INTERVIEW WITH
Mr. Timothy Stanley
by
Dr. Thomas Soapes
Oral Historian
on
February 28, 1977
for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
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Timothy W. Stanley
Donor

Nov 3, 1968
Date

Archivist of the United States

November 19, 1962
Date
This interview is being conducted with Mr. Timothy Stanley in his office in Washington, DC on February 28, 1977. The interviewer is Dr. Thomas Soapes of the Eisenhower Library. Present for the interview are Mr. Stanley and Dr. Soapes.

DR. SOAPES: First would you tell me where and when you were born and about your formal education?

MR. STANLEY: I was born in Hartford, Connecticut in September, 1927. I had an academic career consisting of two "sandwiches:" I went to Yale, and then to the Army, and then back to Yale, and to the Harvard Law School, back into the Army during the Korean War, back to Harvard Law School. Then I did some teaching there and also got a Ph. D. from Harvard in political economy.

DR. SOAPES: Specializing in foreign policy?

MR. STANLEY: In international relations.

DR. SOAPES: Your military experience in World War II, were you in the European Theater?

MR. STANLEY: No, and this was actually after the end of hostilities before I served and it was all in this country.
DR. SOAPES: And the Korean War, you went to Korea?

STANLEY: Well, I started out to Korea and they changed the orders of our unit halfway across the country and I wound up in Germany.

SOAPES: I see the Army was functioning then like it does currently. Did you ever participate in political activities while you were in college?

STANLEY: No.

SOAPES: How did you come into, in terms of civilian service, the federal government?

STANLEY: Oh, I'd been teaching at Harvard. We were starting what became the Harvard Defense Studies Program which Henry Kissinger was associated with later on. And some of the professors who were running it urged some of the young members of the staff to try to spend a summer in Washington getting a more recent feel of the agencies concerned with national security. It turned out, to make this work out, I had to take a civil service exam, and so without really intending to I became a career
civil servant. I did a short tour in the Pentagon, came back to Harvard, and then the Pentagon asked me to come back to work in their international security affairs area, and so I did. So I had been in the Pentagon before going to the White House.

SOAPES: How did it come about that you moved over to the White House?

STANLEY: I don't really know. I was asked to come over for an interview and met with General [Andrew] Goodpaster and Albert Toner, and they described a job and it sounded like an extremely interesting experience so I accepted it. I assume they got my name perhaps from someone at Harvard Law School.

SOAPES: Just for a moment to have a little more detail on your Pentagon experience before you went to the White House, could you give me a little more detail about what your duties were there and under what department you worked?

STANLEY: They had a program of management training where they took in people out of graduate school and deliberately rotated them around among assignments in several different parts of the
Pentagon. I had several of these orientation-type assignments in different parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the only really substantive work I did was in the international security affairs area. And being quite new and green they put me in the northern and eastern European branch where it was supposed to be quiet. Then as soon as I wound up as a desk officer for those two areas, we had, first, the big Iceland base problem; then we had Hungary; then I also had to fill in on the French desk at the time of Suez. So I found myself thrown in the water and having to swim on some fairly hot problems fairly early on in my career.

SOAPES: As you look back to the Suez and the Hungary episodes, what sticks in your mind as the key considerations in the Defense Department in those episodes?

STANLEY: Well, you bring up a very, I think, interesting and important point from the standpoint of this project because—recognizing now that I'm a very junior desk man, well down in the bureaucracy—it did not seem to me that there really was any effective interdepartmental consideration of issues and options and alternatives that I could see from where I sat. And I think
I was close enough to the assistant secretary and the intelligence people that I would have been aware of it if there had been. This, of course, overlapped the election period which preoccupied, understandably, President Eisenhower, and it was during the period of Mr. Dulles's illness. If recollection serves, the acting Secretary of State was Herbert Hoover, Jr. and the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, was a man with industry background and not really a public policy background and he really felt that these areas were outside his responsibilities. And those who were working for Gordon Gray on the problem simply found that there didn't seem to be any effective National Security Council or interdepartmental mechanism in which to make recommendations. Now I think the feeling of the Pentagon of frustration, part would be procedural and part would be over our inability to make any meaningful moves to help the Hungarians.

I'll make another aside if I may on the Suez Crisis because years later it came back in a curious way. After the Kennedy administration came in, of course this being many years after that, General DeGaulle's government was circulating in NATO circles a report that at the time of the Suez crisis when the
Russians, Khrushchev in particular, had talked of Soviet missiles possibly being applied to London and Paris, that the United States had been very ambiguous and had not assured them that the NATO guarantee would apply. This was doing a great deal of harm to U.S. foreign policy, which at that time was trying to discourage independent nuclear forces. Curiously enough, Douglas Dillon who had been the ambassador in Paris at that time remembered very clearly having, on instructions, assured them via Guy Mollet, the French prime minister, that, irrespective of our disagreements over Suez, if the Russians threatened Paris the American guarantee is in place and could be counted upon. But there was no report of that anywhere in any of the government files.

Because I had known John Eisenhower on the White House staff, I undertook to call him and ask his help in seeing whether there was anything in the President's papers which would show what the response to the French had been. He indicated that he didn't think that was appropriate and filed the memorandum for his father's files indicating that I'd made the request and that he'd indicated that such request should come from the Secretary of Defense,
not through the staff channel. It was, of course, my intention simply to find out if there was anything there that bore on the subject so that a proper request could be made. Now the way this came up later was apparently in the suit that's now in process for the Nixon papers; some lawyers came to see me with a copy of John Eisenhower's affidavit about this telephone call. They said they wanted to file a counter at least to answer that particular point. I didn't feel I could do so myself, but I did refer them to Paul Nitze who'd been my boss at the time [as Assistant Secretary ISA] and had asked me to help on this problem. He has filed and it's available, I guess, as part of the court record, a very detailed deposition on this point. It concerns the substance of what our position was with the French and the procedural impasse that was caused by the difficulty of a new administration getting access to Presidential records of another administration.* But that's perhaps a digression from the main point.

SOAPES: But this is still interesting story we're glad to have down. Now, when you were at DOD you were working directly under whom?

