INTERVIEW WITH

Bernard M. Shanley

by

David Horrocks
Oral Historian

on

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for

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Bernard M. Shanley

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This begins an interview with Mr. Bernard Shanley at his law office in Newark, New Jersey. This is David Horrocks of the Eisenhower Library, May 16, 1975.

MR. HORROCKS: Mr. Shanley, by way of introduction for the tape, could you summarize your personal background?

MR. SHANLEY: All right. Well, actually I was born the fourth generation in this town, city of Newark, New Jersey. I was born here on Broad Street. I went to a small prep school up on the hill here, it's still in existence, called St. Benedict's Prep run by the German Benedictines, and I graduated from there in 1921. Most of my time in those days was spent in athletics I guess and not too much on the books. Because of the athletic background that I had, I was offered I guess at least ten scholarships in different colleges. I finally went to Notre Dame, and I was there a short time and my father was taken very ill and consequently I had to come back east; so I went to Columbia and there I played baseball with Lou Gehrig--

MR. HORROCKS: You were a roommate of Lou Gehrig's, right?

MR. SHANLEY: And we were, we were great friends. I was all-state guard here and pitched on the state championship
baseball team. So I finished at Columbia, went to law school, and my father died that year. I had to quit and so I had to go to work, and I went to Fordham night school while I was working. Got through law school, had no intention at the time of practicing but my father having died, I had nothing else to do so I started practicing. Did very well, I think, in the law business, and I established my own firm in the early '30s, which was a hard time. Then along came the war and it pretty well broke the firm up. I enlisted in the army and, never met Mr. Eisenhower, in those days. We were in a little bit different areas. So finally I got out of the army, and while I was in the army I met two very close friends from this area, both of them Democrats, and they urged me to get into politics. So when I did come back, I became involved with the Republican party in New Jersey and did a lot of work on the finance committee. As a result of this, they came to me in 1947, I guess, late 7, asked me, Governor [William H.] Vanderbilt of Rhode Island [1939-1940], if I would take on the Stassen for President campaign here in New Jersey. I sent him away because I had no experience and didn't think I was qualified. They came back again, and finally I asked that
they obtain the approval of the governor. He very much approved, and I took over the job in 1947 to represent him here in the state of New Jersey. That was my contact, first contact really, with politics and subsequently, I think I can jump to 1951—

HORROCKS: Going back for one question, did you have any contact or were you aware of any contacts with Eisenhower or any people connected with him in 1948?

SHANLEY: No. No, I don't think so. He had, I suppose had been mentioned as a possible future candidate for the--but everybody thought, I think at that time, that he might run on the Democratic ticket.

HORROCKS: So he really didn't run into your calculations or your work at that time?

SHANLEY: Not at all. I just thought that I should make some contribution to politics because, as Eisenhower used to say, it's the basis upon which we live. This is what controls our futures, and it's that important.
HORROCKS: What was your type of law practice? Who were your clients?

SHANLEY: Oh, I did mostly trial work, and I was starving to death at that point so I didn't have very many clients. There was a lot of my father's friends, those who could have given me business, who were doing business with a firm that I left. So I had a hard struggle. But, I don't think my clients were ever very important, but basically I represented a Mr. Hoffman who was president of a bank, president of numerous companies who had made millions of dollars, gone broke, lost it all and then made it back again. And he was my principal client, and as a result of doing work for him, I was able to obtain other work, other sources. So gradually I established in the early '30s, established this firm, which pretty well fell apart when I went in the army in '43. But when I got out of the army, the query was, "Do I start all over again and start building a law firm?" And I finally concluded it was the thing to do, and then it grew pretty fast. But unfortunately, then along came politics, and as I got involved in the Stassen thing and then subsequently, after I got out of the army, got into the finance committee here in the
state. And as a result of this, as I say, we had a meeting at Amos Peaseley's, a wonderful man, a Mormon from Clarksboro, New Jersey, later became Stassen's eastern chairman under our chief justice, Warren Burger, who was the national chairman. And they asked me at this meeting at Amos Peaseley's, there were about ten senators and maybe twenty congressmen, if I would run the delaying action for Eisenhower in 1951.

HORROCKS: And this meeting took place in the spring of '51.

SHANLEY: Spring of '51 in Clarksboro, New Jersey.

HORROCKS: Were [Henry Cabot] Lodge and [Herbert] Brownell at the meeting?

SHANLEY: No, neither of them were there. Although they knew about the meeting and knew what the proposal was, because a number of these congressmen had told them, and they felt very strongly about it that it had to be done, particularly Herb Brownell.

HORROCKS: And was it somewhat at their initiative then, that this was done--the initiative of Brownell, for instance?
SHANLEY: I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question.

HORROCKS: Was the meeting at the farm organized on the initiative of Herbert Brownell?

SHANLEY: I don't know. I thought it was organized, at the time, by these senators and congressmen--I'm sure he knew about it—that felt that Eisenhower was the one person that could win and they very much wanted to support him for the presidency.

HORROCKS: And what transpired at the meeting?

SHANLEY: That I, much to my amazement, was asked if I would head up the organization to run the delaying action in '51 for Eisenhower, whom I'd never met, didn't know, but I agreed with them that I thought he was by all odds the best candidate we could produce.

HORROCKS: And how did you conduct this delaying action?

SHANLEY: Well, what I did was, I picked out key people all over the country and then started to visit, particularly
those that were going to have primaries, primary contests or primaries themselves, in order to arrange, perhaps, the support of the key Republicans in the state for Eisenhower so that we could go in and contest in the primaries and in this way make certain that General Eisenhower would have a real opportunity to become the candidate. We felt strongly that if this weren't done, these two days at Clarksboro we discussed this in great length, if this were not done that Senator [Robert A.] Taft would definitely be the candidate and Eisenhower wouldn't have a chance of being nominated. It isn't as simple as a lot of people thought it was, that Eisenhower, all he had to do was fly back to the United States and he'd be the next President. We had a long way to go.

HORROCKS: Which particular state and party leaders did you contact?

SHANLEY: I don't remember them all now, Dave, but I do recall that one of the first I went to see was Sherman Adams who was then governor of New Hampshire. That was the first primary, as you know. And my own governor, of course of New Jersey here, and in Pennsylvania where one of the initial Eisenhower
activists was the governor who later became senator--

HORROCKS: Duff.

SHANLEY: Duff--Jim Duff and Jim Duff and I became very close friends. And then, of course, I moved out through the country. You know, California, I went out to see the governor, later chief justice, Warren, Earl Warren.

HORROCKS: What was your discussion with Earl Warren?

SHANLEY: Well, I said to him I thought that, of course he had ambitions of his own at the time as well you recall, but that I felt that Eisenhower was our strongest candidate, and what I was anxious to do was to pull all the Republicans together and not have the fractionated and going one way or the other, although I did appreciate that certainly he was under very strong consideration for the nomination. But he spoke very highly of what we were trying to do and very highly of Eisenhower. But I think I went to the governors first, and of course I had a good entree because all these senators and congressmen had spoken to their own governors, spoken to them.
HORROCKS: Had you had any, especially with relation to California, any contact with Senator [Richard M.] Nixon?

SHANLEY: No, I think my first contacts really out there, although I did know the congressman, he was a congressman then, he was at the meeting I believe at Clarksboro—I think he was there, quite certain he was there.

HORROCKS: Who were some of the other senators that were there—

SHANLEY: Senator McCarthy was there, Joe McCarthy: Senator Ed Thye of Minnesota.

HORROCKS: Was Warren Burger there at the time?

SHANLEY: Yes.

HORROCKS: He was at the meeting too?

SHANLEY: Yes. I really don't recall the others. I might have it in my notes which I took on the story of the delaying action which we call it. I'm sure many of them would be listed there. There were a lot of congressmen like Walter Judd and there as well—
HORROCKS: What was Harold Stassen's actual relationship to this?

SHANLEY: Well Harold was, as you know, had been a very, very important Republican—was almost nominated in '48, exceedingly well thought of by many of these congressmen and so forth, and he was a natural person to lead this because he was a national figure. And what we needed was somebody who was a national figure to go in and fight the battles in these primaries. This is, of course, again what I spoke to a lot of these governors about and senators that, you know, we were prepared to go in in these primaries where there was a contest, where they felt and we felt it was a wise thing to do and—

HORROCKS: New Hampshire, for instance.

SHANLEY: Yes, that was the first primary, and we knew that Eisenhower was very strong there and would be, and particularly with the help of the governor who was Sherman Adams.

HORROCKS: You were originally going to go in with Harold Stassen, into—
SHANLEY: Well, only as a stalking-horse--

HORROCKS: Only as a stalking-horse.

SHANLEY: You see that's what we used him for. That's what he agreed to and this is what it was agreed at Clarksboro. And, as I say, he sent me, which he had drafted, well it's more than a frame of reference, it was almost a manifesto as to what his position was in this thing. And his position was that he was going to be the stalking-horse for Eisenhower and that whatever delegates he picked up in the course of stalking, he would turn over to Eisenhower when Eisenhower returned.

HORROCKS: And, what happened when Eisenhower returned? Harold Stassen really didn't--

SHANLEY: Well Stassen went over to see Eisenhower during the course of this delaying action and had quite a talk with him--came back and reported to us, the hierarchy of this group, what had taken place. And basically it was that Eisenhower yet hadn't made up his mind or if he had, he wasn't going to disclose it, but that he was going to do so very shortly and
if he did, he certainly appreciated all the work that we were
doing on his behalf in this delaying action which we had
formed. And Stassen told him what his position was in it
and told us that he had told Eisenhower that he had agreed to
turn over his delegates when Eisenhower returned.

HORROCKS: And then what happened at the convention?

SHANLEY: Well, even before the convention, it became very
clear to me that Harold Stassen felt that there was some
question whether Taft could be nominated or Eisenhower could
be nominated. And I think it began to seep through to me
that he believed that it would be a deadlock between the two
and that he would be the man that ran down the middle, and
this I suspected for some time after his return from Europe
from seeing Eisenhower. And finally I had fairly definite
proof of it so I went down to Philadelphia on a Sunday after-
noon and talked to him about it and told him that I could
not countenance this and our agreement was that he would
turn over all the delegates he was working for Eisenhower, not
for himself and that this was my position and I couldn't
countenance anything else. From then on it was, I suppose
you'd say, there was quite a cooling between us. But we
went to the convention, and at the convention he told me I could attend the meetings of the delegation from Minnesota, but I could not speak. Then he had the suite out in Chicago, and I found out very quickly that he was dealing also with the Taft people on the side—maybe to curry favor with them so that he could perhaps get their delegates in the event that there was a tie-up or they would swing to him; they wouldn't be unfriendly to him.

HORROCKS: Did he at any point angle for a specific appointment under either Taft or Eisenhower?

SHANLEY: That I don't know. That I don't know. I think at that time he felt that the strongest thing was not self-advancement, but my political judgment would have been—I think it was probably his—that he did have some delegates. Theoretically you see, in Minnesota, the delegation could not legally switch to somebody else without his permission, it may have been after the first ballot, but it was at least that. I don't think that was even a condition. I think they had to have his approval in order to do it, but which of course they paid no attention to when we came to the convention.
HORROCKS: So really up to the final vote, or the vote when Minnesota switched, Mr. Stassen still wanted to retain his Minnesota delegation.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Yes. He told me so in no uncertain terms and as I say, he wouldn't even let me talk at the— but there was a big group of that delegation who had already switched to Eisenhower and made it very clear they were, and they didn't give a damn about— they weren't too worried about the legal implications of their switching and so forth, but they did. And I've forgotten how many delegates there were now, it'd be clear in my notes, nine or ten had completely switched to Eisenhower. Then came the convention, then came the vote, and Warren Burger, I recall, Senator Thye, came to me and said, "You've got to talk to Stassen. Tell him that the rest of the delegation is going to go for Eisenhower whether he likes it or not."

When I went up, had a private phone ran to Stassen's suite; I called him and told him this. He said, "They can't do it. They have no right to do it legally."

And I said, "Well, Harold, they're going to do it and that's that." And he was very irate and had hoped to hold this
group together and again the hope that there'd be a deadlock. But I went back and told Warren Burger and Ed Thye and I think Walter Judd, what the story was. So then we arranged to have Walter Judd go up and tell the speaker that Minnesota, as soon as the vote was over wanted to be recognized, which Joe Martin did and the rest is history.

HORROCKS: The President didn't really find out about Harold Stassen's actions until some time later, right?

SHANLEY: That's correct. Because Sherman Adams was a great supporter of Harold Stassen's, which I recognized when I went to see him initially in the early days of the delaying action.

