INTERVIEW WITH
General Robert L. Schulz
on
July 23, 1972
for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of ROBERT L. SCHULZ.

In accordance with the Provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Carl F. Schulz of Detroit, Michigan, hereinafter referred to as the donor, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on July 23, 1972, August 18, 1972, August 20, 1974, and June 24, 1975, with my father, Robert L. Schulz, and prepared for deposit in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall not be available for use by researchers during the donor's lifetime. After the donor's death, access to the tape recordings shall be for background use only, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom.

(3) During the donor's lifetime the donor retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter, the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. During the donor's lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts (but not the tape recordings) without the donor's express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

[Signatures]
This is an interview being conducted with Brig. Gen. Robert Schulz on July 23, 1972. The interviewer is Dr. John Wickman of the Eisenhower Library. The interview is being held in the home of Gen. Schulz.

DR. WICKMAN: It's interesting that the four minutes a day, or whatever it was--

GEN. SCHULZ: Yes, well, I guess it was after the first term, and Max [Maxwell M.] Raab had left the organization. And I ran into him at a dinner or reception or somewhere. And he said, "You know, Bob, you used to have us scared." I said, "Well, what do you mean, Max?" He said, "Well, you know, that period of time that you have with the President." He said, "Every morning you would walk over to the office with him." I said, "Yes." "Well," he said, "that's the period of time that we don't know what's going on." He said, "Do you realize for all we knew you'd say, 'Max Raab's a bum,' or 'Look out, Mr. President, for this guy.' But you never did that." And, as I say, that never struck me in that way. The General didn't want gossip.

DR. WICKMAN: Yes, this five minutes a day or whatever it was--this was from the residence to the office--is that right?

GEN. SCHULZ: Yes--the routine shortly after the inauguration--it was a day after. The General told me to work out with Tom [Thomas E.] Stephens my time; that I could have any time that I wanted, in effect. And I wanted to be cooperative, so I said, "Tom, if it will be helpful to you, I'll see him the very first thing in the morning. As a matter
of fact, I'll see him at the residence and then walk over if it's necessary. But otherwise you can figure when he gets to the office, he's ready for appointments. Will that be of help?" "Oh, that would be great." So I started that way.

I went to the usher's office. I got there roughly at 7:15. I'd have a cup of coffee with them in case there was anything that we could do to help them. And then when the houseman brought his breakfast, they would pass the usher's office and say, "I'm taking the president's breakfast up." And I would finish my coffee and go upstairs; and right outside his door on the other side of the hall was a desk, and a newspaper was there. And I'd read the newspaper until he was ready to go. The door would open, and I'd get up: "Good morning, Mr. President." And then together we'd go. And I would brief him on the papers I might have for him to sign. If it was a personal matter, family matter: "Your petty cash is low, Mr. President"; or "Sir"--I never could get to call him "Mr. President" very much--but, "Sir, I have a check," we'll say, for a thousand or two thousand dollars, whatever. There was a set amount that he would reimburse petty cash. And, well, in the eight years he audited my accounts twice, and it was at my insistence. I mean, he never, well, at any rate--.

So we would walk over, and I'd say, "Sir, I have a slate of majors through lieutenants colonels," and so forth; or "I have a slate of officers" or something of that sort--"general officers."
And he would pass on to me: "I wish you would look into this or the other thing"—most of these were personal. "Call General [Arthur] Nevins and see how this calf is," or any number of things. Or, "I've committed myself to go to country X or Y: and while I'm there, remind me or make sure that I have time to see my friend, XYZ." Those things he would leave to me. He didn't want to get the State Department or anyone else involved. Those were his personal friends.

But this walk if you will, took about five minutes. That was the period of time that nobody knew what the president was saying to me or what I might say about the staff. And they were just a little upset about it, I guess. I don't know.

[Interruption]

WICKMAN: We'll see if we can work our way through this, but we were talking this morning about General Eisenhower's philosophy being expressed in things like People to People and the Eisenhower Fellowships--

SCHULZ: Freedoms Foundation.

WICKMAN: --Freedoms Foundation. Now one of the things that ultimately comes up—and will come up a hundred years from now—is whether his participation in those things was primarily the result of a kind of continuing philosophy or whether his
participation was brought on by people who were politically associated with him or socially associated with him, wanting him to get involved to further the thing.

SCHULZ: I don't think so. You can check his statements, but I think you will recall that he said, "The happiest time of my life" --or something like that--"was at Columbia University because I was following my desire to enter into the area of education."

That is, "The future of America are our young people; and if they understand what it's all about, they will--if they have the opportunity to receive education--they will be good Americans" and so forth. O.K.? Now that was number one; that was Columbia University. And whether it was Columbia or X,Y, or Z, I think under the similar circumstances he would have been very happy.

But he wasn't able to finish that. He wasn't able to bring about at Columbia a change that would allow him to enter more into the educational phase. He had to divide his time between that which he really wanted to do in the area of education or developing a system or organizing educational processes--he had to divide that with fund raising, which he did very reluctantly. He never really ever asked for a dime. He presented an idea, and "they tell me that this is going to cost so much." Now the others--Paul Davis, primarily; Joe [Joseph] Campbell, who was then the treasurer of Columbia--they, you might say, had the possibilities lined up: the people that, A, liked Eisenhower; B, that followed his line
of thinking or would support any good thoughts of Eisenhower.
These people were at the luncheons, at the dinners. So he really
was kidding himself—but he said, "I never asked for a dime."
And he didn't. There was one man—and I forget his name.
Kevin McCann may remember--Bopster--not Bop--somebody like that;
very wealthy man; just idolized Eisenhower and so forth and would
support Columbia, but he wanted Eisenhower to ask him, you know.
Well, there are people like that.

But he had the thought that if he could separate this chore
and have a chancellor and a president, you see, and one would be
responsible—all right. He wasn't able to follow through because
SHAPE came in. President Truman asked him then to go on. O.K.,
now this is my thinking: that he was a frustrated man in that he
wasn't able to follow through; so he got the idea of—maybe—from
Freedoms Foundation because that was started in 1948 or '49 out
in Denver. Kenneth Wells came out, and he asked him for a dime.
And the boss gave him a dime which somebody else supplied, and I
gave a nickel. I mean that was the theory. Yes, he would support
this.

The next thing that came out was either People to People—or
the Exchange Fellowships—and then People to People and then the
College [Eisenhower College] and then Cerebral Palsy. Why Cerebral
Palsy? He was really touched, and you'd have to go into his
speeches at the various cerebral palsy dinners to really capture
why he gave his name. And this is really the first one—the first
unit—that he gave his name [to]. The College, I think, was the second one. No, the first one was Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, which Tom [Thomas B.] MacCabe picked up. He picked up the ball and said this was a great idea and so forth, but they're all inter-related. They all have to do with knowing another person, knowing how he works, knowing how he thinks, knowing that really he's not a "buddy" or "black-cat man" or what else have you. And a great—I can't very well express myself—but I see underneath there is a meshing.

WICKMAN: Yes, consistency of thought all the way through. The American Assembly fits in there too.

SCHULZ: Yes. A consistency of thought. Well, O.K., but American Assembly as I understand it—and I may be wrong—but as I understood: here we have major problems.

WICKMAN: That's right.

SCHULZ: Now we come together, and we have a bull session. Now we agree that here is the solution. Now the fifty or forty or eighty of us go back; and we have agreed upon what the solution is, so we spread the word. And in a little way this comes out of staff work in the military. In other words, everybody down below fights like the very devil; but once the decision was made way up top side—and the decision was made by virtue of the diverse thinking of many, many people; but they finally bent and gave, you know, until it got to the man, whoever he might be; he made the
decision—from that point on everybody went along with it. And that's the American Assembly. I see it. I may be wrong.

WICKMAN: Well, it is, but it still fits in the same context of working on problems whether they be individual problems or they're larger in scope as the American Assembly works on.

SCHULZ: I think the American Assembly's still operating. I don't know.

WICKMAN: Oh, yes.

SCHULZ: It is? All right. Now, I'm going to ask you: Does the American Assembly—can they come up with: "Indeed we now believe that Eisenhower had a philosophy"—we come back to that again, thank you—"that is going to be good for all of us"? Now can they get together and say, "We ought to engage somebody to put all of these pieces together and really come up with a textbook," if you will?

WICKMAN: I don't know if they would or not. The kinds of problems that they usually have considered have been fairly short-range problems. And they've, you know, they've tried to get—

SCHULZ: The black vote or the teen vote or the—
WICKMAN: Yes, that's right. They've tried to focus on that and then come on to some kind of consensus about it. I don't think that they would--well, they really couldn't in the way they operate--

SCHULZ: Speaking of black, do you know that the president of Columbia University, i.e., Dwight David Eisenhower, had a--I wouldn't say a fight but there was quite a lot of discussion. There was a dinner for--well, first of all, there were honorary degrees. And an honorary degree--I honestly don't know who nominated him--but Ralph Bunche was nominated. Now the problem suddenly came up about the--normally there is a dinner at the president's house the night before the honorary degrees and so forth and so on. And somebody on the university staff--I think Kevin McCann might be able to give you the background--but I remember I sort of got into it sidewards. And the General said: "Well, yes, but if he wasn't worthy of an honorary degree, then why is his name on there? Of course, he's going to have dinner." In other words, this problem--and it wasn't a problem as far as he was concerned--he could care less. So Mrs. Eisenhower--Mamie--said: "Well, you know, really I'm the wife of the president of Columbia University, you know. What's the big deal going on here?" And I don't know. But that was the first black man, if you will, that had dinner at Columbia University to the best of my knowledge--Ralph Bunche.
WICKMAN: I've got another broad question for you. It's something that came up in talking to Kevin. Kevin has said that one of the things the General liked to have around him was what Kevin called familiar faces. Did you notice the same--

SCHULZ: Well, yes. And I can sort of support it in this way. And it's a long way around Robin Hood's barn, but it may be best to do it this way. And you can cut out whatever you want. On one of the trips for American Assembly we were in Ohio. We went to Bucyrus, Ohio; and John--not John Dean--I'll think of his name in a moment--who had been at Columbia, went out to Heidelberg College. It was on that trip that President Truman called, and we had to accept the call in the freight station at Bucyrus. The background on that was [Louise L.] Hackmeister, who was the chief operator, never put in a call for General Eisenhower. She'd call me, and she'd say: "My boss wants to talk to your boss. How soon can we get together?" And either she'd leave the line open or call me collect--as the case may be. So I had to go back to the train. It was snowing. That story is already--

WICKMAN: Yes, we have that.

SCHULZ: So that was the alert that he was going to get involved with SHAPE. Alright. We continued on the journey; and we were now at Charleston, West Virginia; and another call came in: "When would it be convenient for you, General Eisenhower, to come and
see me?" "Well, my schedule calls for me to be in Washington tomorrow morning." And I was called in; you know, "What time do we get in?"--and so forth. And so I believe the appointment was for 10:30--again, this can be checked--10:00 or 10:30; and it was truly the president who made it convenient for the General to set the time.

Then the General, was getting ready. He was putting on his tuxedo to make the speech, and the thought occurred to me that the General, might want to talk to his wife about all of this. He was about to commit himself to SHAPE. And so I said: "Well, sir, you know General [Hoyt S.] Vandenberg has always said an airplane can be in the air within the hour. Would you like to be at home tonight and, you know, be with Mrs. Eisenhower and talk about this?" And, "What are we going to do about the railroad car?" "They'll understand" and so forth. So this indeed, is what we did. We flew back in General Vandenberg's plane, and General and Mrs. Eisenhower were able to decide, you know, "What are we going to do?"

I picked him up in the morning; took him to the Pentagon. And en route from the Pentagon to the White House he said: "Bob, will you make a list of those people that you know who were around me during the Chief of Staff days? And indicate whether they are still on active duty, whether they are back in business, or just, you know, what are they doing?" And he said, "You know a lot of
them were with me during the war." Well, of course, he certainly recognized I wasn't. And he said, "If you need any help, call Pete [Col. Paul T.] Carroll." And this I was to do while he was in with the President. And at Matt [Matthew J.] Connelly's desk is where I took an ordinary GI pad and made my list. I made three columns: One, those still on active duty; those that had left—like Kevin McCann had left the service; and the third column had only three names—General [Howard] Snyder, Sergeant [John] Moaney and Major [Robert L.] Schulz. But that might support what you're saying—because he wanted those people.

I don't know who was—well it doesn't matter really who was number one on the list—but they all were people that he was interested in. And on our way back from the White House to the Pentagon, he said, "Will you call these people and ask---." And then he took the list. I guess it's in the waste basket somewhere. I didn't realize how important these things would be. But in his little scribbling—he wanted this man "to do this, and would he serve in this capacity? But find out primarily: Would they like to go overseas with me again? And under no circumstances make it mandatory. Now if they'd rather stay here --but I sure would like to have them." And that was that. So I guess that does support you.

WICKMAN: Yes, that supports it. Yes, it does. Did he do the same thing in the White House, I wonder, when he went in there?
SCHULZ: The White House was a little different in that the politicos--those--and again, names are really not important; and if I were tied down, I guess I could develop them. But I mean I don't really think they're important. But the thought was conveyed that "we, the politicos, want to do this on our own; we don't want a soldier for a president." This was one of the reasons that I was sort of, you know, shunted off on a sidetrack during the campaign. I was on active duty. (I volunteered to resign and all of that. The General wouldn't accept it.) Because "my political friends tell me they don't want to have anything military around me."

WICKMAN: Now during that campaign of '52--you stayed on active duty all the time?