*Copies of these affidavits are appendes to this interview.
STANELY: Let's see, Gordon Gray was then the assistant secretary, and I was acting on some problems as sort of a staff assistant to him and on others simply as a part of the European region. And I've already forgotten who was director of that office—a military officer, I believe an Army general.

SOAPES: What are your recollections of Gordon Gray as an administrator and as a person to work with?

STANELY: I'm not sure I really saw enough of him in his administrative capacity to make a judgment. Certainly he's a man of great ability and integrity. I can only say that having come back to ISA later and worked with quite a few assistant secretaries of defense, directly in their front office, in retrospect I had an impression that ISA [International Security Affairs] was not quite as well organized as it might have been, but at the time I didn't know enough to make that judgment. I certainly enjoyed the contact I had with him, had a great deal of respect for him.

SOAPES: Now when was it that you went to the White House?
STANLEY: March of 1957.

SOAPES: Did you go into work immediately with Al Toner's office doing "Staff Notes?"

STANLEY: Right.

SOAPES: As I was telling you before we started the tape, we do have a rather complete record of the paper that came into that office and went out. Could you give us just a brief description of the process that you went through in your part of developing "Staff Notes?"

STANLEY: Well I think we worked as a team and didn't specialize. I tended to emphasize a little more in my work the defense side, because that was my background as Al's was State Department. I'm not sure I had any really different experiences from what you have in your archives, from his comments and those of others who worked in that process. I think the process itself was intriguing because it showed me, as a political scientist, that the old adage that a President, despite his power, cannot really compel the bureaucracy to respond without a great deal
of leverage applied through the cabinet levels is true. And we were essentially in the position of reporters writing a highly classified newspaper for a readership of one, except to the extent that General Goodpaster, and later I believe the vice-president, were given copies of it. And we had to observe the reporters' cautions about our sources.

We were given free rein to put in our report anything that we got from a designated source; but we could not and should not have been allowed to simply report rumors or scuttlebutt going around. But if we could get anyone of our designated contacts to give us an item, we could print it. We also had to be aware of being used by people who were simply trying to use this channel to get some information to the President of a self-serving nature. So it really was a reporter's job more than a bureaucratic job. But even with all that leverage and with someone as powerful as Sherman Adams, or General Goodpaster, very firmly behind us and willing to call up a cabinet officer and say, "Your department really has not been giving as much material as they should," we still had to go and find our own stories and then very often bring them to the attention of the staff contact in the agency and
have him write up the report rather than just sitting back and waiting for these to come in. So it varied a great deal, and some departments were very, very good—Defense in particular who could always be counted upon, thanks in large part to the cooperation of our contact, Eugene Livesay. But the nature of the enterprise, as you know, was to see that the President got early warning of problems, not to wait until everything was tied up in a nice package and then announced to the newspapers. Of course the more difficulty there was with a problem, the more it was like pulling teeth to get people to talk about it.

SOAPES: What was the source of their reluctance?

STANLEY: I think a feeling, which I guess perhaps I was too immature to fully appreciate at the time, but a desire not to have the White House involved until they had worked things out the way they wanted them worked out, in the interest of the administration to be sure, but they wanted to present their boss, the President, with a completed package for whatever it was or with a problem to which they had answers. They didn't want a problem raised and perhaps have questions asked about it before they knew what the answers were. So it's simply a
bureaucratic instinct of self-preservation I think.

SOAPES: Did you detect any concern on their part that these reports might go to unauthorized people?

STANLEY: No, I think they all knew the system and understood that only General Goodpaster and Governor Adams and the President could see it, that there would be no other distribution. There never was a leak of any kind, so I don't think that was a concern.

SOAPES: You mentioned and I think there is something in the papers that the vice-president did get them.

STANLEY: Yes.

SOAPES: From all the innuendo and rumor that we've heard about suspicion of Vice-President Nixon during the administration, the fact that he was getting them, was that known to them and if so, did it add to your problems?

STANLEY: I honestly don't know. We were told to give him a copy and Al or I used to go down every day in a White House
car and deliver it to, rarely him personally, more often to his military aide. And the questions that he had, and he had a lot of questions, always came back through that channel rather than going out to the departments. I think we probably did indicate that it was also going to him and to others, but I don't think that made any difference.

I would like to say for the record though that, again, as a young man serving the government from that level for the first time, I was tremendously impressed by the types of questions that would come back to us from the Vice-President's office. They were perceptive questions. They were not just technical detail of when something was going to happen, but probing questions. For example, at one point we were running a series of items about skirmishing going on on the Chinese off-shore islands, and on at least one occasion Mr. Nixon sort of raised through this channel, "Has anybody stopped to ask the basic question whether we should be on those islands and if not what the consequences would be?" So, he was revealing then, I think, the willingness to ask fundamental questions about some of our policies which he later was to implement as President. I certainly felt that there was a man there with a
very able mind and—well, a man with some vision and courage. He certainly was raising more questions of that nature than were commonly raised within the Cabinet, as far as I could tell.

SOAPES: Did you ever attend cabinet sessions?

STANLEY: Only one I think. I attended a couple of National Security Council meetings, later on when I was back in the Pentagon, with President Eisenhower. But even there, although that's a very small sample, there didn't seem to be an awful lot of frantic debate of alternatives or raising fundamental questions.

SOAPES: Now we've got some conflicting evidence, of course, on that as some of the people I've talked to who did attend NSC meetings have given me a contrary view. Was it your feeling that these sessions were perfunctory; that the President already knew the answers that he wanted?

STANLEY: Well, to be quite honest I, as I say I only attended two—they were on specific topics, reports to the President on studies that I had worked on. And in one case it was very clear that the President knew what the recommendation was going to be,
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I did not agree with it, and was not about to implement it. I'm sure it was in the post-election period and it had to do with the shift of our posture toward what became a "limited war," or a more flexible kind of doctrine, and the President was quite adamant and some of the people there had the temerity to argue with him. I certainly didn't, but some of the more senior people did. I remember Gerry [Gerald C.] Smith had worked on this--he was in the State Department--and spoke up very forcefully about the consequences of being as strategically muscle-bound (as our report shows we were) would be to U.S. security. I don't know whether because there was going to be a change in administration or for budgetary reasons or simply a matter of the President feeling he had thought about this issue enough and didn't want to hear any more about it, but he shut off debate, and Gerry courageously reopened it once or twice and got stomped on pretty hard.