HORROCKS: Was there ever any doubt in Sherman Adams' mind as to who he would have preferred at that early point? To follow through with Stassen--

SHANLEY: No, I think he was. I think in all fairness to Sherman Adams, I think Sherman Adams was strictly Eisenhower. But if there ever had been a deadlock, he would have cheered for Stassen because they were very close. He would not have been disappointed, I'm sure. Except that, as I say, I want
to make it very clear--I think he was wholeheartedly for Eisenhower; as far as I knew, he was.

HORROCKS: The general did have to come back from SHAPE perhaps earlier than he expected and had to actively seek the nomination.

SHANLEY: Or he wouldn't have been nominated.

HORROCKS: But which perhaps he hadn't anticipated.

SHANLEY: No, nor did the general public. The general public thought that Dwight D. Eisenhower, if he decided to become a candidate for the presidency, just would have walked in without any problem at all. Actually he was very fortunate to get the nomination.

HORROCKS: Was he forced into returning, was his hand forced because the stalking-horse idea was not working out?

SHANLEY: Well, it really did work out. The only place that it didn't work out—no, it worked out exceedingly well because if we hadn't had the operation, if we hadn't had the delaying action in '51, and with all due respect if Stassen hadn't been the stalking-horse, Taft would have been nominated. The
only disaster we had was in South Dakota, because we had done exceedingly well. For instance, here in my state of New Jersey, I think I indicated, Stassen got 3.7% of the vote, Taft got maybe 10.3% of the votes, something of that sort, and Eisenhower had the balance—he had 60, 70, 60 to 70, somewhere around 70% of the vote. I haven't got the figures right here in my head now. So Eisenhower came out of this thing, you know, well there was no contest. No, Taft had 37.5% of the vote, that's right. Stassen had 3.7% as I recall and yes, because Eisenhower had some 61% of the vote. So the delaying action was a great success. If we hadn't had it, I don't believe Eisenhower would have been nominated. The only disaster we had was—Brownell came here to the city of Newark to see me and Stassen. We met at the Robert Treat, and he said he did not want Stassen to go in to contest Taft in South Dakota. And I said, "Why?" And he said because he thought that it would be better to have Cabot Lodge, Stassen was too close to that area and so forth—which arguments didn't impress me or I'm sure didn't impress Stassen. But he wanted Cabot Lodge to handle the standard out there. Well, whether Cabot had urged this or whether this was—I don't know. But,
of course, Cabot had been one of the first and strongest Eisenhower supporters and so I said, "Well, this is your decision," because by that time Brownell had been appointed to handle the delegates for Eisenhower. He was in charge of it, and I was prepared to recognize that, of course.

So he said, "I don't want you to go in; I want to send Cabot Lodge in there to contest Senator Taft." So as I say, we both agreed it was a bad mistake to make and we told him so, but he insisted. We sent Cabot Lodge in and Taft slaughtered him, and as a result of which, we almost were finished then on the question of the nomination.

HORROCKS: So you really worked in very close liaison with Brownell in general on this.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes.

HORROCKS: Was Lodge--

SHANLEY: Because I remember one time Governor [Thomas E.] Dewey saying to me--I met with Governor Dewey and Brownell and, what was the famous--had much to do with my being on the campaign--oh, from Nassau, he was--

HORROCKS: Sprague?
SHANLEY: Yes, yes, [Russell] Sprague. I met with them in New York. And I'd never met Governor Dewey before; we became very intimate friends after that. But at that time he said to me, he said, "Mr. Shanley," he said, "I don't know you. I've never met you before, but I know from people that I have complete confidence in that they completely trust you. But they don't trust Harold Stassen." So there was this friction problem there too. Then, of course, we went into the convention and, of course, there our present chief justice, Warren Burger, played a very important part. And I think again, if the Taft people hadn't made the bad errors that they made in judgment on Louisiana delegation, the Illinois situation, what was the other--Texas--

HORROCKS: Yes, Texas was--

SHANLEY: --if they hadn't made the mistakes they made and the fight, of course they fought for the Texas delegation. They wouldn't give up any part of it and they insisted on all of it and as a result they got a bad beating. And this is the thing that--and even then it was nip-and-tuck as to whether
Eisenhower was going to be nominated.

HORROCKS: When Eisenhower actually formally announced his candidacy and actually came back, actively seeking, that must have changed the strategy in working with Stassen's campaign.

SHANLEY: Yes, but by that time you see most of the primaries were, the major primaries, were pretty well over. And our job was done, really, because we were certainly on an equal level, if not looking a little bit better maybe than Mr. Taft at that point of the game. But so I say, the Taft people had been working at this, as they did with Barry Goldwater in '64, they've been working on it for years and consequently the question was--maybe the delegates would go for Taft and not for Eisenhower although the public wanted Eisenhower.

HORROCKS: The real work of the Stassen group was really to keep the delegates that were chosen by the state party people.

SHANLEY: That's right. It also did indicate that the people in the country overwhelmingly wanted Eisenhower as President. And therefore, going into the convention, whether they were
committed to Taft or not, they had to recognize the fact that 
the overwhelming vote in this country was going to be for 
Eisenhower, as against Taft, and Eisenhower against Adlai 
Stevenson, eventually.

HORROCKS: Did you say you became friends with Governor 
Dewey or--

SHANLEY: Yes, we became very close friends. Matter of fact, 
he wanted me to go with his law firm in New York after I left 
the White House.

HORROCKS: What was his role in the administration or as an 
adviser after the inauguration?

SHANLEY: Well, he and Sherman Adams were not very friendly, 
number one. The President, although he thought greatly of 
Governor Dewey's ability, were not very close personal friends. 
I kind of fell into the slot because after the initial meeting 
with the governor, Governor Dewey, where he told me he didn't 
trust Stassen but, by his people, trusted me, we always had 
a very intimate relationship, and when he wanted something in
the White House, he came to me for it. He didn't go to
Sherman Adams; he came to me because our relationship was a
very close and very intimate one.

HORROCKS: Did he want many things out of the White House?

SHANLEY: No. No, he didn't. Of course, the answer was that
he'd already gotten a good deal, because his closest political
friend was Herb Brownell, and Herb Brownell was attorney
general.

HORROCKS: Did Brownell ever get caught in a position where
he was torn between his affiliation with Governor Dewey and
his new affiliation with the General?

SHANLEY: I don't recall any, really, Dave. Herb Brownell was
such a forthright individual and so was Governor Dewey. He
and the President were, Brownell I mean, and the President
worked in a very close, fine, had a fine relationship. And I
don't recall any. And, of course, I think I was the only
special counsel to the President that didn't fight with the
attorney general after we were both appointed. I went over
to see the attorney general, and I said, "Herb, I've got all
the work I can handle in the White House. You have all the work you can handle over here. Let's make sure that neither of us step on the other's toes. I think it's my job to, if something comes up I think is within your province or even I think it's in mine, I should call you and tell you what it is and ask your opinion as to whether you want to handle it or whether I'm to handle it." We made it very clear and the President made it very clear he wanted Herb to handle the appointment of district attorneys, U.S. attorneys, judges, et cetera, as far as making recommendations to him were concerned. So it was something I stayed far away from, because it was his prerogative; I had all I could handle. And consequently Herb Brownell and I never had a harsh word and I don't recall any case where, you know, his relationship with the governor interfered with, became in conflict with--

HORROCKS: So he never got into a tight spot--

SHANLEY: No. Eisenhower, let me make one thing very clear, Eisenhower thought a great, great deal of Governor Dewey's ability. I think personality-wise they just didn't, they didn't hit it off.
HORROCKS: Not the same--

SHANLEY: They weren't the same breed of cat, which is not maybe the way to put it. But it explains them. The fact remains that I recall vividly, when I first went on the campaign train, we were in New York and I was to take the President, or then the candidate, to Brooklyn to a veterans' meeting over there and to some other meeting. And then we were to go to a television studio in New York City where the governors had put on a very important program and Eisenhower was to come in at the end of the program and so forth and on television. I went up to pick up the President, he was with his brother, Milton, his doctor--Dr. [Howard M.] Snyder, my great friend, and I don't recall anybody else. And I walked in, Governor Dewey was finishing this particular program on television, and the President said, "Bern," he said, "I've just seen one of the, really one of the outstanding performances in all my life." He said, "Governor Dewey was just unbelievably, fantastically good, just absolutely perfect, couldn't have been better." Well that same day we were up in Westchester County at a big gathering, and the President was about to speak and Governor Dewey turned to his
county chairman, I've forgotten his name now, and said, "Is lunch all ready?"

And he said, "No, it's been cancelled."

And Dewey said, "Who cancelled it?"

He said, "I suppose somebody from the Commodore."

And I said, "Governor, nobody from the Commodore cancelled the luncheon." This was the sandwich luncheon we're to have on our way. This was Dewey's day because he was with Eisenhower through the whole time.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: We'll begin this interview now after a break for lunch, and we were talking about a lunch in Westchester County.

SHANLEY: Well, it was really a picnic lunch and it was to be between two major appearances that the candidate was to make in New York. The weather was fearful; we had terrible weather during that three days of campaigning in New York state. And the county chairman had told the governor, Governor Dewey, when he asked him, that the lunch has been cancelled. And somebody said that it had been cancelled by
the Commodore, and I spoke up and said that it hadn't been. With that the governor launched on the county chairman and took his hide off. And the President turned to me and said, or the candidate rather, and said to me, he said, "No wonder he never could get elected President of the United States."

HORROCKS: Not that touch.

SHANLEY: Oh, he was just cruel, you know. Mmm.

HORROCKS: What were your duties during the campaign, after the convention.

SHANLEY: Well they were numerous, but mainly they were to be with the candidate the entire time, to protect him, help him. A major candidate, or even a minor candidate, has got to have somebody with him during a campaign to fend off the well-wishers, to find out who to write to to thank, people who have got something to say to the candidate that he hasn't got the time to do it. Even to protect him physically as I had to do in Sacramento one time with Senator [William] Knowland, and I had my clothes ripped off my back. It wasn't anybody who was being nasty; they just went crazy; the women in particular went crazy when they saw Eisenhower. And, this was true.
Knowland was a very heavy-set, big, tough fellow. Of course, that's the reason I had recommended, and I think it was because of my pushing, that the Secret Service finally took over the candidates, but they didn't do it in our day. And we didn't have proper security for the candidate.

HORROCKS: As the campaign special was going around the country, you would make the appointments and control the access--

SHANLEY: Well, as we hit each state or each area, these people would come aboard, the senators, the county chairman, all kinds of well-wishers and so forth. And we knew pretty much the important people who were coming on, and our job was to take care of them, entertain them and talk to them, and sell Eisenhower.

HORROCKS: Were you on the campaign train when it went into Wisconsin?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Yes.

HORROCKS: And do you remember the meetings with McCarthy and [Governor Walter J.] Kohler?
SHANLEY: I didn't attend all of them. I was at one major meeting when the question was discussed, and the President was pressured into, I don't say appeasing, but not to completely break with McCarthy over [General George C.] Marshall and so he was very amenable, very decent to do it, but he was badly criticized for it by a lot of people because they felt that he had—which he never would have done because he adored Marshall and tremendously respected him as you know.

HORROCKS: Is there anyone in particular whose advice he particularly relied on--

SHANLEY: Well I think it wasn't that he did, but I think at that point he relied to a great extent on [Arthur] Summerfield, who was the national chairman at the time, and he was the one, I think, that was the prime mover to get Eisenhower to, at least not to openly break with McCarthy.

HORROCKS: Hadn't the General been anxious to avoid going into Wisconsin and that situation?

SHANLEY: No, you couldn't very well do it. You had to go in. It was just like [William] Jenner in Indiana, same problem.
And he told me that night, I'll never forget, he said, "He puts his hand on me once again, I'm going to knock him right off that platform." He just couldn't abide Jenner and this was a normal reaction. They could never get along.

HORROCKS: Jenner would have been a hard person to get along with in those circumstances.

SHANLEY: But there were a lot of other problems I had to handle: We did a lot of the scheduling; I had to take phone calls on and off the train. As soon as we'd stop, we had the phone system hooked in and we got the calls and we all had to split them up and take them. And then, of course, another thing, we had to make appearances periodically or handle special problems. They were about to fly me out to California to settle the problem as to this so-called fund that Nixon had, friends had set up for him and was causing quite a scandal and quite a, blew the, as you know, the thing into the great television performance. I was just leaving the train when the word came through that Nixon had signed up for this television program that night with Checkers, you remember the dog? And so it was called off. But you did all kinds of special jobs
like that.

HORROCKS: Who sent you in that case and what were your instructions?

SHANLEY: They knew that I knew the people out there and Stan Mullin and very fine people, very fine lawyer in Los Angeles who had set this fund up. They knew that I knew them and knew that I could talk to them because, you know, the rumors were rife as to what the fund was and all the rest of it when it was a perfectly legitimate fund that was set up to help a candidate.