SCHULZ: Yes. The General was in a unique position. General Eisenhower was in a unique position in that a five-star man either resigns or dies. Otherwise, he's a five-star consultant or what have you. Now to satisfy his own conscience what he did was to decline receiving pay and allowances during the campaign. He did not resign his commission. However, in Denver the afternoon before the train left for the convention he came over to an office which I had in the Continental Oil Building. As a matter of fact Mac [Schacht Victor] McCollum, who's now chairman of the board, I guess, of Continental Oil Company--No, I beg your pardon; it wasn't. It was that building, but it was--
[Interruption]

SCHULZ: Having consulted with the chief of staff [laughter]—Fred Manning offered General Eisenhower his personal office as a private office for General Eisenhower to do anything that he wanted—you know—paying his taxes, and paying his ordinary household bills, and all of that sort of thing. And that's where I held fort—in civilian clothes. And I was forbidden to go to the Brown Palace, and I took it so literally I couldn't even go and have a steak there. But, at any rate, he came over that afternoon, and he said: "Bob, I'm going to the convention; and if I make it, I want you to send a telegram to the Secretary of the Army over my signature submitting my resignation. Now I'm going to do the same thing; but it might be a little upset at that time, and I won't be able to send it out as quickly as I want to." And he was very—you know—straight-down-the-line bit. "And I want to talk to the Secretary now if you can get him on the phone." Well, I got him on the phone, and he did indeed say, you know: "I'm on my way to the convention; and if I should be nominated, I of course will immediately send in my resignation. And I've instructed my aide to send it over my signature, but you can be sure I will try to authenticate it from Chicago." And of course, I don't know what was said on the other end of the line. At that time I said: "Well, General, I'd sure like to, you know, go along with you and so forth, and I'd be ready to give up my commission and to stay
with you if I can be of any help." "I can't ask that of you. Moaney has done the same thing; and my friends have assured him of a retainer for his life or what have you, but I can't ask them to--"

WICKMAN: So Moaney resigned? He resigned for the year, you know.

SCHULZ: Yes, he did. But what the General was trying to say--"I don't want to squeeze my friends too hard."

WICKMAN: Right, right.

SCHULZ: And be that as it may--I mean they were generous and all of that. So I stayed behind; and, well, that's another story. That night old Harry [M.] Anholt, Kevin McCann, Ruth McCann, Dottie [Schulz] and I--And who else? There was one other couple --we were glued to the television set. And when it was a fait accompli Harry Anholt rolls in with a towel over his arm and a bucket of champagne, and Schulz was crying like a baby.

[Interruption]

WICKMAN: I've got another difficult question for you.

SCHULZ: It's not difficult. I don't know how far to go; that's all.
WICKMAN: I know. This is another broad question, but if we took all of your association with Eisenhower in what I think—even though you may not see it this way—but in a career that breaks down into several different roles as you go on through the whole thing from before the chief of staff, chief of staff, SHAPE, Columbia, presidency, post-presidency—which period was the most difficult for you in terms of what you had to do for him, with him—you know, everyday kind of thing? I mean obviously in some periods there was more staff support in administrative terms.

SCHULZ: Yes, I was just going to say the whole thing boils down to the depth. You see—I guess it would be post-presidential.

WICKMAN: Then why?

SCHULZ: Because there wasn't depth in the staff. And while I could have gotten it, and legally, he wouldn't allow it.

WICKMAN: Why? I mean what—

SCHULZ: I don't know. He had a fetish. When we got to SHAPE in Paris, his whole concept was that "this is a policy-making body, and I only want a minimum of U.S. Officers in this new organization." But the U.S. was putting up the money; the U.S. had the communications; the U.S. had the aircraft; the U.S. had this; the U.S. had that. How were you going to cut down the number of U.S. personnel—be it military or otherwise? And it being a military organization,
how were you going to cut down the numbers of people that knew how to operate--or, indeed, how to put gasoline into--a United States tank of model number XYZ? The German didn't know. Of course, they weren't in in the beginning, but I mean others just didn't know. And it was hidden from him--and not in a way to try to pull him down with it. These things were divided; they weren't attached to SHAPE. And I must say I agree with the principle that he had in that the headquarters, the overall thing, should be a policy-making and not an operating unit.

[Interruption]

SCHULZ: We were talking, I believe, of his idea of minimizing the number of people in SHAPE. He insisted that this should be--as I understand it, now this is just Bob Schulz way down in the echelons--he wanted this to be a policy-making, not an operating unit of NATO, just the same as he wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a policy-making and not an operating unit of the military organization of the Defense Department. And in that he only saw possibly less than fifty; somewhere that number comes into my mind. Well, today JCS is operating, you know, it's just another layer. This is not what he had in mind; this is not what he--you might say--fought for. This is not why he went to Congress and said, "We need a Joint Chiefs of Staff." But today it's that way. I don't know who--I could theorize.
All right. So what he saw in SHAPE was a very highpowered, compact think factory—and I hate to use that because it always reminds me of Rand Corporation,—but this type of organization. We establish the policy, but the operating end of it we leave to the field commanders. We give them the instructions. Well, not to go back, but this is what brought me into the Army. I just like the concept of how these things work.

WICKMAN: Let's go to the question. The question was, Which one of these many associations with him was the most difficult for you in the terms of your job? I think you said that the post-presidency was first from the standpoint—

SCHULZ: Yes, because here he was the head of his party. And, if you will, in 1951 where he decided he was going to get political all of a sudden, I wasn't allowed to be seen. You know—I was a little black-faced kid that had to go behind the kitchen or somewhere because I'm not allowed into this thing. All right, he was the head of the party. He was still called on from the field of education. Now whether it was Eisenhower College or whether it was Columbia—they did call on him a few times. But then the President of the United States—first, Kennedy; second, Johnson—would call on him, call for his advice and counsel. He truly was the elder statesman. The Congress had given back his five stars; but those five stars were intended for the military concept, not the political. But, nonetheless, everybody would come to him for
advice and counsel. Now I am not well versed, if you will. I certainly don't have the wherewithal that Dwight David had. If I was, I'd probably be somebody else. But I mean the point is [that] I as the guy that I am--how do I yo-yo all of this? And I was fortunate. I had friends. I had people like Bryce Harlow. I had--

[Interruption]

WICKMAN: Post-presidency and--

SCHULZ: --the people around him you mean?

WICKMAN: Yes, the people around him. Really, the major question--still the same question we're on--is this question of where you thought it most difficult to operate.

SCHULZ: I guess it would be the post-presidency, where with good intentions the General himself didn't wish to appear to be greedy and want a big staff and so forth.

WICKMAN: But the question emerges even then though: How could he support the staff that he even had?

SCHULZ: Oh, well, that was a law on--past presidents law [PL85-745-Aug. 25, 1958]. Which as a matter of fact he signed. And he signed it in order to help not himself, but he was able to always pull himself away. He was the President, and I've heard him use
the expression, "I think the President might well do thus and so; it would be good for the country" or what else have you. So he signed the bill. Harry Truman, the former president then, really got the benefit of it all. Through some stupid little thing the press made a big hassle about Truman and Eisenhower being the opposite poles. Actually, it was not as serious as they made it out to be. There was an unfortunate incident which I'm aware of that--honestly, John, if my life depended on it, I couldn't remember the name of the individual. But the incident was that President Eisenhower was in Kansas City for--not for 4-H one of these--

WICKMAN: It may have been in connection with the American Royal because they have Future Farmers--

SCHULZ: It was! Future Farmers of America because--and I should remember that--because one of the major trips I took was to Durham, North Carolina, for the Future Farmers of America. However, the President had made his talk at the big arena--whatever building it's called. It was the time where he was talking just before his speech--in general--and he said something about the Galloway, which is apparently a type of cow or animal [a type of black beef cattle]. And he turned around; and he looked at Harry Darby--I think--and he said, "Harry, whatever did happen to the Galloway?" And it just brought the house down, you know. He could have stopped right there and come out winning. At any rate he was tired.
He had—you know—he pushed himself; and I don't know where else he had been; but it was quite a day. And he went to bed rather early, having come back and said the niceties to his close friends—Harry Darby, I guess, and I think his brother Arthur [who] was still living.

At any rate, Arthur belonged to a club within the Muelbach Hotel, and I think the General paid a visit there either on behalf of his brother or for some reason. But he was tired when he got back. O.K. So the telephone rang at the command post—or call it what you may—and a voice said, "This is Harry Truman. I'd like to talk with the President." And the response was, "I'm Julius Caesar—"—you know, an unnecessary remark. But with true respect to President Truman, who was accustomed to doing things himself at this point, I think he made a mistake making a phone call. He should have somebody else do it for him—maybe Mrs. Truman or somebody. But indeed it was Harry Truman; and so he was miffed, and I don't blame him. I guess I would be miffed too. But this didn't come to the attention of President Eisenhower until many, many months or years later. And when he found out, I mean he raised within the official family holy hell.

But again there was a People-to-People program on in Kansas City; and [Miguel] Aleman came up from Mexico, and it was a big thing. I think Bob Hope was there. At any rate, the press asked, "Are we going to get a picture of Truman and Eisenhower?" And I said, "Well, I see no reason why not"—because I didn't see any differences,
if you will. And so I asked my boss, General Eisenhower, "Would you? The press is asking for a picture." And he said, "Well, you ask the President." Well, then it was, you know, Alfonse and Gaston sort of thing; and so, to make a long story short, this was the first picture together. And one of the reporters asked, "Have you made up?" And President Truman in his sarcastic way, said, "Made up for what?" In other words, "What are you talking about?" And so from that point on, officially there was nothing --but there was never any difference of opinion. Officially, well, let me put it this way: Party wise, they were on the opposite sides. And I can remember very well President Eisenhower --or General Eisenhower to me--saying to President Kennedy (and the same thing to President Johnson more than once): "Mr. President, in this matter I will support you to the hilt, and I will speak out loud and clear. Now we understand on some of your domestic policies I don't agree with you and I will speak out equally loud and clear against you. As long as you understand that, Mr. President, I'm at your service." Well then again that Mr. President-Mr. President. It was really comical. But he was very, very serious about that. And both Kennedy and Johnson called on him frequently.

WICKMAN: Well, this, of course, goes back to the question, Bob, that we started off with. Here's the former president under the act passed by Congress for the former presidents. There's a dollar limitation. You arrive at a point where the former president
--is asked to do this and that and something else. He has to have a staff of a certain size, and how can he do it inside that limitation?

SCHULZ: Well, we did. As far as General Eisenhower was concerned, he always wanted to turn something back. So now initially at Gettysburg I was still on active duty, so he didn't have to get me on his payroll. Ann Whitman did come to Gettysburg, and there was a slight cutback in her pay. But still you might say by Gettysburg standards it was a high rate of pay. Then the law was still being tested--and I personally feel a lot of claims were made on that money that maybe today I would challenge, but he wouldn't at that time let me challenge them. He said, "Well, if they think that it comes out of my money, you know, well and good; now don't you do anything." The way he spoke I was going to get everything for nothing, and I think I would try because he was entitled to it--as they are today. Now today it's three times the amount. Now granted we've had an increase in the cost of living. We have had inflation and all that, but it hasn't been that much more. But we were the pilot organization.

WICKMAN: Yes, right. That's the point I wanted to bring out: that it was the pilot organization and--

SCHULZ: Yes, but he was the last one that would take advantage of a situation. The government had treated him well he felt. I think they took advantage of him, but that's another story. So
everybody tried to live within what he wanted. He wanted a small staff. If you want to be blunt, I think he took advantage of people on his personal staff. You take Sergeant [John] Moaney. Sgt. Moaney didn't want to take a leave while the General was around—or the President. You see? And then when the President was away, well that's when he wanted Moaney. So when is Moaney going to get a leave? You see?

WICKMAN: We brought this out in his interview, by the way.

SCHULZ: Oh, really?

WICKMAN: I did.

SCHULZ: Well, all right. You can pyramid this. During the presidency I don't think I—yes, I once took a leave. And that was with my family. We went to Puerto Rico or something. But other than that, the fact that I was moving around so much—the change, I guess, itself—would create or would satisfy—not satisfy; would temper—

WICKMAN: Change of scene.

SCHULZ: Change of scene. So you don't take a leave.

WICKMAN: Now this Gettysburg staff came entirely out of the money provided by the government, then?
SCHULZ: Oh, yes. Well, the Gettysburg--the office of the former President--but don't read into this that the work he was doing on his memoirs had anything to do with that. He was very circumspect in splitting that.

WICKMAN: Yes, that's right.

SCHULZ: "What I do this afternoon on my book--don't interrupt me with daily routine." No, no. And, of course, I followed that--tried to--and I got cut down a couple of times [for] being a little too circumspect about this. "You're using government paper; you shouldn't be." You know. It's stupid, but still if that's the way he wanted it I wanted to follow through on it. But I wasn't successful. We won't get into business of that. It was our friend.

WICKMAN: Well, with all the traveling that he did, which was considerable, presumably that which he did for the incumbent president the White House helped with in some way.

SCHULZ: This is an interesting thing. You bring up what President Johnson collared me on one time. I mean he was--it was after the election in 1968. And he had a great regard for General Eisenhower, and only to his face did he say, "Mr. President." To me he talked about "the General." And he raised that very question about the travel; and I said, "Well, Mr. President, he paid his own way."
And he said, "Well, what about you, Schulz?" And I said, "Well, sir, I have a subsidy because the cerebral palsy organization has subsidized me to take care of the General; but wherever I go I'm to drop the name. I guess you'd call it a form of fund raising. But by the same token if we get involved in politics, I'm going to call on the Republican National Committee for a portion. Let's say in a twenty-four hour period I'm involved in ten hours of political effort and support the General in a political way. Well I would say my time should be paid for by the Republican National Committee or, if you will, Mr. President, the Democratic National Committee as the case may--" Well, he didn't quite see this until I outlined it to him. And I did. There were some trips that I got a little bit of money from cerebral palsy, a hunk of money from the National Committee, and the balance Dwight David Eisenhower paid--because there wasn't any travel fund. Now today you'll find there's a travel fund in the office of the former president.

WICKMAN: Right. This is exactly what I wanted to bring out, Bob, because that--

SCHULZ: And Johnson was the one that wanted this--and not for himself. Initially--I'll be honest--I thought he was, you know, sort of looking after himself. But he wasn't.
WICKMAN: No, because this is the thing that, of course, emerges about your position with the former president. You're faced with this constant problem of juggling funds, getting them in the right compartment, and having to go through all this business of "What are we doing now? Who's paying for it? Where are we going?"--you know. And that's a dimension that is very easily lost.

SCHULZ: Of course, had Miss Mamie traveled by air, things would have been a lot easier. Because while President Johnson was ready to send "one of my airplanes"--and he could care less about criticism--to take General Eisenhower somewhere, actually General Eisenhower didn't need that because any travel that he would make, legally, he could call upon the military to furnish the aircraft as long as it wasn't for partisan politics. In other words--literally, if he wanted to go to Palm Desert to play a round of golf I had the right to call on the Air Force for an airplane.