SOAPES: When you were in the White House, did you have much contact directly with the President?

STANLEY: Very little, very little. A "good morning" in the hallways mostly. (During emergency "relocation" exercises outside of Washington and once during a staff exercise at Camp David, we junior staffers did get to see a little more of "The Boss, as he was called."
SOAPES: You did not, perhaps even with Goodpaster or--

STANLEY: A great deal through General Goodpaster, and we sometimes got special assignments from General Goodpaster on behalf of the President. I found myself one day doing a very quick content analysis of some conflicting personal communications from Khrushchev at the time of one of the recurrent Berlin crises. And it seemed to General Goodpaster that there were some significant differences, as though one had been drafted personally and one by a committee and that kind of thing. So he asked me in just the few minutes available to do a quick count of types of words, expressions, and so forth. So one got into some very interesting sidelines on that.

SOAPES: In the files of the office there is a series of file folders labeled "Special Projects" and it has your initials. Is that the type of thing that you were just referring to?

STANLEY: Yes. This happened to be one that came up very quickly during preparation, I guess, for an NSC meeting. Then I think we did a little more systematic analysis of it later on and there were some other special projects in terms of staff
research nature.

SOAPES: I see. The folders usually don't have the end product, they have a few scattered notes in them and almost all, I think, deal with foreign policy. But those were reports you would prepare for specific situations?

STANLEY: Yes. And I'm surprised that they're not. There should be certainly a file copy of our office copy somewhere in the records of that office, and the original, presumably, went to the President. And I must say one other thing--General Goodpaster never, or I can't say "never" because it only happened once--and the fact that it only happened once I think is very significant--ever held anything up. What we gave to him went to the President without any comments. Goodpaster's feeling was: Let the chips fall where they may; it's important that the President have one unbiased source of views. They may be wrong, they may be inaccurate, but he's entitled to that one unvarnished, unslanted bit of information, since everybody else in this town comes to him trying to sell him something and persuade him to do something, or not to do something. The only time that I remember his asking for a
change was when he felt that we had been used to get into an internal
staff fight—I don't even remember who was involved or what the
issue was—but that we had been inappropriately used without
our knowledge by somebody else in trying to get something in to
President Eisenhower. He did ask us to redo that page and take
out that item. Out of all that time I think that's a pretty
remarkable model of objectivity. Because, of course, it was
General Goodpaster who bore the brunt of it if the President
saw something and discovered the government was doing he didn't
like—it was to General Goodpaster that he took his complaint.

SOAPES: You said that that was the one time that he held some-
thing up. How frequently would you be able to catch departments
trying to do that?

STANLEY: I think Al got to be very good at it; he of course did
this substantially longer than I, and I think he had a pretty
good bureaucratic instinct of when we were being used, better than
mine, and I think he caught a lot. We could also usually tell when
our sources were trying to hold something back. After I worked at it
for a while I began to spot the tendency too, self-serving things.
And of course trying to report information bearing on responsibilities
of—how many?, twenty-one, twenty-two different agencies
of government—we couldn't have enough expertise ourselves to
know all of the infighting and arguments that were going on.
We did have to rely on our chief contacts to pre-screen. Some-
times when he would get some powerful elements at this depart-
ment pushing him to report, he would tell us. He'd call us up
and say, "I sent you two items, but I had some doubts about
them; I suspect that they're being used to try to make an end
run here." Generally we would edit them or refuse them.

SOAPES: You had a space limitation, didn't you, a maximum of
what—two pages?

STANLEY: Tried to hold it to two pages. Sometimes it ran over
to three. And when we had something we thought just couldn't be
handled that way, a subject that was too complex for that treat-
ment, we'd have a special staff note, I think we called them, the
addendum, so to speak. Basic "Staff Notes" were two pages.

SOAPES: Was it tough to hold it down to that?

STANLEY: It was very hard. Al toner, one of whose skills is
that of a professional editor, was just awfully good at taking two pages of material and getting the gist of it down into one paragraph. I could get it down to two paragraphs and he'd get it down to two sentences.

SOAPES: I've read them and they are very remarkable, very tersely state what was in the much longer page. Would there be a process within the office that you or Chris Russell or someone else would start the initial drafts and that Al Toner then would handle the final?

STANLEY: So long ago now I have to stop and think. It seemed to me we sort of divided them up. We'd get in toward the later afternoon a flood of material and divide it up and each of us take a crack at it and then each edit the other's drafts and again till we got it in good shape.

SOAPES: So it was a team effort, and it wasn't a heavily structured--

STANLEY: No. No, there was a very good, pleasant working relationship. Certainly in addition to the pleasure of working with
someone like Al, who's a very modest kind of a fellow, it
was a very good experience for someone new in government. It
was a pleasure to work with General Goodpaster, who was and is
one of the most remarkable men, I think, of our time.

SOAPES: That was going to be my next question. He is, of
course, a very powerful figure in the White House and a very
interesting one, and I was wondering about your candid assess-
ments of the major strengths and weaknesses of the man.

STANLEY: I don't think there were any weaknesses that I could
detect. I suppose, again, you have to remember that I'm fairly
young, a couple years out of graduate school, he certainly was
the calmest man under pressure I've ever seen. I remember the
night before Eisenhower was going to broadcast--this was a
matter of twenty minutes or half an hour before he was going
to broadcast about sending the troops to Lebanon, the White
House was a very tense place. Goodpaster was briefing all day
on the substance of that and I came down and stumbled through
this maze of television cameras and so forth and saw what was
going on and was about to sneak away because--I don't even remember
what I had but it was hardly earthshaking. And he looked up and said, "What have you got?" I said, "Nothing that warrants your time right now." "No," he said, "We don't go on the air for ten minutes, what's the problem?" And he just had that kind of a calmness that's extraordinary; I never saw him lose his temper. I've known him to be angry sometimes, but he kept himself always under very tight— he's just the most perfectly disciplined man in his manner and his ability to understand the political and bureaucratic forces, they weren't really his province to deal with, but he always understood them. And he was just a tower of strength, and if he had any weaknesses, they never came to my attention.

