saw him was up in middle England and very glad to see me.

BURG: He bounced back from these things fairly fast.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: What the heck did you say to him, General, there in
North Africa after the Sicily thing?

LUTES: I didn't ask him about it at all. I just let him talk about it. He simply said he's in the doghouse and he hoped he'd be able to stay in [his position] but that he wasn't sure.

BURG: Did he seem surprised or express surprise at the kind of reaction that that incident had created?

LUTES: No, he didn't. Well, yes, he did. He was surprised.

BURG: And I'm going to ask you: Do you think that what he did was excusable?

LUTES: No, because he'd been taught as a young officer, as we all were taught that you never strike an enlisted man. You punish him for whatever he's done in a legitimate way, but you don't hit him.

BURG: And since you and General Patton shared that knowledge, and you shared--if we want to call it that--that code, did he ever make an attempt to explain to you in your conversations at that time why he broke that rule?
LUTES: No, he didn't explain it, and I didn't press him on it because I could see that he was pretty well upset.

BURG: Yes, yes. That is sort of an aberration that came over him—a loss of control.

LUTES: Yes, a loss of control, yes.

BURG: We wanted to talk to the AG down there, the Judge, JAG, Herbert Clarkson Slayton I think was his name, General Slayton. Because he was the man who had to prepare charges and handle the legal side of it, but we were not able to do so. General Slayton was ill, quite ill, in San Antonio so it wasn't possible for us to talk about it. We wanted to talk with somebody who might be able to tell us a little something about that incident. You felt that it was, given General Patton's situation at the time, his depression over what was happening, you thought tactfully you would not inquire.

LUTES: That's right. I thought he had enough on his mind without having me butt in on it.

BURG: Yes. And you saw him again just prior to the Normandy
invasion.

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: When he was operating that fake army in England, issuing out the radio traffic as though it were actually a formation in being. And he was in much better mood you say?

LUTES: Yes.

BURG: Did you see him later after he got into Europe proper, when he was operating 3rd Army?

LUTES: Yes. I was out just before the Battle of the Bulge. I had dinner with him in his quarters.

BURG: Oh, really. You were with the 3rd Army at that time?

LUTES: No, I was--

BURG: You know, visiting.

LUTES: --visiting.

BURG: Yes. Did he ever express supply needs to you?
LUTES: Yes, and that's talked about a great deal.

BURG: Gas, I suppose, that seemed to be one of the things that he constantly wanted.

LUTES: Yes, yes.

BURG: Now, I'm thinking along those same lines—at the time that you had dinner with him, just before the Battle of the Bulge, it seems to me that he had run his spearheads about as far as he could go and that he desperately needed gasoline among other things.

LUTES: Well, he didn't talk about it that night I was with him because I think we had gotten supplies up there.

BURG: So that need had been met.

LUTES: That need had been met.

BURG: My recollection is that in fact he had been told to stop his tanks while they still had gas at a particular place—you know the story better than I do, I think—and that what he did was to send them forward until they were running on fumes, figuring that no one was going to leave them there without gas.
But would things like gasoline, would that fall under your
direct responsibility? You had to take the heat on that, too?

LUTES: Sure.

BURG: But on that occasion, just prior to the Bulge, he wasn't
grabbing you by the throat--

LUTES: No, we were putting down pipe, pipeing to pipe gasoline
to him, and he'd had enough time to rest there to recover some
of his gasoline.

BURG: On that occasion, we're in Europe and it's just before the
Battle of the Bulge, did you call on Eisenhower?

LUTES: Oh, yes.

BURG: That would be your first move I suppose. You would go
there, Paris I suppose or near Paris to meet with him. You
would see him personally?

LUTES: He had asked me to come over there.

BURG: He had asked you to make that trip?

LUTES: He had asked Somerville and General Marshall to have
me sent over for checkup.

BURG: There were certain things on his mind that he wanted to get straightened out with respect to logistics and supply?

LUTES: Yes. He asked for me to come before the cross channel operation to, you know, I spent two months over there.

BURG: Oh, ho, to talk about that whole thing; to get that all lined up.

LUTES: He wanted me to check the supply plans of his army, of his armies, and tell him approximately when he should go. Because that whole damned thing was based on logistics, you know.

BURG: You bet it was. You bet it was.

LUTES: I'd gone over there and spent two months going through the plans and finding out who was short. We got the shortages pretty well covered by the time of D-Day.