HORROCKS: In fact I think he'd even mentioned once before to a newspaper, but hadn't picked it up. It was the New York Post, I think, that--

SHANLEY: That's right. But then you had television appearances. We hit New York and I debated [Averall] Harriman; I debated Jim [James A.] Farley; I don't recall what else. But, you know, you'd hit New York and there'd be a big television program and they'd ask you to go on it. And, of course, at that point I probably had three hours sleep in two or three nights and--
HORROCKS: Did they have a particular strategem for wooing away ethnic voters from the Democratic party?

SHANLEY: Well, not at that point, really. I say no—I think that's not quite accurate either. For instance in Chicago we had, you know Cary, he was the black councilman. There was a lot of work being done and then finally we, on the train, came young Morrow, you may recall, who, Fred Morrow, who later came to the White House and the staff, who Sherman asked me to take over and help. So these things were going on constantly independent of where you were, really, because, like up in Harlem. The President went up, he went to, up to Harlem and few people could have gone in there and gotten the reception that Eisenhower got.

HORROCKS: It was a tremendous reception?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes, it was fantastic, you know, because ordi- narily you'd have been, this is no battleground for a Repub- lican. But Eisenhower made a tremendous impression on these people there and I remember distinctly

HORROCKS: What sort of advance work would have been done in Harlem to prepare for that visit?
SHANLEY: Well there was a great deal of advance work being done as you know. One of the things that is fascinating was the famous balloon and Elizabeth Firestone, you remember. And her group, Citizens for Eisenhower, the young people, did a lot of that advance work and they did a lot of the ballyhoo, and they had a balloon in Wisconsin where he was going to be at a big rally, and the balloon would be up there floating around. But the advance work was pretty well done; it was pretty expert. And the rest, to a great extent, had to do with Eisenhower, you know. I never worried. We hit Illinois about the middle of the campaign and one of my jobs was to go around among the people and assess the crowd, the number of people, the reaction, et cetera. I always remember in Illinois, and being in a very large industrial area and we, you know you couldn't be on time all the time, and he was a great stickler for being on time. But we were some three and a half hours late to this one session in Illinois; we were supposed to be there, I think at noon, and got there about 3:30. But there were women out there with babies in their arms and a lot of them had waited that whole time just to see Eisenhower. And these were wives of the working people and
so, I remember saying to him that afternoon, I said, "Ike," we called him then, of course, "you can stop worrying."

He said, "What do you mean, Bern?"

I said, "You're going to get the big, you're going to get a tremendous labor vote, and the reason you're going to get it is because the wives are going to make their husbands vote for you, and it's that simple." And I told him what had happened at this, you know, that rally, and he was—. But that was one of my jobs, to just check the numbers and the people, the reactions and how things were going; it became pretty obvious. And then we were on the campaign train going through Minnesota and my great friend, Gabe Hauge, came out with a teletype that Truman had accused Eisenhower of pulling the troops back from the Elbe, the American troops, put the Russians in. Well, he orbited and it was the first time I realized that he had somewhat of a temper, and of course he was livid because it wasn't true. And he finally turned to me, and I'd only known him then a couple of weeks, and he turned to me and he said, "Bern," he said, "you know, I'll never ride down Pennsylvania Avenue with that so-and-so."

HORROCKS: Wow. So, had his—
SHANLEY: Then, I thought to myself, well that's all I want to know—he knows he's going to win.

HORROCKS: Was there ever any doubt in his mind about winning?

SHANLEY: I wonder now. And I wondered then because I thought to myself if he is so, if he made a remark like that, the answer was that he was pretty sure that he was going to win.

HORROCKS: Did he ever express any surprise at what he had gotten into?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes, because I don't think anybody could anticipate what you were getting into when you become a presidential candidate, the rigors of campaigning. We campaigned all day long and all night, and we'd arrive back usually at the hotel in some town at midnight, and he'd say, "Well, let's have a drink." We'd sit down and have a scotch or two and just chat, relax and then go to bed. And then it was my job to drag him out of bed at eight o'clock the next morning or whatever it was and then we're on our way again.

HORROCKS: His antipathy towards Truman predates—
[Interruptuation]

HORROCKS: General Eisenhower was willing to--

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. But I don't think either of them were overly anxious. But I felt strongly that the President of the United States, should consult with previous Presidents of whatever political color.

HORROCKS: Now on the campaign train you helped coordinate the President's schedule and appointments.

SHANLEY: We all did, really; there were just a few of us on there. You see, we weren't all on the campaign train. Some had to be in New York, the headquarters. Others had to be in other places. Cabot Lodge was hardly ever on the campaign train. I was on the whole time. Gabe Hauge was on the whole time because of the speech writing end of it. Sherman Adams was because he was running it. [Fred] Seaton was doing most of the scheduling, running the scheduling pretty much at that time. And that was about the--

HORROCKS: Was Frank Carlson on the train at all?
SHANLEY: When we hit the Middle West, he came on. Like most senators, you know, he came aboard then, but no he was not actively working on the campaign train. Had advises from him periodically, but no, he wasn't really an active member of the campaign effort.

HORROCKS: Where were you election eve? Were you with the General then?

SHANLEY: When did you ask?

HORROCKS: Election night.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes, sure. Well the last night of campaigning we came back from Boston, had quite a celebration on the train. And had a lot of fun. And I went back with him, he and Mamie, after the festivities; we had all kinds of entertainment. People like, what is his name, the senator from California, Frank, not McCarthy, Frank, the movie actor [George Murphy]--but there was a lot of entertainment, songs, singing and the like. We went back and had a drink together and we kind of reminisced a little bit about the campaign. And we were
talking about friendship and that kind of thing and got a little nostalgic and he said, "Well, Bern," he said, "you know, if I didn't see you for the next years, it wouldn't make any difference. We would be just exactly on the same basis of friendship we are now." He was very cute, he had a great facility for friendship and for people, you know, he was just a dear person. It was a hell of a comfort.

HORROCKS: How did you come to become special counsel to the President?

SHANLEY: I really went down there because they really didn't have a job to fill. Sherman Adams needed help, and therefore I was really deputy chief of staff and presided at the staff meetings and that sort of thing when Sherman wasn't there and I was, guess, theoretically the boss when Sherman wasn't there, the staff boss. And so it then happened that Tom [Thomas E.] Stephens had been promised the job of special counsel to the President when I think, as a result of Governor Dewey's President, for Eisenhower in the early days, and had been promised it. It turned out that Tom Stephens eventually became secretary to the President which
left the job open; so I took it over and I was acting special
counsel for a few months, I guess, and then I eventually was
sworn in as counsel.

HORROCKS: Between the election and the inauguration you
returned to private practice, law practice?

SHANLEY: That is correct; I was right here.

HORROCKS: You were not involved in the appointments--

SHANLEY: No, because I was doing all his legal work and that
took a lot of time. And I'd been away from the office so I
didn't have that kind of time, but he had a great deal of
legal work. People using his name for ads and all kinds of
things, and he had to put a stop to a lot of it. Somebody
was permitted, where we could do it, or it would be helpful,
but I kept pretty busy writing opinions and so forth for him.
And he was then in the Commodore, his headquarters were over
at the Hotel Commodore.

HORROCKS: As counsel to the President, special counsel, did
you deal very much in the early days with the independent
regulatory agencies?
SHANLEY: Oh, yes, yes, because there were a lot of matters that were going through these agencies that we were vitally interested in, not to influence them but find out where we stood with certain issues. Of course, as you know, most of these regulatory agencies were five-year term or longer, consequently you just don't, with a new administration, they just don't disappear. And you had the same, when you get an opening—and of course most of those regulatory agencies are quasi-judicial. They are fact-finding. They make absolute, not absolute, but final judicial decisions on issues. And, of course, as counsel I made a great effort to avoid attempting any way to influence any decision, but we had to know what was going on and as you do know, many of these agencies require a three-two; you can have three Republicans and two Democrats or three Democrats and two Republicans, but that is the law, so that they don't overload with one party or another. But your difficulty with those agencies is, and always will be under the present setup, that you'll have an agency which is completely out of tune with the philosophy of the administration, be it Republican or Democrat.

HORROCKS: Did you find this to be the case with any particular
agency?

SHANLEY: There was too many of them; I really don't recall which. In most cases, of course, pretty soon we were able, like one of the ablest men we had was, who was head of Federal Trade Commission, Jack Howrey, practicing law down in Washington now and head of one of the big firms down there—for the moment I can't think of his last name—and of course [Jerome K.]Kuykendall was head of the Federal Power Commission.

HORROCKS: Now Kuykendall was an Eisenhower appointment, right?

SHANLEY: Yes, so was Jack Howrey, who I think was the best man Eisenhower appointed to an agency.

HORROCKS: Kuykendall was on the Power--?

SHANLEY: Yes. He was supposed to become the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and I'm trying to think, oh, I know who it was—it was my old friend that was, became President of Jersey Bell—was a friend of his, Hornsby Wasson, who is now retired from California Bell. We brought him in to
Sherman Adams to have him appointed as chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. And he walked out of the office chairman of the Federal Power Commission.

HORROCKS: What happened?

SHANLEY: Well, one was open; they wanted to appoint somebody else to the other job and so that's the way it ended. But he was a good chairman.

HORROCKS: Was there some controversy with his appointment, especially with one or two particular senators?

SHANLEY: I don't recall it. There may have been; I don't recall there was. I never got involved in it to my knowledge. He had been in that type of work all his life, really. You know, he never really practiced law. He was the commissioner out in the state of Washington--power commissioner out there--and this has been his life.

HORROCKS: Were there any other particular problems that came up with the regulatory agencies in this period, adjusting from such a long Democratic reign?
SHANLEY: Well, I think the particular problem was the one I mentioned, that is, the philosophy of these agencies was not the philosophy of the Eisenhower administration--so it was a very difficult--and I think it's wrong. I think that those agencies ought to be on the political-philosophical plateau with the administration that's in power. Otherwise you get conflict; you don't get the cooperation; you get political issues rising which you don't want in those things. That wasn't the reason they were formed.

HORROCKS: Perhaps I'm fishing again on this--did you run into any real problems in appointments to these agencies, fights for position between Eisenhower and Taft Republicans, outside of the fact that there is a normal amount of that?

SHANLEY: Well--I didn't have too much to do with it. Sherman had more to do with that than I did, Sherman Adams. But, of course, Taft had a list of people that he wanted appointed to certain, into the government, and many of them were. Some of them were good and a lot of them weren't. [Clarence] Manion was one who was made the chairman of the commission that I
mentioned. It was a specially set-up commission to try to
determine between the states and the federal government who
should have what taxes and tried to divide up the pie in a
sensible manner, which it isn't presently divided up. Manion
was appointed to it and didn't do his job and I was forced to
fire him.

HORROCKS: How did he take that?

SHANLEY: Badly. Called me a few names as he went around the
countryside.

HORROCKS: How did Robert Taft take that—or was that after
Taft's death?

SHANLEY: Well, he wasn't too bad about it. It happened in a
number of cases. We had others I can think of that were Taft
appointees and they just didn't work, and some did. For
instance one of the greatest in the world was in the White
House. We had a number of Taft people there who were just the
greatest.
HORROCKS: Martin.

SHANLEY: Jack Martin was, in my book, one of my greatest friends and made a tremendous contribution to the White House.

HORROCKS: Was there a problem then, Taft having been in the party so long and having worked with so many people in the party structure for so long that perhaps, well, owing them things is perhaps putting it too strongly, but--

SHANLEY: Naturally he wanted a lot of these people appointed and he would--I never had much to do with it, Sherman Adams did. But I knew he had people he wanted appointed to jobs and a lot of them were appointed. I don't think he was too happy at the number, but he understood the problems.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: You were involved with revision of the Taft-Hartley Law?

SHANLEY: Yes. The way it happened was that we were having a staff meeting, I think on the minimum wage, in Sherman Adams' office and the President walked in and said, "Bern, I've got
a new job for you. Senator Taft's recommended that my
counsel be appointed the chairman of a committee to draft
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, because the senator
feels that it is the most important issue in the country
today." (Which is interesting because today I don't think
anybody knows what the Taft-Hartley Act is.) So I was
appointed and Senator Taft sat at my right arm for two days
every week for months and we became very close, very intimate
friends; he was a wonderful person. And the more you got to
know him, the more you realized it. I did normal courtesies
for him and took care of him periodically and so on. When he
left to die, because he knew he'd never come back to Washington,
to head for New York, he said to me, "Bern," he'd never called
me by my first name before and, "Bern, I just want to thank
you for all the courtesies you've given me over the long
stretch of time." I could have burst into tears and--well I
got him a car to take him to the station and so forth. I
went into to tell the President that he'd gone and I didn't
expect he'd ever come back, and the President burst into tears.
That's how close they'd become. And they really were very
close friends. He was a wonderful person when you got to
know him, but his personality was just—it wasn't there until you got under his skin and really got to know him intimately, you know. But he was quite a person. So he sat to my right, the commerce department, the labor department, numerous other individuals were involved. Secretary [Martin] Dirken was then the secretary of labor, and we seemed to get places and then he got across the street and talk to [George] Meany and Meany'd veto everything we'd done so that was the way it went on and on and on.