SOAPES: I think you've already indicated he was always very supportive of your office.

STANLEY: Yes.

SOAPES: I think I recall a couple of times seeing in the papers where he had sent back something to you that the President had noted.

STANLEY: Yes, he was very thoughtful in that way. He went out
of his way to try to help me see things that might not have been strictly in my line of duty but get more experience in the way government worked. He was supportive of our effort in two ways. First, as you suggest, when the President had a question it gave us a lot of satisfaction to know that, because that was the feedback we got from our readership, and he made an effort to do that. And whenever we needed any help in any of the departments, we'd just have to ask. He would make a judgment, "Do I want to call them or should I have Governor Adams call them or maybe the President ought to say something about it." But he just always not only supported it but he could be counted upon to back us up on this.

[Interruption]

SOAPES: Did you have much contact with Sherm Adams?

STANLEY: Really very little. I was interviewed by him at the last stage of my hiring and I remember he asked, "What are your politics?" And I said I was an independent. He thought for a minute and said, "Well, as long as you're an independent for the President of the United States, whoever the poor guy happens to be,
it's probably a pretty good thing to be for this job. You're hired." And my father, some years later but while I was working at the White House, was down on some business discussion with the President and had a moment to chat with Sherman Adams and he said, "You know, I've got a son working here. How's he doing?" And according to my father, Governor Adams said, "Well, I haven't heard anything bad about him"—my father was a little taken aback at that, so the President said, "That's about the best thing we say about anybody around here."

SOAPES: What did you detect was the staff's general reaction to Governor Adams? He's got the reputation of having a very vicious bark, but others say that he was a very kind man in some ways and they seem to respect his judgments.

STANLEY: Well, we saw him occasionally at staff meetings and that kind of thing, but, again, our function was so specialized that we weren't involved in the day-to-day political management side of the White House, so I don't think I have a very good feel for that. My own feeling was that his bark was deliberately—oh, he had a pretty bad bite, I don't say it was worse because people who had been bitten didn't forget it. But I
think he deliberately put on this very gruff manner as the only way he really could shield the President and command the kind of attention that he commanded. And I suspect that personality was a typical New Englander with a gruff exterior but a fairly gentle interior. Certainly I was very distressed by all the unfortunate publicity that surrounded his departure. But I think he was another remarkable man, but I didn't really work with him enough to have a relevant net judgment.

SOAPES: Were there any others on the White House that I haven't mentioned that you did have enough contact with?

STANLEY: Well, Max Rabb and Brad Patterson who ran the cabinet office, which was part of this overall secretariat function. I assume you've talked to them or others about them.

SOAPES: Yes.

STANLEY: Came to know Brad, who is closer to my own age, fairly well over the years. Very energetic, incredible kind of energy and enthusiasm. Max Rabb was always a little more of a mystery to me, and again it seemed to me he dealt a little more with
the political sides of things or at least the politics of working with the Cabinet was his job. So I don't really have personal impressions. Al and I were privileged, and again this reflects General Goodpaster's supportive nature, to be a member of the White House Mess. And that really was a very valuable experience because it's a very small mess as you know—and you go in and sit down at a table and you find yourself lunching with cabinet officers, but occasionally Governor Adams, Max Rabb. So again this gave us some sense of talking shop with what was going on in other parts of the White House.

SOAPES: Speaking of the mess as an institution, was it your feeling that this was an important part of the day where important things did occur with people meeting informally?

STANLEY: Yes, very much so because, you know, people there work an impossibly long day under tremendous pressures and lunch is about the only time that they could kind of catch each other informally. So there'd be an awful lot of people getting up from one table and going over and sitting down at another and saying, "I tried to get you about this, but what are we going to do about that?" and that sort of thing. So it was, it seemed
to me, a business as well as a social institution.

SOAPES: Did you have much contact with Bill Hopkins?

STANLEY: Not a great deal. He certainly was the institutional memory of the White House—as I'm sure he's been called by others. He was always very courteous and correct and whenever we had a problem, what to do with our paper if the President was away or how to get hold of Goodpaster or whatever the problem might be, he was always very helpful. But I never really had much dealings with him on substantive matters. Art Minnich, of course and later John Eisenhower was active in that front office and I certainly had very good working relations with them, too.

SOAPES: You stayed at the White House for how long?

STANLEY: Just about two years. General Goodpaster called me in one day and said that the then assistant secretary of defense for ISA, Jack [John N.] Irwin, had approached him to ask him if it would be all right to talk to me about coming back to the Pentagon to be his assistant. And I found that this had sort of been arranged almost and that General Goodpaster felt this would be a good thing for my career even though he, I assume,
didn't want changes in the staff at that juncture. And his loyalty to his staff is indicated by the strange negotiation between General Goodpaster and the Pentagon. The job in question was a couple of grades above where I was, and they wanted to give it to me at the higher grade. General Goodpaster said, "No, if you take it at that grade you'll be clearly labeled as a kind of a political appointee and you'll very soon be at a level where there won't be anything else for you to do and you won't have had the experience really to go on to other things. My advice to you would be just to take it at your present career grade." And so that seemed to produce personnel problems for the Pentagon; so there was a very strange negotiation with General Goodpaster trying to get a grade that was significantly lower than the one they were offering, because he thought it was best for me. So that's the way it worked out. And Andy was right.

SOAPES: They were talking about what they call a supergrade level?

STANLEY: No, that didn't come up until much later. I think it was a [GS] 15 and I was a 12 or a 13 or something. It was very good advice.

SOAPES: Then you went back doing many of the same things that
you had been doing before you went to the White House?

STANLEY: It's kind of ironic; the last thing I did as a sort of a special drafting job for General Goodpaster was drafting what amounted to a presidential directive to the Pentagon and some other agencies to do what became, sometime later, the study that I referred to, a limited war capabilities. The first job I was given when I got back to the Pentagon was to prepare a memorandum from the secretary back to the President explaining why it couldn't be done. [Laughter]

But it's again, a very interesting experience; I was very lucky to have that kind of broad exposure because it was both procedural in the sense of being a kind of staff secretary to Jack Irwin, of the kind that Goodpaster was to the President, in the sense of running his front office so as to see things got managed sensibly, and also having the opportunity to get deeply into some substantive problems. So it was a very happy experience. And when the administrations changed, the new team thought they wanted some continuity and asked me to stay on; so I did that for the next few years.