WICKMAN: That's the five-star business, right?

SCHULZ: That's right. Of course, Jack Anderson would have a beautiful five, six columns worth of stuff if I ever did that, and the Old Man wouldn't let me. But there were one or two times that I can remember very clearly that we were on nonpolitical business, and I said, "Well, General, why bother your friends? We can get a Jet-Star to go out so you can make a speech for"--Lord, I don't know what it was, but it certainly wasn't political. "Well, now, Bob, I don't--" you know--he wasn't sure in his mind.
WICKMAN: But that ties you see immediately into the problem also then of the—beyond Eisenhower—of the non-military former president—who then suddenly reminds you of the problem.

SCHULZ: That's right. Well—and I've said this many times—that you cannot use Eisenhower as an example. Now again—and I think I told you earlier today that I happened to like President Johnson as a person. Now he quote "is a character"; and if he were sitting here, I wouldn't hesitate to say it. And I think he knows it. But he also knows I respect him. He was our president, and he is entitled to that which we staff people types can give him. He was our president. Now whether it was by, unfortunately, in this case due to the assassination of President Kennedy—but Kennedy was the same way. Sure, he was a democrat. But he [Kennedy]—now again, this is Bob Schulz—he was lost.

There were three occasions that we were at Camp David. One is a very famous one right after the Bay of Pigs. But all I could think of, John, at that time was, well, that he's like I am: he's looking for advice and just a nod or just a pat on the head—"I'm doing the right thing for the country." And I was sorry for him; I really was.

WICKMAN: I have kind of a strange question along with that just to ask you because I have no idea what you may have observed in this connection, but it's been said that John Kennedy had a very genuine respect and regard for Eisenhower.
SCHULZ: That's true.

WICKMAN: And I was just wondering if you had observed this?

SCHULZ: I saw it. Yes, I saw it in his eyes. I heard it in his voice when he called. The first time I, literally, almost fell off the chair. But the second time he said, "Colonel, I wonder if I might speak to General Eisenhower if he isn't too busy?" And I said, "May I advise him who's calling?" I wouldn't ever say, you know, "Who's calling?" Because I thought I recognized the voice, but I thought it might be, you know—we had many crackpots. And he said, "President Kennedy." I said, "I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I didn't recognize your voice." And he laughed, and he said, "Don't worry about it." And I said, "I'll have him on the horn right away, or would you prefer that we call you back?" He said, "No, I'll hold." And I ran, you know the distance between his—and, I would go in there, and I said, "The President's on the--." "Well, why--", you know. Then I'd get hell because the President was waiting for Eisenhower, but this is the way he wanted it. He pushed his own button.

WICKMAN: Does anybody know the genesis of this thing with Kennedy? Why? It certainly didn't go back to any previous association before the election?

SCHULZ: I don't think so—I don't think so.
[Interruption]

SCHULZ: I could suggest that two people might be able to give you some background. One, and key I think, would be General Andy [Andrew] Goodpaster. If you'll recall, General Eisenhower suggested --and I think it's in his book--that the president might wish to retain General Goodpaster as staff secretary to further the transition, if you will, especially as it related to foreign affairs and national security affairs. I'd have to sharpen my memory whether he just stayed on or whether he left and came back again. But, at any rate, Andy stayed there. And the other man would be General [Brig. Gen. Chester V.] Ted Clifton, who was my successor. I believe Ted wanted to be in some sense a staff secretary, whether he wanted to be the military aide. He assumed certain intelligence briefings--something that I never did. Whether he took those over immediately or whether he took those over when Andy finally left--that I'm not clear on. But those two men can probably give you the Kennedy side of this.

I recall that very often Andy would call; or when he did call, he called at the request of the President. And then, of course, the President himself called. And there were meetings. And this followed through when President Johnson was in office. Now perhaps he more than Kennedy called. And I know in both instances--and I think I may be repeating myself--the General said to them, "I will support you in these matters, but domestically, I'll speak out loud
and clear against you on domestic policies. If I feel that you're on the opposite side, I'll speak out loud and clear." And both of them understood and agreed, you know, they appreciated his support.

In one instance, there was great secrecy about the meeting between President Johnson and President Eisenhower, and this was one instance when General Eisenhower did use a military aircraft. Well, I had put my request in my normal way. It came back: "You will be using one of the presidential Jet-Stars." And Ted Clifton asked whether President Johnson could meet with General Eisenhower prior to the trip and perhaps it would be convenient to meet at Andrews Air Force Base in the airplane. This was to be very, very secret. Well, President Johnson arrived in a helicopter, and I can't say that in itself was very secret. I thought, frankly, he would arrive by automobile and would just be another car; but looking back on it, I can see the Secret Service required certain security and so forth. But at any rate, the two gentlemen met in the airplane. [Jack J.] Valenti was then with President Johnson. And I--my own hunch was to leave the two of them alone, but I noticed that Valenti stayed back and was taking notes. So I got back on the airplane; and the General looked up, and it was with his approval I just stayed. But it was hush, hush, hush. We were in the air, and the General said, "What's the ball score?"--you know. And we were on our way, I think, to St. Louis. I don't remember--yes, it was to St. Louis. We were in the air, and the news was on. The news announced the fact that President Johnson conferred with General Eisenhower aboard an airplane at Andrews.
And General Eisenhower just, you know, practically went through the ceiling. He said, "But the man asked me to make it secret!"
And he smiled, and he said, "Well, I couldn't accuse you of leaking that one"--you know, one of those things.

[End of Interview]
Oral History Interview with General Robert L. Schulz on August 18, 1972. The interviewer is Dr. John E. Wickman of the Eisenhower Library.

DR. WICKMAN: I suppose the easiest way to start is to just take up the question of the fact that some people, not understanding the nature of the post-presidential situation--

GEN. SCHULZ: Well we got a great number of inquiries and as a matter of fact, even John Eisenhower for awhile was under the impression that the General was receiving a pension as the former president, and because the Congress had given him his five stars that he was getting a salary as a five-star general. This of course wasn't so. He had the decision to make before he left the White House. It was just the last week or so; I believe Bryce Harlow came to him and said that Congress wants to give you back your five stars. He, the General, then chose to take them. The main thing he was interested in was the hospitals, commissary, you know, these kinds of--

DR. WICKMAN: The benefits of any retired officer, whether he was five stars or not—I get them. So he declined the salary or the pension or retirement of a five star general in favor of the pension which also provided—that Former-President's Act initially—it's been modified many times—but initially it provided for a pension for a former-president's widow which had never been done before. So he took the salary of a former president and the side privileges of a five star general. And there may be a letter to that effect to the Army, you know--
WICKMAN: Yes, I think there is.

SCHULZ: There is, okay?

WICKMAN: Yes, I think so.

SCHULZ: And just how he worded that I don't know. But as I say we had a number of inquiries, whether they were letters or phone calls I don't know. But he received only the monies from the law that provided for former-presidents. And that was modified. The first general pay raise that the government had, I raised the question with the pay man that I was dealing with in GSA [General Services Administration]. I said, "Hey, we get a ten percent on the general's allowance." Oh wait a minute that's still another law. There's certain money set aside for the staff of a former president. And I think it was limited to $50,000, initially. I don't know where it is now. $95,000. And that's what I got confused—but the amount of money that he received didn't change with the raise but it did change when the executive salaries were changing. There were lots of little things that we got involved in, you might say interpretations of this law. A very good example is a very precise postmaster in Gettysburg that declined moving of the mail by air because "he had received an interpretation that just did not include airmail." The wordage was such that it would be transmitted free of charge or something like that. I'd have to get it out, the language out of the bill.
WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: But I can remember vividly being on the phone. I said, "Well as far as that goes it could go by dog sled or boat or railroad train or pony express or air." I said, "That's a service." That was my interpretation. Well after a year or so I finally got the Postmaster General, to say, "Of course it is intended if it goes by air." And we got a letter and all of that fling flang. Lot's of little things that I feel that were smoothed out for former presidents in that office, being the first one.

WICKMAN: Well not only being the first one but also being so active, I think that's another part of it because you may recall in the case of Herbert Hoover when President Truman wanted to involve him and did several times in his retirement and General Eisenhower did too when he was President. It was always this question of "How are you going to move him?" "What are you going to do with him?" And General Eisenhower, being as active as he was in the post-presidency there would be more questions raised about "how can he function?" "How can a former President function?"

SCHULZ: Well this is for background and no slights are intended at all. Because I honestly feel that I am a middle-of-the-road guy. But President Johnson while he was still in office but knew he was leaving called me a number of times and I was flattered that he would. And he always wanted to do it himself. I would be
satisfied to talk to Tom Johnson, who I understood was going to be the Bob Schulz of that outfit. But no, he wanted to know himself. Well I ran into this thing, in its simplest form it was the fact General Eisenhower or President Eisenhower was a popular person before he became President of the United States. He continued to be popular. So it was, not double jeopardy but, here was one thing on top of another. I wasn't going to be able to tell President Johnson, "You're a darn fool for ordering six MTST machines--These automatic typewriters.

WICKMAN: Yes, yes.

SCHULZ: I had enough work for one, although frankly I didn't have the manpower to use it properly. But I understood he was ordering six machines. He felt that he was going to get the same amount of mail that he was getting as President of the United States.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: Well, I think one-third or a quarter of our mail in Gettysburg related to the life of General Eisenhower. Another part related to Eisenhower the President and another part related to the retired President and another related to the political Eisenhower. So there you got different people. Well Johnson couldn't claim that. And alot of people didn't understand that this man was divided in many parts. And in my tidy little mind, you know, it was this detail, that detail, the other detail. And
how are you going to tell a President that he isn't going to be needing six machines. As it turned out he turned back a number of them. I think they got one or maybe two. A more up-to-date one.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: But, Mrs. Nixon, for example. They have two automatic machines; they might get the third. Well this is the full-time President's lady here and now. If I had to put money down I'd say that her mail, her pen pals, will hold pretty well for a year and a half after the presidency. And I'm just forecasting. President Nixon's mail is going to hold up more than did President Johnson's. And I don't know what Johnson's count is today. And maybe I'm just talking through my hat. Maybe very possibly people are now writing about him as a Senator so he may be getting a lot of mail. I just don't know.

WICKMAN: Yes. Based on your experience, Bob, in the post-presidency there, are there any ways that you think that we ought to sharpen up the laws on this whole subject? Or is the support now adequate for the former president?

SCHULZ: Again it depends on the individual. In the case of Eisenhower, boy I wish I could do it over again.

WICKMAN: What would you have done?
SCHULZ: I would have found an easier way to get people detailed to the office in view of the fact that we were limited in funds. I told this to Ted Clifton when he was the senior military man in President Kennedy's day and they were revising the law a little bit. And he called me and I said, "The best thing, in my way of thinking, would be for President Kennedy to now name a person and I would say a military man, because of their nonpartisanship experience and their background. And get him tuned to the Kennedy way, you know, the John F. Kennedy way. And a little bit like Nesbitt [John R. Nesbitt, Head, Richard M. Nixon Library Project] is today.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: You see, in preparation of later on. That in the transition, this military man will have the authority to ask for a hundred and twenty people from Defense and through Defense, or from Agriculture or State or what have you. You do need some specialists. I would say you'd get one middle level State man; middle level Defense man. Never mind what service. Like our present executive order. We have one man to deal with in each department or we can create if needed an office. All right, so you've got 120 people, two weeks afterwards the pattern is now set so you might be able to get rid of ten people. Or four months later, all right, we knock off another 20. We may need 100 people for a year and then we may not. But this is the guy that is responsible and he could care less.
It's not political. He hasn't got the budget to worry about. But he then can start selecting people for the permanent staff within this. Now this guy is good; this gal puts out good, nice clean work and so forth. Then present to the former President a program. These are the people I would recommend you keep; here are the salaries. It's within your budget. You know, and then gradually phase out all of these temporary people and you come up with a hard core staff. Now whether he stays on or not I don't know. He might be the guy that's going to be training a likely candidate. That candidate may have come out of the Treasury Department. Who knows. A writer, a man that is--how should I say--flexible enough, has no grand ideas; that he can wrap a parcel if its necessary or draft a letter if it's necessary. But this is what I would--this is what I told Ted Clifton he should do or recommend to President Kennedy. And I still believe it. I think a lot of this transition business would be smoother--although to the general public its smooth. But, you know, inside it isn't.

WICKMAN: Yes. Well this is right.

SCHULZ: I mean LBJ, he's a unique individual, but I mean still they had to extend the period of time for his funds. You get additional funding. This could have all been programmed in advance.
WICKMAN: Yes. Well, of course one of the suggestions that I've kicked around, you and I have talked about too in this regard, is that actually inside the structure of the presidential libraries, if this was a viable organization this is where you could do it.

SCHULZ: But, with due respect, again—Gee I hope—You understand me but I mean whoever's going to hear this years from now. It may sound as if I've got an ax out for a certain individual. I honestly don't, but personalities do get into this.

WICKMAN: Oh yes.

SCHULZ: And for various reasons. I learned about politics by observation. And especially internal politics. Well I've got to be this way because of my background. I came into the military from industry. And I liked the way they did business, at least the way I understand they did business. And I understand there's politics within the military too, but that I feel is before a decision is made. It requires somebody, again, who is flexible. Who has had not a technical knowledge of just writing or just politics. Somebody, as I said a moment ago, who can wrap a package if it's necessary or go run and wash a pair of socks if it was necessary. But get the job done. And he's got to have broad experience. I would think a good candidate would be an administrative assistant from a senator or a congressman's office.
Somebody who one minute is talking about the economics of something and the next minute "my son sent the President his best tie and I'd like to get it back," or some damn fool thing like that. Maybe I'm just too basic. The nit-picking part. But if you don't take care of the nit-picking then the whole thing goes.

WICKMAN: Yes. But what I was thinking of is I see, I've always seen a possibility here because we are doing two functions of government. Especially since your particular office here of liaison with the former president's has been established, you're doing two functions in government that are very intimately related insofar as you're doing the presidential libraries thing down at the National Archives and you're doing another thing with former Presidents here. And one of our problems in the over all operation of presidential libraries has always been the problem of the ability of people in that particular part of the federal government to deal with some of the things we run into in dealing with former Presidents and their staffs and all the rest of it. That's where I see a possible joining here somehow of--

SCHULZ: Okay. I think it'd be great. The only disadvantage I see is if this office were tied in with say with the presidential offices in the Archives. You don't have the clout--

WICKMAN: No. I think that this office, in order to--would--
SCHULZ: Would be the other way around.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: You mean, remove the--

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: Well, boy, that'd be great. You'd get a lot of things done.