HORROCKS: Was that literally, virtually literally the case, that Dirken would go across and consult with George Meany and George Meany would swivel his head and--

SHANLEY: That's correct, that simple. So you really got nowhere with it until one time—I insisted that any draft of any amendment contain with it the message to congress, because otherwise it was meaningless. And the secretary of labor came in with a proposal, which I would have opposed, which we would not have sent to the congress because I wouldn't have permitted it to go, and it got leaked out to—well it went to both chairmen of the labor committees and the third copy was in my desk.
It got leaked out to the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Wall Street Journal* published this as a proposal that Eisenhower was going to send to the congress.

HORROCKS: Do you know who, or where the leak came from?

SHANLEY: Yes.

HORROCKS: Where?

SHANLEY: But I haven't said anything about it. The man is still alive and I just don't want to--he doesn't know I know it. But I know where it came from. It did a lot of damage because I was accused of being a left-winger and all the business people wanted me to be fired, and then the labor boys decided that I had leaked it out purposely to hurt them and then they wanted me fired. So the President called me in and said, "Bern, you're really taking quite a beating."

And I said, "Yes, I am, Mr. President."

He said, "Just remember that a week from now somebody else'll hit the front page."
HORROCKS: Well did the leak come from the White House or--

SHANLEY: No.

HORROCKS: --from the congress, then.

SHANLEY: The Senate, up on the hill.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: Now the source of the leak to the Wall Street Journal--

SHANLEY: --came from Senator Alexander Smith's office. He was then head of the labor commission. Taft had put him in there as chairman. Barry Goldwater was really the chairman in fact, because he knew the problems of the labor committee and Senator Smith didn't. And I had a very good relationship with Senator Goldwater. But it was leaked out of Alex Smith's office and I, of course, resented terribly the Wall Street Journal publishing it without calling me or talking to me and finding out what my views were, which they should have published. And I never forgave them for it. I met Clark, who did it, who wrote the column, about six months ago in Washington; he was
having lunch with a very close friend of mine at the Metropolitan Club. And he said, "I suppose you don't want to talk to me," or something like that, he said, "I'm Bob Clark," I've forgotten his first name.

And I said, "Oh, I know who you are, you're the one that published that labor amendment."

He said, "Yes, that's right."

And I said, "Well, all I can say to you is that I just never understood why you didn't call me to ask me what I had to say about it, because we never would have sent it to the congress, which you said we would, we were going to." So I terribly resented it because it did a lot of damage and it did tremendous damage to our efforts to try to amend the Taft-Hartley Act.

HORROCKS: And the proposal itself was something that Dirken had come up with on his own, presumably from George Meany?

SHANLEY: I suppose, but nothing that we would have recommended to the congress, I can assure you.

HORROCKS: So contrary to what some people have thought, this
was absolutely not a proposal that had ever been agreed upon.

SHANLEY: Right.

HORROCKS: Did Senator Taft's death change the proposals that were actually sent to Congress?

SHANLEY: Well, the thing just died aborning after his death, really, because the impetus to do this thing was dead. There wasn't enough muscle in either the Senate or the House Committee really to help to implement this thing and really put it together. So it just died aborning. Just, after his death, the effort ended.

HORROCKS: Did you ever speak to President Eisenhower about Secretary Dirken?

SHANLEY: Yes I did. He was a dear man. I was very fond of the secretary. Very, very simple, very fine man, but he never took off his other hat; he never took off his A.F. of L. hat. He was the head of the plumbers' union out in Chicago, and he was a man of limited capacity. In fact, he just didn't do his job and I was forced, as counsel, to do a great deal of the work that the secretary of labor should have been doing in his
own shop. I had to do it myself, because he didn't do it. And then, he and I were very close friends, very good friends, and when he left, he let go a blast at me and I didn't reply. And a week later I had a note from him apologizing and saying how sorry he was that he wished he hadn't done it. So I wrote back and, you know, in the same vein and said to forget it. But he accused me of sabotage and anti-labor and all the rest of it, you know, which, of course, was farthest from the fact. And he knew it. But I think somebody forced him to do it, frankly.

HORROCKS: Were you familiar with the choice of James Mitchell as secretary of labor to succeed him?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. He was in the defense department, as you know, and had done an outstanding job there. One of my friends who I had nothing to do with appointing to the supreme court, because as I told you before, I had nothing to do with judicial appointments, I stayed far away from it, but a very, very close friend of mine, who was a partner of the Pitney firm downstairs, Mr. Justice [William J.] Brennan, who still thinks I was responsible for his being on the supreme court, which I wasn't, highly recommended Mitchell. He'd been in the labor
business here, representing the big companies in the negotiations when he was with Pitney, and he and I are very close personal friends. He thought that he was an ideal appointment for the Republicans because he was able; he had proved it in the defense department. And Brennan, among others, had had considerable experience with him when he was there and thought he was outstanding. There was a group in the White House, headed by [Robert] Cutler, that wanted me appointed because they knew the work I had been doing, you see, in handling a lot of the work of the labor department. And they went to Eisenhower, who was out in Denver and recommended to Eisenhower that he appoint me secretary of labor. So I received a call from out there—I was counsel then so I wasn't out there as much, just periodically—the President wanted to see me. Would I come out? So I said, "Certainly." So I jumped in a plane or something, the same day or the next day. Got out there and we were sitting in the rocking chairs on the front stoop and Mrs. Doud, the President's mother-in-law's home.

HORROCKS: Doud.

SHANLEY: --Mrs. Doud--oh, she's a wonderful person. And he
said, "Bern, do you want to be secretary of labor?"

And I said, "No, sir, Mr. President, I certainly do not want to be secretary of labor."

"Well," he said, "there are certain people in this administration recommending you be made secretary of labor."

And I said, "Well they're out of their minds." I said, "I think that you would make a very great mistake appointing me for a lot of reasons and," I said, "frankly I don't think that I'm the person you ought to put in that job." And I strongly recommended Mitchell.

HORROCKS: Would it have been the Wall Street Journal article and the ruckus over that that--

SHANLEY: Well, Mitchell for some reason, I don't know what it was, but Mitchell never reciprocated in his feelings towards me, although I think I was very instrumental in his appointment. And then he came up here because, you see Peter Frelinghuysen wanted me to run for governor, and if I had, I'd have been elected in '57, I'd have beaten [Robert B.] Meyner. And Meyner knew it; he told me so later. And then of course [Richard J.] Hughes, it was Hughes that Mitchell ran against
and beat, or that Hughes beat him. But he came up here, and
word got out that he had made the remark that if he got elected
he was going to get rid of me. And this came to the attention
of some very strong, very important political people in the
state who called me and asked to see me and came to see me and
said, "Is this true? And if this is true, we'll kill him."

And I said, "No it wasn't." I lied because I had to; I
just couldn't afford to--because the President asked me to do
everything I could to elect Mitchell governor and I did. The
President came in here right over in that hotel. He called
me in--

HORROCKS: The Hotel Robert Treat.

SHANLEY: Yes, he called me in. He said, "Bern, please tell
me now that we're alone, tell me what's the trouble here." And
I told him what I thought was wrong with the campaign and I
said, "Frankly, Mr. President, you asked me to do a job for him.
I'd do anything for you, you know that. I've done everything I
could, but this man won't listen to me. He won't pay any
attention to what I tell him, and all I do is cause more trouble
rather than less by trying to force myself on him and my views."
So he said, "By God, he'll listen to me." So I told the President at the time what I thought should be done and the President called Mitchell in and told him this and Mitchell paid no attention to him. And as a result, got himself a good sound beating, and he should have won it in a walk.

HORROCKS: Now, what year was this?

SHANLEY: '61.

HORROCKS: This is '61.

SHANLEY: Was it '61? I think he ran in '61. It was the '61 election, I think.

HORROCKS: Did—during his, during—

SHANLEY: --'59, I think '61.

HORROCKS: During the '50s, Mitchell, apparently, was able to stay on fairly good terms with organized labor.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

HORROCKS: How did he manage that?
SHANLEY: Well, I think his record in the Pentagon. I think he had a fine record with labor and they were very high in his praise and he got along exceedingly well with the other side of the fence. He had all the credentials and he did an outstanding job as secretary of labor, but he was no politician. And he never should have gotten into this thing. It was Senator [Clifford] Case that pushed him into it and I wasn't--they tried to get me to go in and lick him in the primary and I said, "I'm not going to get into a knock-down-drag-out fight with another Eisenhower man; I'm just not going to do it." And the President didn't want that; I knew he didn't. But Peter Frelinghuysen would do anything to get me to run. He thought that I would be elected, and I think I would have been. And, I don't know, so that I didn't and I think in a way it was a mistake because I'd have been governor.

HORROCKS: How did you get involved in the '58 senatorial primary?

SHANLEY: The President called me in one day and he said, "Bern," he said, "Senator Smith has,"--just a second, trying to think, it's about, I gather about ready to bow out, something like that.
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He said, "Unless you run, we're going to lose that seat."

And I said, "Mr. President, I can't get the support of the party. I can't get the support of the state chairman. I can't get the support of the senators. And therefore I can't win the primary." Well what I was hinting to him was that if he had called in these people and told them this is my candidate, you support him, I would have been nominated and I'd have been elected to the United States Senate at that time.

Actually Bob [Robert W.] Kean, who is a dear friend of mine, now, entered it and Senator Smith, Senator Case, state chairman [Samuel L.] Bodine, all the congressmen, all supported Kean as well as the county chairmen. I had some county chairmen that supported me, but naturally the organization was behind Kean. I lost by 18,000 votes, but the President kept insisting if you don't run, we're going to lose a seat, so I did.

HORROCKS: Was this a real problem on his part of not having effective communication with New Jersey state leaders?

SHANLEY: No, I don't think that was it at all. He was a consummate politician, but he didn't know the
basic things that you have to know in politics; namely, if you want somebody to do something, you got to help them lay the groundwork to do it. Had he called in the senators and the state chairman and given them orders in supporting me, I'd have been nominated and elected.

HORROCKS: Did he have this kind of problem on other Republican party issues.

SHANLEY: Well, not too much because those of us who were close to him would counsel with him on these things and he was always amenable and very astute. He handled people better than anybody I've ever known. But these are the kind of lower down situations that, you know, were just a little out of his bailiwick.

HORROCKS: What about Richard Nixon in 1956? Did he want to replace Nixon with Robert Anderson?

SHANLEY: No. If he did, he kept it very quiet because he never talked, and I, I was so close to him, I felt that if it were true he would have said it. He might have--he did do this--he
went this far--this I know. He told me this. "I called Dick in and I said to him, 'I think you're at a dead end with this job of Vice-President. I think if you were smart, you would step aside and take on the secretary of defense job, something equally as important in the cabinet, and then you'll have a real launching pad for the future.'" And he meant this with the utmost sincerity. Now whether he had in his own mind the idea that if Dick did this he would, he would push for Bob Anderson, I don't know. He never mentioned to me and never indicated it, but I think Nixon felt that Eisenhower was kind of indicating that he didn't really want him--which I don't think was true. At least, it certainly was not my impression at all. But Sherman Adams had no use for Nixon and did everything he could to dump him and was very anxious to do it.

HORROCKS: Is Sherman Adams the prime mover in the Stassen and [Christian] Herter movement?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes.

HORROCKS: How did Sherman Adams go about this?
SHANLEY: I don't know, because it was kept from me, although I found about it, and when I found about it I went direct to Sherman Adams and told him I thought that he was making a terrible mistake because I thought that he should go direct to the President with it if he felt this way.

HORROCKS: And Sherman Adams' reaction was—

SHANLEY: He didn't like me much any more, I think. I'm afraid it was the beginning of the deterioration of our relationship.

HORROCKS: Did the President ever become aware that Sherman Adams was working behind the scenes?

SHANLEY: I don't know. I never told him. He certainly knew it at some time, but when I just don't know, Dave.

HORROCKS: How did it come to your attention that Sherman Adams was doing this?

SHANLEY: Oh, I don't know. You know, you're working in the White House in the position I was in, you hear a lot of things. But I couldn't believe that Chris Herter was doing this on his
own. Chris and I were close, and I think the way I really nailed it down was Chris was in the White House and I talked to him. He was secretary of state then. I said, "Chris, what is this? You running for the Vice-President? You out of your mind, or what?" Well he kind of, he didn't give me a very straight answer and I was a little bit miffed, frankly. Then I got really suspicious as to what was going on, and I think I went right in directly to talk to Sherman. You know Sherm and I were as close as any two people. And I said to him, "What's going on here with this thing? What's Stassen up to?" Because I knew Stassen wouldn't have dared to do it without Sherman knowing about it.