SOAPES: You mentioned getting into some substantive issues.
Do you remember what some of those were that you did get into?

STANLEY: Well, one was this major study on what are America's warfare capabilities, which involved a fundamental strategic issue: Is the United States going to have a limited war capability or are we going to try to deter conflict with our strategic forces? Of course there were a lot of budgetary considerations and the interests of the various services involved so I served as Mr. Irwin's representative on that study team.

And there was a series of congressional investigations about the Military Assistance Institute. There was nothing to investigate but Congress, than as now, wanted to stir up a little excitement so they stirred up quite a bit. All much to do about nothing really. It was a good program that Congress had itself mandated to have an institute to train people going overseas in the foreign assistance business, but they didn't quite like the way it had been done. And I remember at one point I was both sort of respondent to the General Accounting Office investigation, testifying before two congressional committees, and being executive director of an internal study of the thing, and that didn't leave me an awful lot of time for other things.
SOAPES: Having held essentially the same desk in two administrations, did you notice any significant differences between the Kennedy and the Eisenhower policies or style of policies if you want to go to that level, that historians or political scientists should be sensitive to?

STANLEY: I think they're mostly pretty well known by the writers who've analyzed this, but Eisenhower had a very formalized and structured government system. It's been described, I think accurately, as a military staff system. Kennedy people were much less inclined to use the National Security Council except as a platform really. This was done on a much more informal basis. I happened to be in the office of the deputy assistant secretary of defense when the phone rang and a voice said, "This is Jack Kennedy" and my friend who got the call, of course, uttered something like, "Try your bad humor on somebody else." Of course it was Kennedy himself, so there was a little more of that done. I think the fundamental difference, though, was a deliberate lack of structure. They did not want a basic planning document, a so-called Basic National Security Policy, because they felt that made everything too rigid. They tended to rely
on key individuals, who might be at any given level, that they had confidence in. They were a group of people, a lot of them intellectuals that had been in the defense-academic community before—they knew each other. A lot of us would deal sort of directly through Mac Bundy and bypass any formal machinery. So there was an awful lot of kind of "ad hoc-ing" in effect, if that's the expression. I must say in retrospect, having come back once during that period to a meeting in McGeorge Bundy's office, I found a lot of would-be crisis managers--forgotten even what the problem was—but they reminded me of a bunch of kids around a pinball machine. They had a world military map there and were saying, "What happens if we move there and they move here." And I said, "Look, fellows, if you go on doing that the machine is going to tilt." Which I don't think endeared me to that particular group of people. And that would not have gone on in the Eisenhower administration. You can't say that it's all bad.

I think when a new administration comes in, it wants a chance to stir things up and look at the issues and see what questions have been kind of hidden under the rugs and force them out and look at them. But it was a very trying period for the
bureaucracy. The Pentagon, by instinct, wanted to have the strategic document, called the basic national security document that they could draw up their plans on the basis of and feel they were following orders. And Kennedy, McNamara, and Nitze simply did not want that kind of a document. I remember I had to substitute for Paul Nitze at the National War College once and be the speaker, which was all right because I'd written the speech. But then I had to endure that two-hour grilling they give their guests, and all the questions focused on, to the minds of the people at the War College, this "vacuum" of policy making, the lack of clear guidance, what was our sense of direction? But it's hard to strike a balance. Both extremes are bad and I'm not sure we'll ever find the appropriate middle ground, but it will depend on the personality of the President.

SOAPES: What we've talked about is administrative style. Were there equally strong differences in policy assumptions?

STANLEY: Oh, yes. And I must say in retrospect that I think the general shift that the Kennedy administration people gave our strategic planning was right for that period. Not necessarily projecting it indefinitely but the fundamental issue
was the durability of the Dulles massive retaliation doctrine and the rather thinner force structure with its emphasis on strategic deterrence. That was as opposed to the flexible response doctrine, the desire to downplay the role of nuclear weapons because they simply felt that they were not usable. They were no longer a credible threat as the Soviets developed their own capability and we would be in a position of bluffing where we had no options. A search for options involved very substantial increase in our conventional posture, our deployments and our strategy. It certainly led to a large increase in the defense budget, and one can argue that that approach did precisely what General Eisenhower had been afraid that it would do—namely get us involved in Indochina, as it ultimately did. On the other hand, I was one of those who had to install the Kennedy (or McNamara) doctrine at NATO. It was difficult; but when we finally did it in 1967, there haven't been any changes on NATO strategy since.

SOAPES: As you look back on the Eisenhower foreign and military policy as a political scientist, with some chance of perspective now, how do you think the Eisenhower administration should be evaluated by scholars in those fields?

STANLEY: Well I hope it will be evaluated, as I think it is, much more favorably than it was at the time. Certainly various friends that I had in the academic community or the press were more than
ordinarily critical of the Eisenhower administration, as being rather static, not very imaginative, reactive rather than dynamic. And I found it hard sometimes to defend against these charges. But in retrospect a lot of those same people I've heard say: "Those were the good old days," when we had a government "that didn't try to stick its foot into everything, and mess everything up." And I think the historian of the future is going to have to judge how much this was a function of the man, his overwhelming popular mandate from the country, the confidence people had in him, how much it was just a fairly placid period of history. And I think, in retrospect, people are looking back from the latter days of the Nixon or even the Johnson and Kennedy periods, saying that was a period of stability and high confidence in government which we haven't seen since.

SOAPES: Just briefly to fill out your personal history: After you completed this position at the Department of Defense, could you trace for me your positions after that.

STANLEY: I took a sabbatical, if that's the word for it, and went off to the Council on Foreign Relations and did a book for them on NATO, then came back to the Pentagon and worked in policy
planning which involved the Berlin crisis, the multi-lateral force proposals, and a lot of things of that kind. And about the time the book came out—I don't think Bob McNamara even knew that I'd written this book—I was asked to go to NATO as the Defense Department's planning representative there and later as its Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO. It seemed kind of ironic that just before this book came out, which had a lot of things to say about NATO, I was asked to go over there as the Pentagon's man. So we had to get Secretary McNamara an advance copy of the book to see if it would be embarrassing. He didn't have time to read it. So he finally called me in and asked me, "Is there anything in here that really is going to embarrass either me or you." I said, "I hope not." So on that basis I went and served four and a half years, first in Paris and then in Brussels. Having originally gone to Washington for a summer, or perhaps for a year or two, after fifteen years I thought it was time to get out, so I did.* I taught for a year at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and then joined this non-profit economic research organization which I now head.