WICKMAN: But in order to do that, you see one extension of some thoughts that I've had on the operation of the office of former presidents is that this office really should be attached permanently to the White House.

SCHULZ: Right.

WICKMAN: Not as, so it's not--

SCHULZ: A good example, look and this is my personal experience--I can talk. General Eisenhower would want something, former President Eisenhower. He would express a thought. He expects that to be done like yesterday because tomorrow we're going to really have a different problem.

WICKMAN: Yes.
SCHULZ: LBJ is very much like this. He wants it, let's do it now. Once I've made up my mind, damn it, let's go. I am not sure, I have a feeling that Harry Truman, when he was still a little more active, was that way.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: It shows in Bob Adams. As a matter of fact, next time-- well let's ask Bob Adams. I'll bet you he would support something like this.

WICKMAN: Yes. Well you see, what's happened, I've been able to watch the operation of the office of former presidents. Now I've watched the operation of the Eisenhower office, the Truman office, the Johnson office and what I've seen in these three are really quite varying patterns of the same problem and then how it got solved. Now in the Truman case the way it got solved was that any extra load or overages or needs were thrown into the region, [GSA] Region 6, in Kansas City. And GSA provided that because they were close and available.

SCHULZ: This was before the law?

WICKMAN: It was before and after the law. It's right up to the present time as a matter of fact. If Mr. Truman, for example, likes a certain kind of photographic paper and this has been something that he has doted on ever since he came out of the White House,
he apparently had it in the White House, and this is not available through regular GSA stock, but that paper is purchased by Region 6 and is provided to him whenever he’s needed it.

SCHULZ: Right, right.

WICKMAN: So this is an example of the way in which that relationship has worked out, kind of extra, outside the regulations.

SCHULZ: Yes, but I didn’t have that.

WICKMAN: I know you didn’t. I know. That’s what I’m saying.

SCHULZ: He wanted certain things too but whether they started clamping down on Eisenhower or not, I mean, I got the job done but it was my job to go and, well maybe I was foolish. Maybe I just should have pitched it to somebody and say, “You do it.” But that isn’t the way Eisenhower trained me.

WICKMAN: Well, what I was thinking or what I was leading up to is that again, if you had this kind of merger, you see of the presidential libraries and the office of liaison for former presidents and this thing was, this new office, or you still call it liaison for former presidents, you can still call it that. But if you had that permanently attached to the White House you would have a lever forever that we don’t have now in terms of getting things done for living Presidents.
SCHULZ: But what do you do with the Office of Presidential Libraries within the Archives?

WICKMAN: Take it out. Take it out.

SCHULZ: All right. So in other words, like I have always been doing it. If I have a problem with the Archives I just go to the executive director of the Archives, Archivist, I mean.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: And if I have a problem with the State Department I've got the executive secretary there. I've got Mr. Wallace in Defense Department and so forth.

WICKMAN: Yes. See the problem is, philosophically, the Office of Presidential Libraries inside the National Archives is a kind of anachronism because the office is primarily a planning office and as part of the permanent bureaucracy it simply does not have the means to get many of the jobs done that are interrelated to the office of former presidents.

SCHULZ: Right.

WICKMAN: And this is part of the problem.

SCHULZ: Yes. Well as a matter of fact I got a little teed off if somebody from that office called me about something and the answer was right in their own shop.
WICKMAN: Yes, but, you know, regardless of how that office is run, this makes no difference, but the problem is still the same. Much could be done for a former president without in a sense increasing the costs if the thing was just located properly. [Laughter]

SCHULZ: In the chain of command.

WICKMAN: Yes, right.

SCHULZ: Yes. Well, I'm all for this and as matter of fact I can see where you'd save money.

WICKMAN: We would save money.

SCHULZ: Because as you know, we have a small staff. Some people wonder why I have a deputy. Well I can't live forever and I'm a great one for continuity. The secretary doesn't have the clout that goes with it so whoever it is should have a deputy and one that is--well like Dick [Col. Richard] Streiff. I mean, he knows, this is one of the reasons we're in the same room together, that we know what the other guy is up to.

[Interruption]

SCHULZ: Well, I think your observations of Gettysburg, and now down in Austin, bear out the fact that there is a need, and I'm just wondering on behalf of President Nixon who will be in this spot.
And he's younger and as I've always said our presidents are getting younger so we're going to have more living former presidents. I'm wondering and I've often thought maybe Alex Butterfield would be the man that might go with President Nixon when he retires. Or Bob Haldeman. I don't know which. But I wonder if I shouldn't give this thinking to Butterfield now so that when the time does come they will have the advantage of this and, I believe things can be accomplished rapidly. There would be then the representatives --let's assume that Alex Butterfield is going to be the executive assistant to former President Nixon. Okay, he has one point of contact like Tom Johnson had. Now granted Tom Johnson could call anybody at the State Department. Nobody's going to tell him not to. But it's going to be easier for him to pick up the phone and say on a first name basis, "Hey, Bob Schulz--or in the case of Alex Butterfield, "Hey Dick Streiff, look into this I think you'll find it in Treasury or think you'll find it here. Let us know." He's got another hand. He's got another staff to work with. And it is important, I mean, our whole life, our whole system is going faster and faster and it's bigger and bigger. And he needs someone like that. Or he's going to be sitting out in California sooner or later and they're going to forget who the heck is Alex Butterfield. Some bureaucrat in the State Department or Defense Department. But they will know Mr. X in the office of former presidents, they're not going to forget him because he's right next door.
WICKMAN: The only parallel I can make with this and started on this--it came out of my own understanding of how the White House operates--but this is really what happened initially to create the position that Bill Hopkins held. I mean it was created long before Bill Hopkins was in it but the theory had to be the same. That you had to provide some kind of continuity that was somehow out of the regular bureaucracy of the agencies, was still tied to the White House, somebody who's loyalty in a sense was to the federal government, to the United States Government, as opposed to any president who might come and go.

SCHULZ: I wonder if we could get Bill Hopkins and try this out on him.

WICKMAN: What we ought to do is try to get Bill Hopkins and maybe Darrell Trent or somebody you know--

SCHULZ: Yes.

WICKMAN: --Maybe Alex Butterfield. Sit down and talk about this.

SCHULZ: Well of course Alex is hard to get. I mean, he's like I was in Gettysburg. Every minute, you had no life of your own. And I'm not complaining I'm just saying that you have a loyalty to the job. But maybe between Trent and Bill Hopkins, you and I, I'd like to submit a paper.
WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: Maybe Bill Hopkins can submit it as a objective person. I'd like to talk to Bryce Harlow. I think he can see this.

WICKMAN: Well do you have a copy of the paper that Kevin did on the,

SCHULZ: On the original of this?

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: I believe I have a copy. Not the very original. I have, let's say, the third or fourth draft. You see, and I tried--well I think I did--the job is pretty well completed. I have a history of this office.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: I did it for, well for certain reasons that I don't want to mention now because it's past. But I'd like to have it past as anyone would. But the idea came just before General Eisenhower was to go back to Gettysburg and then they decided to do the speech for the convention in the hospital rather than Gettysburg. And then the next day he had a relapse. But I believe--
WICKMAN: That'd be the summer of '68.

SCHULZ: Yes. '68. I believe the idea was in the back of the General's mind as a result—and maybe I'm repeating myself—but as a result of a phone call. He received a phone call from a governor who had lost an election. Now this, I'm trying to time it. It must have been following the '62 elections. Right? The off year elections.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: So at his request I had monitored the call, because he didn't know what the governor wanted, there was some political thing. So he did ask me, he said, "Well, stay on the phone." And the governor told him that he was terribly sorry to bother—he called him Mr. President—but he said, "I find myself destitute. I've got to find employment and I wonder if you, through some of your friends, could give me a lead or two." I think those were his words. And General Eisenhower sat back in his chair and he had the oddest expression on his face. You know, he couldn't realize that this had happened. He said, "Here is a man that for years ran the budget of a great state"—and I don't remember what state it is now but it probably will show up in the files—"we're wasting his talents. And, you know, there should be a way of using people like this. The money is the same whether it's Democrat money or Republican money, he's running the state.
He's got a state police force. He's got taxes. He's got all kinds of--he's running a little nation. And here the man hasn't got a job. That's awful." And that bothered him. And it is possible, John, that this is where the idea came from. Not for himself.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: I think everybody realizes although there'll always be the columnist that will say he did it for himself. Which is a lot of baloney. I think the reason some of our furnishings here have been held up is because somebody on the staff feels it would be a reflection on the President. Hell, if it were up to me I'd bring out these things and utilize the experience of these former governors. Maybe you go down to the office of Mayor. I don't know where you stop. But I mean, there should be a pool; here's a pool of knowledge you get by hard knocks. You know, the school of hard knocks.

Well at any rate. We could go on--this is what I think started the General thinking. Then he, somewhere along the line talked to Kevin [McCann]. And there wasn't any rush for this, you see. And then Kevin came. And I remember one night, and I guess it was the night of the election because President-elect Nixon came by the hospital on his way to Florida. And I had given the General the hard copy of this, you know, like an aide memoir or whatever you want to call it. And a copy was given to Bryce Harlow.
Now maybe he's got the basic. But I know that after that Bryce was in Florida and I called up and frankly was curious as to what the status was. And I'm not sure. I'll never know unless I ask President Nixon now. But I believe one of the reasons I was selected was Senator Johnson knew Major Schulz and President Harry Truman knew Captain Schulz. In other words, they knew that I was an entity that could be relied on and so forth and so on. Maybe that was the reason. Of course President Nixon knew me for the years that I was with General Eisenhower. So, but at any rate I think the--maybe this will be my contribution to the government. I'm not the type of person that perhaps can put into focus. I can always cite examples but I can't put it in a studious--

WICKMAN: Framework.

SCHULZ: --framework of a proposal. But I think Bill Hopkins can work with me and I feel Bryce Harlow would work with me. And maybe through Bryce we can bust loose Alex Butterfield. And I don't know what President Nixon's thinking is as to who--and I'm sure Rosemary Wood will carry on with him. And she's, the Dorothy Territo, I mean, she'll be there.

WICKMAN: One of the things I've been thinking about, Bob, you know, the idea of the office of liaison for former presidents is just too good an idea to let it fall into either on the one side simply partisan politics so that the office is undone when the president goes out.
SCHULZ: No. It should never be that.

WICKMAN: Or that it falls into the hands of what we might call, let's say the more permanent but uncommitted bureaucracy of the agencies. Because then it would be subjected to the same kinds of internal pressures and politics that we have now.

SCHULZ: No. It should never be that.

WICKMAN: So the only institution, really, in this country that you can attach it to and have any assurance at all that it's going to be run on a high level and that it's going to conserve the interests of the existing president as well as the interests of the former president, is the White House itself.

SCHULZ: That's right.

WICKMAN: That's all. That's it.

SCHULZ: Tell me--and you should be asking me I suppose but, OMB seems to be getting an awful tight rein on an awful lot of what I would call White House business. Now I don't say it's--I'm not a student of government in that sense. I'm just an operating type.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: And it seems to me though that they are getting a tighter control. They have almost dictatorial control. And I never figured that office to be that way; I mean their function to be that way.
WICKMAN: Well, I think the reason that that's happened is because the OMB is one place where you can tap into a group of experts that the administration, regardless of who the current administration is, can feel that they can rely on and they can get quantitative answers.


WICKMAN: Continuity.

SCHULZ: Right?

WICKMAN: Right.

SCHULZ: All right. That's the same continuity then that you have to apply to the day to day business of a man.

WICKMAN: Well the same thing is true, you see, on the congressional side. The same thing is true with GAO. Which is why I would set up, if I could, I would set up this office exactly the way GAO is set up. With a term appointment for the holder of the office that spreads it out far enough so that he is across—you see the Comptroller General of the United States is appointed for fifteen years.

SCHULZ: A two, eight, that's ten and two; it'd be a twelve year term then you're talking about.
WICKMAN: Yes but set it up so it wouldn't be divisible by two. This is what they do with the comptroller general. His term is fifteen years which means that never at any time is he going to fall exactly with the end of an administration. In other words he goes across for years--Elmer Staats has gone across Republicans, Democrats, now Republicans again. And there'll probably be a Democrat in the White House when his term is up.

SCHULZ: Yes.

WICKMAN: That appointment is made, of course because the GAO is an arm of the Congress. It is made on the recommendation of the President.

SCHULZ: Yes, well I don't want, I don't think this office should be under a Congress. Because they would use it for--

WICKMAN: Well, no. No, no. I'm just using the principle. No I'm not saying it should be under Congress. I'm just using the principle of the length of the appointment.

SCHULZ: Length of years. I see.

WICKMAN: Yes. Whether you make it nine years, or eleven years, thirteen years, whatever. The idea is that--

SCHULZ: I'd say eleven would be a good.

WICKMAN: Would be good. Yes. Anything to get it out from under this business of--
SCHULZ: Yes. Well I agree with that. I get your point. All right.

WICKMAN: That takes the partisan business out of it. See. That leaves the incumbent free to say, "I have this term of years; I can do the job. I can make the recommendations that have to be made. And I don't have to worry that somebody's going to come along and turn me out tomorrow for it."

SCHULZ: Right. Right. I think that's--. Well I'm going to get a written copy. I'd like a couple of these pages so I can remind myself of that. But I think I'd like to go to Bill Hopkins. I'd like to get his views. Next time you're in town with your tape machine ask him.

WICKMAN: This would particularly in the area of presidential libraries which is one of the concerns, this would do away with this problem that we have now with, for example, Nesbitt's operation over in the EOB [Executive Office Building] where that operation is charged with assisting and, in a sense, trying to plan for the ultimate Nixon Library.

SCHULZ: Right.

WICKMAN: And yet it's a creature of the permanent federal bureaucracy. It's not a creature of the White House. It's just simply tied down to the bureaucracy of the General Services Administration
Gen. Robert Schulz, 8-18-72

and National Archives and Records Service. So that means that if there's any limitation on funds to the National Archives it's reflected there, as well as anywhere else. If there's any particular change of direction in the National Archives or GSA, it will be reflected there in staffing or quality of personnel. The whole business.