HORROCKS: Without who knowing about it?

SHANLEY: Sherman Adams.

HORROCKS: Oh, without Sherman knowing about it. I was curious, knowing that you were so close or connected with the Stassen people and Stassen in '52--

SHANLEY: Well, Harold was one of the greatest campaigners I've ever known. Everybody now thinks if you were connected
with Stassen, you must be pretty, something awful wrong with you. Well, you know, there were some, as we were talking before, Dave, there were outstanding people all over the country, every walk of life, who just were very high on Stassen and in '48 he blew it, that's all.

HORROCKS: I was thinking, that with this background that you might have had some sort of logical tie-in in '56 with Stassen's activities.

SHANLEY: No, I knew nothing about this. I don't know where I got wind of it, maybe some reporter gave it to me. I think that's probably how I got first wind of it and then I spoke to Chris Herter. And then I went in to see Adams, asked what was going on. I didn't get a very direct answer.

HORROCKS: Now we spoke earlier about Sherman Adams and 1958 and his resignation.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Well I went in to see the President as I did periodically, of course, when I was in Washington after I'd left to run in the primary, senatorial primary. And I walked
in and the President said, he said, "Bern, I just don't understand why Sherman doesn't resign."

And so I said, "Mr. President, do you want me to talk to him?"

He said, "No, I don't want to get you involved with this." But he said, "I just don't understand it, because he's doing a lot of damage." I think that was about the end of it. I think within a few weeks after that, he resigned.

HORROCKS: Well, how did Sherman Adams get mixed up in this sort of thing—with Bernard Goldfine?

SHANLEY: I don't know. I never met Goldfine, fortunately. He had known him when he was governor of New Hampshire, and maybe long before that; I don't know. They were, I guess, personal friends, and Sherman didn't seem to realize the implications of what he was doing. I suppose he just took it for granted that these things were not very inconsequential and just weren't that important.

HORROCKS: Were you a close friend of Jock [John Hay] Whitney—
SHANLEY: Right, very.

HORROCKS: Did you work with him, or were you in touch with him in rebuilding the Republican party in New York state?

SHANLEY: Not so much New York state, but generally around the country and I worked with him on all kinds of problems. He was very close to me. And I remember Eisenhower saying to me, he said, "Poor Jock just got back from his go-around in London." He had been made ambassador. And he said, "It's so hard to trust anybody that's working with me in that shop." And Eisenhower said, "You know, this is the lonesomeness of command." He said, "You're the top dog and this is what happens; it's in your lap. And it's pretty hard to find people to confide in, to talk to, to get straight answers as to what you want to do." But Jock was a very dear, dear friend of mine and a wonderful person, wonderful person.

HORROCKS: Were you involved at all with bringing along Jacob Javits and Nelson Rockefeller?

SHANLEY: No, I didn't get very much involved. I always stayed away from New York politics. See, I never got into
politics until about '47 to begin with. I always stayed away. I became a very close friend of Nelson Rockefeller's. But I always stayed out of New York politics because I thought it was too close to home. None of my business and all I do--

HORROCKS: Enough work in New Jersey.

SHANLEY: --yes and I'd just get battered up and maybe do more damage than good; so I stayed away from it. But, as you know, Nelson Rockefeller and I are very close friends and I made it very clear to him that, at the present time, anything I can do for him I'm prepared to do it.

HORROCKS: You mentioned earlier about handling the Joe McCarthy problem in the early years. What really were your duties in that and what specific things did you undertake?

SHANLEY: Well, I say handling it. I was really handling it in the White House. As you know, there were certain senators on the Hill that were very much involved in the censure of Joe McCarthy. Some of them displayed great guts in my book. So this was out of our bailiwick. What I was doing was trying to advise our people how to handle themselves and if possible to try to bring back a rapport between McCarthy and the
administration. So I worked very closely with a lot of the senators on the Hill. I worked very closely with the secretary of the army, Bob [Robert] Stevens, and others in the administration.

HORROCKS: Which senators were most helpful in this.

SHANLEY: Well, Senator Thye was one, Senator [Wallace] Bennett, of course, was another.

HORROCKS: Were you in touch with Senator [Ralph] Flanders before he introduced the resolution?

SHANLEY: Yes, I think Flanders was another. The President was anxious and so was I, I felt we should stay as far away from that situation as possible because, number one, we would never be able to put back the pieces again if we got involved in the actual pushing of the censure against Joe McCarthy on the Hill. It wasn't our business, and, although we discussed it at some length with these men, it was their responsibility, not ours.

HORROCKS: Didn't you have discussions with Joe McCarthy to try and--
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SHANLEY: No, no I never did. Although I had known him intimately. I felt that it was a little too close to home and the best thing to do was to work through others and when this request came from Edward Bennett Williams, the famous criminal lawyer, that he'd like to meet me, because I knew he was representing Joe McCarthy, as he did, as you recall, in the censure move, I jumped at the opportunity to meet him. And we met at Monsignor—he was an admiral in the navy, he's died since, he was a fine man from Iowa—Sheehy, Monsignor Sheehy.

HORROCKS: How would that be spelled, for the transcriber?

SHANLEY: I think it's S-h-e-e-h-y, Sheehy, I think that's the way it's spelled. He was a fine man. And so I said, "I'd love to." So we had a luncheon arranged at his mother's apartment in Washington and I went there. And I walked in, I'd never met Ed Williams, and we both agreed how delighted we were to meet each other. We became firm friends and have been ever since. And he said to me, "Bern, forget it. McCarthy's over the hill. There's nothing more to be done about it." Well in a way it was a big relief to me because I'd had this
thing on my back for a long while. But from then on the poor fellow just went straight down hill and it was shortly thereafter that he was taken to the hospital and really never recovered.

HORROCKS: It was really his drinking problem—

SHANLEY: Oh, yes.

HORROCKS: So, during the committee hearings—

SHANLEY: He destroyed himself.

HORROCKS: Try, try as the party might to contain McCarthy, get him to impose self-restraints, McCarthy just was not in a position with his own health problems—

SHANLEY: Part of it, you know. Kept deteriorating. But for a long while we thought, you know, we'd be able to work something out, that there'd be some rapport and we wouldn't have this constant irritant up there, but it soon fell apart and I think basically because he felt that Bob, secretary of the army, Bob—

HORROCKS: Stevens.
SHANLEY: Stevens. It was a sorry situation because Bob Stevens decided that he had to prove himself by taking on Joe McCarthy, and Joe McCarthy was not prepared to let Bob Stevens—

HORROCKS: That's ironic because hasn't Stevens been criticized for not putting up enough backbone to McCarthy?

SHANLEY: Well, I remember very distinctly sitting down with Bob Stevens—I think others were there—when he said, "I'm just not going to back away from this thing because I feel that it's my duty to defend my honor, et cetera, and I'm just not going to do it." Because I cautioned him and his counsel in particular, [John] Adams, just not to—matter of fact he may have been criticized for it, but the fact remains that he so irritated Joe McCarthy that McCarthy just said, "Well, now I'm going to take on this fellow and I'm going to blow his brains out." He was no match for McCarthy frankly.

HORROCKS: Did Sherman Adams take an active role in working to contain or remove McCarthy?

SHANLEY: I don't think so. I don't think so; I don't recall
that he did. He may have, more than I thought, more than I recall, but I don't think so because it was dumped in my lap to pretty much handle with the different elements.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: --a very active policy role outside of the 1956 Vice-Presidential issue?

SHANLEY: You're talking now in the political area?

HORROCKS: Okay, in the political area.

SHANLEY: Well, Sherman Adams took a very active part in the political situation. He was not an admirer of Vice-President Nixon's at the time, nor was Stassen, as you know. I think they both felt that the President would be far better off without Richard Nixon as number two man. He was very active and, of course, dealt, you know, on an hourly basis with the Hill, and we had a very effective group in the White House, of course, that did the actual contact work and that sort of thing. But every day there was a stream of congressmen and senators coming into the shop to see Sherman Adams. So he took a very active role in the political area, as I did.
HORROCKS: What exactly are the duties of the secretary to the President.

SHANLEY: Well, do you want to go back first and talk about counsel?

HORROCKS: Sure, counsel.

SHANLEY: Well, it depends what you do. I was not the same counsel as my good friend Clark Clifford. Clark Clifford basically was a policy man, basically a speech writer, which I was not. There's plenty of legal work to do there and I did it, plus the fact that I had charge of the legislative program, putting it together and presenting it. I did a great deal of political work all over the country, made a lot of appearances, spoke all over the country, substituted for a lot of congressmen, particularly Charlie [Charles A.] Halleck.

HORROCKS: To interrupt, now that you mention Charlie Halleck, wasn't there a long history behind the attempt to have Halleck replace Joe Martin.
SHANLEY: Well, it was a long, long story. Halleck, of course, was, as you can imagine, was particularly anxious to replace Joe Martin, because everybody in the House wanted to be the speaker, and he wanted it. The President would not, in any way, interfere with it. He felt very strongly this was none of his business and he shouldn't get involved in it. But that isn't what a lot of the people, I think Sherman Adams one, and others in the White House felt. They felt that, although they were great admirers of Joe Martin, the fact was that his effectiveness was over. He was not effective and that was the reason we weren't getting things through. Well it wasn't altogether accurate. It took the President a number of years to realize that unless he took an active role in legislation and trying to urge the congress to support issues and so forth, they just wouldn't do it. You may recall, we controlled the 83rd and the 84th Congress, and that was the early days, '53 and so forth, when as I say, I was in charge of the legislative program. We didn't fare very well in the congress in those two, both of which we controlled. Then we lost the congress; the 85th was Democrat control, 86th and so forth. And from then on, as the President started taking a more active participation and helping
to drive through some of the legislation, we got a lot more legislation then through the Democratic congresses than we did in the Republican.

HORROCKS: Do you attribute some of the problems then in the first two congresses of the administration to the fact that the President himself--

SHANLEY: He felt very strongly. He and I talked about it by the hour. I remember one time we had--I think it was almost five hours we talked about it. He felt very strongly that there were the three branches of government--judicial, executive and legislative--that he had no right to interfere with the legislative process; it was not his business; it was out of his bailiwick and he wasn't elected to do that. Well, the answer to it was: If you don't, you're going to get what we got and we didn't get enough. The President, finally, I think came around to realizing that unless he did that, we were just not going to get anywhere. So in the, you know, the later congresses we did well. Of course, he had a lot of friends on the other side of the aisle, as you know. And [Sam] Rayburn and all those people were very high on Eisenhower.
HORROCKS: Did Bob Anderson prove to be an effective liaison--

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

HORROCKS: --with Lyndon Johnson?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes because they were very close, as you know, and--

HORROCKS: Well, I'm not too--that's really an area that I've picked up in bits and pieces, but I don't think it's ever been made very clear--the relationship--that triangle, Anderson, Johnson and Eisenhower.

SHANLEY: Well I think that I can fairly say that Bob Anderson was more or less Eisenhower's direct liaison with Lyndon Johnson and to some extent with Sam Rayburn and others, on the Democratic side. And he was very effective, very effective. They thought very highly of him, and when he had a job to do he did it.

HORROCKS: Going back now, talking about Halleck, I've seen things that indicated that before the '52 convention, one of the things that Arthur Summerfield wanted was Eisenhower's
support in replacing Martin with Halleck. Now what--

SHANLEY: Well, he'd never, he'd never be able to talk to Eisenhower that way. I mean, make one thing very clear--

HORROCKS: Oh, I don't mean to say that it was a direct thing--

SHANLEY: Oh, no. But Eisenhower just wouldn't stand for that sort of thing. And he wasn't going to--and he didn't do any undercutting of Joe Martin on the Hill; I can tell you as far as the job was concerned or anything else.

HORROCKS: Did Summerfield?

SHANLEY: Oh, I think so. I think that he worked very hard to, behind the scenes, to help Charlie Halleck take over. I don't know how effectively because Arthur Summerfield was, I think, always thought he was a much greater politician than I thought he was. He is a delightful guy and a very close friend of mine, but he is pretty brusque and a little bit too blunt for senators and congressmen to talk to the way he talked to them. So how effective he was in helping in
this situation, I don't know. It came about. It was bound to happen, you know, it was bound to happen and it took a long while to happen, maybe too long.

HORROCKS: '58.

SHANLEY: Because we just didn't have the leadership up there that we should have had. We had a wonderful crowd in the White House. Jerry [Wilton B.] Persons headed it up to work in those areas. And if it wasn't for them, we'd have been a lot worse off than we were.