SOAPES: Thank you for your time this afternoon, Mr. Stanley.

*I might add that I was asked to stay on at NATO into the first Nixon administration, and I did stay into the summer, until I had to get ready to teach in the fall. Just to show that it is a small world: I had a dinner for my NATO successor (who was a law school classmate) and invited both General Goodpaster, just arriving as SACEUR, and John
Eisenhower, who was then the U.S. Ambassador to Brussels. In turn Mamie, who was visiting John after President Eisenhower's death, went out of her way to come to my farewell dinner in Brussels a few days later.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD NIXON, individually and
as the former President of
the United States,

 Plaintiff

v.

ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES

and

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Defendants

C. A. No. 74-1852

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

County of Montgomery ) ss.: 
State of Pennsylvania )

John S. D. Eisenhower, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says:

1. My permanent residence is in the State of Pennsylvania.

2. At the present time I am serving as Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees.

3. I am the son of Dwight David Eisenhower, who was President of the United States from January 20, 1953 to January 20, 1961.
4. During the period June 6, 1944 to March 27, 1963, I served as a regular officer in the United States Army. I am currently a Brigadier General in the United States Army Reserve.

5. During various periods of my military service I was stationed near Washington, D.C., and was able to work closely with my father and members of his staff during his term as President. For the last twenty-seven months of his term in office I worked as a Staff Assistant to my father in the White House. During the course of my work at the White House, and through discussions with my father and his aides, I acquired a general knowledge of the nature of the workings of the Presidency and a specific knowledge of the daily operations of the White House Office. After President Eisenhower left office, I continued to work directly with him in a capacity I will more fully describe below.

6. It was President Eisenhower's practice while in office to have at least one of his staff members attend nearly all meetings between the President and others, whether they were heads of foreign states, Members of Congress, government officials or private citizens. Following the meeting, the staff member would prepare a memorandum for the President's file setting forth a description of the meeting, the substance of the subjects and viewpoints discussed, and the course of action, if any, to be taken thereafter. These memoranda were prepared at the direction of and exclusively for the use of the President.
7. Notes were also taken of the substance of matter discussed at all cabinet meetings.

8. It was also President Eisenhower's practice to have his personal secretary, Mrs. Ann C. Whitman, listen on an extension telephone to most all of his conversations in the oval office and to record by notation the substance of the conversations. These notations were subsequently transcribed and made available to the President. Thereafter they were included in the President's files.

9. Neither the memoranda of President Eisenhower's meetings nor his secretary's notes of the Presidential telephone conversations were prepared for public use or review. All of the notes and memoranda, however, were available to my father after he left office and were used by him as an invaluable resource in preparing his memoirs for publication.

10. During President Eisenhower's term in office he engaged in extensive correspondence with a number of persons. On occasion the President would seek out the opinions and recommendations of one or more members of the public and private sectors of the nation. In response he received candid and frank statements of the writers' views.

11. Some of the topics encompassed by the President's correspondence pertained to the President's constitutional duties, such as the signing of and vetoing of enrolled bills passed by Congress. Others related to the President's duties as a leader
of the nation, such as the formulation of economic policy. Another category concerned the President's duties as the head of his political party. This correspondence was retained in files maintained by the President's personal secretary (to this date referred to as "the Whitman files").

13. Near the conclusion of my father's second term as President, I began the process of arranging for the disposition of all of the materials generated by or retained within the Office of the President during his Administration. Through conversations with President Eisenhower and others, I was aware that prior to the time my father arrived in the White House on January 20, 1953, the prior administration had removed from the White House and Executive Office Building offices all staff and central files pertaining to the work of that administration. My father informed me that the only material left for him was a single page of instructions to be used in the event of national crisis and National Security Policy Documents. All other files had been removed. We were informed that this same general procedure had been followed by every prior administration, and we determined that we would adopt the same policy.

14. An integral part in determining the disposition of the Eisenhower presidential papers was the preparation and execution of the letter of intent dated April 13, 1960, addressed to Mr. Floete from President Eisenhower. As that letter of intent indicates, President Eisenhower, in donating his materials to the United States, placed under seal those papers
which contain "statements made by or to [President Eisenhower] in
confidence, papers relating to family or private business affairs,
papers containing statements which might injure or harass individ-
uals or their families" and "such other individual files as I,
or my representative or the Administrator of the General Services
may specify." It was thus that President Eisenhower decided to
maintain the confidentiality of the documents he desired not to
be made public.

15. To begin the task of packaging the presidential
materials for shipment from the White House, White House Staff
Secretary, A. J. Goodpaster, prepared a memorandum to be sent to
all members of the White House staff directing them to package
at least 75 percent to 90 percent of their individual files and
deliver them to a temporary storage area preparatory to transfer
to Abilene, Kansas. This memorandum was circulated approximately
December 15, 1960, and the requested deadline for packaging and
transfer was December 23. On January 11, 1961, a second memo-
ramum was sent by Wilton Persons to all staff members reiterating
the directive for packaging of the Eisenhower Presidential files.
In this memorandum, the staff was told to "... clear out every
last possible paper (other than strictly personal) from their
files!!" and to box, label, and place them in the custody of
GSA by the end of the day, January 16. Nothing was to be left
in any office that was not "completely essential."
16. With regard to the material, if any, that was to be left for the incoming administration, the memorandum directed that such items should be "cleared with the President" through the office of staff secretary.

17. On the afternoon of January 19, 1961, within hours of the inauguration of John F. Kennedy, I personally toured the staff offices and gathered several storage cabinet safes that had not previously been prepared for shipment. Apart from these safes, there were no files nor other items of Presidential materials left for the incoming administration.