SCHULZ: I hate to say this, but you speak of quality of personnel. I mean you can almost see it. As the idea starts off you have a certain level and then as the day arrives of actually leaving the White House now you have a bunch of chiefs all of a sudden descending. Where were they when you needed them?

WICKMAN: Yes. That's right. Well, I think historically we've got an interesting precedent here and something that needs to be brought out. When presidential libraries first started and Mr. Roosevelt had made the gift of his papers to Congress in 1939 there was no apparatus for managing a presidential library. None existed in the federal government. And this was never a question as long as he was alive. Because as long as he was alive the building was built under his auspices as president. And when it was all done and the day arrived that he did die and something had to be done, the library was turned over to the National Archives because the National Archives was charged with keeping the permanent records of the federal government. So the Archivist of
the United States was still involved in it. In 1962 when you suddenly had in one year two more libraries, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and the Herbert Hoover Library, the Archivist of the United States felt that it was too much. So he established the Office of Presidential Libraries and put into it somebody who would supposedly be in day-to-day contact and control of these presidential libraries. Now this didn't keep the Archivist of the United States, then, from getting back into the act which he continued to do for as long as he was Archivist. But it took some of the focus and some of the force out of the development of these libraries and gradually we've had this same situation now so that the office is simply part of the permanent bureaucracy. And many former presidents are going to find that when they--as has frequently happened in the past--when they want something someone is going to say, "Well I'm sorry the budget doesn't allow that. I'm sorry we can't do that." You see.

SCHULZ: How well I remember hearing that!

WICKMAN: Yes. So there we are.

SCHULZ: Well this program we're on right now is a repeat. Boy I was mad. This guy from Columbia University came down. And he just wasted my time as far as I'm concerned. Well, he didn't conduct it as I thought it might be, and as I now find out, it can be. And I don't know who spent the money. Whether it was Columbia's money or whose.
WICKMAN: One of the things that I think ought to evolve out of all this, and it really should have evolved long before this—It's a tragedy it didn't,—but you can set up a program for a presidential library. In other words you can program the establishment of a presidential library just the way you can program anything else in government. Because its a rational activity involving a professional area. The limits are known. There's no difficulty in doing this.

We know now—we being the professional people in this business—we know that every presidential library is going to have to have an archival staff; it's going to have to have a museum staff and function. It's going to have to have an oral history staff and function. And it's going to have to have what, for want of anything else you might want to call it a kind of administrative staff and function which may be above all of these others. Now we know that.

SCHULZ: Well you take your oral history, for example. And your papers. Again, I hate to use the word "I" but it was suggested that a memorandum be sent around to the staff here in the Nixon administration pointing out or grouping various types of papers, i.e. that a man would have in his office. All right. Your tax papers are yours. Your electric bill is paid and so forth. Those are private papers. There are official; there are official-personal and so forth. And when you leave, this, this, this and this paper is part of the presidential papers and will be deposited and available to you at the library. And the guy to contact is going to be
so and so. And that should have been distributed the first week, if you will, or be part of the papers that a guy signs when he swears in and accepts a commission.

WICKMAN: That's right.

SCHULZ: Because they're two--I don't know how many people have left this administration, where those papers are, I don't know. I may be surprised. Maybe John Nesbitt has them. But I know oral history--I'd sure like to see that even a little secretary should have the opportunity to present, you know, their little part. When I say little stuff there you know what I mean. Kids that read the mail. That must be an interesting job.

WICKMAN: I hate to go back and belabor the past on the Eisenhower Library because this is always kind of futile. It's over and done with. But I think that there is no greater example of the need for the kinds of things we're talking about here than the fact that in 1961, the inauguration of John F. Kennedy, eleven million pages of documents proceeded from Washington, DC to Abilene, Kansas. And there was only one person at the other end to receive them. And there was only one person until they hired somebody else a month later and then sent somebody else over from the Truman Library two months later. And those are facts. I mean, that's just literally fact.
SCHULZ: I know and you should have heard a few choice words of one Dwight David Eisenhower when he heard about it.

WICKMAN: The problem here is that, here was an example of a kind of total breakdown between the permanent bureaucracy which was running the presidential library and the office of the former president, and even as far as that goes the office of the current president.

SCHULZ: Yes but they all had to take care of Mr. Kennedy. That's all they were interested in making sure that their name was before the new President. You know, the king is dead, long live the king.

WICKMAN: Yes. But you see the scope and range of presidential libraries is such that you can't tolerate that kind of thing. Because now, as you well know in the case of the Eisenhower Library we are years behind on solicitation. We've lost dozens of people in the oral history program who we'll never get. It's all finished as far as that goes because they're gone. Sinclair Weeks is gone. Arthur Summerfield is gone. Many people who should have been obtained in the first four years after the post-presidency are gone.

WICKMAN: And there is no way in this world that we can ever do anything about that except to try to insure that it doesn't happen again. And the only way to insure that it doesn't happen again is by programming, as I was saying a few minutes ago, programming this business of the presidential libraries.
SCHULZ: Okay. And this is why I said a little earlier that I recommended to Ted Clifton that the man—in this case President Kennedy. Now unfortunately he was assassinatated. I did make the suggestion. I didn't know whether Ted Clifton was going to be the guy. Nobody knows what would have come out of that. Maybe Kennedy would have seen it. He did listen to General Eisenhower, even though he didn't listen to him when it came to the Cuban situation. But that's a different area. But I do believe that had he lived we might have gotten toward that. Because Ted Clifton was most interested. I know he called me two or three times on the subject, once it was initiated by the change in the laws. What else did I want. And, of course, you know, Dwight David, don't you ever ask for anything in my name. Well it wasn't that. I kidded Clifton about the air mail and, you know, that kind of stuff. But I do believe, having lived through it, that it's going to be necessary because, again I say, things are getting larger, they're moving faster and unless you plan it in advance you're going one of these days get yourself in a hell of a mess.

WICKMAN: Yes. You know the other thing about the operation of this office as well as a presidential library when the president is out of office is that we are still doing things on a piecemeal basis that we shouldn't be doing on a piecemeal basis. Even in the day to day operation of the library and the relationship with the former president. When the former president is alive there
tends to be an attitude in the bureaucracy that says, "Well anything that he wants we'll do. We'll find the money, we'll find the people. We'll do this." Or, in the case of let's say the Kennedy Library, anything that the family decides they want, we'll do. And they manage this. You can go to the public record and look at the budgets for the last several years. Look at the Johnson Library budget, the Kennedy Library budget. No question about what's happening there.

SCHULZ: Well, you see—I've got to say one thing for President Eisenhower, General Eisenhower. And it's a little his fault. He would get an idea and having been accustomed to having a staff accepting that as an order, if you will, he then dismissed it because he had other things to think about. Now come back to this business of LBJ and Eisenhower. President Eisenhower's time was indeed very valuable. He made a decision. He would stick by it. And he figured it was done, you see. When he talked to you I think an oral history, he thought he had stacks and stacks or reels and reels of tape.

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: And it wasn't that way. But Johnson on the other hand, not being as busy. His time—I'm not saying he's not busy but his public service time is not being used like Eisenhower. Eisenhower was making speeches and he made less than he could have. He could have made a speech every day.
WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: But Johnson has time to follow up personally on some of the things that he wants. And if he doesn't get what he wants he picks up the phone and he talks to a Schulz in Washington or—when old Bob Kunzig was the administrator [of GSA] he would call in there, "Hey, what's going on here?" And he would get it done.

WICKMAN: Yes but that's exactly my point. That in getting it done he's taking away, he took away money from existing presidential libraries.

SCHULZ: Well he didn't care where the money was coming from.

WICKMAN: No, no, no. I'm not saying he cared or that he intended that. Not at all. Mr. Johnson and I get on very well and this is not any imputation of him. But what I am saying is that when these things are in the hands of the permanent bureaucracy the end result is that when the president, former president does this, the money, the personnel and whatever to do that job is taken away from--.

SCHULZ: I think this is why LBJ really thought this was a good idea. You know the story about Bryce Harlow taking the last draft of the executive order before it went in to President Nixon for signature. He passed it by LBJ to see if he wanted anything added or changed. And LBJ said, "I'll sign it right now. Let's put up a little ceremony." And Jim Jones had to tell him, "Sorry, it's Mr. Nixon's executive order."
Gen. Robert Schulz, 8-18-72

"Well why the hell didn't we think of it?!

WICKMAN: Yes.

SCHULZ: And I think that proves the value of this outfit.

WICKMAN: Oh yes. In the minds of any former president I don't think there's any question about their interest in the subjects and their willingness to cooperate.

SCHULZ: Well I think what I'm going to do. I'll be Peck's bad boy once more and maybe I can get this thought and maybe we can get the action started this year. Or right after inauguration. I think that's the time.

WICKMAN: I think it is too.

SCHULZ: Right now they're a little busy.

WICKMAN: It has to be done. If it's going to get done. I don't--and it's not going to be easy to get it done, but it's worth doing.

SCHULZ: Well I'll get it started, John. How's that? My contribution. I'll at least start it and let somebody else take--.

[End of interview]
This interview is being taped with Gen. Robert Schulz in the General's office on Connecticut Avenue, Washington, DC the date is August 20, 1974. Present for the interview, General Schulz. The interviewer, Dr. Maclyn Burg of the Eisenhower Library staff.

DR. BURG: We're discussing at this moment on the tape a history which General Schulz and Colonel [Richard W.] Streiff did of the office for liaison with former presidents. It's a multi-volume thing and estimates around ten brown folders. I think we have a copy, at any rate General Schulz has a copy. So what we're going to do this morning at least to begin with is to discuss some of the insider's picture that would accompany this formal document, this formal report on the history of the office, with General Schulz. What I was going to ask, General, is after you left Gettysburg, you came back down here to Washington, D.C.?

GEN. SCHULZ: Well, when you say I left Gettysburg, you imply that I left the General, which is not the case, which is I'm afraid what Mrs. Eisenhower thinks happened. But with the General's knowledge and the establishment or the acceptance of the establishment of the office which was not named at that time by president-elect Nixon, the thoughts were that Schulz, who was known when he was a captain by President Truman, when he was senator by President Johnson, as vice-president by President-elect Nixon and of course Eisenhower, that he, Schulz, would continue to look after General Eisenhower, you might say, with one hand and the other hand establish the office. And he would have a deputy, and that deputy was Dick Streiff, Colonel Streiff.
BURG: Were you given the opportunity to choose him, General?

SCHULZ: I thought of him immediately because he was known to President-elect Nixon and of course General Eisenhower who had a very high regard for Dick. Dick was a West Point graduate. General Eisenhower did not want the assignment to the White House again to be any hindrance to Dick Streiff's career. So when I talked to Dick as to the possibility of joining me, he very frankly said, "It'll take me twenty-four hours." But I didn't interpret it to mean that he was ready to go. But at any rate he came after the Army assured me that this would not in any way injure his, Streiff's, military career.

BURG: Who did you have to go to, General, to get that kind of assurance? Do you remember who it was you called?

SCHULZ: When I was military aide to the President, I got into an agreement you might say rather than going to the Secretary of the Army and whoever I wanted to, I asked for one person, one officer, in the chief of staff's office to be my "liaison", my one-man army, and he had authority to go up or down the chain of command at will.

BURG: So if you had a button to push, you knew who he was by name.

SCHULZ: That's right. And that man was in the Secretary of the General Staff's office. The particular individual at that time was Arch [Archelaus L.] Hamblen, [Jr.], who I think is now either
a major-general or retired. But, at any rate, Arch, having checked, he said, I can remember as though it were yesterday, he said, "No way. Two notations of being in the White House and particularly being asked to come to the White House, that wouldn't hurt Streiff's career one bit." And I gave General Eisenhower that assurance on my next visit to the hospital. So he said, "O.K.", 'cause he liked Dick very much. So then as the executive order was being formulated, my actions were to, you know, find a location.

BURG: What was the date, by the way, General?

SCHULZ: Of the executive order?

BURG: When you're getting rolling on this, you're picking Streiff--

SCHULZ: Well, that goes back to--the day after election, if you'll recall, President-elect Nixon headed for Florida, and on his way he stopped at the hospital.

BURG: '68?

SCHULZ: Yes, this was November, '68. But the concept of the office developed, I think, in the General's mind or was sparked again, if you will, by the General because I recall on one occasion, and I have a note in here as to who the governor was, but one day a call came in and this voice asked for the General and he knew my name. He said, "Bob, could I speak to the General; this is Governor so and so." It may have been Anderson; I don't know who.
BURG: But you have a note on it.

SCHULZ: No, I have a note to try to find out who that governor was. I switched him through and walked into the General's office, telling him who was on the line which was a practice with people I knew he would talk to almost immediately, people that he knew never were held up. And he asked me to listen in which I did. And the governor, in very simple terms, said that he was looking for a job and he needed help and this really hit the General hard. And as he very often did, sort of talking out loud to himself after the conversation, "Did you get his address," and all of that.

And I said, "Yes."

He had hit the button and I went back in. And he said, "I can't understand this. Here is a man that has run a state, certainly knows budgets and can't get a job of any consequence." And he said, "This is wrong. Why don't we utilize people like that?" And that bothered him, tremendously. At any rate, he called a couple of friends and immodestly I made a suggestion, so a job was obtained. But this was way back what, '62, maybe, you know, early in the Gettysburg detail, as I choose to call it.

But periodically this incident would come up in his conversation; I would be present or not. I mean, it wasn't directed to me, but he was talking we'll say to George Humphrey, who was still living of course, and he would say, "Well, it's wrong. Now here we're looking for people and then like so and so couldn't find a
job and what's wrong? Why can't there be a continual liaison," (he didn't use the word, liaison,) "dialogue," he didn't even use that but "contact with these people. After all, the fact that they were voted out of office for some reason or another doesn't make them any less capable; we should use this vast resource of knowledge." O.K. so this also developed, oh, I'd say during the campaign. I talked to Kevin McCann. Kevin was saying, "Well, [Lyndon B.] Johnson certainly has been using the General, to his own good." Of course the war was on, you know, and Johnson would confer either direct or through Andy [Andrew J.] Goodpaster or somebody would come up to visit the General and theoretically to pay their respects, but it was all geared to Johnson wanted to know something. And I can remember occasions when President Johnson wanted secret meetings. I remember one very well he had headed out for some place, it was non-political, therefore we did use military aircraft. And apparently the word was out whenever Schulz asked for an aircraft the word got into Clifton's office or to the President somehow and he'd call, "Ike, I want you to use," or, "General, I want you to use--" (He never called him Ike come to think of it.) At any rate, "I want you to use one of my planes."