HORROCKS: Were you ever under discussion for a diplomatic appointment?

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. I was offered a number of them. I was offered the bench too.

HORROCKS: Didn't want any part of any of them?

SHANLEY: No. No. In the last couple of months I was offered one. I said, "No, thank you. I haven't the remotest interest."
HORROCKS: Stay here.

SHANLEY: Yes.

HORROCKS: Now what are the duties of secretary to the President?

SHANLEY: Well, as you know, it's a statutory position. It's the only one in the White House. And as you notice my certificate here, it reads "Secretary to the President of the United States." That is the official title; there is no such thing as appointment secretary.

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: Now I believe we were talking about the job of appointment secretary--

SHANLEY: Secretary.

HORROCKS: Secretary, I'm sorry.

SHANLEY: There is no such thing as appointment secretary.

HORROCKS: Right, it's secretary job. And what I really am
asking is how do you decide who sees the President and when and for how long, and how is the President prepared for each visit?

SHANLEY: How is he prepared?

HORROCKS: Right. Is he given briefing material or--

SHANLEY: That of course is just one facet of the job of secretary. The basic thing the secretary does is protect the President of the United States: from frustration, from being overwhelmed by people, by people that shouldn't be seeing him but somebody else coming in, to eliminate those who shouldn't see him, but generally--it's a protective job. And then still try to keep the senate, the house, the cabinet members, politicians all over the country, big industrialists, the labor, everybody else from just coming down him. You see what I think is important to realize is that when Calvin Coolidge, who was President of the United States, he dictated and signed and answered every letter that came in the White House. That's Calvin Coolidge; now that isn't very long ago.
One of the first jobs I was handed when I entered the White House was the Rosenberg case where, if you recall, were both executed for treason. This blew up into a terrific matter. And I think in one day alone we had something like 50,000 pieces of mail in the White House. Now when I first went in the White House in '53, I would say that the President spent maybe a third of his time, just as a ballpark figure, in foreign affairs and maybe forty per cent and so forth down the line. By the time he was into his second term, the President was spending almost ninety per cent of his time on foreign affairs and defense matters. And it wasn't that he ignored or intended to ignore or wanted to ignore domestic problems, but what people don't realize is that every day at our shop was another crisis and maybe ten. But the President was just tremendously pressured, and that was one of the reasons why I had the studies made and changed and modified many of the President's duties. No efficiency study'd ever been made of the presidency. As I think I mentioned to you, the only change that I could discover in my research, which was helped by the Bureau of the Budget, was that in Hoover's day
they eliminated the visit to the White House which took place once a month where anybody could come in and shake hands with the President of the United States. That was the only thing that I ever knew was ever eliminated. So it had never changed from the day that George Washington sat there till Eisenhower stepped in. So I had the study made and we kept--I unfortunately told him about it--so about every week he'd say, "Bern, where's that study from the Bureau of the Budget?"

I told him, "Mr. President, it's still going--."

"Well," he said, "you better push them along."

I never should have mentioned it to him because it took a long while because when the study came through I think it was two and a half inches deep and we made a tremendous number of changes--some of them legislative, some of them by presidential order, others by just changing policies--I mentioned the case of Commodore Beach coming in. The first matter I had when I was made counsel, he asked me to have the President sign a whole stack, three or four inches of designations of senior officers to stations all over the world. I said to him, "Why should the President of the United States sign these?"
"Because he always has."

And I didn't say to him, "I'm afraid, Commander, that isn't good enough." So I called, I think I told you, the secretary of the navy who was Bob Anderson. I said to him, "If you suggest the wrong man for a job and he does something wrong, who do you think is going to have his throat cut?" I said, "You are; you're secretary of the navy. It's your responsibility anyway. So why should the President--."

He said, "Bern, you couldn't be righter." So I sent them off to him and that was the end of that.

But these were the kind of things that were just absurd. The President, for instance, had to sign an order designating the construction of a fish hatchery in a national park. He had to approve the decoration of a maritime officer when he was decorated by--Coast Guard is what I'm trying to say. These things were just absurd. It was all right when Presidents could afford that kind of time, but the President of the United States today can't do that; it isn't possible. There have been so many rumors as to whether we shouldn't have another Vice-President who would be the protocol man
and, you know, this just isn't going to work. The only argument I think I ever had with Foster Dulles was when he wanted the President of the United States to greet all the chiefs of state that came to the United States, and I objected strenuously to his going to the airport or anywhere to do this. Foster won and I lost. But it was a terrible mistake because it was so time consuming, so time consuming, and such a complete waste of time for the President of the United States because he sees these people. I did the state department in a number of times when I was secretary because I'd take the prime minister of Thailand, all he wanted to do was play golf with the President. He had no desire to sit and talk business with him at all. So I said to the state department, "The Prime Minister is dying to play golf with him."

"Yes, we know that."

I said, "All right, let's arrange it." So we arranged it, went out to Burning Tree and then the state department found out that I wasn't going to set up the three hour session with the prime minister and the President to talk problems between the two countries and they blew. I said, "Sorry, but what more do you want? You got a golf game." And that was the end of that
one. Well there were a lot of fascinating things about my job and of course you had to be a little intuitive and you learned it the hard way. I always recall the 20th Century Fox, the Greek--he's a good friend of President Eisenhower's--

HORROCKS: Oh, Skouras?

SHANLEY: Yes, Spyros Skouras called me one time, this was after Warren Burger, who was then head of the civil division of the justice department, called me and said, "Will you support me if I move against [Aristotle] Onassis' ships because he owes the government twelve million dollars in taxes and he won't pay it." And he said, "I'm going to move in and just levy on his ships."

So I said, "Yes, I'll support you a hundred per cent."

I told the President about it. The President said, "Positively."

So we hit, he not only hit one, but he hit 120 of Onassis' ships, tied up his whole fleet! And Onassis, understandably, was somewhat upset.

So Spyros Skouras called me and said, "Bern, I haven't seen the President in six months." Greeks are very close, as
you know. And he said, "I'd like to say hello to him."

I said, "Fine Spyros, there's nothing he'd rather do than see you, I'm sure."

So I went in and said to the President, I said, "Mr. President, Spyros wants to see you but I know why he wants to see you. He wants to talk to you quietly about lifting this--Warren Burger that levied on all these ships of his--to lift these liens."

So he said, "All right, Bern, pick up the phone. Don't go back to your office, pick up my phone. Get Spyros on the phone and you tell him I'll be delighted to see him, haven't seen him in a long while, and I'll just be delighted to have a little time to chat with him, but if he raises the question of Onassis and these ships, he will never come in this office again."

I said, "You really want me to tell him that?"

He said, "Yes." So I pick up the phone, I call Spyros Skouras and told him just that. There was dead silence on the other end; I thought he'd had a heart attack. But you see, and it was perfectly obvious, this is what he wanted. But these kind of things you had to get through your feet.
Or if somebody was lying to the President, you know, I had that happen with a senator, Senator [Alexander] Wiley. Just lied to him. And I got it across in his presence—the President was such an astute man.

HORROCKS: On which issue was this?

SHANLEY: This was on the St. Lawrence Seaway issue.

HORROCKS: Could you repeat that story that you told between tapes?

SHANLEY: He came in, he was very anxious, and he wondered why it hadn't been pushed harder up in the congress by the administration. And the President was very much for it, and so was I. There were members of the administration that were not, like George Humphrey. He felt that it would be a mistake from the standpoint of the steel industries which he had grown up in the middle west. He later changed his opinion. But Wiley came in, he was senator from Wisconsin at the time, and lied to the President. And I, of course, knew that he had lied because I'd been working with Kuykendall in the Federal Power Commission. But the President was so smart and we were so close that I was able to get it across to him without making it
apparent to the senator that he was lying to the President.

HORROCKS: What was the lie?

SHANLEY: I don't remember. It was about a case that was involved with the Federal Power Commission. It really involved the St. Lawrence Seaway, but I've forgotten what the decision was or what the case was, frankly. But in any event, the President said, "Well call up Jerry Kuykendall," who was then chairman of the Federal Power Commission. And then, of course, I knew the President realized that the senator was lying to him. When he walked out the President turned to me and he said, "Bern," he said, "you know that so-and-so was lying to me." And then I was going to hit for a raise, but I didn't get it.

HORROCKS: Well, wasn't this sort of thing, seeing who gets to see the President--picking that sort of thing up--wasn't that the area where Sherman Adams caught a lot of flak.

SHANLEY: Yes. Yes, he did and he'd come in to me and he'd say, "I want so-and-so to see the President."
"Okay, but why Sherm? He hasn't got time today," or whatever it may be. But there were a lot of factors involved. For instance Alex Smith used to, just for his own ego, wanted to see the President about every two weeks. And he'd be wild at me, because I was from New Jersey and so was he, that I wouldn't arrange these things for him every two weeks; it was just a complete waste of time.

HORROCKS: Let's put it this way. Would it have been more correct for the people to have put the flak on you on this, rather than Sherman Adams, because didn't you bear the full responsibility?

SHANLEY: Most of them did. Most of them did. That was my job, to take it. I had to. I had trouble with Summerfield for instance. He was the most difficult of all the cabinet officers. I never had much trouble with any of the others like Herb Brownell, or any of those men, Humphrey or Foster Dulles. Foster was in our office three times a day. I never had any problem with them, but I did with Summerfield. He was just insistent. He had to come down then and he was going to see him then and so forth.
It just wasn't in the cards.

HORROCKS: How about Charles Wilson?

SHANLEY: I never had any problem with Charlie. He felt closer to me than I thought he was. I recall about a year or so before he retired he came down to see the President. He called me aside and he said, "Could I see you after I come out of the President's office?"

And I said, "Certainly." So I took him across to what we used to call the Fish Room, next to my office, and we sat down.

He said, "Bern," he said, "do you think I ought to get out, think I ought to resign?"

And I said, "Charlie, you've asked me a question. I'm going to give you the answer in all honesty. You're not going to like it, but I'm going to tell you what my answer is because I mean this very sincerely." I said, "You should have gotten out a couple of years ago." Well, he looked as though I hit him in the head with an ax. I said, "Charlie, don't misunderstand. What I'm saying to you is this: I don't care who you are--[Robert S.] McNamara did it, not McNamara, I was thinking
of; it was [James] Forrestal. He stayed too long in the job. You do that in the federal government, you leave under a cloud." There's something about staying too short a time, too, but particularly overstaying your leave in a major job in the federal government. You just get hurt by overstaying your leave. McNamara did it too—I mentioned McNamara—and he did it too.

HORROCKS: Wasn't the President really unhappy with Charles Wilson's propensity for putting his foot in the mouth and also his propensity to overtalk his case.

SHANLEY: Well, the President was an amazing man—depressing blow or something like that had happened. But he really was so loyal and so great, while a man was in that job, you know, he supported him. One thing you never had to worry about with Eisenhower was that if you did what you thought was the right thing to do and did it with every proper motive, he would support you right down to the ground, even though he thought you were wrong. And probably you were.

HORROCKS: The reason I pursue this is because one picks up indications that Charles Wilson was not a happy choice,
particularly happy choice for the President.

SHANLEY: Well I don't think they were particularly, you know, close like George Humphrey was; he was very close to him although his philosophy was quite different. Herb Brownell was close to the President; Foster Dulles particularly was close to the President. As much as people thought that Foster ran the foreign affairs, he didn't. It was pretty much a team effort. And the number one guy on the team was the President of the United States, I can assure you. I always remember when we went into Lebanon, reminded of it because of this present incident in Cambodia. The security council meeting, the President said, "I think that after listening to all these different opinions, I think we've come to the point where we've got to make a decision. And that is, do we send the Boy Scouts in or do we send in the Marines."

Foster Dulles looked at him and he said, "Mr. President, what do you mean?"

And the President said, "What I mean is, we're going to send the Marines in. We're going in there and we're going in today; we're not going to waste five minutes and it'll all be
over in forty-eight hours." And it was, it was, you know. And this present Cambodian thing, and I admire [Gerald R.] Ford for it because he's really taken a leaf out of the Eisenhower book.

HORROCKS: If you're going to use force--

SHANLEY: You've got to use force, use it. And don't do what we did in Korea and tie the hands of your troops behind their back, and to some extent in South Vietnam.

HORROCKS: Speaking about foreign affairs and access to the President, what about Clarence Randall, chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy?

SHANLEY: Well, he was quite a conservative, as you know, but effective. But on the other hand, you know, there could be only one secretary of state and Foster Dulles, in particular, was not the kind of secretary of state, any more than [Henry] Kissinger is, that brooks, that can stand somebody else interfering in his operation. Foster was a one-man show to a great extent, except Eisenhower, and Eisenhower had complete control over foreign policy and was the fellow who made it more than
Foster Dulles did I can assure you because I was present all the time during those days. Clarence Randall was an effective man as I recall. He did an outstanding job. But it was one of the troubles that Nelson Rockefeller ran into when he took over the Cold War in our shop. I told him to get out. Go on home. Run for governor.