18. With respect to the President's personal files, they had previously been packaged for shipment to President Eisenhower's future office in Gettysburg. The only material left by President Eisenhower for President Kennedy was a satchel containing a series of orders and instructions to be of assistance in the event of nuclear attack or other national crisis.

19. After leaving office, President Eisenhower retired to his home in Gettysburg. A principal activity thereafter, for several years, was the review of his Presidential materials and the preparation of his memoirs. I accompanied my father to Gettysburg and assisted him in these activities.

20. Among the tasks I undertook at my father's request and as his direct personal representative was to review all of the memoranda of Presidential meetings. President Eisenhower directed me to reclassify them from whatever classification they then held to "privileged." See Exhibit A. This classification was intended
to reflect the fact that the memorandum embodied confidential
communication between the President and his aides.

21. On January 18, 1961, two days before leaving
office, my father authorized eight persons within the limits of
the security division to have access to his Presidential papers
for the purpose of assisting him in their compilation. Therefore
I was the only person at Gettysburg other than the President who
had total access to his files.

22. During the time President Eisenhower's personal
files were at Gettysburg, but at least three years after my
father left office, I am aware of at least two instances in which
he granted permission to an author or historian to have super-
vised access to certain strictly limited portions of the Whitman
files in order to aid them in their research. I am also aware
that during the same period President Eisenhower refused for
various reasons to grant similar access to other persons.

23. On at least one occasion a member of the incumbent
Kennedy Administration sought access to the Eisenhower files and
was denied such access. On January 18, 1962, I received a tele-
phone call from a staff member of the Office of International
Security Affairs of the Department of Defense who explained that
the State Department desired to reconstruct a portion of certain
discussions between the United States and France concerning the
Suez crisis in 1956. I replied to the staff member that it would
be necessary for the incumbent administration to request such access
to President Eisenhower's files from the President himself. To my knowledge no subsequent request was made and my father never instructed me to review the files to locate the information in question. At the time of this incident, I prepared a memorandum setting forth the substance of my conversation with his staff member. That memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

24. On another occasion, in approximately 1964, a request was made to provide President Johnson access to a letter sent from David Ben Gurian [Ben-Gurion] of Israel to President Eisenhower. That request was honored. Prior to his death, the highly secret materials which he no longer needed were transferred to Abilene.

25. Upon the death of President Eisenhower in 1969 all of the Whitman files which had been in his possession in Gettysburg since the close of the administration were packed and shipped to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. This transfer of custody was made under the same conditions with respect to access that had been imposed on the original shipment of staff and central office files sent to Kansas directly from the White House.

26. Since my father's death I have appointed an advisory committee known as the Eisenhower Manuscript Committee to assist me in reference to the Eisenhower papers. This committee meets as required and communicates informally even more frequently concerning policy questions involving the imposition or relaxation
of restrictions on public access to particular documents, segments of files or categories of materials. Although I have the authority to make the final determination of whether access to the Eisenhower Presidential materials should be restricted, the committee's recommendations are generally accepted and often reflect the suggestions of the library's professional staff. Recently approximately half of the so-called Whitman files have been opened to research. However, materials in these files that were classified or fell within the category of documents directed to remain under seal by the April 13, 1960 letter of intent remain sealed.

27. After leaving the White House and until his death, President Eisenhower used and treated his Presidential papers as his own personal property and at his death deeded them to the government in his will.

/s/ John S. D. Eisenhower
JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of June, 1975.

/s/ Miriam T. Magyar
Notary Public

Miriam T. Magyar, Notary Public
Chester County, Pa.
My commission expires Oct. 28, 1977

* name is not clear on document
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

Lt. Col. John S. D. Eisenhower

Since you will be dealing with my papers in the near future, I would like you to accomplish the task for me of regrading all Memoranda of Conference in which I have participated to PRIVILEGED rather than the security classifications which they now bear.

[Signature]

Exhibit B
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

January 18, 1962

Mr. Tim Stanley, formerly of the White House Staff, and now an official in the International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense, called this afternoon requesting an opportunity to check into the files of former President Eisenhower.

Apparently there is a search going on between Secretary Dillon, Mr. Nitze and members of the State Department to ascertain some facts (which Mr. Stanley could not give over the phone) pertaining to our discussions with the French at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956. I received the impression that the issue applied to a possible United States response to Khrushchev's threats to use "rockets" if the Suez operations were continued.

Apparently the French are currently making use of alleged inconsistencies in the U.S. position at that time in discussions now being held with the State Department. Secretary Dillon, who was Ambassador to France at the time in question, recalls a certain U.S. position which he represented to the French government: the French, on the other hand, claim that Ambassador Alphand in Washington received a different impression from the U.S. State Department. Mr. Dillon recalls writing a memorandum on the subject but such memorandum is not to be found in the State Department files or in the Dulles papers. Mr. Stanley's request is to make a check of President Eisenhower's files to ascertain whether they may be here. He did not, of course, insist on doing it himself and would be delighted for us to do it for him.

I explained to Mr. Stanley that had this request been made while President Eisenhower was still in office, such an arrangement would be easy. However, upon his leaving the Presidency and being succeeded by a new administration of different political persuasion, it is now necessary as a matter of principle to restrict access to the files to those to whom President Eisenhower gives personal permission to check. I indicated somewhat directly to Mr. Stanley that the channel for this permission should not go from him as a junior staff officer to me as another. As procedure I suggested that if the issue is one which truly involves national security (which seems highly doubtful)

Exhibit B
then Secretary McNamara should feel free to telephone President Eisenhower in Palm Desert, California and obtain permission to send a representative to see him to explain exactly the nature of his request. If such request appears legitimate, then President Eisenhower would instruct me to do the required research within the files. Mr. Stanley thought this procedure would be feasible since the item in question is not a "crash" item with respect to time.

I then telephoned President Eisenhower in California at 5 P.M., EST, and advised what had been done. I alerted him that he might be receiving a phone call from Secretary McNamara, although I doubted seriously such would occur. President Eisenhower agreed completely, and expressed some surprise that any agency of the government would attempt to obtain permission to get into his papers through such an indirect approach. I explained that this had been a personal idea of Mr. Stanley's, based on our former association in the White House, and that Mr. Stanley had merely overlooked the requirement for protection of Presidential papers.