BURG: He would actually be in touch with you himself.
SCHULZ: Ah yes, Johnson? Many a time and that first time I almost pulled an awful boo-boo of saying, "Yeah, I'm Julius Caesar," like some telephone operator did when President Truman called President Eisenhower in Kansas City which ticked Truman off, you see. Of course he made a mistake of making the phone direct, but he was at home, the General had completed his speech at the Future Farmers of America or something like that where he made that famous comment about the various types of cattle and he turned around to Harry Darby and said, (he mentioned the Galloway) "By the way, Harry, whatever did happen to the Galloway?" And it just broke the whole house up. But at any rate, Truman made this call afterward and wanted to talk to him, and this telephone operator when he said, "This is Harry Truman."

And she said, "Yeah, I'm Julius Caesar."

He said, "Well, I want to speak to the President."

She said, "He's gone to bed." Which turned out to be true, you know.

BURG: So when Johnson called in you darned near did the same thing. [Laughter]

SCHULZ: Yes, I almost did but I didn't; I said, "Yes, sir."

"I understand the General's going to such and such and I want him to use one of the Jetstars. I want him to use this."

Then the next call I got was from Jack Valenti and he said,
"The President would like to meet secretly and he will meet him on the airplane out at Andrews, and nobody knows about this and I want you to keep it a secret."

And I said, "Don't worry about me."

So we came down in a chopper and we got in the airplane and minutes later another chopper comes in and here's LBJ. And Valenti's at the doorway and so am I, just outside the lounge area; both people knew that we were there and they were discussing the Nam war and certain logistic, I don't know just exactly, I didn't make any notes; Valenti made them because he represented the President. And Dwight David never asked me to make notes until afterwards to check his memory, this was just a habit. Well you know we got off and up in the air and the General was very, very quiet. He said, "Well why does he want to keep it secret? I'm not going to say anything to anybody. Say how's the ball game going, Bob. Turn on the radio." And there was a news break, you know, half hour. "President Johnson has conferred with President Eisenhower"--General Eisenhower just practically went through that airplane. "Why that dirty so and so. He told me to keep it secret and there he's blabbing it all over the radio," you know, so--

BURG: You were in the aircraft with Johnson in flight?
SCHULZ: No, no. No, no. Oh, I beg your pardon. The meeting took place on the ground. The pilots, everybody was shooed away from the area, excepting Valenti and myself; we were allowed. The secret service was outside the aircraft maybe fifty feet; nobody got anywhere near us, super secret meeting. So then Johnson left with Valenti and got on his chopper and off he went you see, and then we were now ready to take off on our trip. We were going to St. Louis I think or maybe, I don't know, Kansas City, I don't know just where; I'd have to look it up. But we were up in the air and I think Sergeant Moaney was with us, but I'm not sure. Moaney was in the plane or came on board later on, but just the three of us in this little Jetstar, and we were headed out to the midwest, and there was a ball game going on, baseball. So this was the reason we turned on the commercial radio, and, well, there it was.

BURG: He was just a trifle unhappy that the top secret meeting was publicized within minutes after it occurred.

SCHULZ: Yes, within the hour, you know. Not so much that it was publicized, but then why go to such a great length of making it a secret and keeping him on the basis of, you know, you keep it secret, I can talk about it.
BURG: Was there anything said, General, to your recollection now, anything significant? In other words, might Johnson, had Eisenhower not told him what he wanted to hear, and the news from Eisenhower not been to his liking, is it possible that then all of that secrecy would simply have been kept firmly locked on as though he had never conferred with him at all? But maybe he got something from the meeting he could use and since he had something he could use, fine, that he would blow to the press.

SCHULZ: Yes, I suppose. I hadn't thought of it that way.

BURG: From what we know of LBJ, isn't that the way he would hedge his bets?

SCHULZ: Never thought of it that way, yes, I guess so, I guess so. But you see too many times Eisenhower was, you know, known he will support—and he made it public—"I'll support you in international affairs, but there is a big difference between your domestic policy and mine," and that's been published. And no, I don't know what happened. It was just that he wanted to be the one—that's the way I looked at it— I mean, Johnson wanted to be the one to break it to the news. He didn't realize that General Eisenhower could care less. He didn't need any popularity; he was popular.

BURG: That could be too. Do you happen to remember offhand on the next occasion that Mr. Johnson talked to the General, did the General chide him about that?
SCHULZ: No.

BURG: It was never mentioned again as far as you know.

SCHULZ: You know they're way up there in that celestial echelon when they get to talking that I don't think there's time for that sort of thing. Now they may have. Now I was not always in on all the conversations, I don't want you to get that wrong, but when Valenti was there then Eisenhower gave me the nod and I stayed, see. It shouldn't be one-sided.

BURG: But that was an illustration then of how Johnson was conferring.

SCHULZ: Yes, a hell of a lot more with Eisenhower than people realized. Now, Kevin knew all of this, obviously, and so he got the idea that the perfect thing would be for there to be a means of communication, not disallowing if you will anybody to communicate direct, but to have a line of communication that was reliable and not kept from the press but would not be publicized excepting by agreement. In some ways it might look funny to John Q. Public that—gee whiz this guy is always going running and checking with somebody else about policy or about what happened here and so forth and so on—-and to avoid unfortunate things like the Truman-Eisenhower reported rift which never existed even though later on, whose book is it, Merle Miller's book [Plain Speaking] came out which would
support the idea that Truman was teed off at Eisenhower. If that's the case, they certainly put on a terrific act whenever they were together, and I mean act. I mean they were really good actors because I never saw it.

BURG: As far as you could tell they were friendly and--

SCHULZ: They were friendly. They had their differences of opinion, but I think it was, like many things, the press took something and made something out of it and the principals could care less. They're too big for that sort of thing.

BURG: How long did you watch this post-alleged rift sort of violated by their friendliness? This would extend throughout the presidency and after the presidency too?

SCHULZ: Well, yes. I can remember on two occasions that the General, or then President, made an effort for President Truman to be present under certain circumstances, you know, and President Truman declined because he didn't feel he wanted to travel. I don't know. I know that during the time the office of the former Presidents was in force, and he knew who I was, and I told him pointblank that he had the right to use military aircraft and we flew him down in an unmarked--

BURG: Harry Truman?
SCHULZ: Yes. We flew him down in an unmarked plane to Florida. There wasn't any reason why he shouldn't have it. That's one of the perquisites I guess you want to call it. But shoot, we'd take a sick senator and fly him on military aircraft. The only thing is, Harry Truman didn't want to see the air force name on it; so we have a couple of unmarked aircraft and we used one of those and took him down and brought him back again. Nobody knew about it. If somebody wants publicity, you can have it, you know, it's very easy. And Johnson loved publicity; he just loved it. I could not have gotten Harry Truman, I don't think, from Kansas City to Florida without—you know Johnson wanted people to know how nice he was—"now I let Harry fly in my airplane," you know, it's people. Eisenhower did many nice things for many people that have never been publicized. And this is what irks me when they say he was a do-nothing President. Oh, well.

BURG: Difference in the man. But when you were talking with Truman, you never ran into any reaction from him that would lead you to think there was bad feeling between Truman and Eisenhower?

SCHULZ: No, he made a point, "Be sure to tell the General and give him my warm greetings." And Mrs. Truman would pipe up and say, "Give my best to Mrs. Eisenhower, to Mamie." And I would always carry, you know, the same message. But, no I've never run across anything.
Gen. Robert Schulz, 8-20-74

BURG: We were talking about Kevin McCann kind of thinking about this sort of opportunity to assist--

SCHULZ: All right, so he discussed them with the General during one of his visits at the hospital. You've got to remember now the General was at Walter Reed, and we were just practically waiting for the day that he would be going back to Gettysburg; we were ready for him up there. But he'd ask for Kevin periodically. I would see the General—see I was living in Virginia so on my way to Gettysburg on a Monday morning I'd leave very early and I'd stop by Walter Reed figuring that I'd see him after he'd had his or during his breakfast, whenever the doctors allowed it, time wise, in case he had something on his mind or give him a report of his phone calls and some of the letters that he would get. You know, just communication report if you want. And then he'd say, "Oh, I want to dictate on that. Just put that with the stuff I want to dictate." And periodically he'd have his secretary come down and dictate letters. And so while they were acknowledged, usually by me, there were some that he had a thought, "Oh, yeah, that's right, I wanted to talk to him or to write to him about thus and so." So he would dictate. Then Wednesdays I would leave shortly after lunch and have with me mail that came in that he might want to see, letters for his signature. Then I would drop by the hospital and get there, mid-afternoon—just before, you might say, milking time.
BURG: You were coming down from Gettysburg.

SCHULZ: Coming down to Gettysburg on my way home, to spend the night with the family. And then Thursday morning it was the reverse; I'd stop by on my way in case there was anything. So in one of these meetings with Kevin, I heard about it through the General. He said, "Tell Kevin I want a memo on this liaison man." I said, "Yes, sir." I still didn't know what he was talking about, I mean, that's all right; Kevin would know. So I talked to Kevin and that's when I found out that this was in the making, as it were. So as an end result, Kevin, the night before election, I guess, Kevin said, "When you go down the next time, bring this paper to the General; he might want to give it to Dick [Nixon]." And that paper, and unfortunately I don't know where it is--the original, original, original outline--and it might be that Dick's got it in his papers if staff didn't throw it away. So the time when we knew that President-elect Nixon was coming to Walter Reed, the General asked me to have that paper out there on the table next to him.

BURG: I see, Kevin's original memo?

SCHULZ: Yes. Oh, I don't know how many drafts there were, but I mean this was it. And it was on his table when I escorted President-elect Nixon into the room, and it was not there when I came back in to see if there was anything out of that meeting that he, you know, any action to be taken.
BURG: You did not stay in the room during the meeting?

SCHULZ: Oh, no, no. And I don't think other than, I think the ladies might have—I think Richard Nixon was in the room and John [Eisenhower] may have gone in a little later, I don't know. But they were, I would say, were quite alone for a while and—as a matter of fact I can tell you how long if you're interested, I got the—you want the record on it?

BURG: Yes, if you have the record.

[Interruption]

BURG: You're reading from the log now.

SCHULZ: Yes, on November 6th, Wednesday,—

BURG: 1968.

SCHULZ: Yes. And at 7:20 at night there's a notation that President-elect Nixon and family were in there. "Nurse noted monitor stable throughout; observed by Drs. Hall and Bednick." This was on a scope outside the room. "Enjoyed the visit tremendously. Cheerful during and after the meeting." But it doesn't say how long—I don't have a notation on how long.

[Interruption]

BURG: We just talked about the meeting where the Nixon's dropped in on the General, and then you said, when the President-elect left,
the memo from Kevin McCann was no longer there by the table.

SCHULZ: Right. And I'm checking now, here in the first of these outlines, about the history of the origin and such--

[Interruption]

BURG: So the formal memorandum goes into the hands of the President-elect. Was he then on his way down to Florida?

SCHULZ: He was then on his way to Florida. With him of course was [Robert] Haldeman. I remember him because he was a little put out because he couldn't go into the room, and I arranged later for him to meet the President, Eisenhower that is. They had met I don't think before that, but at any rate there he was. I wanted to get Bebe Rebozo in; he was with the Nixon family. But I had to be guided by the doctors as to how much, confusion isn't the word, but activity because the General, he's in a sickbed; so you had to, but I could get signals from the doctors. And if somebody couldn't go in then I was a dirty so and so, you see, not them or not the General--Schulz was the one that kept me from the General. So I got these signals and I--

[Interruption]

BURG: You were saying that Rebozo and Haldeman on this instance were out there--
SCHULZ: Oh, yes. And I don't know who all, but I know Bryce Harlow was there. Now, General [Leonard D.] Heaton was really the guy that was giving me the signals, you know, how much activity. And Heaton and Kevin McCann were closeted in a room; Kevin was definitely interested in having me as the buffer between "the political--the President, i.e., and his people," you see. He was selling this idea of a liaison office even then to the doctor. Bryce Harlow was there; he was headed down to Florida with--. So he was told by Kevin McCann of this paper.

BURG: Bryce was?

SCHULZ: Right. Bryce thought it was a good idea of having such an office. I always say this, "they picked on Bob [Schulz] because he's just stupid enough not to know too much at the wrong time," O.K. [Laughter] But he never got involved with policy; he never opened his mouth unless he was asked, you know. So then, oh, gee, I've got to back up, because there was a birthday thing that Kevin McCann wrote a--

BURG: In October, of '68.

SCHULZ: October of '68, gee, I forgot all about that. Where Nixon's put out a birthday message, "Happy birthday, General Eisenhower," and in it, I'm reading now: "Today Dwight Eisenhower is seventy-eight, but he is no man of the past. He is still vitally concerned with today's problems and their solutions."
He is still inspired by his hopes for tomorrow and his plans for their achievement. The republic's first and most beloved citizen, he is our richest resource of experience, knowledge and wisdom, enlightened with a noble patriotism. Through the years ahead, the President of the United States should draw on Dwight Eisenhower in quiet days as well as troubled for the sage guidance and heartening lift he gives all who call on him. I, who shared with him the concerns of our nation for eight rewarding years and who through the eight years since have cherished his friendly counsel, intend to do just that should I be elected. I have directed my staff to prepare ways by which without undue imposition on him or trial to him, he can be kept currently abreast of the ventures, problems, and aspirations of the next administration. But today, whatever the future may hold for me, I join with women and men of all parties, all creeds, all lands, all races in saying a heartfelt happy birthday, General Eisenhower. May God give you many more years among us. Your friends."

BURG: So that's October 14, of '68.