HORROCKS: What about C. D. Jackson before Rockefeller?

SHANLEY: Well C. D. Jackson was a, you know, I loved C. D. but C. D. was a public relations man. C. D.'s idea was to throw something up and get on television, and, you know, he was with Fortune; he was editor of Fortune, I think—

HORROCKS: Right.

SHANLEY: And a wonderful guy. But he was more in the public relations field than any policy making. But the difficulty was again you had trouble with Foster and everyone of those guys tried to do it; there was friction because they were in the White House and he was over in the secretary of state's office, and it's bound to be trouble, and there was.
HORROCKS: We were talking earlier about Halleck—I keep jumping around here on this, if you think of anything to intrude while we're on a certain topic, or we're talking about national security for instance—okay. Going back talking about Halleck now, when Taft died and [William] Knowland was chosen as senate leader, was the White House actively involved in that choice.

SHANLEY: I don't think so; they weren't very happy.

HORROCKS: They weren't happy at the time with it.

SHANLEY: No, because Knowland was a very difficult—I didn't, I had no trouble getting along with him but I didn't have enough to—no reason for me to be in trouble with him. But Knowland was a very difficult fellow, very difficult fellow. And he was terribly jealous and I think Dick was of him, of Nixon, and so this jealousy entered into a lot of things that happened because they'd both be sitting at the leadership table, and it was a very difficult situation.

HORROCKS: Could you give a for instance?
SHANLEY: He was very difficult to get along with, and he certainly didn't get along well with Sherman Adams or with the White House generally. I think Jerry Persons did more with Bill Knowland than anybody I know.

HORROCKS: Is there a "for instance" where Knowland-Nixon antagonism—

SHANLEY: You just saw it flare up periodically. Every now and then, you know, some issue'd come up and I think because one took one position, the other would always take the other. It was that kind—it was so obvious. I don't recall any specific instances, but it happened all the time.

HORROCKS: Were they happy to see Knowland leave in '58?

SHANLEY: I would think the answer's very definitely yes.

HORROCKS: Were they instrumental in his leaving?

SHANLEY: Oh, I don't think so. If they did, I didn't have any part of it. I never heard it, frankly. And most of these things were, you know, pretty well discussed in our
shop because we had a very small shop. We had eighteen people when we started out in '53, eighteen people. And there were, maybe six or eight, seven of us that, you know, saw the President on a regular basis. I think when I left, I don't think there were more than, it had grown considerably because we took in a lot of these characters that I don't think they should have taken into the White House; they should have put them in the East Wing and kept them there; that's where their offices were. But theoretically they were a part of our staff, and I don't think they ever should have been. Because they could cause trouble rather than be helpful, and I think that's part of the trouble now. Nixon's staff was much too big. Too much empire building.

HORROCKS: You attended National Security Council meetings regularly--

SHANLEY: Yes.

HORROCKS: How would you describe Gordon Gray and Robert Cutler's work.
SHANLEY: Well Cutler had a fabulous facility for presentation. He had a very brilliant mind. And he was always exceedingly well prepared as you can imagine when he came into the security council meeting. And he'd start right off, he wouldn't waste any time, he was very—and the President thought a great deal of Bobby and liked him personally of course. But one day he was going down to speak at the—

[Interruption]

HORROCKS: Now about Robert Cutler and NSC.

SHANLEY: He was the director of the security council, and he went down to speak to the War College one evening and he flew back that night, I guess, to be at the security council meeting at 8:30. (We started the meetings as I recall at 8:30.) He started the meeting right off as he always did, reciting what the problems were for immediate decision and so forth. The President interrupted him and he said, "Bobby, I hear you're quite a wit." He'd heard about his speech before the War College.

    Bobby said, "You're sure that's what they said about me, Mr. President?"
Only Bobby Cutler would have dared to make a statement like that, quite a character.

HORROCKS: He was essentially an administrator in the NSC.

SHANLEY: Yes. He'd put the problems together and then present them.

HORROCKS: And that was Gordon Gray's role after him, right?

SHANLEY: Well, Dillon Anderson was in there for quite a stretch you know.

HORROCKS: Right.

SHANLEY: Dillon was good. Dillon was of course a top lawyer and therefore he knew how to present it. So was Bobby, although he was very clearly a different type. But Bobby did a fine job as far as--

HORROCKS: And now Gordon Gray?

SHANLEY: Well Gordon, I think, I think it was frankly a little, I think he did a good job. I think he was a little out of his depth.
HORROCKS: You think Gordon Gray was a bit out of his depth even in an essentially administrative position, not a policy making one?

SHANLEY: He was a lot better as assistant secretary of the army or something like that, you know.

HORROCKS: Was there a problem in failing to coordinate, failing to--

SHANLEY: I don't recall any great problems, but I think the answer really is that like any, particularly an agency like the security council, you need--the better the man who is the director, the better the mere effectiveness of the security council. You see, the security council doesn't work by a majority vote in the broad sense. The President of the United States makes the decision, and it's his decision to make. He will listen to all the CIA, the defense department, the secretary of state, et cetera. But when it comes to the decision he is the one that makes the decision. For instance, I was the one that advocated the secretary for the cabinet, because it got to be a debating society, and it was a waste
of time. And then my friend Max Rabb took it over. And the President would insist these fellows come into the meeting and somebody hadn't done their homework and he'd just take his hide off. "Don't you come to my cabinet meetings without doing your homework." And so that, you know, we had some effective decision-making process.

HORROCKS: Now, was, well do I infer then that, with regard to the national security council under Gordon Gray, that it became a less effective--

SHANLEY: Well, I can't really answer that, Dave. I'm frank to tell you this is hard for me to--how long was, do you know how long Gordon Gray was director of the security council?

HORROCKS: I think it was--

SHANLEY: I've forgot, I've even forgotten he was; I knew he was in there--

HORROCKS: --I think it was two years.

SHANLEY: Really?
HORROCKS: Wasn't it really shortly--

SHANLEY: Maybe it was after I left.

HORROCKS: It might have been--because I think it was--

SHANLEY: Because you see initially it was Cutler and then when he retired, very unhappily, I think he'd been there at least two to two and a half years, maybe three, maybe three. Dillon Anderson then took over at his recommendation, and he had it for a year and a half or two years, I think. So if Gordon Gray had it, it must have, it may have been after I left.

HORROCKS: Okay, it was at the end--

SHANLEY: I just don't have, really, any recollection of his ever having been director.

HORROCKS: Now you say Robert Cutler retired rather unhappily from it?

SHANLEY: Yes. Well this is the first time; he came back.

HORROCKS: Right.
SHANLEY: Yes. Well, unhappily from the standpoint that he wished he hadn't; it was his decision. He wished he hadn't left because he was lost; he was sad; he was a fish out of water; he couldn't--. Nobody home was compatible so he was dying--

HORROCKS: How does someone like Robert Cutler do an agenda and work things up for the National Security Council with someone like John Foster Dulles coming in who's not going to be bound by an agenda.

SHANLEY: Oh, well the boss ran the show. Eisenhower ran the show, and he was very meticulous about staff work. Foster wouldn't dare, you know, try to avoid the issue or go off on tangents because the boss would bring him right back again. Because, as I say, he not only presided, but it was his decision to make and he made them. There was no problem with that, because there was no problem with Eisenhower because he was a strong man.

HORROCKS: Sometimes I get the intuitive feeling, you've partially answered my question on this, that the elaborate
staff organization, for instance the Cabinet Secretariat and
the Operations Coordinating Board and the NSC planning board,
you have all these agendas and position papers and things
like that—and really it looked fine on paper but in practice
it was so beside the point that the actual meetings and such
did not really flow along the lines that the papers implied.

SHANLEY: Well, that's not an easy question. Actually, I
think the OCB was a pretty effective group and the reason
Jack [John F.] Kennedy destroyed the security council was
because he destroyed the OCB. In other words, the staff work
was just not done properly so when these issues came before the
national security council, they weren't properly staffed or
prepared for decision. That's what happened in the Bay of
Pigs. It was not a bad decision on the President's part—it
was because the President had done away with OCB and the staff
work wasn't there.

HORROCKS: And it was your experience, that when you did attend
those NSC meetings that the people in attendance really had paid
attention to the agenda, and the staff work.
SHANLEY: Well if they didn't, they better not open their mouths. Not with Eisenhower. You see, this is what people don't understand. He was a strong President. When he sat in on a security council meeting, I'll tell you, there wasn't any "running about" as they say. Somebody talked too much he just cut them off, and he did most of the talking anyway. I mean, after the presentations were made, most of the talking was done by him. He might turn to Dick and say, "Well, what do you think about this part of it?" Or the secretary of defense or the chairman of the joint chiefs, ask them a question. But basically, he was the security council.

HORROCKS: You mentioned the Lebanon incident. Are there any other national security council meeting debates that really stand out in your mind?

SHANLEY: Oh, I think the constantly, the question of ICBMs, because this was a vital issue, you know. I recall also China a good deal too. And when I went out, the President sent me out to see Magsaysay in '55, the security council was then Dillon Anderson, incidently that was '55. Dillon Anderson was then the head of the security council, director of the
security council, and Dillon asked me if I would check into the question of Quemoy and Matsu because the security council was very unhappy with the reports they had from A, the state department and B, the department of defense. So he asked me if I would check into it and report back to him.

HORROCKS: What did you find and what did you report back?

SHANLEY: Oh, I think that I frankly don't remember the report. I don't think I ever filed it, Dave, a written report; I think it was an oral report. What he was particularly interested in was, what were the Chinese chances of retaining it; how important was it to Taiwan et cetera. But he didn't seem to feel that they were getting any very straight answers from either defense or state. Then I went over to see Magsaysay, and I had had his secretary and trained him in our shop--

HORROCKS: That's Magsaysay of the Philippines?

SHANLEY: Yes, he was president of the Philippines, really great men of all time in Asia. Great big man, you know, he was six foot two or three, wasn't like a Filipino. He gave
me a luncheon and they had all our top people there and he had all his top people there, and I asked him at the luncheon, I said, "Mr. President, I'd love to hear the story--I've read Crusade in Asia which was written by Romula."

He said, "He wasn't here, he was in New York when that took place." He had no use for Romula--I knew that, and that's the reason I did it, just to egg him on to telling me the story. And the story is the goriest story that the world has ever heard, I'll tell you. You wouldn't believe the story of how he licked the commies and how he destroyed the polit-bureau, and boy they did it with machine guns you know, this wasn't any--. They finally rounded up the rest of the polit-bureau and knocked them off and whoever the--call them a guerilla or what--came to the White House with a bag thrown over his back, canvas bag or roll-up bag, and turned it over and rolled all the heads out on the floor--

HORROCKS: This is one of the aides to the Philippine government bringing in a sack of this into the Philippine president's office, rolling out this bag full of things--
SHANLEY: It's a beautiful room, beautiful, that palace is so beautiful with all this Philippine mahogany and magnificently beautiful chandeliers and beautiful room. But the story was such a fascinating story; it had everybody spellbound, even the people that had heard it a hundred times, I guess, in his own shop. Took about forty-five minutes to tell the story and after he finished, the reason I did it was because I was very anxious to get him to write the story for publication because I thought it would be, coming from a native of the area, would be more effective than the United States trying to sell this. And it would have been a tremendously effective document.

"Oh," he said, "oh, no, I can't write it."

And I said, "Well, Mr. President, listen." I said, "I feel very strongly about this. I think that this would be a very effective thing coming from you and so forth." I built him up as much as I could. Then I went back and got ahold of Rocky. He didn't pay much attention--he didn't think much of the idea I don't believe. But C. D. Jackson came in after and then--he was very strong for it. And so we went to work and about, gad we just about had the thing nailed to the
masthead when Magsaysay was killed in the airplane accident out in the Philippines. The Filipinos, and I checked it with Foster's brother, Allen [Dulles], because I thought maybe, you know, it was sabotage, that he'd been killed by the commies. Allen was completely and absolutely satisfied that it was just the usual Philippine trick of overloading planes and they were all killed. It was sad. A great leader.

HORROCKS: To your knowledge, was this story ever published, made public?

SHANLEY: What story--you mean the--

HORROCKS: Magsaysay's--

SHANLEY: No, oh, no. Oh, no, he never wrote it. He never had the time to write it. It never got written.

HORROCKS: Could you summarize it for the tape? Would you care to?