John S. D. Eisenhower
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD NIXON, individually and as
former President of the United States

Plaintiff,

v.

C. A. No. 74-1852

ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES,
et al.,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL HENRY NITZE

COUNTY OF ARLINGTON  )
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ) ss:

PAUL HENRY NITZE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I have for thirty-five years been actively involved,
both in and out of government, in the study and conduct of
American foreign and military policy, and have occupied posi-
tions in the Administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S.
Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. John-
son, and Richard M. Nixon.

2. During World War II, my work included service with
the Office of Coordinator of Inter American Affairs, Board of
Economic Warfare, Foreign Economic Administration and as Direc-
tor and then Vice Chairman of the United States Strategic Bomb-
ing Survey. From 1946-1949, I served as Director of the Office
of International Trade Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs and from 1950-1953, as Director of
the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State. From 1961-63, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and subsequently (1963-67) as Secretary of the Navy, and (1967-69) as Deputy Secretary of Defense. From July, 1969 until June, 1974, I served as a member of the United States delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union.

3. Outside of government, I have served as President of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation, as Chairman of the Advisory Council of the School of Advanced International Studies at Washington, D. C. and as a Trustee of Johns Hopkins University.

4. While serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I was responsible to Mr. McNamara for the coordination of U.S. Defense Policy with U.S. Foreign Policy, working with the State Department, the White House, the NSC and the other pertinent parts of the Executive Branch. In addition, President Kennedy had personally asked me to take an active role in certain matters having to do with arms control and with France. In late 1961 and early 1962, one of the difficult national security issues we faced concerned the efforts of the French Government under President DeGaulle to raise doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent, with respect to Soviet threats to the security of Western Europe. Such doubts were invoked to justify the French policy of establishing a national nuclear striking force, termed the "Force de Frappe." A major objective of United
States policy was to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of additional national governments.

5. During the above period, it was alleged by the French Government that, during the Suez crisis in 1956, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev had publicly threatened a nuclear missile strike against French and British cities if the Suez operations were continued, the United States Government had failed to support the French and British. The French alleged that in 1956 the United States Ambassador to France, C. Douglas Dillon, had been personally asked by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Guy Mollet, whether the United States would commit its own intercontinental nuclear force to counter such a Soviet threat against France, even though the situation provoking the crisis was located outside the boundaries to which the NATO Agreement, strictly construed, pertained. The French alleged that the United States had not in 1956 provided firm assurance that its allies could count on the full support of the United States under the circumstances.

6. Mr. Dillon, who in 1961 was serving as Secretary of the Treasury, had told me and others that he had in 1956 given the French Prime Minister firm assurances that the United States nuclear deterrent could be counted upon to support its Western European allies in the face of any nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, including any such threat to France arising from the Suez incident. Although Mr. Dillon recalled sending a reporting telegram to Washington on this subject, it could not be located in the State Department files.
7. There was, of course, no question on the part of myself, or any other concerned officials, as to the accuracy of Secretary Dillon's recollections regarding the statement of the American position given by him to the French Prime Minister in 1956. Nevertheless it appeared desirable to obtain such written records as had been made by our government at the time of the disputed events. As a result, Dr. Timothy Stanley, then serving as my Special Assistant and who had also served as Special Assistant to my predecessor in that office during the closing years of the Eisenhower Administration, was directed to request Secretary Dillon's report on the Suez incident and such other pertinent records of the American position as might be available in former President Eisenhower's papers. As is noted in the affidavit of John S. D. Eisenhower (¶ 23) submitted to the District Court June 30, 1975, on behalf of former President Nixon, and in Exhibit B to Mr. Eisenhower's affidavit, Dr. Stanley telephoned Mr. Eisenhower to request the materials in question from former President Eisenhower's papers. As Mr. Eisenhower indicates in Exhibit B to his affidavit, Dr. Stanley did not insist on making the necessary search of former President Eisenhower's papers himself, but stated to Mr. Eisenhower that it would be acceptable for those in charge of the Eisenhower collection to retrieve the materials.

8. Upon being informed, as is recounted in Mr. Eisenhower's affidavit and Exhibit B thereto, that the materials sought could not be obtained except through a personal request from Secretary McNamara to former President Eisenhower, Dr.
Stanley reported back to me. It is my recollection that I took the matter up with Secretary McNamara and that after some consideration, taking account of the delicacy which then marked relations between the new Administration and the former President, and considering also the need which the new Administration had discovered to make a variety of requests of the former President, including requests for his support on certain important current foreign policy decisions, it was determined not to pursue this matter further. The decision was that, although the question of the credibility of the American deterrent, especially regarding our Western European allies, was of high significance, and although the matter of the American response to Soviet nuclear threats in 1956 bore centrally on this issue, it would nevertheless have to be sufficient to rely upon Secretary Dillon's statement of his recollections, in view of the general importance of minimizing the number of occasions on which the Administration would make a request of former President Eisenhower. Hence, the decision was made to proceed without written record of the American Government's official responses to the issuance of Soviet nuclear threats during the 1956 Suez crisis.

9. I have reviewed the affidavit submitted by Mr. John S. D. Eisenhower in support of former President Nixon and Exhibit B thereto. I note Mr. Eisenhower's observation in Exhibit B to the effect that if the issue "truly involves national security (which seems highly doubtful)," that Secretary McNamara could therefore request of former President Eisenhower
permission to send a representative to him to demonstrate the legitimacy of the request. I would have here to emphasize that the decision not to pursue the matter further was not made because it did not "truly involve national security." Nor did this decision reflect any judgment on our part that it is not essential to preserve written records of major commitments and actions taken in the field of national security policy.

On the contrary, the continuity of government requires that officials have at hand the written record of past commitments and actions taken on behalf of the nation by its highest officials. Access to materials restricted on national security grounds should be confined to officials properly cleared, and to those who properly require such access. But on the basis of my experience, it would be my judgment that it is not in the nation's best interests to require personal intervention of the highest officials, such as the Secretary of Defense, to obtain access to such materials. Nor should access to critical records be conditioned on the outcome of what are in effect negotiations with former chief executives exercising personal dominion over such records.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19 day of July, 1975.

[Signature]

Paul Henry Nitze

[Notary Public]

My Commission expires 5-8-77.