[Interrupted]

BURG: So there had been some thought of this, some contact on this prior to and shortly after the election. In October there had been some, and it seems to me that I read in the history here that Kevin McCann had even talked to Nixon up in New York about it. That's probably why he refers back to it in October. Then they've got the formal kind of memo from Kevin which they pick up at Walter Reed.
SCHULZ: O.K. Now I get in the act because Bryce had asked me or Bryce asked Kevin who asked me, one way or another, to make a draft of an executive order. So I went to Bill [William J.] Hopkins and I said, "How the hell do you start making a draft of an executive order."

BURG: And he's executive clerk at the time.

SCHULZ: Yes. And I told him why, and he thought this was a great idea, this was what should have been a long time ago. So he was enthusiastic, and referred me to a man in the old EOB [Executive Office Building], you know the old State, War, Navy Building--oh, I've got that name somewhere--to sit down and get his counsel because he is the drafter, or one of the many drafters, of executive orders. So I gave the whole concept to him and in his very quiet and studious way said, "This is wonderful thing." So I met with nothing but, "yes, this is right," you know--"Gosh, it's daytime"--"the color is green", and so forth. Everybody that I even mentioned it to was enthusiastic about it.

BURG: All you had to go on, General, was the memo that McCann had prepared.

SCHULZ: Right, and conversations, I mean we'd talked about this.

BURG: Did the man who was going to do the drafting, did he remark--
SCHULZ: Well, no, he only gave me an outline, go ahead.

BURG: I was going to say, did he bring up the issue of, all right, what about the constitutionality of this, would there be any problems of this sort that he would have to face in drafting that executive order? The wording I suppose would have to be pretty careful.

SCHULZ: Yes, but all I had to come up with was an outline, which I did.

BURG: With that man's help.

SCHULZ: I turned that over to Bryce Harlow, who after all is a master at this. I don't know, let's assume there were four or five drafts. Finally the last draft ready for the President's signature was passed through LBJ's office to see whether he wanted any changes, either strengthening or, you know, add or subtract anything. And a fellow named Jimmy Jones was the guy, through Bryce Harlow, that carried the ball, you know, carried the draft. It was reported back to me that LBJ said, "Gee, let's have a ceremony on this," and was already with the signing and photographs and all of that.

And Jones had to tell him, "Look, this is President Nixon's executive order."

"Well, why the hell didn't we think of this?" This was great; he was very happy with the thing.
BURG: So it actually was moving so fast, General, this is the transition period--

SCHULZ: This was before inauguration day.

BURG: Before inauguration, so they really moved with dispatch on the thing. But LBJ, too, thought that it was a very good plan, a good idea.

SCHULZ: Right. So much so that he had wanted to take the credit for it. But that pleased me; it really did. Then it dragged, then it fell between the cracks and, not to be bitter, but hindsight, and not to be a dead horse, I now can see what happened. I saw it a year, no, six months after the office was established. It didn't go through Bob Haldeman therefore it wasn't any good, and I never had the support of the staff; I felt this. I couldn't get to the President like, of course, it turned out many people couldn't get to the President. But being this close and having so much support from the people who really counted i.e., the President, Nixon, the former President, Eisenhower; the former President, Truman, the former President, Johnson; and loads and loads of what people called bureaucrats, people that make the thing run; they were delighted. Mel [Melvin] Laird was the first person to call me after he received a copy of the executive order and part of the order if you may recall says that--let me read it.
In section three, "The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council shall each designate a member of his staff as a point of contact for the Special Assistant." And then, "The Special Assistant may call on such staff to supply information and get assistance," and so forth and so on; then it goes on, for the other departments. Mel Laird was the guy that said, "Bob," and I didn't know who it was, he says, "Bob."

And I said, "Yes, sir."

He said, "This is Mel Laird." He said, "The man in connection with this executive order and I think it's great will be [David] Packard." And then he said, "I'll confirm it by letter." He was moving out, you see. I had no trouble getting to anybody. The State Department, they wanted to check with the secretary; he was, you know, not in the office. The executive secretariat was the key, that man. [Richard] Helms at CIA, he selected a man who already was, you might say, White House oriented and was also his personal representative. And so we had no problems.

BURG: But when did you first know for sure that this was going to be your baby? You had drafted the executive order, but did you know--

SCHULZ: Well, it was--not a forgone conclusion. It was Eisenhower's idea, and I was acceptable.
BURG: And McCann had pushed you too with Bryce Harlow--

SCHULZ: Well, yes.

BURG: And do you happen to remember on what day and in what way it was formally announced to you, the word was given to you?

SCHULZ: I got a telephone call from Bryce Harlow saying the President had signed the executive order and you better get to work.

BURG: February of '69?


BURG: And you were at Gettysburg at the time that you got that phone call, or were you here at home?

SCHULZ: Let me tell you where I was; I don't know at the moment. [Pause] On February 14, I must have been at Walter Reed, it was a Friday, because the General dictated to Warrant Officer Hoffman, and I brought him to the hospital so that's how I know I must have been there; he dictated for an hour and ten minutes. Then he had an hour with Arnold and Winnie Palmer. In the afternoon General [Earle G.] Wheeler came in for a half hour, and then David and Julie [Eisenhower] were in for an hour and a half. So I must have been at the hospital on the 14th when I got the word.
BURG: You were told that and Bryce Harlow made the call to you; he told you that the President had signed the order and you'd better get to work. And in effect, General, when you got that call, "You'd better get to work," you didn't have a bloody thing. You didn't have a place to put this office.

SCHULZ: Bryce said, "Where do you want to set up your offices--"

BURG: And that's on this call?

SCHULZ: Yes. "--in the east wing."

And I said, "Well, Bryce, I don't think that would be proper."

"Why?"

And I said, "Well a former President based on Eisenhower wouldn't want to have an office in the White House." Now maybe Bryce was kidding me, you know, when he said the east wing.

He said, "Well what about the Executive Office Building?"

And I said, "Well, that's still part of the White House, and besides it's drafty," or something like that.

And he said, "The New Executive Office Building."

And I said, "That's a little more like it."

Well he said, "Why don't you come down?" That was it. And he had offices there. So that's when we selected—or not that minute I mean—that weekend I got on the seventh floor, that would be made available. I think Vice-President [Hubert H.] Humphrey was on the sixth floor.
BURG: In the New Executive--

SCHULZ: Yes. And the transition offices were there; so that's where I went. And we had room 7001. And then I took a floor plan and made a little conference dining room and a little kitchenette where we could serve lunches if need be, and the President would have a corner office and it would overlook Pennsylvania Avenue, that would be, what, the southeast corner of the building. And then we had to get a little private powder room you know, and the staff room was at the other end and a highly secure area with a vault door and all that jazz. As time went on we were looking out, watching the reconstruction of Jackson Place. And I kept watching this one building because it had an elevator, and so I nosed around and found out that it wasn't earmarked for anything.

BURG: Who was doing the reconstruction?

SCHULZ: What do you mean, who, some construction company.

BURG: But it was federal government offices.

SCHULZ: Oh, yes, this was Mrs. Kennedy's--remember, or you may not. The original plan for the block bounded on the south by Pennsylvania Avenue, on the north by Eighth Street, on the west by Seventeenth Street, and the east by Jackson Place was scheduled to be torn down.
And Mrs. Kennedy, you know, wanted to save these places, and did. So that's why the then Federal Building Seven and now known as the New Executive Office Building, the main entrance really is on Jackson Place, although everybody uses Seventeenth Street thinking that's the main entrance.

BURG: But you can pass through that courtyard.

SCHULZ: But you can pass, all right, that's the formal entrance to the New Executive Office Building, the fountain and all that. On the other side of Lafayette Park you'll find the same type of building and that's the judicial center and the Taylo House and the Cosmos, old Cosmos Club and all those houses have been saved. Justice Clark has an office there. So I had this one building and I noticed that it had an elevator. Well, to make a long story short, that's where we finally ended.

BURG: Who did you put your request through?

SCHULZ: I sent a memo to the President, that was my boss. But then it got lost between the President and the third or fourth echelon, and I'm being sarcastic, but beneath Haldeman, see--because he had all these young kids around there and they thought they were the general, they were carrying the general's stars, and that's an old military saying--but they thought they were quite something. And this is when I sensed for the first time that I
wasn't getting any cooperation. So I went around end as it were and got the word in, and I got approval.

BURG: How did you do that?

SCHULZ: Well, that's my secret.

BURG: There was a way that you had though of getting through to the man on top.

SCHULZ: Yes. You see they were so God-damned smart they out-smarted themselves. They forgot that I know every corner of that building, of the residence, of the west wing and of the east wing. And I know people. You know your regular public servant doesn't forget, and I used to go back into the White House and they were moaning, "Gee, it's sure different; you don't get a smile any more or anything like that," and, "Everything is by the number;" you'd think I were back in the marines with some of the uniformed people. Dick [Streiff] and I would walk into the White House and we'd see a plumber or a carpenter or somebody that we knew--oh, my God, it was old home week. And these kids looked down on us you know, "Oh, you don't talk to people like that; they're carpenters." Well, bull tinky. I mean--we weren't built that way, and we weren't raised that way, and we weren't trained that way. Eisenhower would stop and chat with people all the time.
BURG: So you used your own technique to get that memo up there where you wanted it.

SCHULZ: I got the concept, then the memo had to be found, and then it was approved. And all of these things, obviously, I see now were working against Haldeman's method of operation.

BURG: When you put that memo through for the first time suggesting that place on Jackson Place, about how much time had you been in the New Executive Office Building? Was it maybe within two months or so, three months?

SCHULZ: Oh, no, it was a little longer than that, might even have been the next year. I honestly—you see, those copies are in the files of Nixon; they're going out to California, I think, or at least they should be out there.

BURG: Well we can check that out if we need to.

SCHULZ: Unless they're in the private files of Haldeman; I don't know.

BURG: Within a year you find out that the President's, Mr. Nixon's, lower echelons from Haldeman on down, you find that it's a different ball game when you're dealing with those people.
SCHULZ: There's no ball game unless it's theirs.

BURG: There's no ball game except theirs. As you think back on it, General--

SCHULZ: And I've been so accustomed to doing things that would be helpful to my superiors, i.e., the General or the President and so forth. I go back to Johnson saying, "Why the hell wasn't this my idea? Our idea? Where were we? We should have done this?" You see?

BURG: Now, as you think back on it, General, was there a way that you could have made contact with Mr. Haldeman and knuckled your forehead in the proper way and perhaps gotten access through him? You said for example that he seemed a little miffed when he didn't get to go in with Mr. Nixon into the General's bedroom at Walter Reed. Later on you secured an introduction for Haldeman to the General, but evidently that wasn't enough, that didn't do it.

SCHULZ: Well, I don't know. You see, it may be part my fault, Mac, I don't know, but I was so accustomed to conducting business a certain way. I recognize that Bob Haldeman was between anybody and the President, somebody had to be there, you see. But they took away the business of the senior people being the secretary to the President, who, for years it was the appointment secretary who was known as the secretary. The press secretary was on an equal
line, if you want to go on organizational chart. And I've heard many times, in the line of precedence, in the pecking order, you know, who is first, the secretary or the press secretary. They're so even in the eyes of the Presidents that I knew, now I go back to Roosevelt and Truman and Eisenhower. These jobs were parallel, press secretary and the secretary. The secretary was, as I say, primarily the appointments man, and he was the keeper of the door; nobody dared go around him, you see, unless it was a personal matter. So I thought, O.K. this was where Haldeman would be. But, no, he had Dwight Chapin made the appointments secretary, but Chapin was Haldeman's man; he wouldn't dare sneeze unless Bob Haldeman said it's O.K. So no matter how close you were to the President, if you wanted an appointment you went to Dwight Chapin and then Chapin would check with Haldeman. And if Haldeman said, "No, I don't think Mac ought to go in there." That was it, period. And that's why all these, you know, the cabinet people couldn't get in.

[End of interview]
This interview is being taped with General Robert Schulz on the 24th of June, 1975 in General Schulz's office at 1511 K Street, NW, Washington, DC. The interviewer is Dr. Maclyn Burg of the Eisenhower Library.

DR. BURG: Now when we were talking the last time, we had established the office for liaison with former presidents, and we had established where that office was to be placed, and we'd begun to talk a little bit then about your experiences with some of the White House staff of the then President Nixon. And it seems to me that you had some problems with that office simply because of the way the Nixon White House was organized.

GEN. SCHULZ: The problem in a nutshell might be the fact that I did not know how Mr. Nixon worked. In other words, my efforts with General Eisenhower developed a certain routine he liked and I was trained into that routine by my predecessor--I mean Jim Stack and Craig Cannon, Pete Carroll, all had worked with the man. And so I had this training you might say as to how he liked memoranda or when do you bother him, and when are you on your own. I took as literal the fact that I was a special assistant to the President and therefore I assumed that I reported to him in person when he desired it and in memorandum form under other circumstances.

DR. BURG: This had been the procedure in the Eisenhower White House.

GEN. SCHULZ: That's right.

DR. BURG: For special assistants there.
SCHULZ: Now of course, we had Carroll and [Andrew] Goodpaster as staff secretaries, we knew that we could work through them, again it depended on the importance of the subject. Well I thought it was rather important that the President be aware of any actions that involved his predecessors. After all, that's a very exclusive club you might say--President of the United States. Our efforts with Mr. Truman were easy to process, we worked with Bob Adams. They were all administrative things, nothing of great importance. We offered him, President Truman, briefings, if this is what he would like--in other words, just opened the facilities in any way that he wanted. He decided he did not want any briefings on the war in southeast Asia. Contrary, Johnson did. So we went around and developed a program that he would get a briefing every Friday. Well, initially, it was in person and then it developed that we could work up a paper for him. So we'd dispatch a courier or a plane or what else have you. In some way or another he would get a paper or a briefing.

BURG: So actually with Lyndon Johnson, the paper would have been carried out to him or the person--

SCHULZ: Right.

BURG: --to do the briefing would have been carried out to him. Once a week, roughly?
SCHULZ: Yes. This was once a week. The briefing, the paper--I'm trying to recall how we first—for about six months there were—of course, Bergstrom [Air Force Base] is down there so there were planes going down that way anyhow. And we decided, well why should there be need for a body to go along with it, and we checked out why does an officer have to carry it when a military plane, which is in command of an officer, could carry it down and another officer from Bergstrom can bring it over to LBJ's office. Well we worked on that and it worked itself out; so we saved a little effort there.

BURG: Now those briefings then, General, were not at such a high-level, the content of that paper was not at such a high-level that you needed to worry about security.