SHANLEY: I'd really haven't, I really, well I couldn't. I'd really have to go back almost to rethink it over but he was secretary of defense and--
[ Interruption ]

HORROCKS: He was secretary of defense—

SHANLEY: And he had more courage than was good for him. He had word that he could meet with the leaders of the Communist party and that they wanted to talk to him about trying to settle their differences. Well actually they were going to murder him; they had every intention of murdering him. And by the grace of God his jeep broke down on the way to the meeting, and I don't remember the details now, I'd have to think them over again, what happened—-but because of that, he wasn't murdered. Word came back that if he wanted to meet with the polit-bureau, this was the second go-around as I recall, if he went to a certain town and followed a woman with a flower basket in her arms or something of that sort, she would lead him to the meeting. Well, he wasn't quite as naive at that point as he had been and realized, had gotten word that they really would have murdered him had he been there on time, had he made the, or if his jeep hadn't broken down. So they surrounded the area with troops, machine guns and they moved in on them and just slaughtered them, just killed them all
off, the whole polit-bureau. You could go on and on and on—I would have to, as I say, recollect. Maybe I have some notes on the meeting with him, but it was a fantastic story and would have been a best seller for years, I can assure you. He was a lot of person and tremendous courage. But the people adored him because what he did for them out there in the Philippines was to give them decent wells; they got decent water and just weren't, you know, sick all the time. And that was the first thing he did and all these baggios—the Philippine name for town or village—he put in these fresh water wells where these people got decent water. He also gave them health clinics and because the place was rabid with all kinds of diseases and children and so forth were—but these were the kind of things he did for his people and they adored him. They loved him.

HORROCKS: Eisenhower had been in the Philippines in the '30s.

SHANLEY: Oh, yes. He was there with--


SHANLEY: --MacArthur as his chief of staff.
HORROCKS: Did Eisenhower carry through with any special emotional interest in the Philippines--

SHANLEY: Well I think he always had a very deep interest in it because he was there for quite a stretch.

HORROCKS: Did you ever see this manifest itself in any sort of decision or policy-making way?

SHANLEY: I think maybe part of sending me out to see Magsaysay had to do with it. I think he also recognized him as a great leader and as quite a military man, and I think for that reason he had a very high respect for him. He wanted to pay him some kind of a tribute; so he knew I wanted a vacation so this was a good opportunity to send me on a junket. Well actually I had other things, I told you, with reference to Quemoy and Matsu, so I had this job to do with the defense, which nobody knew about except myself and Dillon Anderson.

HORROCKS: Was Chiang Kai-shek cooperative on this Quemoy-Matsu--

SHANLEY: Yes, he was not there when I was there. But all the defense people were most cooperative. I had no problems at all that way.
HORROCKS: Was Chiang at that time, conducting any actions against the Chinese mainland from Taiwan?

SHANLEY: No, we were.

HORROCKS: We were? From Taiwan?

SHANLEY: Well, we were doing a—of course our constant reconnaissance work was a lot of it, you know, this is something that we never let up on. We watched it and we had it going, and periodically we'd have a major trouble because a pilot would get in trouble or something of that sort, you know, like the episode over Russia. But we were constantly going in and probing to find out what was going on and so forth and so on.

HORROCKS: Probing in the sense of—more than just overflights?

SHANLEY: Oh more than that. We'd send it reconnaissance—

HORROCKS: Squads.

SHANLEY: Yes.

HORROCKS: Did we engage in any harassment operations?
SHANLEY: Oh, I don't think we, I don't know; I never got into that particularly. If I did, I don't recall it. I think our main problem was just to keep abreast of what was going on, that was the main thing, particularly what might happen to Taiwan if we weren't prepared.

HORROCKS: With regards to this trip, were you briefed at all on U.S. or Chinese nationalist operations from the Golden Triangle or from Burma or aid to Tibetans?

SHANLEY: Well, no, actually, I remember in the security council, which, of course, when these things would be discussed, but not briefed to go out there and discuss those things out there at the time, no.

HORROCKS: Do you remember any discussions over aid to the Tibetans for instance?

SHANLEY: No, really not. You see, seldom in the security council, unless it was a particular operation that was vital like the Bay of Pigs or something of that sort, would they discuss these covert operations that were going on because I think a lot of that CIA was doing and they reported direct to the
President on their operations. Every now and then some of these things would come out of the security council meeting but basically there it was the major things--. I remember a number of crises during a period of time not in the security council but in the White House on some of the Chinese problems and so forth, but, I'd have to go back through my notes more carefully to give you specific examples.

HORROCKS: It's such a long time, it's hard to recall specific events.

SHANLEY: A long while since I've looked at them. I'm going to have to leave you pretty soon, I'm afraid.

HORROCKS: Okay, well let me ask a few wrap-up questions then; you've been most generous with your time here. It's been a large block. What were the General's relations with Leonard Hall?

SHANLEY: Oh, very good.

HORROCKS: Very good.
SHANLEY: Yes. Well, he respected Len as an outstanding—and liked him personally and I think felt that he was as good or maybe one of the best national chairmen we ever had.

HORROCKS: Did he back up Leonard Hall enough to try and build the party?

SHANLEY: Oh, I think he did. I think he did. But our problem then was that Len knew what he was doing himself, and a lot of it he did on his own, and we backed him in our shop, you know. I knew what he was doing and so did Sherman, and we helped him as we did Meade Alcorn or any of the other chairmen. There were a lot of them in our day. Then, of course, Ray Bliss [Thruston Morton?] came along as the end of the session and so forth, but Len was outstanding in the job and the President knew this and didn't interfere with him and helped him whenever he could.

HORROCKS: I can't think of any other particular questions to ask. I think anything beyond this, it'll be really fishing expeditions.
SHANLEY: Well, let's get together again, Dave. You'll be in New York periodically and give me a call, we'll have another session.

HORROCKS: Okay. If there's anything you'd like to add to this particular tape while we've got it here--

SHANLEY: Well, maybe just a comment about the President. He was a very dear person, of course. His friendship to me, one of the things I treasure most in life I suppose. He was such a warm person. And he had such a great sense of humor. He didn't like dirty stories, but he had a host of the most fascinating stories in the world, and I never heard him tell a dirty story, and he never liked any other people telling them either. But I think the famous story, and a lot of these stories have come out because I've told them and used them in speeches and so forth, so they're all over. People just take it for granted--like the one where he was made head of OVERLORD, you remember, and was brought to Casablanca after FDR and Churchill had met with Stalin at [Teheran?] and they had DeGaulle in. And after DeGaulle left, FDR turned to Churchill and he said, "He really thinks he's Joan of Arc, doesn't he?"
And Churchill said, "Yes, but the bishops won't let me burn him." I mean I could tell you a million stories like that. His secretary, last time Churchill came over, his secretary came with him and he said, "I'm going to write a book about Churchill and stories. Can you help me?"

I said, "I sure can. I've got a hell of a lot of stories about your boss that you could find very useful in your book." I don't know what ever happened to him because I never heard another word from him—whether he died or what, but I never heard of the book being written. But he was a great story teller; he was a very human individual and had a tremendous sense of loyalty and sense of honor.

He had a terrible temper. He told me one time at Camp David, he said, "You know, Bern, my mother," (of course he revered, he adored his mother), he said, "she taught me how to break my temper." And I thought to myself, "She did a lousy job," because he had a fearful temper. But you know Ann Whitman and I were really the only ones that ever saw much of it, and we realized the pressures he was under and so forth.

But he was so cute because you'd have a day with him where he just, you'd have no blood left by the time the day was over.
Then about six o'clock he'd say, "Come on, Bern, let's go over and have a couple of drinks." I remember going over to his studio where he was painting and he said, "I want to talk to you about the new chief justice." And he said, "Have you ever read the [Albert J.] Beveridge life of Marshall."

I said, "Oh, yes, I have, Mr. President."

And he said, "It was quite a book." You know it was three, four volumes. Then he recited very accurately Marshall's background, you know as a legislator, as a trial man, a non-believer in briefs, a prosecutor, a judge, et cetera, et cetera. And he said, "You know, I think, Bern, this is the type of background a chief justice needs. Now when it comes to an associate justice, I want him to have legal training, training on the bench, and that's something else again. But when it comes to chief justice, this is the kind of background I think he's got to have to be a fairly effective chief justice, because this is what Marshall had." Then we got to talking about Earl Warren, you see, and we talked about it for a long while. And he said, "This is the kind of background Earl Warren's got and therefore I think he would make an outstanding chief justice." Well I don't think he was ever very
happy with his decision after it was made.

HORROCKS: Was Earl Warren placed in Eisenhower's mind by Brownell.

SHANLEY: Was he what by Brownell?

HORROCKS: Suggested by Brownell?

SHANLEY: Oh, could have been, but I think that the President had it, you know, had been thinking about it for some time because he knew he had to come up with the appointment and who was he going to put in there? Every meeting with Earl Warren that the President attended or had with Earl Warren, I was there. And I was the third one, strangely enough, I don't know how many times, three or four times——

HORROCKS: Before the election that you're talking about?

SHANLEY: During the election, during the campaign, before the election, when Warren was being considered, you know, for a number two spot and all that. And I seemed to have been the only one that was ever present when the two of them were talking. And there was never any discussion of anything for Warren.
HORROCKS: At all.

SHANLEY: Never, never. Never talked about his desire to be chief justice which is contrary to what the rumors were.

HORROCKS: Of agreeing to get or working out some way to get Warren's help, certainly not on the first ballot--Warren wanted those votes--but on the "Fair Play" amendments?

SHANLEY: Well, Eisenhower didn't do it because I was there, and he just wouldn't do that, you know. I think he figured he'd rather lose than, almost, than, you know, get into that type of discussion. He was not a politician, and he wasn't prepared to do it. I think he figured: What the hell, if this is the way it ought to be done, somebody like Brownell ought to do this, not me.

HORROCKS: Did they discuss Warren as Vice-President, or was he under serious discussion?

SHANLEY: No--you mean the two of them together?
HORROCKS: Well, were you in any other conversations where it was seriously considered?

SHANLEY: You mean where, not with Earl Warren, you don't mean with Earl Warren?

HORROCKS: Not necessarily, no.

SHANLEY: Well I never got into, you know, who the number two situation would be. At the time I guess maybe I was— at least if I did I'd have to recall it in notes and things like that. I probably did at some point, but—

HORROCKS: Were you present during the convention in the hotel room when Dewey and Brownell and everyone got together and discussed who the Vice-Presidential nominee should be?

SHANLEY: No. I don't know why I wasn't, really. I say that not without any intent of being, that I was that important, but I wasn't. I don't recall why, frankly.

HORROCKS: My guaranteed last question here is, are you familiar with any actions that Eisenhower took in 1964 with regard to Goldwater's nomination, in trying to stop it or in
cooperating with William Scranton?

SHANLEY: No, I think he felt that—no, I knew that he was—but the Scranton thing was an abortive effort to, it was hopeless—

HORROCKS: Right. It did not get far.

SHANLEY: It didn't make any sense. How much he got involved in it I really don't know. I think that he felt that Goldwater was not his dish of tea, but he would have supported him certainly if he had been nominated—I mean when he was nominated. You see it was a little like when Nixon was nominated. I was running the campaign here in New Jersey, and I kept screaming, you know, to everybody down there—had sixteen generals and no troops, you know, as you recall in '60. And I called Len Hall, "Send me up Eisenhower and New Jersey's a pushover." I didn't get anywhere. So I finally hopped a plane, went down there and said, "I want to see the President," to Tom Stephens who had come back to take the job that I had as secretary.

And he said, "What do you want to see him about, Bern?" This is the stock question; so we both started laughing.
And I said, "Tom, I've got to get him up here to New Jersey to help me, because we can't lose."

"You can talk to him; he knows you're here; he won't let you go without seeing you, but you can't talk to him about that."
And I said, "Why not?"
And he said, "For the very simple reason that he has told Nixon that anything that Nixon wants him to do for him, he will do. Nixon has not asked him to do it, and it looks at the moment that Nixon is not going to."

I said, "Why?"

He said, "You know the answer. He doesn't want to look as though Eisenhower elected him."

I said, "Well, Tom, all I know is that this is—he's going to blow this if this is the way he's thinking." But it was. Eisenhower would have done anything to have helped the guy, and he didn't have enough sense to get himself elected.

HORROCKS: And yet Eisenhower wouldn't go unless asked by Nixon.

SHANLEY: He wouldn't go because he had offered to do anything in the world he could to help. So he felt that he had made the offer; if Nixon wanted him to do it, he would be glad to do it.
And would have done it. But he wasn't asked. And he got blamed for Nixon's defeat, because he wouldn't go out and campaign for him, which is not true. It's just not true.

HORROCKS: Small things, but such a big difference.

SHANLEY: Incredible. I know because I was right in the middle of it. I was, you know, personally, emotionally, every other way, involved.

HORROCKS: Thank you very much Mr. Shanley.

SHANLEY: Well I was delighted to see you.