SCHULZ: Well we worried about security but there are ways of transmitting classified papers as long as an officer is responsible and signs for them. That officer then relieves his responsibility by getting another signature from another officer. In other words, the White House would send a cleared person to Andrews [Air Force Base] and the officer flying the mission would sign for the packet or the paper or whatever, and then he would carry it to Bergstrom. And very often the flights were faster that way than if we would have set something up. But it would be officer to officer to officer, all having clearances.
BURG: So only a cleared officer was used.

SCHULZ: Well that's SOP, that's not just in this instance. I mean in material that came up to Gettysburg an officer or a person cleared for the purpose was sent to Gettysburg. Didn't happen often, but that was the way it was. Now there were occasions that LBJ wanted personal briefings. I remember one instance that we got the Commandant of the Marines, I guess it was, flew him out there, because this is the way we saw it. Now we knew that the President was aware of what was going on because we had to set it up, and obviously somebody was going to, I didn't have to say, "Well, Mr. President, we're doing thus and so." I mean, this is staff work. But gradually I got to a point where I wasn't too sure. I thought it would be proper --let's put it this way, for the President to know that I was going to see the people down there [in Texas] to see if everything was going all right. I would stop at Abilene, and you know the routine, thinking well maybe he would send a little personal message or he might call me into the office, say "Well, when you see LBJ," you know, "say hello," or this that or the other thing or hand me a letter. I didn't know. Again, I didn't know how he operated. And I had no way of finding out because if I put in a call for Bob Haldeman, who I thought was the logical person to brief me, if briefing is the right word, to administratively say how things are going to be done from here on out--I thought that would be the
logical guy. But I never could get to see him, even to ask a simple question. You know, how do you want me to operate? I have a feeling—I've nothing to prove it one way or another—that because this entire office was established without his knowledge as it was progressing—it was done as you recall (I don't know if this is on tape or not)—

BURG: Yes, it is.

SCHULZ: All right. That it was Eisenhower talked to Nixon and it was implemented by people like Kevin McCann and Bryce Harlow. And Bryce Harlow carried the ball to the, you know the paper, if you will, the actual executive order—that was done through Bryce Harlow, because Harlow knew what it was all about. He had lived all of this sort of thing. And, with due respect to Bob Haldeman, organizing an office, he wouldn't know the need here. You follow me? This is no disrespect to Bob Haldeman.

BURG: And I think you mentioned to me, General, that out there in the corridor at Walter Reed Haldeman had seemed a little miffed with you because—

SCHULZ: He couldn't get in to see the General. Well, that's right. But there are other people that have been miffed, but I mean you don't, at least—. If he continued to be miffed, I'm surprised. I thought he was a bigger man than that. But I had that feeling.
Well, there's nothing I could do. He was a sick man. And of course now I perhaps realize it when I didn't at that time. That medical people, maybe the man himself knew there was a limit to his being with us. I never thought—I felt damned sure he was going to get back to Gettysburg. I was so—I was just waiting for that day—well, okay.

BURG: But Haldeman then right from outset, when the office was actually functional, Haldeman did not at any point call you in and say, "All right, Bob, would you give me a rundown on the office for liaison with former presidents. Tell me how you--"

SCHULZ: "What you going to do?"

BURG: "What are you going to do?" He never did that?

SCHULZ: No, but I figured that to mean that I reported to the President, that this was the President's baby. And frankly, I think that's the way it should have been. In other words, President to President. There's nothing in that executive order that would change that. If the President of the United States wants to call anybody, you know, this was the point that Eisenhower brought out. That, "what do you mean, I'm not going to be able to call up?" Well, that was not the object. Then the wording had to be very clear to historians and others that this was a means to relieve the nitpicking business between Presidents and also to give them another safe channel, if you will, through which to work. If you make a lot of
detours, then the value may be questionable. In other words, if it had to go to the President, to Haldeman, to Schulz—you know, there's another step there. And I think the object was that it goes to the President to the liaison man, whatever his name is, to the other former Presidents.

BURG: And vice versa, from the former President back.

SCHULZ: And vice versa. But LBJ, let's be very honest, LBJ liked to get into everybody's department. He was that kind of a man in the way he operated. It was LBJ, period. And he used this man for this purpose and then he'd have somebody check and make sure—not to check up on—but you know. General Gruenther was a little bit like that, to protect, especially if an officer was new in the thing. He would have a shotgun man—you know what I mean—somebody ride shotgun for him for a little while until--

BURG: Until he saw that he caught on.

SCHULZ: But LBJ, no he—if it was General Eisenhower needed a helicopter, he called to make sure that—you know it was unnecessary. But he just wanted to make sure that it was "one of my airplanes that he was going to ride in." But then when you get down to the details of the time, you know, then they get on an aide level and all of that settles down. You get the good plane, but you don't get the President's plane, you get one of them.
BURG: So, the way then that you saw it working and that you assumed from Haldeman's inaction, the way he saw it acting would be that the contacts would be either in person or by memo with Mr. Nixon.

SCHULZ: That's right.

BURG: Now, did it in fact work like that?

SCHULZ: Well, it did for me because--now this was well over a year after this I'm talking about now--

BURG: A year after the establishment of the office.

SCHULZ: Right. It was established on the 14th of February, 1969. But, after a while, after the first trip for example, I made a report. It was a one page thing. And I don't know at the moment, I can't recall what it was, but I decided that I would give them, you know, the alternative--we can do it this way; we can do it that way; and then unless directed otherwise I will do thus and so--a little thing that I had picked up from my days with General Eisenhower. This was after my heart attack and all that sort of thing. Well, I didn't get any answers. I wasn't directed otherwise. So I did it. I forget what it was. It was very minor, Mac, and it amuses me because what happened by the time this went through the layer of the Haldeman buffers of which there might have been three or four and got to Haldeman, the deadline had passed; I had done it anyhow; and I
would say they just shoved it in the pile and let it go at that. This indeed must have happened because there was one thing that, you know, was I going to go on a trip or not? And I said it, "unless directed otherwise I will be leaving on such and such a time." Well you know, I don't say it's dirty pool, but what the hell was I going to do? Do you see any other--? Little nasty isn't it? [Laughter]

BURG: You didn't call them up as the deadline approached for--

SCHULZ: I put in calls for Haldeman; he still has to return them.

BURG: Ah, really.

SCHULZ: Yes, because I had too many people that had to know the same thing. I said, "Well may I speak to Bob Haldeman? Or may I come over there?" Finally one day we had a nice meeting with [Alexander] Butterfield. I forget what it was. He was trying to play Solomon there for a while. But that's as far as I got in the chain of command, which I never knew existed till I read it in the papers.

BURG: You got as high as Butterfield.

SCHULZ: Yes.

BURG: From that meeting was there any result from your standpoint; any positive result that said, "From now on, General, this is the way you ought to do it?"
SCHULZ: Yes. When it comes to these matters, come to see me. Well, it was pretty well boxed.

BURG: He had a certain realm of responsibility--

SCHULZ: Butterfield, yes.

BURG: --which only covered part of what you needed to do.

SCHULZ: So I didn't bother anymore. I just went ahead and did what common sense told me was right and figured if, God bless my soul, if it isn't right, then they'll let me know. I never had any trouble.

BURG: Now for how long a period, would you say,--

SCHULZ: Till the end of--because when my customers died, I mean the end of the first term. I retired from government on the first of January, '73.

BURG: So that's the way you functioned up till approximately that--

SCHULZ: Till the office was closed. Because there were no--. Now as far as I know to this day, the office exists on paper. And I think the building--of course, did you read the paper here a while ago where [Donald] Rumsfield was pictured at a stand-up desk? That's my desk.

BURG: Oh, it is?
SCHULZ: Yes.

BURG: I didn't see the picture.

SCHULZ: The one I designed. Yes. Well, you saw it over there.

BURG: I saw it over there in the office.

SCHULZ: Okay. And the only reason I knew it because the picture was taken from the right-hand side of the desk, and if you'll recall I had a little pencil tray which was added on later on over there underneath there that slid out where just my pencils were kept. But as far as I know, the building is still the same and the furnishings are there and I don't know where my pictures are, but they did a right nice job. I know that Vice-President Agnew was in there, his staff was in there working on the files after he left the office.

BURG: That was the place that they had picked out for them to work on that.

SCHULZ: Yes. Which makes sense.

BURG: So the office is still in existence at least on paper.

SCHULZ: As far as I know, yes. Well they have a former President. But you see that circumstance is a little different. I'm surprised that I wasn't--quote "recalled" for a while--I'm glad I wasn't. But I'm surprised I wasn't. I would have done my job the best I could.
BURG: To handle this present situation.

SCHULZ: Yes. Even today, I mean he's entitled to certain things.

BURG: As a former President.

SCHULZ: Yes.

BURG: But they evidently made, even with that legislation, and my recollection is that you and Bryce Harlow conferred with respect to this; so the Ford administration knew very well that the enabling legislation had been passed, the office still existed on paper, there was the--

SCHULZ: Well, I don't know. I can only assume that it did.

BURG: Because you did call it to their attention.

SCHULZ: Ford?

BURG: Yes.

SCHULZ: Ford? Oh, I did through, that's right I did. But who through? Oh boy--

BURG: It wasn't Bryce Harlow? Seemed to me that you had talked to--

SCHULZ: Bryce wasn't involved in the Ford administration.

BURG: Well, who am I thinking of then?
SCHULZ: That's what I'm thinking of--who the hell would I call? Oh, I know who--Bill Scranton.

BURG: So they did know and you did go over and talk with them.

SCHULZ: I talked to Bill Scranton, told him everything. Then there was somebody else, but that was a Scranton man, so--.

BURG: Now let me ask you this: During that period of time then during the Nixon period, did the President ever get in touch with you; either through a memo from him or a call from him?

SCHULZ: No. The only time I saw President Nixon was at some ceremony in his office and the time he went out to California and stopped in Missouri and brought the piano to Mr. Truman, went through Mr. Truman's library. Now I was involved in that. He saw me there, greeted me, and somewhere along the line stopped to say, "It's a great job, Bob." Or, "You're doing a great job." Something like that. So as I say, from that I just assumed that I was doing the right thing.

Then one other time he was crossing over from the West Wing to his office in the old EOB; I knew he was headed my way because of the Secret Service preceding him. So in that little vestibule I just put my back up against the wall because I knew somebody was coming and he stopped briefly and shook my hand and he said, "You're doing a great job, Bob." That was my only contact with him in four years. Whoopee! [Laughter]
BURG: Well, from your standpoint, your years of being with Dwight Eisenhower, observing him in action, and thinking also, General, on the condition that Nixon had to cope with--the Vietnam war for example--is it your judgment that maybe it was a mistake for him to not use the contacts that he had with former Presidents?

SCHULZ: If Dwight David had lived longer, you see, he died shortly after inauguration. Well he died in March of 1969; so he didn't really get into Nixon's administration. Didn't live long enough. The confusion which I'm sure exists at any time when a new President comes in--as a matter of fact some of the old GSA [General Services Administration] types and I used to talk about it--"Oh, you know, give him six months, let all the newness wear off and their great demands for this, that and the other thing been all simmered down a little." And I always brought out the fact that these people don't know the first damned thing about the government. They don't even know where to get pencils, and they didn't.

BURG: People in the White House.

SCHULZ: But, by the same token, when Eisenhower's people first came in, it was done a little differently, if you'll recall. He had this guy, this Steffan--oh, boy--man died of cancer about a year after he came in and Pete Carroll and General [Wilton B.] Persons.
They were down there from, let's say, a week after election till we got there. They were the ones said, "That's your office, that's your office, you'll get a secretary"--I mean we had instructions how the hell the White House ran. Hold the machine a minute, I'll look.

[Interruption]

SCHULZ: Yes, that's the name--Roger Steffen. And according to this staff book, he did graduate work in New York. From 1919 to '52 he was with the National City Bank of New York, beginning as educational director and ending as vice president. In December 1952 he became informal business manager at the White House-to-be and served in that realized capacity as assistant to the assistant to the President from January 21, '53 to May 22, '54. And then Jerry Persons was involved with our getting acquainted. But you must realize Persons, maybe not Steffen--Steffen looked at it strictly from, I would say, as an industrial engineer, you know, the mechanics, how do things happen. Pete Carroll and Jerry Persons both were government oriented people; Bryce Harlow, you know, and, modestly, myself. I mean, I knew how things happen, when you're on an army level, when you're on an executive level. Within the White House, you knew that you had permanent people. Granted, if you didn't like them you could ease them out and so forth and so on, but there are methods of doing this. But also when you realize that the man, Bill Hopkins, who is just fabulous, and I hope you have him on record.
BURG: Indeed we do.

SCHULZ: But Bill Hopkins knew who Eisenhower—I mean he was at home here, you see. And in Bill Hopkins's shop, his deputy was a Wayne Hawks. Well Wayne was signal officer on Eisenhower's staff during World War II. So it's like, you know, you're welcoming an old friend into your home. So there was no mystery to a lot of people. Of course, there were a lot of people that, well I can't even think of one. I mean, Tom Stevens knew government from Governor Dewey's staff; I mean he'd worked in state government. Well, you say no or yes to an appointment whether it's the governor or the President—the procedure, your background knowledge of the individuals making the request. Jim Hagerty, again that was his business. And this is why I just was floored when I realized there wasn't one person, other than—if there were a half a dozen there were a lot, I mean, Bryce Harlow; modestly myself. The military aides' office—don't get me started on that ever—that was terrible—but at any rate. I can't recall anybody else that had background in the government.

BURG: In the Nixon crew.

SCHULZ: Anybody in the Nixon staff. And I think I've told you this, whether it was on tape or not I don't know. But when Dick [Streiff] and I used to go through the building, you know, to go from one wing to another, we'd see a carpenter that we
hadn't seen, "Oh, Charley, how are you?" "Oh, Colonel,"—even though I was a retired Brigadier, it didn't matter—I was Colonel Schulz to them. And they remembered us. They were happy. And you'd get these odd looks from the staff, "my goodness you don't talk to--", you know—snobs. Pure and simple. And it made us so mad. And we did it on purpose. We were a couple of "old nasty brats" running around there saying hello to the janitors and messengers and so forth and so on. But the looks, I mean we used to laugh about it.

[End of interview]